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Matthew M. Hurley 




Although most of us—myself included—tend to treat science as the jurisdiction of 
experimentalists, there are in reality many phases to the scientific treatment of a topic, and many 
varieties of evidence that can be brought to bear in developing a richer understanding of the facets 
of the world that interest us.  What you will find in this work should properly be considered an 
informed hypothesis—a work of theoretical science at the intersection of philosophy, biology, physics, 
and cognitive science.  
The hypothesis I offer is far from the first word on these topics, and even further from 
being the last word.  But it is a hypothesis that I believe has its place near an important inflection 
point within the ages-old discourse about biological and human nature, as well as the physical world 
that serves as their context. 
As of this moment, that hypothesis comes with hundreds of small incompletions and dozens 
of larger ones.  Critics who head into it mining for weaknesses will no doubt be rewarded—they will 
find more ore than they know how to smelt, and I wish them an enjoyable expedition.  But despite 
all its problems, the value in producing a hypothesis of this sort is not in getting it entirely right, nor 
in successfully defending it against all the early criticisms that might be leveled against it.  It is in 
stimulating the thoughts of a new generation of scientists to begin to explore these topics from a 
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In this work I pull together many long-explored ideas on agency, vitality, function, and goal-
directedness in an attempt to explain how the subjective properties of our world arise from its objective 
constituents.  The main ingredients of my theory are: (1) a distinction between comparative and 
evaluative norms, aimed at dividing the philosophical notion of normativity into two separate 
problems; (2) a view of life and vitality as a form of resistance to material disorder (in contrast to 
Schrödinger, who saw them as a form of resistance to energetic disorder); (3) the idea that although no 
organizational pattern in the world has an intrinsic function, certain organizational patterns in the 
world do possess intrinsic goal-directedness; (4) a new mathematical characterization of the 
metaphysical notions of identity and value; (5) a set of distinctions, based on my new view of 
identity and value, that allows different kinds of orderliness in the world to be classified; and finally 
and most importantly, (6) a theory of teleology, rooted in all these ideas, which I believe can 
underpin an eventual science of the subjective. 
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Chapter I 
Purpose:  An Introduction to Teleology 
 
Biology has not so far been able to analyse and paraphrase in precise and exact scientific, i.e. physico-mathematical, 
terms, the really fundamental characteristics of observed life in the full and original meaning of that word: that 
apparent purposiveness and goal-directed character of vital activities which make the distinction between living and non-
living systems in nature one of the most important distinctions Man draws among the objects of his environment: those 
characteristics of observed life which invite us to think of living things as somehow endowed with a soul, as somehow 
capable of personal relationship; those characteristics which invite us to think of living nature as permeated by 
intelligence and purpose, and whose loss we mourn when death occurs. 
 
– Gerd Sommerhoff (1950:1) 
 
The earth is a rare and strange place.  It is energetic and it is dynamic; teeming with life and 
pulsating with industry; seething and swarming with activity and objects that we don’t know to exist 
anywhere else in the universe: not only organisms, but also the products they produce, the husks 
they leave behind, the societies they comprise, and the cultures they sustain.  In all but the most 
remote corners, our planet is saturated; it is steeped and it is sodden . . . it is dripping with 
purposeful items and events.  And yet, in comparison, broad swathes of the rest of the universe 
appear to be barren of this activity and devoid of these objects.  The problem that Sommerhoff 
approached, some sixty-five years ago, goes unexplained still:  Science has not been able to analyze, 
in any precise terms, the fundamental characteristics of observed life—the purposiveness and goal-directed 
character of vital activities that make the distinction between living and non-living systems one of 
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the most important distinctions we can draw.  The goal of the current work is to characterize that 
distinction.   
It turns out, however, to be a rather multifaceted distinction.  One might suggest that the 
core of this work is the issue of subjectivity or agency since it relates to the way subjects or agents come 
to exist in an objective world, to the way a thing (or a pattern1) can transcend the objective nature of 
its physical constitution and come to have a perspective.  One might also say—indeed the title of this 
chapter seems to say—that the focus is what’s called teleology, also known as purposiveness or goal-
directedness.  It is a theory of how some items in our world might be said to be the kind of thing that 
is for (or that exists in order to do) something or other, the kind of thing that serves a function or that 
behaves toward the attainment of goals, the kind of thing that is purposeful.2  The eminent French 
biologist Jacques Monod termed this notion projectivity to highlight the fact that, in some sense, 
organisms transcend objectivity not only through their perspectival subjectivity but moreover 
through their behavior—organisms set themselves incessantly to working on projects (1971).  They do 
something for some reason.  Nothing else in the world comes even close to being so industrious. 
Following Monod’s observation that the class of projective agents maps onto biological 
organisms, one might also say that the core topic here is life itself.  It is a biological thesis . . . one 
that centers not on how the molecular, genetic, physiological, and ecological processes of life work, 
nor on the evolutionary details of how the diverse forms of life have come to be, but more 
specifically on what accounts for their vitality. 
While this may look like a patchwork quilt of concepts, if you read on I think you’ll 
eventually come to conclude, as I have, that the picture is not really pieced together from patches; it 
is a tapestry woven from fibers and the concepts that make up those fibers are so intricately 
																																																								
1 The term “thing” is obviously not well defined and may lead to interpretation that is influenced by an object-
chauvinism that takes material boundaries too seriously.  I will discuss my use of the alternative term “pattern” in 
2 As it turns out, this focus on purposiveness depends also on a deep understanding of existence, and so, the theory is also 
one of ontology—a theory of the kinds of things that can exist in our universe. 
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interlaced that theories of them could not easily be separable into individual theoretical strands.  The 
project of explaining the phenomena described above is, I believe, an all-or-nothing affair (see also 
Deacon’s, 2013, treatment of many of the same phenomena, which he groups together under the 
label “ententional”, though I’ll steer clear of using that term).3 
Some parts of what is at stake here are obvious.  A definition of vitality—or of life, taken 
independently of cell-biological constraints such as nucleic acids, ribosomes, protein synthesis, and 
lipid bilayers—will help us understand what kinds of things could possibly be agents in the universe, 
what we should watch out for when searching for life, and what we should strive for when trying to 
foster it4.  It also will give us a basis for making ethical judgments about how we would like to treat 
various patterns that we may encounter in our world.  A theory of goal-directedness and of the ways 
that goal-directed things achieve their goals will help us understand not only the relationships 
between agents, their bodies, and their behaviors, but also the relationships between agents and their 
artifacts, between ourselves and our technologies, and between ourselves and the artificial 
intelligences that some scientists hope one day to build.  
Other parts of what is at stake may be less obvious at first, but will become clearer in time.  
The more focal topics above are just as intricately interwoven with, and inseparable from, the 
subjects of identity and value, as well as autonomy, cognition and will.  A close look at the first pair (in 
chapters II, IX and X) will provide the footing for our central topics to build upon, while the theory 
																																																								
3 This all-or-nothing attitude also reflects my affinity for the Duhem-Quine thesis of confirmation holism, which claims 
that scientific statements cannot meaningfully be tested absent the context of heaps of other related theoretical claims.  
Empirical work reflects upon the predictive power not of an individual narrow hypothesis, but of a complex, intertwined 
network of related theoretical pieces.  And because of this, theories should be understood as being (allegedly) 
explanatory not in isolation, but in relation only to broader theoretical frameworks (Duhem 1954; Quine 1951).  Narrow 
scientific hypotheses may be simpler to work with but, no matter how clearly a set of experiments might seem to answer 
them, they are more likely to be misleading precisely because they are disconnected from a broader context of 
relationships. 
4 In, say, artificial life and artificial intelligence endeavors as well as in NASA’s and SETI’s search for (signs of) life 
beyond earth. 
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I’ll advocate for those central topics (in chapters VIII through XI) will have broad implications for 
the latter trio. 
Currently, the issues in the collection of italicized terms scattered across the past few pages 
are all topics of philosophy.  A primary goal of the current work is to nudge them all closer to being 
topics in the realm of science.  In 1944, Erwin Schrödinger noticed, much as Sommerhoff did, the 
vast difference in our abilities to explain the behaviors of animate and inanimate matter.  
Schrödinger suggested that there should be laws—laws of purpose (or of subjectivity, or of life), just 
as elegant as many of the laws of physics—that can provide a foundation for a quantitative study of 
life and cognition (Schrödinger 1944; see also Bohr 1933; T. Nagel 2012; Oparin 1964; but for 
reductionist dissent, see e.g. Schaffner 1967 and also, despite his observing the projectivity of 
organisms, Monod 1971).  Nowadays the idea that such laws might exist seems to be viewed with 
general disregard but I hope this work will be part of the path toward showing that, in this regard, 
Schrödinger was right5. 
  
																																																								
5 Schrödinger (1944) also suggested that the laws to be discovered would center on what he called the “aperiodic 
crystal”—the chromosome—that at the time had yet to be illuminated as being what we now call DNA (Watson and 
Crick 1953).  Kauffman (1997) argues against this aspect of Schrödinger’s view of life.  On Kauffman’s view it is not that 
DNA does not play a role in life, but only that the behavior of DNA (and also of natural selection) is not the central 
phenomenon producing vital behavior.  In fact, he offers a compelling explanation of how self-organizing autocatalytic 





It is the all-pervasive presence of this apparent purposiveness in life processes, and the resulting possibility of thinking of 
living systems in terms of the ‘goals’ towards which their activities are directed, which is mainly responsible for the 
radical difference between the ways we think about living and non-living things. 
 
—Gerd Sommerhoff (1950:5) 
 
The notion of goals or of being goal-directed is one of the central themes in this work and, 
whether it was by chance or by necessity, it happens to be the germ from which my exploration of 
the rest grew.  Thus it seems appropriate (to me) to begin by characterizing goals and goal-
directedness both in terms of our basic intuitions about the subject and in terms of the most widely 
agreed-upon philosophical reflections on the subject.  These topics will all be revisited in more 




The concept of goals is often taken to be synonymous with aims, ends, objectives, intentions, and 
purposes, among other things.  It seems to be the result that is important to goals . . . at least certainly 
more so than the means, which can vary widely.  But are ends truly what goals are?  And in any event, 
what are ends? 
Certainly no moment in time is privileged or exceptional in any way.  We could say that the 
“end” of the day is at midnight, but that choice was arbitrary and historical.  It was defined out of 
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convenience and could as well have been sunset, or sunrise, or even “bedtime”6.  Few other objects 
or events have any reference to points in time in their specification, but those that do are also 
chosen by discrimination of time’s relevance to our interests.  A race, though timed, comes to an 
end when the judges deem that the finish line has been crossed regardless of when it happens or 
how long it takes.7   
It is more common to consider an end to be a state in a physical system.  For instance, one 
might want to say that a marble coming to rest at the bottom of a half-spherical bowl or a pendulum 
bob coming to rest directly below its pivot point is an end.  But what is actually ending when such 
rest is achieved?  In most cases, the pendulum bob or marble are still vibrating to some small 
degree—being repeatedly perturbed away from the rest position by some forces and then coming 
back to (something that resembles) rest.  In all cases, the bob or the marble is hastily circling the 
center of the earth at up to perhaps a thousand miles an hour8 and the earth itself is zipping around 
the sun at an absurd rate, itself dwarfed by the nearly half million miles per hour at which the 
marble, earth and sun all together make their way around the galactic core of the Milky Way.  The 
determination of states such as “being at rest” requires interest-dependent (that is to say, subjective) 
judgments.  Their definitions are formal prescriptions—they are based, firstly, upon boundaries 
where we choose to divide a continuous variable (such as a rate of motion) into discrete categories 
and, secondly, upon a frame of reference with respect to which the variable can be measured for 
comparison against the threshold (for instance, rate of motion with respect to the room, but not 
with respect to the moon or the sun).  
																																																								
6 Or it could have been based instead on the apparent sidereal day, which, though in some sense more “universal”, is a 
far less convenient schedule to live by, since sunshine has biological consequences. 
7 In a similar vein, the painter Rembrandt is often quoted as having remarked, “A painting is finished when the artist says 
it is finished.” 
8 Depending upon its latitude. 
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An alternative description of the pendulum or the marble-in-bowl system can be given in 
terms of dynamical systems theory—the mathematics that describes the qualitative behaviors of 
physical systems in terms of the differential equations representing the forces that govern the flow 
of those systems.  In either of our scenarios, the marble or the pendulum bob is moving in the flow 
of the dynamics created by a number of factors, including the gravitational field, the damping 
friction of air resistance, and the other molecular forces of the various parts of the pendulum or of 
the bowl and the marble (e.g. friction, tension, torsion, and so on).  As a result of all these factors, 
there exists what dynamical systems theorists call an “attractor”.  An attractor is a mathematical 
object that represents the eventual position of items in the flow of the system.  A point near the 
bottom of the bowl is an attractor for the marble, and a point below the pivot is an attractor for the 
pendulum bob.  In other cases attractors are not points but instead circles or ellipses (for instance, in 
the case of a stable orbit) or some other more complicated or chaotic patterns (such as the now-
famous double-lobed Lorenz attractor).   
An interesting consequence of this view is that, even when an item is apparently “at rest”, it 
is still behaving identically within the flow of the system as it was before it came to “rest”—it is 
flowing towards the attractor in the system on a pathway defined by the equations (ultimately, the 
forces) that govern the flow.  This behavior—flowing—is never-ending unless the system itself is 
perturbed (the string released, the bowl tipped over, or the local gravitational environment altered) 
and, even then, flowing continues; it just continues towards a different attractor defined by the 
parameters of the new system.  In other words, motion may appear to end, but flow is endless; 
“staying there” is just a special case of moving.  What has actually ended when a pendulum or 
marble appears to come to rest is only subjectively perceived motion—motion within the range of 
sensitivity to which a particular perceptual system is tuned.   
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The conclusion I want us to draw here is that objective “ends” do not exist in our world.  
Flow is eternal and no state, defined in terms of either time or space, can count as an end without 
subjective determination of one sort or another.  The hope of some modern thinkers—to disguise 
the long-noticed subjectivity of goals in the clothes of objective ends—cannot succeed if ends 




Whether or not there can be an objective definition of ends, goals are not usually seen to be 
merely resultant physical states in the sense implied by the marble-in-bowl or pendulum examples9.  
Today, in the distant wake of Newton’s (1687) publication of the laws of motion and universal 
gravitation, most scientists and even most laypeople don’t believe (or even wonder whether) marbles 
or pendulums are goal-directed.  The laws of physics sufficiently explain the behavior of these non-
biological objects and so no question remains for the notion of goal-directedness to answer10.  
Physical states or attractors may be seen as ends (though, see above), but those ends are not, in and 
of themselves, goals. 
Instead, we usually identify as a goal only a particular kind of end that has some relationship 
to an agent or a subject.  Certainly this is the case with canonical goals—our own human goals—
wherein we are the agents for whom certain ends become goals . . . the subjects who either intend or 
benefit from the attainment of those particular ends (Bedau 1992a, 1992b).  The notion easily 
generalizes also to organisms as agents who similarly appear either to intend or at least to benefit 
																																																								
9 Mayr (1974) labels phenomena of this sort “teleomatic” because by approaching attractors automatically such systems 
seem to be end-directed without being goal-directed. 
10 See also Newton’s own “Hypothesis I” of his “Rules for Reasoning in Natural Philosophy”, discussed on p. 158 of 
this manuscript.  
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from certain ends (though we’ll delve into the question of intention and of the representation of 
ends, shortly).   
So we might say that a particular person had the goal of getting a marble to stop at a 
particular position (say, in a game of marbles) but few if any of us (ever since Galileo, Newton, and 
Laplace) would say that a marble itself has the goal of reaching the bottom of the bowl or that a 
pendulum bob is goal-directed toward coming to rest below its pivot.  It requires a subjective view, 
or an agent, to turn a particular end into a goal (although currently we do not know how).  So not 
only is a subjective viewpoint required to convert states into ends but it also takes a subjective 
perspective to transmute ends into goals.   
The fact that goals are unavoidably subjective is not a threat to an underlying objectivist view 
of the world, as long as the status of being a goal-directed agent is somehow defined objectively, and 
then subjective goals are definable in terms of such agents.  If this is the case, then subjectivity arises 
unproblematically from the subject.  The question that remains, and that lies at the heart of my 
project here, is:  What defines a subject or an agent?  In the next chapter I’ll begin to answer that 
question by introducing the notions of identity and value, which, together, I call the “fundaments of 
subjectivity” and which I take to underlie agency.  It seems to me that any theory of goal-
directedness worth its salt will be based in an understanding of agency founded on precise, physically 
justifiable, explanations of these fundaments of subjectivity.  In Part II, I will attempt to give a 
version of those physically justifiable explanations. 






About the Future 
 
Another thing about the notion of goals and of being goal-directed that has given no end of 
headaches to centuries of philosophers and biologists is the fact that these finalistic11 concepts refer 
to events or states of affairs that have not yet come to pass.  Goals and goal-directed behaviors are, 
in a sense, about the future. 
The problem, of course, is that this seems to allow that future events or states (the goals) 
may somehow direct current behaviors, providing the paradoxical concern—called “backwards 
causation”—that something in the future can cause what is happening now or what has already 
happened in the past (see e.g., Braithwaite 1954; Mayr 1974; Spinoza 1677).  If drinking your blood 
causes a mosquito’s proboscis to puncture your skin—if we can only explain the (earlier) puncturing 
in terms of the (later) feeding—then causation appears not to work only in the way that physics 
would have us believe.   
The reaction to this seemingly unnatural, anti-causal circularity has been twofold.  First, it is 
usually pointed out that, in the case of human goals, it is not actually the future state but the mental 
representation of the future state that causes behavior.  It’s the thought that counts.  Since a 
representation occurs prior to behavior, it can produce that behavior through forward-causal means, 
and so there no longer seems to be anything “backwards” to worry about.  I will argue below that 
this line of reasoning, while reasonable, is nonetheless oversimplifying, firstly because it ignores the 
nonhuman remainder of goal-directed creatures, and secondly, because the conscious, cognitive 
goals of humans that do explicitly represent future states are subservient to the same kind of 
																																																								
11 The word “final”, in its teleological sense, means “end-related” and so the derived term “finalism” is more or less 
synonymous with “teleology”; it implies a belief that some things are done in order to achieve an end.  We’ll trace the 
history of this terminology in Chapter III. 
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representation-free12, goal-directed nature that exists in those nonhuman organisms.  For instance, I 
may have the consciously represented goal of baking brownies this afternoon, but that ambition is 
subordinate to the involuntary, instinctive, and unrepresented goals of satisfying my hunger and my 
sweet tooth.  I’ll talk again about representation (and about baking brownies) below, but we can 
supplement the conclusion here with the observation that we humans also often perform fully 
automatic, involuntary goal-directed behaviors where representation plays not a subordinate role, 
but no role at all.  For instance, we don’t think about or represent digestion of our latest meal before 
doing it, though the act is goal-directed toward the production of usable catabolites (biological 
building blocks).  It is clear then that representation is not as central as it may at first seem, even to 
human goal-directedness.  Ultimately our account of goal-directedness and our elimination of 
backwards causation will need to be the same in the case both of psychological and of non-
psychological organisms, and it will need to be given in terms agnostic of mental representations13. 
The second reaction to backwards causation that modern theorists have had is simply to 
discount the existence of goals and goal-directedness in non-psychological biology.  The future can’t 
cause the past and so (the thinking goes) we can only describe what happens in most of biology as 
being seemingly or apparently but not truly goal-directed (see chapter VII).  The mosquito is not 
puncturing your skin in order to drink your blood; it is only puncturing your skin and then drinking 
your blood.  The fat-tailed dwarf lemur is not accumulating fat deposits in its tail now in order to use 
that fat to fuel its body during hibernation (Dausmann et al. 2004); it is only accumulating fat in its 
																																																								
12 The term “representation” is controversial in cognitive science, especially when used to claim that some living or 
cognitive agent lacks representation in some way.  To clarify (but not to enter on either side of that debate), my use here 
of the term “representation-free” is meant to denote situations in which I believe the agent being analyzed is not 
consciously aware of any representation, whether or not representations exist in it. 
13 However, this is not to say that the goal-directedness is not represented structurally in some manner; it is only to say 
that it is not represented to the individual.  If a suitably knowledgeable observer, armed with a sophisticated enough 
theory of life and cognition, were to view the structure of that individual, it might in principle be possible to “read off” 
the goals of an individual, regardless of whether that individual was aware of them. 
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tail first and then burning those calories during hibernation.  As Pittendrigh (1958) put it similarly: the 
turtle is not coming ashore in order to lay its eggs; it is only coming ashore and then laying its eggs. 
The problem of backwards causation is a serious one and so we must choose one of three 
paths.  Either (1) we follow the popular modern scientific tradition and take goal-directedness to be 
merely apparent or (2) we awkwardly alter our theories of physics and causation and take goal-
directedness to be backwardly causal (despite nothing else in the world appearing to be) or (3) we 
find an alternative way to conceive of goal-directedness that does not contradict physical causation.  
Later, I will advocate a view along the lines of this third path.  Rather than eschew backwards 




The kind of ends that we call goals are often conceived of in terms of their use as a 
subspecies of reasons or explanations.  When we think about a fly that we see bouncing against a 
window, we make sense of this behavior in terms of the reason the fly is doing so.  The question 
that comes to mind most immediately is “why” or “to what end is the fly doing that?” or “what is the 
fly doing that for?”  Trying to describe the random-seeming pattern of persistent bounces doesn’t 
make sense except in the light of it being done for some reason.  Even if we asked the seemingly 
more objective question “what is the fly doing?” the best answer still would be one that provided 
not just the literally requested description—what Dennett (2014) calls a “process narrative” (e.g. 
“bouncing repeatedly against the window”)—but also a reason in terms of an end (e.g. “trying to get 
outside”).   
What our curiosity is really about, and what “trying to get outside” really answers, is the 
what-for question.  We consider it an appropriate question to ask because a process narrative does 
	 13	
not seem to fully explain the fly’s behavior14.  Of course a process narrative can explain such systems 
as the marble-in-bowl because the “why” in “why does the marble do that?” only goes as far as 
“how-come”, never leading all the way to “what-for”15,16.  The only thing we find ourselves curious 
about is how come the marble goes to the bottom of the bowl, and so we can be satisfied by an 
answer that does not refer to a goal . . . an answer such as “gravity pulls the marble down, 
momentum carries it back up, and this would continue eternally if it were not for friction damping 
the momentum over time”.    
Many theorists have noted the distinction between mechanistic, how-come reasons and 
teleological, what-for reasons (Ayala 1970; Brandon 1981; Cummins 2002; Dennett 2014, 2017; Haig 
2013; Mayr 1961; see also Plato’s Phaedo and Timaeus, and Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics), and a 
number of those attempting to account for aspects of teleology have framed their discussion in 
terms of the question “what is it for?” (e.g., Bedau 1992b; Cummins 2002; Kitcher 1993; Wright 
1973).  However, as I will explore in chapter IV, the many possible interpretations of the term “for” 




On the face of it, the issue of representation is important to goal-directedness, at least in 
terms of archetypical, human goals.  In most cases we need to think about what we are going to do 
before doing it (van Leeuwen 2016).  Could you succeed at, or even have, the goal of buying eggs 
																																																								
14 Notice that I am not saying quite what about its behavior the process narrative doesn’t explain.  That is the job for the 
entire dissertation, not just the introductory chapter. 
15 Some common linguistic signals that indicate we are looking at a what-for claim are when an explanation has in it the 
terms “for the sake of ” , “for the purpose of ” , or “in order to”.  Sometimes, “in order to” is even shortened simply to 
“to”:  What did you open the window for?  I did it to get some fresh air.  In any such case the explanation is being given 
in terms of some end that presumably explains the behavior or the existence of the item in question. 
16 Douglas Hofstadter has pointed out to me that some languages (for instance, Russian) have two different words that 
translate to the English term “why”, the meanings of which correspond to the “what-for”–“how-come” distinction. 
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without having imagined buying eggs?  We plan our projects, plan our days, plan our careers, and 
plan our retirement, and to the degree that we plan well, we achieve our goals17.  But as I began to 
discuss earlier, many human goal-directed behaviors are neither mediated by nor ultimately goal-
directed because of representational thought.  For example, although representational reasoning 
usually plays some role in the process of grabbing a snack from the cupboard, it is not those ideas 
but rather our hunger (or perhaps a sociocultural codification based ultimately in a biological history 
of hunger) that drives us to snacking in the first place.  Representation, rather than being necessary for 
goal-directedness, may instead be just one particularly effective way for an agent that is goal-directed to 
accomplish its goals.   
Still, it is common for thinkers to differentiate representational goal-directedness and non-
representational goal-directedness, and to insist that the difference is a significant one.  Most writers 
carve up what-for reasons into two further categories.  I am conflicted about employing the terms 
“conscious” or “cognitive” or “intentional” to sketch this boundary18, but those are the kinds of 
terms that are usually used:  There are some things that are done, or that are there, for the sake of 
some conscious, intentional, human goal and some things that are done or are there for the sake of 
organismal well-being.  Let’s look at some examples. 
In the first category, a (human) behavior may have been performed for the sake of attaining 
some end (eggs are bought in order to bring home eggs with which to cook); or an artifact may have 
been created for the sake of attaining some end (a basket is made in order to be able to carry eggs 
home from the market); or an artifact may be employed for the sake of attaining some end (the 
basket is used in order to carry eggs home from the market).  In all these cases, we understand these 
																																																								
17 And to the degree that our goals are realistic, and with a bit of luck, and so on . . . 
18 My hesitation stems, firstly, from a reluctance to limit terms such as “cognitive” and “intentional” only to humans, 
and, secondly, from a sense that the term “conscious” is not well-defined. 
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ends as having been entertained in the mind—represented—prior to the performance that brought 
them about. 
In the second category, a (nonhuman) behavior may have been performed for the sake of 
attaining some end (a nest is rearranged by a chicken in order to cushion the egg that is about to be 
laid); a product of an organism may have been created for the sake of attaining some end (a nest is 
first constructed in order to safely hold a clutch of eggs); a feature of an organism may exist for the 
sake of attaining some end (the oviduct and cloaca exist in order to aid in the careful release of eggs 
from the uterus of the hen into the nest); or an organism may go through some developmental 
process for the sake of attaining some end (eggs are formed in the uterus of a hen in order to 
reproduce).  Unlike the cases in human teleology, the hen does not think about or plan the various 
components of her process of egg production and care19. 
André Ariew, following David Charles (1995), categorized the examples of teleology found 
in Aristotle’s writing along lines such as these.  (I should note that I don’t mean to single out Ariew 
for any particular reason, except that he, nicely and concisely, summarizes a number of common 
impressions about the relationship between teleology and representation.)  While Aristotle himself 
found the teleological similarities between humans and other living beings more compelling than the 
differences20, Ariew focuses on those differences. 
 
[Agency-centered teleology] and [Teleology pertaining to natural organisms] are 
distinct notions of teleology:  Aristotle should have used two words to distinguish 
them.  Agent-specific teleology . . . is purposive, rational, and intentional, and 
																																																								
19 Well, perhaps this is debatable in the case of rearranging the nest; we might attribute intention to the hen at some level 
of that process (though it is debatable as to whether that is a correct attribution).  But there are plenty of other examples 
of ‘instinctual’ behaviors in nature to which we wouldn’t attribute intention, especially as we move to non-vertebrate 
branches of the tree of life.  Even in humans, the reflexive eye-blink is an unconscious and unplanned behavior that is 
nonetheless end-directed (toward keeping foreign objects out of the eye). 
20 “It is absurd to suppose that ends are not present [in natural organisms simply] because we do not see an agent 
deliberating.” (Physics 2.8) 
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represents an external evaluation.  The goal is the object of the agent’s desire or 
choice. . . . Teleology pertaining to natural organisms is distinct: non-purposive 
(though seemingly so), non-rational, non-intentional, and immanent—that is an inner 
principle of change.  The goal is not an object of any agent’s desire. (Ariew 2002:9) 
 
Ariew does call both by the name “teleology”, but it seems to me he doesn’t really mean that, since 
for him teleology pertaining to nonhuman living beings (he calls them “natural organisms”) is non-
purposive.  It’s just similar to teleology but . . . well, as he says, “distinct”. 
I can see why many people take these to be distinct notions, but I am inclined to agree with 
Aristotle:  While there is a distinction, I don’t think it is a teleologically relevant one.  The two 
categories are similarly directed towards ends, and differ only in whether representation plays a role 
in their means.  A deeper review of Ariew’s fourfold account of the differences (purposive vs. non-
purposive, rational vs. non-rational, intentional vs. non-intentional, and external vs. immanent) will 
help to clarify what I mean.  As I see it, the four distinctions all come down to one thing:  whether 
or not thought plays a role in the means by which a goal is achieved. 
First, Ariew deems human teleology purposive, and that of other natural organisms non-
purposive.  There are two ways to interpret the word “purposive” in this claim.  If we take it to mean 
something along the lines of “for a purpose” or “serving a purpose”, then Ariew means that the 
behaviors of non-human organisms are not for the sake of anything.  I find that difficult to agree 
with and Ariew doesn’t defend that claim, but, to me, both the human and non-human-organism 
cases appear equally purposive in this sense, a point of view I’ll examine more deeply in Chapter 
VII.  We can locate a more defensible distinction if we take Ariew’s “purposive” to mean something 
along the lines of “on purpose” or “intended”.  In other words, if this interpretation is right, Ariew 
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is telling us that human teleological items and events, unlike those of other organisms, are 
preconceived in the mind. 
Second, Ariew calls human teleology rational, and that of other natural organisms non-rational.  
But this is much the same distinction as the previous one.  What he is saying is that reasoning and 
planning go into human goals, and not into those of other organisms.  The reason behind human 
behaviors and artifacts has been thought out, while the reason behind those of other organisms has 
not. 
Third, Ariew calls human teleology intentional, and that of other natural organisms non-
intentional.  The common interpretation of the word “intentional” differs from the philosopher’s 
interpretation; however, on either interpretation we end up with roughly the same distinction here.  
Under the common interpretation, Ariew’s “intentional” again means quite the same thing: intended, 
or preconceived.  And if he means it in the philosopher’s sense, then he is saying that human 
teleology is rooted in some mental representation of the world or of the goal.  Still, though, we are 
focused only on the fact that human goal-directedness is preconceived in the mind. 
Lastly, Ariew labels the teleology of human artifacts and behaviors as being mediated by 
external evaluation while that of other organisms is immanent, or internally derived.  But what 
exactly does this mean?  The “external evaluation” that Ariew says is required for human teleology 
means that the judgment of whether or not a behavior or an artifact serves a purpose or fulfills a 
goal occurs in the human mind, rather than in the behavior or the artifact itself.  A knot has a 
purpose just when it helps to affix some item the way a person wants it to—an evaluation made in 
that person’s mind and thus “external” to the knot.  On the other hand, the parts of organisms are 
purposive by their nature and have no need of an external judge to ensure that they are.  As we saw 
with the previous three distinctions, the human side of this one is set apart by the role of the mind.  
We are looking at four ways to describe the same characteristic:  The teleological aspects of human 
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behaviors and artifacts comes from a representation of some sort in the human mind, while the 
teleological aspects of non-human organisms’ behaviors, products, and processes do not. 
Paring down Ariew’s distinction like this leaves me with a different view.  As I see it, the 
distinction between what he calls “agent-specific teleology” and “teleology pertaining to natural 
organisms” is a difference primarily in terms of what means each group employs to achieve their 
goals—the human version using representation, among other tools, as those means.  But both 
human teleology and the teleology of other organisms seem to me to be goal-directed in the same way:  
there is no fundamental difference here in terms of whether or not the behaviors of humans or 
other organisms are done “in order to” achieve something or “for the sake of ”  something.  The 
only difference is whether or not the goals have been represented in a human mind along the way.  
End-directed items and activities that have not been planned by a psychological agent are 
nonetheless end-directed. 
Dennett (2014) makes the point vividly with a pair of examples. 
 
Elizabeth Marshall Thomas imagines that dogs enjoy a wise understanding of their 
own ways:  “For reasons known to dogs but not to us, many dog mothers won’t 
mate with their sons.” (1993, 76).  Nonsense. There is no more reason to think dogs 
know the reason than that we know the reason why we yawn. There probably is a 
reason, but we don’t know it yet, and it doesn’t stop us from yawning. Probably she 
means something much milder and apparently defensible: she means that we don’t 
know what the discriminated feature is that triggers dog mothers’ reluctance to mate 
with their sons.  Well, but we can find out by doing experiments. The first and 
simplest is to isolate a male puppy from its mother as soon as it is feasible, raise it 
elsewhere, and return it and see what happens. Will she recognize it? If so, the 
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discriminated feature is very probably an odor. There is a reason why that odor 
provokes that aversion, but dogs don’t know that reason. (Dennett 2014:56) 
 
When a low-nesting bird leads the predator away from her nestlings by doing a 
distraction display, she is making a convincing sham of a broken wing, creating the 
tempting illusion of an easy supper for the observing predator, but she need not 
understand this clever rationale. (ibid:57) 
 
Dennett’s argument is that reasons (and goals) exist whether or not there is someone (or something) 
that represents those reasons (or goals) (see also Aristotle Physics II.8 for an early version of this 
argument). We may or may not know what purpose something has been done for, or created for, or 
is used for, but that doesn’t mean the thing is not for that purpose.  And, furthermore, we usually 
can—through scientific inquiry—eventually come to understand the purpose. 
The female dog has no interest in mating with her son most probably because that would 
increase the likelihood of genetic and developmental malfunction in her offspring, in the same way 
that inbreeding causes such problems in human lineages, but the dog doesn’t know—and doesn’t 
need to know—that this is why.  She simply has no interest in doing it.   
As I argued earlier, although humans are largely aware of their goals, there is an important 
level at which humans, just like dogs and low-nesting birds, are not at all aware of the goals that 
motivate them.  If you ask me why I went to the grocer’s, I will tell you I went because I wanted to 
buy eggs.  And if you inquire further to what end I desired eggs, I will say it is because I intend to 
bake brownies.  And if you inquire further still as to what end I have in mind in baking those 
brownies, the answer will be “to fulfill my hunger and my sweet tooth and my chocoholic tendency, 
and maybe to please a friend as well”.  Eventually though, no matter which of my behaviors you 
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inquire about, my responses will bottom out in emotional descriptions of one sort or another.  And 
if you inquire further to what end I have those emotional incitements that cause me to represent a 
goal and then to do work in order to follow through on that goal, I will not be able to answer you 
except in terms of theory.  I will no longer be able to say what I was thinking—what I was 
representing in order to achieve my goal—and instead I will have to resort to a description that 
matches our descriptions of nonhuman teleology.  In the worst case, I will simply have to say, much 
as we surmise the answer from the dog or the low-nesting bird would be, “I don’t know; I just want 
it21.”  Ultimately, human goals are just like other organisms’ non-psychological goals; they are “for 
the sake of self-preservation or preservation of the species” or “for the sake of the organism”, as 
Ariew says of “teleology pertaining to natural organisms” (2002)22.  Intentional teleology is teleology 
pertaining to natural organisms, and the reason is straightforward: intentional agents, such as 
humans, are natural organisms23. 
 
Standards 
    
Goals, whatever they turn out to be, seem to come part and parcel with standards of 
achievement, or “norms of performance”, as they are sometimes called.  If the goal is to win the 
race, one must make it across the finish line before other competitors do.  If the goal is to get home 
before the rain sets in, one needs to be dry upon arrival in the foyer. The distinction of whether one 
																																																								
21 In re-reading Douglas Hofstadter’s (2007) I Am a Strange Loop, ten years after having first read it, I was surprised to 
find that the idea expressed in the above paragraph inadvertently, but quite closely, mirrors page 96 of that work. 
22 Well, it is actually a fair bit more complicated than this first approximation admits.  Trouble cases that we can 
eventually analyze include some seemingly counterproductive but occasionally real human goals, such as altruism, 
celibacy and suicide.  An explanation of these cases will have to wait until after we have a theory. 
23 This conclusion might give some readers pause.  One concern might center on what we should then make of artificial 
intelligences.  Might they fail to be intentional simply because they are not natural organisms?  I don’t think that 
inference follows.  I borrowed the term “natural organism” from Ariew’s text, but a more fitting term would be “living 
beings”.  What it means to be a living being, to be alive, is still up in the air and will be addressed later in the dissertation.  
But my answer to the question regarding artificial intelligences is:  To the extent that machines can be alive (and I think 
they can) they will also be able to have intentions . . . 
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is then dry or not is the crucial element that determines whether one has achieved one’s goal.  At 
least part of what it means to “have a goal” is to have a “stick” by which to measure a performance. 
Philosophers use the term “normative” to refer to circumstances in which norms or 
standards somehow apply.  The difference is often put in terms of the “is/ought distinction” 
describing the way some judgments in the world are about how things actually are, while normative 
judgments are about how things ought to be (Hume 1739).  Normative claims compare an object or an 
event with some type of expectation, and since the measuring sticks that accompany goals play the 
role of those expectations, goal-directedness is inherently normative.  One of the central quandaries 
of teleology lies in finding a natural, objective basis for this normativity.  Where do norms come 
from?  What justifies our saying that something in the world ought to measure up in some way or 
other?   
The theory presented later relies on a distinction between two kinds of norms that are worth 
describing now.  The first kind is what can be called comparative norms, and while these norms appear 
to be objective, they are not necessarily associated with goals.  For instance, the dwarf planet Ceres 
ought to continue along its orbit around the sun tomorrow according to the norm set by its having 
taken that path every day for thousands, if not millions of years now.  We simply compare Ceres’ 
performance tomorrow to its previous performances, but whether or not it continues is neither 
good nor bad; it simply does or it doesn’t.  Similarly, if all the river rocks that make their way a 
certain distance downstream from a mountaintop are less than seven inches in diameter, then we can 
compare a new rock arriving in that location to that normative distribution.  The new rock ought to 
fit in the category, although, once again, whether or not it does is not an evaluative matter.  
Comparisons of this sort are norms because the class of comparable items serves as the measuring 
stick, but since that measuring stick is mere similarity, comparative norms have no subjective 
consequences.  The reason we say they ought to do something or other—the reason we expect them to 
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perform in a particular way—is only because the similarity in their prior circumstances leads us to 
predict, by induction, a similarity in their outcomes.  
The other major class of norm is what can be called consequential or evaluative norms.  I’ll use 
the latter term.  Evaluative norms are not simply measured with respect to previous performances.  
We might say that “you ought to stay out of the sun to avoid getting a sunburn” or “we ought to use 
a bucket of ice to keep the fish we catch cool”.  But the point is not only that you ought to stay out 
of the sun because staying out of the sun has avoided sunburns in the past; that (merely 
comparative) claim doesn’t capture the spirit of the “ought” in this circumstance.  You ought to stay 
out of the sun because sunburns are bad for you—because you don’t want to get sunburned.  The 
claim is evaluative.  Similarly, it might be true that previously used buckets of ice have kept previous 
fish cool, but that comparative norm would make more sense out of the claim “a bucket of ice 
ought to keep the fish cool”.  The claim that “we ought to use a bucket of ice to keep the fish cool” 
depends on the evaluative norm that keeping the fish cool is good.  The stick we are measuring by is 
whether or not the fish will stay fresh (and thus edible) until we cook them. 
Both evaluative and comparative judgments are normative in that they require a judgment 
against some kind of measuring stick, but for evaluative norms, the measuring stick is defined with 
respect to some kind of subjective evaluation (see also Millikan 200124).  We saw earlier that goal-
directedness is inherently subjective; I will argue later that this fact can be explained in terms of a 
proper theory of evaluative norms.  I am not the first to suggest this (see e.g. Bedau 1992; 
McLaughlin 2001; van Parijs 1981); however, of the previous theorists who base their work 
somehow in value, only McLaughlin (2001) offers a theory of what value is and, although I think he 
is partly on the right path, I don’t think the theory he arrives at has gone quite far enough. 
 
																																																								
24 Millikan makes roughly the same distinction as I am here, but she takes the opposite view that teleology is rooted in 
comparative, not evaluative norms. 
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Perseverance and Plasticity 
 
What gives us the impression that something is goal-directed?  When we watch a cat trying 
to catch a mouse, or a fly bouncing against a window, or a person throwing a basketball toward a 
hoop, what is it about their efforts that compels us straightaway to characterize the behavior as 
striving?  In other words, if we are to give a theory of goal-directedness, what observations will the 
theory cover?  What objects or activities in the world will fall under its purview?  A culturally 
intersubjective category—one that has a commonly understood term such as “goal-directed” to label 
it—will automatically come with some intuitions about what does or does not fit in the category.  
We all know that the cat, the fly, and the basketball player are goal-directed, but what observable 
phenomena are our minds latching onto when we make such judgments? 
One suggestion that has been made repeatedly is that goal-directed items demonstrate both 
perseverance and plasticity (Braithewaite 1953; Nagel 1977a; Russell 1945; Sommerhoff 1969; Wright 
1968)25. (Most authors use the term “persistence” instead of “perseverance”, but I must switch 
vocabulary here to avoid causing confusion since the word “persistence”, used in a slightly different 
sense, will play an important theoretical role in the theory I describe later.)  Nagel puts it as follows:  
 
One feature is the plasticity of such processes—that is, the goal of such processes 
can generally be reached by the system following alternative paths or starting from 
different initial positions. The second feature is the [perseverance] of such 
processes—that is, the system is maintained in its goal-directed behavior as a result 
of changes occurring in the system that compensate for any disturbances taking place 
																																																								
25 See also Bedau (1998) who presents a theory of life as “supple adaptation”, which he says is teleological, “not to be 
equated with natural selection”, and which he describes in terms that have a fair bit in common with the notion of 
plasticity, albeit at the level of a population rather than at the level of an individual.   
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(provided these are not too great) either within or external to the system, 
disturbances which, were there no compensating changes elsewhere, would prevent 
the realization of the goal. These features can be regarded as identifying marks for 
ascertaining whether a process does indeed have a goal, and if so what it is. (Nagel 
1977a:272) 
 
I cite Nagel in particular because he concludes his description of these features carefully by calling 
them “identifying marks”26. Recognizing perseverance and plasticity in the behavior of an object or 
organism might help us identify goal-directedness, but such identification is not foolproof, and 
Nagel recognizes this27.  The pendulum and the marble in the bowl, for instance, each carry both 
marks—they are plastic, in that they can be started from a large number of initial positions and still 
run to the same “end state”, and they are perseverant in that moderate perturbations will not sway 
them from their ultimate course—but nonetheless neither system is typically seen as being goal-
directed (see also Bedau 1992a). 
Something else is going on in our minds when we intuitively exclude the pendulum and the 
marble in the bowl from the category of goal-directedness.  The division between perseverant and 
plastic behaviors that are goal-directed and those that are not appears to be similar to the division 
between “ends” that are the result of goal-directedness and those that are not.  There is a qualitative 
difference between these categories.  Bedau suggests the distinguishing factor is value—whether or 
not something potentially benefits from achievement of the goal—and I think he is spot on, but, as 
I said in the previous subsection, a deeper analysis of that concept will have to wait until later 
chapters.  Whether or not we can find a more consistently applicable theory of goal-directedness, it 
																																																								
26 A term by which Nagel means “characteristics that are present commonly enough to be used for identification, even if 
they are not defining characteristics.” 
27 Wright, on the other hand, takes these marks more seriously, saying, “What is essential to the teleology of a system is 
the plasticity of its behavior and its persistence towards a goal” (Wright 1968:222, emphasis original). 
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is worth wondering why perseverance and plasticity characterize it at all.  That is to say, why are 
these qualities commonly and intuitively associated with goal-directedness?  I will try to address this 
question near the end of the dissertation.  
 
An Ambiguity in the Interpretation of “Teleology” 
 
When we speak of, or theorize about, purposes or teleology or goal-directedness, there are 
two main themes that we might be speaking of that overlap under certain interpretations but that 
can be seen under other interpretations as entirely distinct.  Confusion between these themes may 
muddle up both modern conversations and reviews of historical debates, and so it will be useful to 
recognize the potential distinction between these themes before setting out.   
The first meaning of “teleology” refers, at a grand scale, to the purposes for which the 
arrangements of the universe have been made.  There is a potentially teleological question that can 
be asked about why the things that we observe in our world are the ones that exist rather than other 
imaginable ones, and about how the universe has come to be ordered in the ways that it is (which 
might seem to be good or purposeful or designed).  Proposed answers for such a question are 
usually given in terms of some unobserved metaphysical and universal teleological force—often, but 
not always, a deistic force.  Some writers have called ideas of this kind by the name cosmic teleology 
(see, e.g., Mayr 1974/1988, 1992).  As we’ll see in chapter III, the history of cosmically teleological 
thought begins with Plato’s conception of ends and to this day remains a mainstay of creationist 
thought. 
The second meaning of “teleology” regards the purposes or goal-directedness of individual 
items in the world.  When we observe certain behaviors of items in the world, and the existence of 
certain other objects, we get the intuition that these things are behaving as if they themselves are 
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goal-directed or that they exist primarily thanks to their relationship with some other observable 
goal-directed agent.  This concept is often termed immanent teleology, which simply means teleology 
that somehow arises from and inheres in an object itself.  We’ll see in chapter III that this more 
local-scale concept of purposiveness begins with Aristotle’s impressions of ends.  I wish I could say 
that immanent teleology is the popular view today, but, in fact, it is not.  The most common modern 
scientific view, as we’ll see in chapter VII, is the homocentric, anti-teleological view, neither cosmic 
nor immanent, in which most items that appear to be behaving in a goal-directed manner only appear 
to be behaving in a goal-directed manner, while the only real immanent teleology in the world arises 
from the intentions of the human mind. 
Now, having described these two interpretations of the word, I can clarify my own project:  
I will be attempting to describe an immanent teleology in terms of the structures and relationships 
found in and between organisms and other biologically-relevant patterns—structures and 
relationships that can account for their goal-directedness and functional natures.  I believe it most 
prudent to try to explain these phenomena in terms similar to those with which we try to explain 
everything else in our universe: simple, physical, and mathematical terms based only on what we are 
able to observe.  I will set this view in opposition to both the homocentric view, which I consider to 
be a fallback position taken by those who don’t see an obvious way to explain immanent teleology, 
and the cosmic view, which I consider to be both false and explanatorily incomplete due to 
metaphysical assumptions.  I’ll say a few words about the latter point now.  
I don’t find it justifiable to believe that there is a creator that designs organisms or that 
organizes or intervenes in the universe in other particular ways.  Nor do I think it reasonable to 
believe that the universe itself has a grand purpose (whose purpose would it be?), nor that evolution 
is directively organized toward some particular end, nor that there is any other kind of cosmic-level 
teleology that needs to be explained.  Cosmic teleology, for me, is an unviable proposition because 
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the purposeful behavior we really observe occurs only—only—at the levels of organisms, their 
artifacts, and their societies.  With the sum of the achievements of science up through the twentieth 
century as a backdrop, there simply are no observed patterns remaining at any other scale still calling 
out to be explained in purposive terms.   
That said, there is one possibility that I find vanishingly unlikely but that I also can’t entirely 
rule out and so I must mention it briefly:  The possibility that while the details of our world are not 
managed by a creator, the entirety of our world is a grand artifact created by a grand artificer (i.e. a  
god) who has simply set up and seeded the fundamental physical constituents and constants that 
comprise it.  Our universe might, for instance, be a computer simulation of some sort—an 
extravagant digital dollhouse residing in a machine that occupies only a tiny corner of a much larger 
universe.  If this were the case, my project would still hope to explain only immanent teleology.  The 
conundrum of how teleology arises in our world, given the physical laws (of the simulation), would 
remain unchanged.  We would merely have to answer the additional question as to how the creator 
came to be a teleological agent in its own world. 
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B. A Note on Methods 
 
Until now the traditional method of approach . . . has been a highly intuitive one. A set of (intuitively) acceptable 
examples . . . are offered and an analysis is constructed to meet those examples. Counterexamples are then sought and 
found . . . Throughout the entire procedure, the putative counterexamples themselves must be accepted or rejected on 
purely intuitive grounds, with no clear agreement as to whether they should count as genuine cases . . . or not. This trial 
and error method may indeed be the best we can do. 
 
—Fred Adams (1979), on “function”. 
 
The test of examples and counterexamples is important. Yet in this case . . . there is a risk that it will decay into the 
dull thud of conflicting intuitions. 
 
—John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter (1987) 
 
The work in this dissertation is a theoretical approach to a set of interrelated topics that, 
traditionally, have been addressed chiefly by philosophy.  The attempt I am making to edge those 
topics from the domain of philosophy toward the realm of science can be divided approximately 
into two parts. 
 
Subjects and Theories 
 
In much of the first part (predominantly, chapters I through VII), I will use some traditional 
philosophical tools to outline my subject.  One of the earliest challenges when offering a theory of a 
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phenomenon is to find a way of drawing the figure that is one’s topic out from the ground that 
surrounds it.  One of Newton’s great accomplishments when developing his theory of gravitation 
was his realization—not nearly as simple as it sounds to us now—that the moon’s orbiting the earth, 
the planets’ taking their paths around the sun, and apples falling from the branch to the ground are 
all species of motion that can be attributed to the same cause, while other types of motions need not 
be accounted for under a single explanation.  Analytically unifying the particular phenomena that he 
did allowed Newton to see a more clearly outlined subject for which he could then develop a single 
explanatory hypothesis—the theory of universal gravitation.  Without that unifying insight, it would 
have been far more challenging to understand each of those kinetic phenomena separately.  A 
primary role of philosophy, as I see it, is to try to find ways such as this of divvying up the myriad 
overlapping patterns that we find in the world and usefully grouping them to suggest cohesive topics 
for science to investigate. 
The division of labor I am describing here may seem to have much in common with 
Carnap’s (e.g., 1936) view that philosophy is tasked with the job of defining scientific concepts 
before science can investigate them, but I want to distance myself somewhat from that comparison.  
Carnap saw philosophy as providing a priori definitions.  What I am advocating, instead, is a 
philosophy that provides analyses—not definitions but rough characterizations—that give theoretical 
science a baseline from which to work, but that may also be revised by the results of both theoretical 
and experimental science.  There are no deductively a priori claims in the method I am advocating 
and the relationship between philosophy and science is one of interplay, of back-and-forth, with 
mutually constraining epistemic dynamics. 
I will approach the task of outlining my subject in Part I by using, among other things, a 
reserved form of the philosophical method of conceptual analysis that I will call cautious conceptual 
analysis in order to contrast it with another sense of the term that we can call conventional conceptual 
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analysis28.  I make this distinction firstly because I have found that, depending upon which 
philosopher you ask, you may hear two quite incompatible ways of interpreting the details of what is 
meant by the term “conceptual analysis”, and secondly, because I wish to highlight important 
differences between, on the one hand, the now oft-criticized conventional version of analysis and, 
on the other hand, my own work, which, without the distinction I am making, might be found to 
resemble that conventional version due to the use of some similar tools of reasoning. 
Conceptual analysis, in its general form, is the act of trying to reason about the world by 
using the structure of our concepts as a guide.  Philosophers reflect upon their own concepts, their 
usages of them, and their intuitions about what they refer to, in order to find out what may be 
revealed by those reflections.  The difference between the cautious and conventional forms lies in 
what the practitioner believes they are justified in doing with those reflections.  The conventional 
interpretation is usually understood as being capable of deducing a theory while, as described above, the 
cautious interpretation sees the method as merely producing a subject . . . to which theory, and 
eventually experimentation, can later be applied (see also Jackson 1998). 
The second part of the dissertation (chapters VIII through XIV) will more closely resemble 
theoretical science in that it will attempt to offer a minimally ambiguous picture of an underlying 
structure that may account for the subject outlined in Part I.  Because of this, Part II is less 
methodologically controversial (though it may still be theoretically controversial).  When a theory 
has been presented, it becomes a target for attempts at both falsification and predictive 
confirmation, two processes that are widely accepted as capable of adjudicating scientific matters, 
even if only provisionally so.  What I offer in Part II may be right or it may be wrong, but the 
process of determining which of these is the case is, in principle, approachable.   
																																																								
28 Jackson, 1998, makes a very similar distinction, naming the two styles “modest” and “immodest” conceptual analysis. 
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So, leaving aside part II for now, I want to say a little more about the methods used in part I.  
In this section, I don’t intend to give an extensive defense of conceptual analysis, but I will very 
briefly describe what I am calling the cautious version of it, as well as advocate for a reduction of 
impulsive hostilities against the tools of analysis when those tools don’t necessarily reflect any 
commitment to the goals and entitlements presumed by the conventional version. 
 
Conventional Conceptual Analysis 
 
The method of conceptual analysis is as old as philosophy itself, though the debate over its 
validity or usefulness seems to stretch back only a handful of decades.  On one hand, there are those 
who find the method to be an utterly indefensible technique and perhaps the largest historical 
blunder in the field of philosophy (e.g. Colin Allen, pers. comm.; Laurence and Margolis 2003; 
Millikan 1991; Stich 1993).  On the other hand, there are those who find the method to be an utterly 
indispensable technique—the absolute lifeblood of philosophical inquiry (e.g. Bealer 1987, 1998; 
Chalmers 1996; Dennett 2007, 2013; Jackson 1998; Lewis 1994).  The disagreement is fiercely 
polarized, but I believe that the two groups are talking past one another by using the same term to 
convey different visions. 
The opponents of conceptual analysis deride it as being an essentialist search for necessary 
and sufficient conditions, in a world that is usually not composed of essentialist patterns (I’ll 
describe and explore essentialism in a few moments). They also scorn it for being performed by 
using intuitions about our hypothetical categorization of hypothetical examples—that is to say, the 
practitioners of analysis often imagine a situation, and then ask themselves whether they would or 
would not intuitively consider that situation to be an example of the category or concept they are 
analyzing.  The opponents of the method point out that the fallibility of our intuitions and of our 
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categorization abilities are both obvious and well documented, and so it would be folly to depend 
upon them in deducing theories (Kripke 1972; Putnam 1962).  These are serious charges that 
certainly justify skepticism if indeed the goal of conceptual analysis is one of deducing an essentialist 
theory.  But I will argue that modern proponents and practitioners of conceptual analysis can (and 
do) still analyze concepts without any necessary obligation to the essentialist onus, and, I suggest, if 
they do so cautiously—if they remain aware of the fallibility of our intuitions and categorization 




The conventional form of conceptual analysis was first employed, so far as we know, by 
Socrates.  A Socratic definition is meant as a kind of a theory; a definition is given in terms of what 
are now called the necessary and sufficient conditions for a phenomenon.  The ideas of necessity 
and sufficiency are invoked as limits such that just those conditions that make up the definition, and 
no more (thus, all together they are sufficient) and no less (thus, they are each individually 
necessary), are required for an item to fit the category of theoretical interest.   
For instance, in Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates discusses Theaetetus’ proposal for a theory of 
knowledge as “true belief with an account” (Theaetetus, 201-210), or what is now sometimes called 
“justified true belief” ( JTB).29  On this view, knowledge consists of 1) beliefs that 2) are true, and 
that 3) are justifiably believed to be true (see also Ayer 1956; Chisholm 1957; Gettier 1963; Plantinga 
																																																								
29 For other places where Socrates searches for essential definitions, see, e.g., Plato’s Euthyphro (piety), Charmides 
(temperance), Republic (justice), Meno (virtue), and Hippias Major (beauty).  Knowledge as justified true belief is also 
discussed in the Meno 98a2; Phaedo 76b5–6, 97d-99d2; Symposium 202a5-9; Republic 534b3-7; and Timaeus 51e5 
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1993).  Since these conditions are meant to be necessary and sufficient, nothing else is relevant; we 
have knowledge as long as we have justified true beliefs.30 
The pursuit of necessary and sufficient conditions for a phenomenon can also be cast as the 
search for the essence of that phenomenon and therefore analyses that purport to provide such 
conditions are termed “essentialist”. 
 
The Trouble with Essences 
 
As it turns out, however, not everything is amenable to being described in essential terms 
and, in fact, it appears that very few things are.  We ran into the difficulty, already, when trying to 
define “ends” in the previous section.  There we found that what counts as being an end is not an 
objective matter for which we could give unexceptionable conditions, but instead it is somehow 
relative to subjective interests. 
Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations, first drew attention to the difficulty of providing 
essences for our concepts.  His most famous example was the notion of a game.  In the broad array 
of types of things that we think of as games there doesn’t appear to be an essential set of necessary 
and sufficient criteria, much less even a single criterion that is common to all of them.  Instead, 
Wittgenstein says, there appears to be a “family resemblance” relationship in which one game may 
resemble some others in some regards, while those others resemble still others in differing regards, 
creating a chain or network of relationships, with no single thread running through every instance 
(Wittgenstein 1953; see also Fodor 1981; Hofstadter and Sander 2013; Lakoff 1987; Rosch 1973; 
Vygotsky 1986). 
																																																								
30 Socrates ultimately argued that the JTB theory isn’t quite right, and many contemporary theorists have done so as well, 
but no one in analytical philosophy has yet given a better answer. 
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If one looks around one finds quite quickly that the same difficulty in essential categorization 
applies to concepts as diverse as “band, chair, teapot, mess and letter ‘A’” (Hofstadter and Sander 
2013:pp) as well as species, rabbit, Australopithecus, Homo, African American, dead, alive, murder, poverty, 
Republican, and Democrat (Dawkins 2014).   
 
Things with Essences 
 
Despite the troubles with essentialism, there are a few ordinary patterns that do appear to be 
describable in terms of rigid essences.  Triangles and circles as ideal mathematical forms are 
commonly cited examples (e.g. Mayr 2002).  It is not at all blurry that a triangle has just three straight 
intersecting sides or that it is made of lines that meet in just three angles in a Euclidean plane.  
Either of those definitions seems to provide necessary and sufficient conditions.  In addition to 
geometric forms and some other mathematical concepts (such as pi or prime number), we find that the 
subjects of at least a few scientific concepts appear to have essences, for instance: electron, proton, 
tungsten, and even possibly DNA.  I’ll address the grounds on which this may be debatable in chapter 
II, but it seems we can say with certainty that if a thing has 74 protons bound together in a single 
nucleus, it is tungsten, and that if a material made up of a particular isotope of tungsten (having a 
certain number of neutrons and another specified number of electrons) then it will behave in certain 
very regular, predictable ways in terms of such things as its electromagnetic properties, thermal 
conductivity, melting point, density, and so on.  There is something very much like an essence to 
fundamental particles and various specific isotopes of elemental substances.  Philosophers typically 
call these types of things by the term “natural kinds”, because they seem to be categories whose 
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identities are created by nature, rather than by our minds—they seem to be not just subjectively 
similar but also objectively similar and thus not subject to Wittgenstein’s concern31.   
So what is the difference between the majority of concepts that are blurry and those few for 
which we can find a rigid essence?  Under what umbrella could we possibly unite DNA, tungsten, 
protons and triangles, while excluding rabbit, chair, and the letter ‘A’? This is the essentialist question 
turned in upon itself.  Essentially, it is asking, “What is the essence of having an essence?”  Later, I 
will suggest some lines along which we may be able to divide these categories. 
 
Cautious Conceptual Analysis 
 
If we relinquish essentialism, or assume at the least that the particular topics we are 
interested in are not necessarily natural kinds, there are still two roles that I think the tools of 
conceptual analysis can play in philosophy.  The first, to repeat what I said above, is that reasoning 
about our concepts and thinking about example cases can be a useful tool not so much for deducing 
a theory, but for helping to produce a subject about which one can then suggest—and eventually 
test—a theory.   
The subjects of science are not handed to us pre-packaged. When we are attempting to 
characterize a phenomenon, we need to come up with reasoned categories about which to theorize, 
based on various observed similarities, just as Newton had to do when he analytically selected 
certain types of motion while deciding to exclude other types.  A primary way of discovering and 
recognizing those similarities is to reflect upon our own concepts and the observed examples from 
																																																								
31 However, a good number of philosophers also count as natural kinds such categories as tree and rabbit, which they 
think are also handed to us by nature.  I am inclined to agree with Hull (1965) and Dawkins (2014) in regarding such 
biological concepts to be subjectively labeled human categories, far more like chair than proton (but for a contrary view see 
Griffiths 1999; or Okasha 2002).  It is clear that we should want to categorize all rabbits as a kind—rabbit is a useful 
category for both biological and practical use—but it is not at all clear that there is a natural kind.  There just don’t seem 
to be any necessary and sufficient conditions that could cleanly capture the set of all rabbits without getting blood and 
fur all over the place.   
	 36	
which they are derived.  As Frank Jackson (1998) puts it: the interesting philosophical questions are 
not ones that have unfamiliar definitions, but ones that inquire about subjects “according to our ordinary 
conception”.  When we ask, for instance, whether a subject such as Jackson’s example of free action 
really exists, what we are interested in finding out is whether the things we think of when we hear 
the term “free action” exist.  The very question is about a pattern we take ourselves to perceive from 
the world.  And, in order to identify our ordinary conception, Jackson points out, the only possible 
way is to “appeal to what seems to us most obvious and central about [for example] free action, . . 
.”—that is, to use our intuitions.  We have no other basis from which to begin.  Of course this 
doesn’t mean our scientific theory of the phenomenon needs to be derived from our intuitions—indeed 
it should not—it only means that our common theory (philosophers say “folk theory”) of the 
phenomenon is derived from our intuitions and that our scientific theory, in one way or another, 
ought to account for our perception of that folk theory. 
Our minds reflect the world imperfectly, much like the reflections in a funhouse mirror, but 
a careful philosopher who is aware of this risk, and who is armed with some idea of the shape of 
that mirror (as produced by the nascent yet fast-growing field of cognitive science) can proceed to 
characterize what they see reflected in their concepts in order to get a rough idea of the subject they 
plan to theorize about, and in order to cast aside patterns that they think more likely to reveal the 




The second role I see for the tools of conceptual analysis, used cautiously, is the common 
activity of employing counterexamples in order to discover insufficiencies in the mapping or 
translation between a theory and a subject.  When a theory of a phenomenon has been offered, 
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through whatever means, a clear counterexample can at any time suggest either that the theory needs 
revision in one way or another, or that the subject that the theory is meant to account for was not 
consistently outlined.32  Counterexamples (as long as they are not too far-fetched) are observational 
data.  That they were not necessarily actually observed in the present does not invalidate them if they 
are clear, central, obvious cases from memory or straightforward extrapolation (see also Hurley, 
Dennett, and Adams 2013). 
Using counterexamples to question the correspondence between a theory and a subject does 
not have to be an essentialist activity.  Modern cognitive science has given us a number of alternative 
notions of blurry-edged rather than essentialist concepts that are nearer to Wittgenstein’s portrayal 
of family resemblances.  For instance, one might think of concepts as being composed of prototypes 
and their variants (Rosch 1973) or a series of exemplars (Smith and Medin 1981), or as having either 
blurry conceptual halos and a dynamic underlying structure (Hofstadter and FARG 1995; Hofstadter 
and Sander 2013), or non-necessary bundles of common features (Prinz and Clark 2004)33, or 
necessary along with exceptionable conditions ( Jackendoff 1983).  If we characterize our subject in 
any of these ways, then a counterexample can still highlight a way in which a theory that is meant to 
account for that characterization may fail to (although determining whether that failure is a fault 






32 The way I see it, the topics produced by a cautious conceptual analysis are equally as subject to revision as theories are, 
and the process of hunting for a theory is one of interplay and mutual revision, but with a focus on broadening the 
subject as much as possible, while narrowing the theory as much as possible in order to strive to find as much generality 
in our theories as we can. 
33 See also Boyd (1999) who also used a notion of non-necessary bundles of features (he calls them homeostatic property 
clusters) to try to redefine species concepts, such as human, lily, or tobacco hornworm. 
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Summary on Methods 
 
The critic of conceptual analysis who finds my use of these methods disconcerting should 
take note that, by the end of Part I, when I have finished mulling over many cases and 
counterexamples to theories, I will not yet have offered anything that looks like a theory.  I will not 
have presented a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for either goal-directedness or the related 
concept of function.  Instead, what I will present (in Chapter VI) is simply a list of questions and 
phenomena related to these concepts, and some reasoned commitments as to what patterns I think 
any theory of these subjects should be attempting to account for.  I make some strong, and probably 
controversial claims; but they should be controversial for what they say, not for the methods by 
which I have developed them.   
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C. Organisms and Artifacts 
 
The origins of AI, in one form or another, go back to the perennial pursuit of human beings to understand their place 
in the overall scheme of things, both as creations and as creators. 
 
—Hamid Ekbia (2008, emphasis added) 
 
As by now you will have recognized, the domain of teleology appears limited, more or less, 
to organisms and their artifacts.   This state of affairs has been a source of both insight and 
confusion in teleological inquiry, as I will explore in detail in later chapters.  But I raise the point 
now for a different reason:  I began my own foray into this field because of my interest in artificial 
intelligence (AI).  In imagining what it would take for modern or future scientists to build a real, 
general, human-level AI, I was inspired by Hamid Ekbia’s (2008) Artificial Dreams, which explores 
some of the reasons AI researchers’ achievements, to date, have always fallen far short of their most 
ambitious dreams.  
Ekbia’s book highlights a number of fundamental tensions in those dreams, one of which 
really caught my attention, and which I think is best put in terms of the contrast between two 
categories that have very different ways of being purposeful: organisms and artifacts (see also Collins 
and Kusch, 1998, from whom Ekbia draws some of his discussion).   
On the one hand, AI researchers are attempting to build something like an organism—
something willful, lively, and internally motivated; a creature that behaves on its own behalf; an 
autonomous system that seems to have, and to serve, its own purposes.  On the other hand, each of 
these researchers is building, by definition, an artifact—a human-made device that we understand to 
serve the purposes of another autonomous agent (typically, the researchers themselves).  As Ada 
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Lovelace put it in her own critique of artificial dreams, over a century before the term “artificial 
intelligence” was coined, “The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. 
It can [only] do whatever we know how to order it to perform” (Menabrea and Lovelace 1843)34.   
It takes some effort to understand Lovelace’s dictum clearly.  Certainly, today, we know that 
machines can in fact compose music and draw pictures that their designers had never heard, 
hummed, seen, or imagined (see e.g., Cope 1996; Ekbia 2008; McCorduck 1991) and so, in some 
sense, these machines are “originating” something, in spite of Lovelace’s claim.   
However, the partially-novel products fashioned by these machines are created within 
bounds that are specified by the machines’ designers and, more importantly, the so-called creative 
acts are performed only in order to satisfy the goals of those designers.  The purpose for which 
Harold Cohen’s drawing machine Aaron creates its drawings is that Cohen (or another user) wants 
to produce a machine-drawn illustration and, when Aaron is started up, it dutifully draws a picture 
by following a complex set of rules that Cohen has injected into it, with a number of randomized 
parameters.  If Cohen never puts spaceships into Aaron’s repertoire, Aaron will never draw a 
spaceship.  More importantly, Aaron will never want to draw a spaceship.  In fact, Aaron doesn’t 
ever want to draw anything at all, because wants are not a part of Aaron’s architecture.  The desires 
and intentions behind Aaron’s works are Cohen’s, as are the style, the repertoire, and even the semi-
random artistic choices.  As Ekbia notes, any apparent autonomy found in an artifact comes to an 
end when you dig deep enough (again, see also Collins and Kusch 1998).  At some point, there is 
another agent behind the scenes ultimately in control of the machine in one way or another, telling it 
which destination to drive to, describing what types of elements may show up in its drawings, 
changing its parts when they wear out, and, most importantly, perhaps, defining the machine in the 
																																																								
34 The Analytical Engine was a design for a mechanical general-purpose computer described by Charles Babbage in 1837.  
The machine, were it to have had all its kinks worked out and had it actually been built, would have been what later 
would come to be known as a Turing-complete—or universal—computation machine much like any of our modern 
devices, though quite a bit slower due to its purely mechanical nature. 
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first place as either an autonomous vehicle, a drawing machine, a music composition machine, or a 
chess, go, or Jeopardy! player (see, e.g. IBM’s Deep Blue and Watson or Google DeepMind’s 
AlphaGo).  
How, then, can something that is human-made, something that is clearly an artifact, 
something that derives its purposiveness from its creators or its users . . . how can it also be an 
organism?  How can it be something that has its own purposiveness?  When we eventually build an 
artificial intelligence, which will it be: organism or artifact? 
Some may see this tension as an argument that artificial intelligence is a fool’s errand, but I 
think that conclusion would be premature.  I take it, instead, to signify the fact that we simply don’t 
yet know enough about what it means to be an organism or an artifact—we don’t yet know enough 
about how either of these types of things come to be purposive.  One of the fundamental questions 
that need to be clearly—even mathematically—answered before our scientists and engineers can 
truly work in earnest on building an artificial intelligence is the question of how any particular parcel 
of particles can come to be purposive. 
 
A Brief Preview 
 
In this work I hope to present a view of purposiveness that not only can differentiate 
between organism and artifact and clarify how the fields of artificial intelligence and artificial life can 
usefully progress in attempting to build organisms while at the same time necessarily building 
artifacts, but that also can underlie a theory of life, agency and autonomy.  As I described in the 
previous section, the view presented comes in two parts, which represent two almost-separate 
projects.  In the first project, I attempt to recast the subject matter of teleology by describing what I 
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think are the relevant patterns to be accounted for, while setting aside those patterns that I think are 
irrelevant or illusory.  That project begins here and concludes by Chapter VII. 
Chapter II will outline some of the physical and metaphysical assumptions that underlie my 
interpretation of the world as applied to both parts of the dissertation.  This is a work in the 
materialist tradition of science and philosophy, and so my goal is to locate theories of subjectivity, 
value, identity, and goal-directedness in the physical world by resorting only to physical constituents, 
mathematical relations, and other phenomena that can emerge from (or, in Jackson’s 1998 sense, 
“are entailed by”) the physical constituents of our world. 
In chapter III, I review the history of teleological thought in some detail, tracing it from 
both its psychological and historical roots in animistic beliefs through the annals of philosophy and 
biology up till the end of vitalism in the early twentieth century.  Throughout that time, many 
insightful issues were raised, and it is worth keeping them in mind so that our later theory can be 
held accountable to the many observed facets found during early observations and analyses of life 
and goal-directedness. 
In chapters IV and V, respectively, I analyze issues surrounding the concept of function and 
then review most of the modern theories and analyses of function.  Function is an important 
teleological concept that has been the focus of the vast majority of recent teleological inquiry, and, 
despite my own disbelief in the field’s central notion of “proper functions”, the contributions made 
in this recent body of literature have laid many of the foundations for the view of teleology that I 
will later advocate. 
In the very brief chapter VI, I will review the progress made up to that point by relisting the 
many questions raised by the conceptual analyses in the previous chapters.  I take it that these 
questions form a kind of checklist that both the theory I will advocate and any future theory of 
teleology should be held accountable to explain. 
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Before giving an account that attempts to answer those questions, I take a bit of time in 
chapter VII to motivate my work in Part II, by showing, firstly, that the modern intellectual 
atmosphere has a thorough distaste for goal-centric (instead of function-centric) teleological thinking 
and, secondly, that this anti-teleological attitude is unfounded, and has, for decades (if not for 
centuries), hindered scientific progress concerning the foundations of biology and agency. 
In Part II of the dissertation, I describe a hypothesis that is meant to account for the 
patterns outlined in the first part.  Chapters VIII, IX, X, and XI are the central description of this 
account of teleology, including exposition of ideas on identity, value, subjectivity, vitality, and 
organization.  The account is not entirely novel.  As you’ll see, other theorists have offered most of 
the pieces of the theory at one point or another.  What is novel about my contribution will primarily 
be the way in which the pieces are arranged together to paint a broader picture.   
Chapter VIII will present an overview of how identity and value can produce naturally 
normative, teleological behavior.  Chapter IX will present an account of how a set of patterns in our 
world can, together, have an identity that may serve as the locus of subjectivity, the beneficiary of 
value, and the teleological agent that can be said to possess its own goals (and to strive for them 
through its actions).  Chapter X will further develop that account in order to provide a measure of 
how such an identity could benefit, making certain objects or events valuable to it.  Chapter XI will 
then attempt to use these notions of identity and value to create a system of classification for the 
various kinds of patterns in our world in terms of their relationships to value.  
Various subsets of my readers will be familiar already with varying parts of the analysis, but 
hopefully the introductions above will help readers to focus on the parts they will find most 
interesting, while avoiding introductions to topics with which they are already familiar.  To 
understand the core of my thesis, a reader who is willing to accept the reality of goal-directedness 
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should focus on chapters II and VIII through XI.  The reader who doubts the existence or 
importance of goal-directedness in our world should add Chapter VII to that list 35.   
																																																								
35 While I’m remarking on what one need or need not read, let me use a footnote to say a few words about footnotes:  
Although, as you’ve seen, there are a considerable number of footnotes in this work, the majority of readers can be 
assured that nothing major will be lost by skipping over all of them.  A large proportion of the footnotes are there 
primarily to forestall certain interpretations, upon which philosophers of various stripes might be prone to base 
preemptive dismissals of my work.  Retaining comments of this type yet moving them into footnotes is my way of 
attempting to reach a broad audience that contains both philosophers and non-philosophers.  While I want this work to 
be subject to philosophical scrutiny, my primary intended audience is students of cognitive science and AI, like myself 
just a few years ago, who have their own “artificial dreams” that they’d like to follow. 
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Chapter II 
Physics and Metaphysics 
 
Metaphysics, n.: The branch of philosophy that deals with . . . questions about being, substance, time and space, 
causation, change, and identity (which are presupposed in the special sciences but do not belong to any one of them) . . . 
 
—Oxford English Dictionary 
 
In many people’s minds, there is a hierarchy among the sciences, beginning with physics at 
its base, followed by chemistry, and then proceeding through biology to psychology, anthropology, 
sociology, economics and so on.  In some way, I find this picture compelling.  If there were no 
atoms, there would be no chemical reactions between them.  If there were only atoms, but no 
molecules, there would be no biochemistry.  If there were atoms and chemicals, but no organisms, 
there would be no minds, no cultures, no societies, and no economies. The hierarchy exists in large 
part because the objects of study at each level within it depend upon the existence of—and the 
relationships between—some of the objects of study at the levels below.36 
For the moment, it is not the hierarchy itself that I want us to be concerned with as much as 
an oft-drawn distinction within it, between what are commonly called the “hard” or “natural” 
sciences and the “soft” or “special” sciences.  These labels have come to be outmoded today, as the 
previously “soft” methodologies in the so-called soft sciences have largely caught up, in terms of 
rigor, with those of the hard sciences.  Even so, there is still something about the subject matters of 
																																																								
36 Some see this hierarchy as supporting a reductionist’s structure of the sciences, in which each level of the hierarchy 
consists of phenomena that are merely made of those below.  I don’t find that viewpoint very compelling; instead I 
subscribe to the emergent perspective, in which new phenomena often arise at each level not merely from the 
aggregation of constituents of the levels below, but from the particular organization of those constituents at each level.  I 
will discuss reductionism and emergence further and, in particular, the question of whether biology can reduce to 
chemistry and physics in Chapter IV. 
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the various sciences that keeps the hard–soft (or natural–special) distinction alive in our minds.  In 
particular the subjects of the hard sciences relate to objects while the subjects of the soft sciences 
relate to, well . . . subjects.  Beginning somewhere in the middle of biology and moving upwards 
through the hierarchy, the subject matter slides from a study of the objective behaviors and 
interactions of materials in our world to a study of the subjective behaviors and interactions of 
organisms and agents. 
The hierarchy, with this division inserted, looks something like the following.37   
 
           OTHER SPECIALIZED SCIENCES 
ECONOMICS and SOCIOLOGY  
       PSYCHOLOGY 
ORGANISMIC BIOLOGY 
       
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
OBJECTIVE            CHEMISTRY 
PHYSICS 
 
But there is a problem with this picture.  The gap there in the middle, dividing biology in two, 
represents something important . . . and something missing.  Really, the divide is between those topics 
of biology that are smaller than whole organisms (for instance, biochemistry, molecular biology, and 
genetics) and those topics of biology that involve the behaviors and interactions of whole organisms 
																																																								
37 This is an oversimplifying image because, for instance, the boundaries of some special sciences, such as geology and 
oceanography, cut across these categories and thus have no obvious single location that they might fit in a hierarchy of 
this sort.  However, the picture I am drawing is not meant to capture the categorical structure of all sciences, but rather 
what is (in popular discourse) a particularly salient cross-section of that structure, relating the biological and humanistic 
realms to their underlying physical constituents.  
SUBJECTIVE 
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(for instance ecology, ethology, and evolutionary biology).  And this is an extremely odd thing for 
the study of living things to do, because it says that, on one hand, we can study the non-living parts 
of living things and, on the other hand, we can also assume the whole-hog existence of living things, 
and then study their behaviors and interactions, but there is an important sense in which neither of 
these activities is actually the study of living things.  What is missing is an understanding of how the 
pieces in the objective branches become alive, so that there is something to study in the subjective 
branches38.  The explanatory gap has been explored by a small but important group of theorists 
whose ideas we will discuss in the second part of the dissertation, but in the mainstream of science, 
and even in the bulk of biological study, it is largely ignored. 
One vision for what could fill this gap is a science of teleological patterns—a science that, 
firstly, assumes the objects of physics and chemistry along with those of the objective branches of 
biology; and that then uses the relations between those objects in order to provide an account of 
vitality, goal-directedness, agency, function, identity, and value, all of which can thereafter be 
assumed to exist by the more subjective (and subject-based) branches of biology, as well as by other 
higher-level special sciences.   
Now there is clearly much work to be done in order to substantiate the claims of that vision 
but, assuming that that work can be done, this arrangement suggests a new picture of the hierarchy 







38 One might be reminded, here, of “books that told me everything about the wasp, except why”, found on the list of 
“Useful Presents” given in Dylan Thomas’ (1952) short story A Child’s Christmas in Wales. 
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MORE SPECIALIZED SCIENCES 
ECONOMICS and SOCIOLOGY 
PSYCHOLOGY 





What I think is beguiling about this alternative arrangement is that, rather than splitting biology 
between the objective and the subjective, or inappropriately shoehorning all of it into one or the 
other of these major categories (while still leaving the other so-called soft sciences in the still-
unexplained realm of the subjective), the dividing line itself is instead replaced entirely by a study of 
subjectivity in objective terms, thus bringing everything above the line into the fold of what 
previously lay below it.  The world is objective, even where it is subjective. 
I don’t expect this vision to convince many readers just yet.  As we’ll see in Chapters III and 
VII, many scientists today believe teleology to have been carefully eradicated from modern science.  
An attempt to reintroduce it (and so very close to the physicochemical foundations of the hierarchy, 
at that!) may not be well received.  But when we recognize that the traditional hierarchy ignores what 
accounts for subjectivity and that, as was noted above, the biologist’s study of life is generally 
agnostic about life, it becomes clear that something needs to span the divide.   
The modern theory of teleology, pieces of which have been coalescing in recent decades, and 
which I think is described most fully now in the latter part of this dissertation, can begin to fill the 
gap, because it suggests that it is just at this level in the hierarchy of the sciences that a particular 
type of arrangement of matter—a particular type of pattern—is able not only to become goal-
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directed but also, at the very same time, to come to have an identity along with the prospect of being 
a potential beneficiary.  Moreover, as we’ll come to see, I think this particular type of physical 
pattern is the very thing that logically underpins the two cornerstone processes of biology—cell-
maintenance and replication—wherein objective, mechanical, biochemical processes give rise to the 
kind of survival-and-reproduction machines that give us the impression of vitality, and to which we 
attribute subjective qualities.  If I am right about that, then this physical pattern is an obligatory 
prerequisite for the existence of the living, agentive, teleological objects under study both in the 
subjective branches of biology and in many of the special sciences. 
My thesis is that it is teleological patterns that form the very nexus between the objective and 
the subjective.  Teleology is the singular thread that weaves together molecules, microbes, minds, 
and machines into one continuous universal tapestry.  And in occupying this unusual position, it 
crosses paths with a broad array of physical and metaphysical phenomena, coming into intimate 
contact with, on the one hand, physical phenomena such as energy, entropy, and information, and, 
on the other hand, many notions of metaphysics such as existence, causation, value, and identity.  
Because of this, we need to spend some time now introducing the relevant pieces of all these 
topics.39   
																																																								
39 Much of what follows in this chapter is an inherited view of the world, derived from the modern culture of science 
and philosophy.  In particular, however, I am greatly indebted to two of my academic advisors, Douglas Hofstadter and 
Daniel Dennett, who have influenced my version of this heritage the most.  Although the majority of that influence has 
come from personal communications, the reader who would like to trace some published pieces of that influence can 
look first at Hofstadter (2007) and Dennett (1991) and then at the remainder of the works by both of these thinkers, as 
cited in the bibliography.  
	 50	
A. The World We Live In 
 
The first principles of the universe are atoms and empty space; everything else is merely thought to exist. 
 
—Democritus of Abdera40 
 
. . . everything that animals do, atoms do.  In other words, there is nothing that living things do that cannot be 
understood from the point of view that they are made of atoms acting according to the laws of physics. 
 
—Richard P. Feynman (1963) 
 
Much of what I am going to discuss depends on some basic assumptions about the 
properties and constituents of the physical world and the mechanics of causation therein.  The 
simplest way to state those assumptions is to say that I am working in the framework of what is 
often called “the modern scientific worldview”, a synthesis centered on the canon of eighteenth-, 
nineteenth-, and twentieth-century physics and chemistry.  There is a little room for interpretation 
about what is meant by this, but I think it is broadly understood to mean what I intend by it.   
To be somewhat more specific, however, I can begin by saying this: I will neither help 
myself to any theoretical substances or forces that haven’t been clearly demonstrated to exist by 
experiments that can be repeated by modern physicists, nor will I tolerate it when other theorists do 
so, either explicitly or implicitly.  While particle physics still faces challenges in explaining the full 
range of observations that scientists have made (see, e.g., Blum et al. 2013; Carlson 2015; Lees et al. 
1970; Lykken 2010; Persic and Salucci 1992; Pohl et al. 2013; Rubin et al. 1980; Sushkov et al. 2011; 
																																																								
40 As cited in Diogenes Laertius IX, 44-45 (Hicks 1925). 
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Trimble 1987), there is a broad swath of theory that is known to describe the world very accurately 
for the vast majority of modern practical purposes, and it is this theoretical basis that I will assume.   
Anchoring that body of knowledge is what is called the standard model of particle physics 
which consists, roughly, of the following ideas:  The world (and, more notably for my purposes, the 
biological and artifactual subdivisions of the world) consists entirely of a small set of particles (called 
quarks, leptons, and bosons), some of which (a subset of the quarks and leptons) combine to form 
the ubiquitous elemental atoms, which in turn combine to form the molecules of which all the 
substances and structures that we interact with are made.  Interactions between any structures or 
patterns made of quarks and leptons are mediated by a set of only four fundamental forces (by way 
of the particles—the bosons—that are either known or theorized to mediate or “carry” those 
forces).41  In short:  in the vastness of the universe there are only particles and forces. 
In addition, I assume that the behaviors of these material constituents are, for our purposes, 
deterministic.  Nondeterministic quantum-mechanical effects are pervasive and can in fact be 
amplified to observable scales (see e.g. Chambers 1960; Tonomura et al. 1986; Young 1804); 
however, we have plenty of reason to believe that at practical biological scales (say, from the scale of 
biomolecular interactions up to the scale of blue whales or even ecosystems), those probabilistic 
effects tend to become statistically irrelevant—that is to say, they generally “average away”42.  While 
biological systems could, in theory, evolve ways to take advantage of quantum indeterminacy, we 
don’t yet have any good reason to believe that they do so widely, and there is neither any evidential 
																																																								
41 The only force for which a mediating boson has not been found is gravitation.  Many theorists assume the graviton will 
eventually be discovered.  But we need not speculate here.  Even if the mechanisms of gravitation turn out not to mirror 
the boson-mediated mechanism of the other forces, our story (of teleology and other material patterns) is about the 
material structures in our world and how forces act upon them.  That story is independent of the behavior of bosons.  
What matters here is simply that there are forces that have effects on the motions of matter. 
42 For those who are interested, “statistically irrelevant” here means that the probabilistic effects average out as a result 
of the law of large numbers, so that the observable effects of populations of quantum phenomena fall in line with the 
predictions of classical mechanics.  I am no expert in this matter, but please see Bohr (1976); Dirac (1933); Feynman 
(1942); and Tsang and Caves (2012) for pointers to Bohr’s “Correspondence Principle”, which is at the heart of this 
notion, and related discussions. 
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nor any conceptual link leading us to believe that goal-directedness or functioning (or for that 
matter, identity, or value) requires nondeterministic effects of any sort.  The large molecules that 
comprise biological systems all appear to behave predictably and deterministically in their functional 
activities, as do the larger composite parts of organisms and their artifacts.43,44  
This general doctrine about the substance and causality of the world is known variously as 
naturalism, materialism, or physicalism.  It is important to mention because, as we saw to some extent in 
the previous chapter and as we will see to a much greater extent in the next chapter, human 
observations of purposeful phenomena were often explained by our forebears through appeals to 
supernatural, immaterial, or extraphysical phenomena.  Even today, supernatural explanations 
continue to be assumed in some circles (e.g., creationists).  Moreover, as we’ll see in Chapter V, the 
most popular modern theory of function (called the Selected Effects theory) is one that overtly 
claims to be entirely consistent with the modern scientific worldview, yet I’ll show that this theory 
should be untenable to a materialist because its most widely championed versions implicitly entail 
either an extraphysical assumption or an anti-causal one.  
  
																																																								
43 And if we can find a theory of these topics that is explanatorily and predictively powerful, while being independent of 
quantum effects, then so much the better for us in avoiding further headaches. 
44 Some modern artifacts (such as lasers and the atomic clocks used in GPS satellites) do depend on quantum effects in 
order to function properly.  And, in principle, some biological items could do the same.  But such things are out of the 
ordinary and so it is clear that while these quantum effects play a role in a particular item’s functioning, they are unnecessary 




We grow in direct proportion to the amount of chaos we can sustain and dissipate. 
 
      —Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (1984, p. 193) 
 
Entropy is the price of structure. 
 
      —Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (ibid, p. 283) 
 
Good luck is rare, bad luck is the norm, and most problems left unattended don’t improve spontaneously. 
 
—Terrence Deacon (2013)45 
 
In terms of my project, we’ll find that not a lot depends upon whether or not some of the 
fine details of the standard model of particle physics are precise, or whether its parts might one day 
be further dissected or amended.  What matters most of all is the gross picture it paints, with a 
presumption that, in one important sense, nothing else exists.  That is, in order to make sense of the 
more complex topics of the special sciences, we must do so in terms only of phenomena that are 
emergent from patterns made of these fundamental point-like constituents and their physically causal 
interactions.46 
																																																								
45 My understanding of the way the phenomena of thermodynamics relate to teleological topics ultimately differs from 
Deacon’s (2013) treatment of these relationships, but there is no doubt that my view was influenced both by his and by 
Alicia Juarrero’s (1999) work, which I recommend to the reader interested in further exploring similar ideas. 
46 See Holland (1998) for a good general introduction to emergence; and see the end of Chapter III of this manuscript 
for a few details about the history of the emergent perspective in biological thinking. 
	 54	
A well-known example of the way higher-level phenomena may emerge from patterns in the 
material world comes from the field of thermodynamics, the branch of physics that deals with the 
concepts of heat, work, entropy, spontaneity, reversibility, and order, all of which we will need to 
review since, together, they play a significant role in providing the context that allows for the 
emergence of teleology.   
We’re going to look at four main topics from the domain of thermodynamics:  First, we’ll 
look at the way properties such as temperature and pressure are emergent from collections of atoms.  
The fact that these new and fundamentally different thermodynamic properties arise from the 
probabilistic interactions of atoms and molecules will help make it plausible, via analogy, that new 
and fundamentally different teleological properties, such as value and goal-directedness, may also emerge 
from certain arrangements and interactions of matter.   
Second, with the concept of kinetic energy available to us from the discussion about 
collections of atoms, we will examine the role that random or unpredictable kinetic energy plays in 
disorganizing the world.  This tendency toward disorganization can be especially dangerous for 
living and teleological systems, which depend crucially upon maintenance of their organization in 
everything that they do.   
Third, we’ll review the famed second law of thermodynamics, which describes the probabilistic 
fact that a spontaneous reversal of disorganizing change is extremely unlikely.  This view is often 
framed in terms of a direct synonymy between the notions of entropy and disorder, but I will follow 
recent work by Styer (2000) and Lambert (2002) in criticizing that comparison, and then I will offer 
a slightly modified basis for the concept of material disorder and of the irreversibility of that material 
disorder.   
Fourth, we will look at a category of patterns—Prigogine’s (1967) dissipative structures—that 
are in some way able to resist the irreversible tendency toward material disorganization.  The 
	 55	
category of dissipative structures does not map directly onto that of teleological structures, but as we 
review these two categories we will come to see that the latter is a subset of the former.  Dissipative 
structures form all of the material orderliness in our universe; they are the things that, by some 
method, can be constructed and maintained despite the tendency toward disorder.  Teleological 
structures are one kind of dissipative structure.  An important part of understanding what accounts 
for teleology will lie in discovering some reasoned method to further distinguish teleological 




In and before the eighteenth century, heat was thought to be a fluid called “caloric”, which 
had a tendency to repel itself, thereby allegedly explaining the flow of heat from hot objects to cold 
ones.  The intuition behind this theory is that if we can detect heat and if it can flow, then it must be 
a kind of stuff—it must be a material thing.   
The truth, which took centuries of efforts by a great many scientists to discover and confirm, 
is that caloric does not exist.  That is to say, the phenomenon of heat is real but there is no substance 
there, residing in or among the atoms making up objects.  All that exists is those atoms and forces.   
It was Daniel Bernoulli’s (1738, 1741) innovative depiction of the interactions of those 
particles and forces that made possible our modern theory of heat, as well as of a number of related 
phenomena.  Bernoulli was pondering the dynamics of fluids when he came upon a way to think of 
gases in terms only of the motions of a large number of atoms and molecules rushing about and 
colliding with one another.  Although the idea was not confirmed or widely accepted until much 
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later47, the form of Bernoulli’s hypothesis was essentially correct:  Each moving atom or molecule 
has a kinetic energy—or energy of motion—that is proportional to its mass and the square of its 
velocity48.  Through collisions, this energy is constantly being exchanged with other atoms and 
molecules.  It is continually being rearranged, and it escapes only when converted to other forms of 
energy (e.g. potential, rotational, or vibrational) or when transferred to the molecules that make up 
the container of the gas. 
This image leads naturally to a number of conclusions.  For one thing, the impacts of all 
these careening atoms upon the sides of a container should have the collective effect of pushing on 
the container; and the faster they are moving (or the heavier or more numerous they are), the 
stronger the total pushing should be (measured, say, in terms of a unit of area of the container’s 
surface).  In Bernoulli’s picture, this pushing is what constitutes pressure in a fluid.  Pressure is thus 
not a new or different kind of force, but is simply an outcome of the concerted motions of atoms in 
aggregate.  
A similar aggregate quantity can be found in the average (translational) kinetic energy of the 
moving atoms, which, it has been determined, varies with the temperature of the gas.  The faster the 
atoms move, on average, the hotter the gas, and the more slowly they move, the cooler.  What we 
call temperature is a proportional measure of that average kinetic energy.  Physicists have chosen to 
reserve the word “heat” to describe the amount of kinetic energy being spontaneously transferred 
																																																								
47 After all, to truly believe the kinetic theory of gases, one must espouse some other underlying beliefs as well.  For one 
thing, one must believe in the existence of atoms, a leap that wasn’t widely taken until Einstein’s (1905) explanation of 
microscopic Brownian motion in terms of atomic jostling.  And for another thing, one must believe in the conservation 
of energy, which ensures that collisions between atoms are elastic, so that their motion continues until and unless the 
energy is transferred outside the system.  See also Boltzmann (1872), Clausius (1857) and Maxwell (1860, 1873) for 
works further developing Bernoulli’s kinetic theory. 
48 Curiously, Leibniz thought of this kinetic energy as constituting a “living force” that motivates behaviors, and so he 
called it just that, in Latin: vis viva.  In the next chapter, we’ll look at a number of historical concepts, similar to Leibniz’s 
vis viva, meant to account for the vitality of life. 
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from one body to another, but nonetheless it is another thermodynamic phenomenon that arises 
from the aggregated microscopic motions of atoms49. 
To return, then, to our main point here: the phenomena of pressure, temperature and heat 
can be said to be emergent because they don’t exist at the level of individual atoms, but only at the 
level of aggregations of interacting atoms.  They are properties that emerge not from matter but 
from a particular arrangement of matter.  And this is important to notice because the theory of 
teleology offered later will share this emergent structure.  New properties—real, measurable features 
that are prominent parts of our world—including identity, value, goal-directedness, and functioning, 
will also be seen to emerge from a particular arrangement of matter.  And no extraphysical substance 
or supernatural force—no caloric, no phlogiston, no vis viva or élan vital—will be required for that to 
happen.  All that will be required is a particular form of organization.  Just as is the case with 
pressure and temperature, it is the organization itself that will be shown to constitute the 
phenomena.  Being purposeful, subjective, and evaluative will amount to nothing but a matter of 
pattern. 
There’s a long way to go before we can describe those teleological patterns.  For now, we 
will continue looking at heat because it also plays a consequential role in creating the background 
conditions for teleology.  Organisms and artifacts are all structures in which individual parts must 
hold certain causal relationships to one another in order for the whole to operate properly.  Such 
items are orderly, and their orderliness is crucial to their teleological nature.  If you significantly 
rearrange, damage, or remove parts, an organism or artifact will no longer be able to serve its former 
purposes.  Because orderliness is so significant, the central context in terms of which organisms and 
																																																								
49 The reason for this slightly unintuitive definition of heat is that different amounts of heat may be required to raise the 
temperatures of different objects by the same amount, depending on the specific heat capacity of the materials being heated.  
The details are of no great concern for the current work but, in short, not all the external kinetic energy that is added to 
an object by heat transfer is converted to kinetic motion within that object; some of it is converted or stored in other 
ways. 
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artifacts must be understood is their place in a universe that has a very general tendency toward 
disorder.  We’re going to analyze that tendency now, but it will take a number of steps to get where 
we’re going, partly because the topic is a bit complicated but also partly because the prevailing 
modern view, given in terms of entropy, can be misleading.  We can begin by noting the most 




The ancient foundations of the techniques that make up the culinary arts lie not in the 
pursuit of varied flavors to excite the palate, but instead in the pursuit of the simpler goal of food 
safety.  As Bernoulli helped us come to understand, heating a thing only means adding energy to it 
by bombarding its surfaces with countless atomic and molecular collisions.  It means violently, but 
microscopically, shaking the thing.   
Over a century after Bernoulli’s hypothesis, in 1862, Louis Pasteur demonstrated the truth of 
the germ theory—that life comes from life—with an experiment that showed that isolated, boiled 
broths would never grow new colonies of microorganisms.50  In the wake of Pasteur’s experiment, 
people came to realize that cooking with heat is actually a process by which various 
microorganisms—mostly bacteria, yeasts, and molds, but also a variety of parasites—become 
organizationally denatured and thus unable to replicate and grow anew.  Today, what we understand 
																																																								
50 Pasteur boiled solutions of broth in specially constructed swan-necked flasks that would allow the steam to escape, 
and air to be interchanged, but generally prevented dust particles from falling in.  What he found is that normally 
occurring molds or bacteria would only ever grow in these sterilized (we now call them “Pasteurized”) solutions after the 
flask was inverted or the swan-neck was broken, thereby allowing inoculation by microbes riding upon airborne dust 
particles. 
	 59	
this to mean is that the process of heating an organism will raise—eventually to certainty—the 
likelihood of catastrophically breaking apart the vital relationships that organize the organism51.   
Heat of course is only public enemy No. 1.  To be sure, any source of energy that may 
impinge upon an organized structure has a chance of contributing to that structure’s piecemeal 
disintegration, and so counts as an enemy.  Electromagnetic radiation, for example, is another 
consistent source of flowing energy that can cause repeated and consistent damage to (even 
microscopic) physical structures, and this is why ultraviolet (UV) radiation has come to be used, like 
heat, as a modern industrial means of food sterilization52.  And while heat and radiation produce 
cumulative microscopic damage, large energetic impacts, such as the damage done by a lion’s teeth 
to a gazelle’s flesh, or shoe soles to insects, or bullets to people, obviously count as disorganizing 
perturbations too. 
The implication, when we understand that energy is distributed throughout the universe, is 
that every pattern that exists—you, me, and everything else—is being slow-cooked by the heat and 
radiation and the distribution of other energetic effects that occur in the world around us. Every 
material pattern in the world is being slowly shaken apart at a rate determined in part by its own 
structural integrity, and in part by the nature of the distribution of energy that impinges on it.   
Despite the background of braising energy, there are two main reasons that you and I and 
other organisms are each here today.  The first is that we (and our ancestors) have had a way to 
																																																								
51 In military (and biological) strategy, swarming is a tactic meant to overcome a strong central target by using numerous 
decentralized (and usually much smaller) forces.  Bees swarm over honey-thieves, armies swarm over cities, and so on.  
The idea is that the smaller and more numerous the assailants, the more informationally complex any defense against them 
becomes.  If we take this idea to its logical conclusion, cooking (or heating in general) is using the smallest possible 
assailants—atoms or particles or electromagnetic waves—in the largest possible numbers in order to overwhelm even 
enemies that we are unable to see (such as bacteria).  When enough heat or radiation is present, there is practically no 
viable defense (one can employ the crude low-information technique of shielding, but any shield has an energy limit 
beyond which it simply becomes inadequate).  This is also of course, why heat and radiation are used not only in cooking 
but also in some of the most effective military weapons, in the form of firebombs and nuclear bombs.  Although the use 
of overwhelming numbers of troops is in some way very different from the use of fire and radiation, there is a sense in 
which both are very much the same tactic of swarming. 
52 Not to mention microwave radiation used in microwave ovens for cooking, and X-ray and Gamma-ray radiation used 
in radiotherapy to break up the DNA of cancer cells.   
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counteract its damaging effects.  We’ll talk much more about that concept as we proceed.  The 
second reason is that the earth is no longer a lump of molten rock with an atmosphere of steam, as 
it was during the Hadean period, over 4 billion years ago (Marchi et al. 2014).  At the more moderate 
temperatures of most parts of our modern earth, damage to organisms is constantly occurring, but it 
can be considered relatively gentle.53  We can exemplify the ubiquity of the problem by reminding 
ourselves of what is perhaps its most biologically salient result:  The rather quick and inevitable 
desiccation of almost any organism’s body that would occur if no additional water were being 
habitually mined from the environment to replace the water that is continually being lost.54 
Environmental braising is certainly the major factor contributing to the deterioration of 
materially organized structures.  Things might be quite a bit more resilient if they weren’t regularly 
being struck by a distribution of damaging energetic impacts.  But braising alone is not a guarantee 
that any particular thing will permanently fall apart.  A second important contributor to disorder and 
destruction is the fact that most of this disorganizing change in our world is cumulative and 
generally irreversible—the random effects that pull things apart do not also randomly put them 
together (Achebe 1958; Yeats 1921).  We’ll return to the story of the irreversibility of braising and its 
effects on organized teleological patterns but before we do so, let’s first review the thermodynamic 
subjects that historically have been understood to account for irreversibility.  Not only do these 
subjects have their own important consequences for teleological patterns, which need to be 
understood, but studying them will also help to clarify irreversibility in braising. 
																																																								
53 Astrobiologists have long considered planets that have moderate temperatures to be in the “habitable zone” of the 
stars they orbit, primarily because they allow the possibility of liquid water (Shapley 1953; Strughold 1953).  More 
recently, the same idea has been renamed the “Goldilocks zone”—the region where things are neither too hot nor too 
cold.  A more precise definition of the Goldilocks zone may one day be possible, given in terms not of temperature, but 
relying instead on, say, a ratio of the usable free energy required to do the work that can rebuild structural information 
with respect to the amount of structural information that can be expected to be lost per unit time given a particular 
distribution of energy flux through the volume of an open system. 
54 There are a few extremophile organisms that are able to survive desiccation and reanimate upon rehydration.  But this 
is not an argument against the fact that braising occurs—they do in fact dry out.  It just requires a different range of 
energy to further disorganize these organisms to the point that they can no longer be reanimated. 
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 “Negentropy”  
 
The notion of entropy, along with its tendency to increase—known as the second law of 
thermodynamics—has substantial implications for teleology and vitality.  I would like to preface my 
introduction to these subjects by noting that the relationships here are more indirect than they are 
sometimes taken to be.  
A classic example of expressing the relationships in an overly direct manner comes from 
Erwin Schrödinger who, in 1944, set much of the modern agenda for the branch of theoretical 
biology most closely related to these topics by claiming “a living organism . . . can only keep aloof 
from [death] . . . by continually drawing from its environment negative entropy” (or negentropy as 
Brillouin [1953] later coined it).  Since then, more or less the same position has been repeated and 
cited often:  entropy is disorder, vitality requires order, and therefore vitality is to be seen as 
consisting in processes of entropy reduction (or, as Schrödinger puts it, negative entropy 
consumption).  
Once one understands entropy, Schrödinger’s argument becomes intuitively appealing; 
however, it is only correct as a loose approximation.  For one thing, one of the argument’s premises 
is mistaken—entropy is related to, but it is not equivalent to, disorder in the material world (Lambert 
2002; Styer 2000).  And for another thing, even to the degree that one can accept the premises, the 
argument’s conclusion is too simplistic—although order is necessary for vitality and teleology, that 
doesn’t mean that any process that eliminates disorder or “consumes” order is sufficient for vitality 
(or teleology).  In fact, many systems in our world (such as crystallization and the formation of stars) 
are able to either decrease entropy or to increase material order, or both, without displaying either 
vitalistic or teleological tendencies.  (We will look at some of those systems shortly.)   
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Entropy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
 
I am going to present entropy using the most popular introduction in modern pedagogy, 
even though that presentation easily leads one to mistakenly identify entropy with material disorder.  
There are three reasons for taking this misleading approach.  First, the images used are clear and 
simple, making it easy to understand some of the basics about these rather abstract topics.  Second, 
presenting things in this manner will bring to light the reasons behind the popular misconception 
regarding disorder, thereby allowing us to address and amend the error.  And third, despite the 
drawbacks of these images, they nonetheless can facilitate, by analogy, an understanding of material 
disorder itself, given instead in terms of our earlier notion of environmental braising. 
The traditional didactic method begins by describing what is called an isolated system—more 
or less a closed and thermally insulated box such as a thermos, with walls through which neither 
matter nor energy can enter or escape55.   
Our thermos is imagined to contain a gas composed of some moving atoms each of which 
has a mass and a velocity, and thus some kinetic energy.  This all agrees with Bernoulli’s picture and, 
as in that picture, the atoms are able to exchange energy with one another by colliding and thereby 
altering one another’s velocities (their masses do not change; and, to simplify the image, we are 
assuming it is an inert gas in order to rule out chemical interactions). 
In this picture, the quantity we call entropy is easily described, but difficult to get an intuitive 
feeling for.  The Boltzmann interpretation says that entropy is a measure of the number of possible 
microscopic arrangements of the kinetic energy in the system that equivalently correspond to a single 
																																																								
55 Isolated systems can be contrasted with what are called closed and open systems.  In truth, there are no isolated systems 
other than the universe as a whole, since we can only approximately and temporarily prevent matter and energy from 
passing across boundaries.  Closed systems are created more easily, as they only require the prevention of material 
exchange but allow energetic exchange across their boundaries.  In general, however, any real (rather than idealized) 
province of the universe is an open system, where the boundaries are somehow specified, but both matter and energy 
may cross those boundaries. 
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macroscopic description that accounts for the distribution of energy in the same system.  We can 
break that down to simplify it:  A macroscopic description is one given simply in terms of the 
system’s temperature, pressure, volume, and the number of atoms present.  And the potential 
microscopic arrangements of a system are simply the different ways that all the energy in the system 
might be organized—some over here, some over there, some moving this way, some moving that 
way . . . So to make things concrete, a system consisting of one mole of helium atoms at a uniform 
20º C and 1 atmosphere of pressure, within a thermos of volume 1 liter (altogether, these phrases 
constitute its macroscopic description), will be consistent with many different possible 
configurations of the ~6.0 x 1023 atoms within that space.  The entropy of the system is a simple 
monotonic function of how many such equivalently consistent descriptions there are56.  The 
diagrams usually used to clarify Boltzmann’s description of arrangements are just flattened, two-







56 To be precise, the Boltzmann-Planck formula for entropy, S=kB*ln(W), sets entropy (S) to be proportional (by way of 
Boltzmann’s constant, kB) to the natural logarithm of the number of possible equivalent states (W)—it is nothing more 
than a logarithmic transformation of a numeric count of those states (Planck 1901) 
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Figure 2.1.a:  Fast-moving atoms lined up against the wall on the left (in red) and slowly- moving 
atoms lined up against the wall on the right (in blue).  (We can assume for simplicity that all the atoms 
have the same mass.)  It is very unlikely for a distribution of atomic energies in an isolated system to 
become naturally arranged in this macroscopically ordered way. 
 
Figure 2.1.b:  A group of atoms all located in one half of an isolated system.  Because in this kind of 
diagram the atomic velocities and energies are unspecified, one might mistakenly assume that 
information to be irrelevant.  Again, it is very unlikely for an isolated system to become naturally 
arranged in this macroscopically ordered way. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1.a, one can imagine that all of the fast-moving atoms (red circles) in an 
isolated system of gas happen to be on one side of the thermos, and all the slowly-moving atoms (blue 
circles) happen to be on the other side (let’s assume for simplicity that they are all equal-mass 
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atoms).  In this case, the entropy—the count of the potential states that have equivalently distributed 
kinetic energy—is relatively low.  The reason it is low is that the scenario depicts a particularly well-
organized arrangement for the energy in the thermos, and so there are relatively few ways to 
rearrange the energy within these atoms while maintaining the same description.  (For instance, red 
circles could be swapped with other red circles, or blue with blue; but blue cannot be swapped with 
red without significantly redistributing the energy.)  An alternative diagram, used commonly in 
thermodynamics courses and textbooks, is a black-and-white image, much like Figure 2.1.b, in which 
the distribution of velocities is unspecified (that is, there are no colors), but all of the atoms (or a 
significant majority) begin on just one side or in just one corner of the thermos (see, e.g., Kondepudi 
and Prigogine 2015, p. 111).  One can easily imagine (and thermodynamic analyses and models 
confirm) that, once the atoms are allowed to move, states such as those in both the images of Figure 
2.1 become unlikely, while alternatives in which the energy in the atoms is further spread out across 
the whole space are much more likely at any moment in time. 
In either case, the technical term used to describe both of the systems in Figure 2.1 is that 
the gas is out of thermodynamic equilibrium, which means that the energy distribution in the system is 
imbalanced.  We can contrast this with being in or at thermodynamic equilibrium, which of course 
means that the system is in a kind of balance with respect to its distribution of kinetic energy.  At 
equilibrium (and as long as the system remains isolated), because of the balance in energetic 
distribution, a system will no longer change spontaneously in either its macroscopic description or in 
the shape of the velocity distribution of its particles. 
Now if time is allowed to flow, and thus the atoms in the out-of-equilibrium systems 
pictured above are allowed to move, they will interact with one another and with the walls of their 
respective thermoses, relocating and exchanging energy during each collision.  Over time, the 
probabilistic result of this motion and these interactions is that the moving atoms in each box will 
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come to be mixed in their arrangement (rather than aligned against the two walls, or on just one 
side) and moderated in their speeds (fulfilling what is called a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, 
rather than the imagined bimodal distribution signified by the colors in Figure 2.1.a).  All of this is to 
say that the system simply approaches equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  The Maxwell-Boltzmann speed distribution for four noble gases, at an equilibrium 
temperature of 25ºC.  Each distribution begins at zero (there are no negative speeds) and then forms a 
somewhat bell-shaped curve ending in a rather shallow, long tail (see Boltzmann 1872, 1877; and 
Maxwell 1860a, 1860b).  The mean of each distribution varies inversely with the mass of the type of 
atoms it represents.  When a system is out of equilibrium, the velocities of the atoms may fulfill a 
distribution of any shape but, as the system moves toward equilibrium, the shape of the curve shifts 
until it resembles a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the same two systems of gas from Figure 2.1 after they have reached 
equilibrium.  In this figure, the entropy in each of the systems—the number of equivalent 
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distributions of the energy—is now at a maximum and the kinetic energy is distributed as widely and 
evenly as possible (Boltzmann 1896; Thomson 1852; see also Leff 1996).   
 
 
Figure 2.3.a:  The same container as in Figure 2.1.a.  However, here the atoms have all relocated and, 
through their collisions with one another, their distribution of velocities has taken on a bell-shaped 
but skewed distribution (see Figure 2.2).  As before, the redder the atom, the faster it is moving, and 
the bluer, the more slowly; but now, as one can see, the velocities are clustered around a purplish 
mean, rather than around extreme reds and blues.   
 
Figure 2.3.b:  The same container as in Figure 2.1.b, with the atoms also having spread out over time 
through motion and collisions.  However, in this illustration, as in Figure 2.1.b, the velocities and 
kinetic energies are still unspecified (and thus possibly assumed by a reader to be uniform or 
irrelevant). 
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At this point, one can intuitively understand that random rearrangements of the atoms will produce 
new and different microscopic arrangements, without significantly altering the distribution of energy 
in the system.  And the fact of the matter is that, because of the statistical nature of large numbers 
(we assume many, many particles), any small alterations to the Maxwell-Boltzmann velocity 
distribution that are made by individual motions and collisions are always counteracted on average 
by other simultaneous or near-simultaneous motions and collisions, such that the overall distribution 
retains its shape (unless energy or matter enters or departs the system). 
The thing that is particularly misleading about the comparison of the images in Figure 2.1 
with those in Figure 2.3 is that one might focus primarily on the fact that, as time has passed, the 
atoms or molecules have moved.  This can be even more misleading in the (colorless) b-versions of 
these illustrations that are so pedagogically common but that fail to specify any energy distributions 
or changes in velocities.  What is most central to entropy and equilibrium is not that the atoms 
themselves have been moved or redistributed, but the fact that the energy in them has been, resulting 
in a more likely, more accessible, and more evenly distributed state of energy.   
 
Entropy is not Disorder 
 
Now that we have a sense of what entropy and the second law describe, we can see why they 
don’t describe material disorder.  In short, what they describe is energetic disorder, and these two kinds 
of disorder are correlated only to the degree that the material and the energy in a system are 
correlated in their arrangement.  In a system where matter and energy are highly correlated—where 
energy disperses in large part through the translational motion of atoms57—entropy and material 
																																																								
57 The paradigm case in which energy disperses primarily through the translational motion of atoms is the case when a 
gas in equilibrium is suddenly given more volume into which it may diffuse and expand.  This is the case in the transition 
illustrated by Figures 2.1.b and 2.3.b, but it is a relatively infrequent occurrence. 
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order will also be highly correlated, but this isn’t always or even often the case (see also Atkins 1984; 
Atkins and dePaula 2006; Lambert 2002; Styer 2000).   
The misconception about disorder comes about when one relies on images such as Figures 
2.1 and 2.3, especially in the black-and-white b-versions that do not specify the velocity distributions 
of the various atoms in the thermos.  One might assume from such images that the energy in a 
system is able to disperse simply by being carried from place to place by the atoms as they move 
about.  The mere translational motion of atoms, however, has no effect on their velocity distribution 
or on the number of equivalent microscopic arrangements of energy, to which entropy is tied; as was 
already described, the dispersal of energy occurs when it is transferred between atoms through their 
collisions.  This latter mechanism can allow energy to move long distances while the underlying 
material substrate vibrates only locally.  
Using the standard pedagogical thermodynamic imagery can be even more misleading, in 
fact, because the scenarios pictured are almost always imagined to be gases, and the correlation 
between the distributions of material and of energy is always much higher in a gas than it is in a 
liquid or, especially, a solid.  And while the concept of material order applies to all phases of matter, 
it is most relevant in the solid phase, where orderliness tends to have the greatest stability over time.   
Take, for instance, an elongated block of copper that is in contact with a heat source on one 
end, and a heat sink on the other end.  The system is not isolated and not in equilibrium.  But 
imagine now that we rapidly remove the heat source and the sink, enclose the block of copper in a 
vacuum-insulated box, and treat it suddenly as an isolated system.  We can see, in such a case, that 
material order can be almost entirely decoupled from energetic order and entropy.  The system 
begins far out of equilibrium, with energy distributed more on one side than the other, just as it is in 
the gases we’ve discussed.  As time passes, the solid system is driven towards a uniform temperature 
and towards thermal equilibrium, by the transfer of vibrations in the atoms of copper.  Ultimately, 
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the equilibrium entropy of the system winds up with a very different value from the entropy value at 
the start, but this change in energetic orderliness occurs in spite of the fact that the system will have 
changed little, if at all, in its material, structural orderliness.  As long as the temperature is not high 
enough to melt the copper, the atoms remain for the most part just where they were, or very close to 
it.58 
The block of copper shows that material orderliness does not have to decrease as energetic 
orderliness decreases, but there are even cases where material orderliness can increase during 
processes where energetic orderliness is decreasing (and entropy is increasing).  For example: when a 
cloud of hydrogen atoms in a nebula is drawn together gravitationally to form a star, the conversion 
of gravitational potential energy into kinetic motion (that is: into heat) will increase the entropy of 
the system, as the particles move toward one another more and more quickly, and thereby jostle 
more and more violently.  (And not only this, but if the atoms involved begin to move fast enough 
they will eventually fuse converting some of their nuclear potential energy into still more heat, 
increasing entropy still further).  At the same time, though, as entropy (energetic disorder) increases, 
order (rather than disorder) in the material constitution will also increase, as the once widely 
distributed cloud becomes a localized, spherical star, and its constituents possibly fuse into heavier, 
more localized, stable elements.  
Material order and thermodynamic entropy are phenomena that can be decoupled from one 
another.  The theory of teleological patterns that I’ll describe later is one based primarily on material 
organization—it is a theory of how certain very special kinds of material order come to exist and to 
remain in the world.  The second law certainly applies here, but the tendency for energetic 
disorganization to accumulate is not the only thing that must be overcome in order for teleological 
																																																								
58 There will of course be some expansion in the newly-warmed side of the copper block and some contraction in the 
newly-cooled side, but this is a minimal change in material locations of atoms, and an even more minimal change in 
terms of the material orderliness that is constrained by fairly rigid chemical bonding. 
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patterns (or, for that matter, other forms of material organization) to come to exist.  The other thing 
that must independently be overcome, and that we’ll look at presently, is the analogous tendency for 
material disorganization, caused by braising, to accumulate.  
 
The Ratcheting of Material Disintegration 
 
The spontaneous flow of events towards thermodynamic equilibrium is usually taken to be 
responsible for what is called the arrow of time or, in other words, the direction in which we perceive 
time to be flowing (Eddington 1928).  The idea is that processes in which entropy comes to increase 
can proceed only in that one direction (of increasing entropy) and not in reverse, and so such 
processes are called irreversible.  Heat flows from warm things to cool things, not vice versa.  Systems 
such as those in Figure 2.1 evolve to look like those in Figure 2.3; but chaotic jumbles of whizzing 
atoms never suddenly end up in a state in which all the fast ones are lined up against one wall while 
all the slow ones are on the other side.  When a dropped ball impacts the earth, its kinetic energy of 
falling is converted into heat as the atoms in both the ball and the earth set one another vibrating.  
Never, however, do a set of thermally vibrating atoms in the ground come to all concertedly push in 
the same direction at the same moment in such a way that a stationary ball suddenly rises up into the 
air.  The only way to get such a reversal of normal events to occur is to perfectly coordinate a vast 
series of distant events beforehand.  But barring acts of supreme omniscience, intelligence, and 
control, that kind of coordination is enormously unlikely to occur for even small numbers of 
particles.  We can label this the energetic coordination problem.  Certain energetic events can occur 
spontaneously in only one direction because, in order for them to occur in the other direction, it 
would require a hugely unlikely and complex coordination of prior energetic events.  The second 
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law’s guarantee is, in effect, a ratchet mechanism by which energetic disorder irreversibly accumulates 
(see also Deacon 2013). 
But as I’ve said, in our quest to understand teleological patterns, we need to be interested in 
whether or not a pattern may maintain its particular form of material organization.  As we just saw, 
energetic disorder and material disorder are distinct phenomena, and so a ratcheting effect in the 
one does not imply a ratcheting effect in the other.  The isolated block of copper, for instance, is an 
example where energetic disorder ratchets up quite rapidly according to the second law, while 
material disorder changes little if at all.  The second law does not imply ratcheted disintegration of 
material disorder. 
We can, however, describe an analogue or a corollary to Eddington’s arrow of time that does 
affect material disorder in much the same way.  Quite intuitively, the random energetic impacts on a 
material pattern from an environment of braising may cause damage to the material structure that 
constitutes that pattern, and the next impact is more likely to further damage the pattern than it is to 
repair the damage recently done.  We can illustrate this, as we did before with entropy, by 







Figure 2.4:  One atom, from amongst a set that were previously arranged in an orderly fashion, has 
begun to move.  The picture is essentially the same as in Figure 2.1.b, except that material order has 
been emphasized pictorially.  The atoms are all organized on one side of the available space, but their 
velocities are now truly unimportant to us.  The atom that has ventured from the group now has 
exactly one way in which it can move in order to return to the orderly pattern, and a multitude of 
ways in which it might move further away from that particular state of orderliness.  The same would 
hold for any of the other atoms if they also began to move from the arrangement.  This illustration 
could be of either a fluid or a solid; the same considerations apply in any phase—as soon as any part 
of the structure is impacted by enough energy for it to break sufficiently far away from the rest, the 
likelihood increases that the lost part will continue drifting away, rather than returning to its previous 
location.  “Sufficiently far” means that it has been knocked away to a location where the attractive 
forces pulling it back towards its previous location are overpowered by the other forces in its new 
location.  In an environment with a distribution of energy that includes random perturbations that, on 
occasion, are able to move an atom to a distance greater than that threshold, the ratchet effect will 
ensure the steady and continuous disintegration of the material orderliness. 
 
As one bit of matter—one particle or atom or molecule—is knocked away from the pattern 
in which it once took part, it immediately comes to have more ways in which it might move further 
away than ways in which it might go back.  A familiar example might make this more intuitive: 
whenever you launch a washing machine through an asteroid belt and it starts bouncing off a 
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number of asteroids, the second asteroid strike is extremely unlikely to repair the damage made by 
the first; instead, damage to the washer accumulates and bit by bit it will eventually fall apart.  The 
same goes, of course, for a washing machine that sits in a basement for six or seven decades.  
Although the damages sustained in the basement are more moderate than those caused by asteroid 
strikes, they also accumulate, and rarely if ever will they undo one another’s effects.   
Let’s leave the washer aside now and talk instead about a dryer.  This example will help to 
describe the irreversibility of material disorder and at the same time re-emphasize its distinctness 
from energetic disorder.  If you take a bundle of folded laundry and put it in the dryer, it will all 
come out unfolded.  If you take the same bundle of laundry, unfolded, and put it in the dryer, it will 
never come out folded.  This process, in which unfolding occurs naturally and spontaneously but 
folding does not, looks very similar to the kinds of unidirectional examples that provide the basis for 
Eddington’s arrow of time, but there is a difference.  What is increasing and irreversible in these 
cases is not energetic disorder but material disorder.  If we assume the two bundles of laundry to 
begin in the same energetic state (say, they are in thermal equilibrium with the room temperature) 
and if we assume they go through the same energetic process (a tumbling), then they will end up in 
the same energetic state:  perhaps they will have gained a little heat and a little static charge, but in 
both bundles that change should be roughly the same, and thus irrelevant to the significant 
difference in how well folded the laundry is.  In each of the bundles of laundry, the change in 
entropy over the course of the tumbling process will be equivalent; at the same time, however, the 
change in material order will differ significantly between the two cases. 
From the washer, the dryer, and the atoms in Figure 2.4, we can see that material disorder, 
just like energetic disorder, has a tendency to accumulate in an environment of random changes.  
Said another way: material order has a tendency to disintegrate.  This is an analogous, but distinct, 
arrow of time.  We can call it the ratcheting of material disintegration or simply ratcheted braising.  Under the 
	 75	
influence of random energetic perturbations, any material organization will have a tendency to fall 
apart.  And ratcheted braising comes also with an analogous but distinct coordination problem that 
we can call the material coordination problem:  The random background of braising is extremely unlikely 
to put together more than a few bits of structured information on its own and, even when it does, it 
is more likely to subsequently pull that structure apart again.  In order for material organization to 
form, there needs to be some source of information or coordination that can drive the process.  Just 
like a mechanical engineer’s ratchet-and-pawl mechanism, the process of material disintegration is 
free to step forward, yet generally prevented from stepping back.  
 
Framing the Context for Teleology 
 
At last, we’ve reached our full description of the thermodynamic problem for teleology and 
vitality.  It is not simply that entropy must be overcome, as Schrödinger had put it . . . although, at 
this point in our discussion, that problem remains too.  In addition (and among other things), the 
material coordination problem needs to be solved in order to counteract the unstoppable effects of 
ratcheted braising, and to allow organized structures to come to exist and to persist. 
Taken naïvely, these considerations seem to ensure gloomy prospects for our world.  It 
seems as if nothing materially organized could ever take root in soil of this sort.  But as we all know, 
that isn’t actually the case.  Organization abounds.  Our world is full of fascinating patterns—from 
stars and planets and galaxies to diamonds and snowflakes and basalt columns, to gyres and storms, 
and bubbles and bedforms, and most especially, to living, teleological patterns.  The world we live in 
is neither heaven nor hell; it is somewhere in between.  It is full of ratcheted destruction, at every 
scale and at every moment . . . and yet at the same time, life blooms amidst the destruction; structure 
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and organization are created; and our world appears, somehow, to resist a complete descent back 
into the chaotic soup of particles where it began in the moments after the Big Bang. 
There has to be a good reason behind the fact that order and life are able to bloom in a 
world where the cold statistical fact is that both energetic and material organization will tend to 
progressively disintegrate.  Order can’t arise by mere accident because, even if it did—even if a 
philosopher’s “cosmic coincidence” were to create some organized structure in a small corner of the 
world for just a moment—that little accidental pattern would be subjected to as much ratcheted 
braising as anything else.  It would quickly be torn apart.  For ordered patterns to continue to exist 
in this world, something more than chance must be involved—some kind of blueprint, some 
dependable source of material orderliness must create them.   
The theory of teleology described later is a theory of a particular kind of material orderliness.  
But in order to specify that particular breed of organization, we need first to account for the general 
existence of material orderliness. By and large, the thermodynamic principles involved in this have 
been worked out already.  As we’ll see next, much of the credit for our understanding of those 
principles is due to the work of the physical chemist and thermodynamicist Ilya Prigogine.   
 
Death and Taxes 
 
If we think of the second law and our analogous ratcheted braising as two universally 
imposed taxes—if we see them as inescapably taking constant bites out of our two orderliness 
accounts—then, in order to explain the organized patterns that we see, we’ll have to look for some 
kind of workaround or exception to those universal statistical rules.  Prigogine spent much of his 
career documenting and describing how this can happen.  What we’ll find, as we explore his ideas, is 
that there is indeed a pair of exceptions to the universal tax-codes, which, when coupled together, 
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allow us to get Order out of Chaos (as Prigogine and his colleague Isabelle Stengers titled their 1984 
book). The first of these exceptions is a loophole in the second law by which certain systems can 
“move their accounts offshore” and thereby pay no “local taxes”.  Well known by physicists today, 
this loophole permits the energetic disorder of many systems to stay steady or even to decrease 
without violating the law.  The second exception is a way to earn interest on material disorder before 
the ratcheted braising tax is applied and even, possibly, at a rate that may exceed the taxation rate.  
This gives systems that have low entropy (as created by the first loophole) the opportunity to reliably 
produce more material order, even while other simultaneous (braising) processes work to 
disintegrate it.  It provides the tools by which certain corners of the universe may potentially come 




The second law states quite simply that entropy will only ever increase.  What this really 
means, though, is that it must always increase when measured over the entirety of the universe, or 
any other isolated system.  In smaller and less idealized provinces of space, particularly in open systems 
where matter and energy both can be exchanged with the environment, the local entropy can be 
found to decrease, as long as the bottom line in our universal entropic bookkeeping works out to 
show an increase. That is to say, if the local decrease in entropy is simultaneously balanced by an 
equal or greater increase elsewhere in the universe, then the second law will not be violated. 
As it turns out, all it usually takes for this to occur in any particular open system is for energy 
to flow through the system.  The incoming energy, in whatever form it enters the system, will almost 
always represent an imbalance in the energy distribution of the system, and thus, in those cases, 
entropy will be instantaneously decreased, pushing the system away from equilibrium.  If the flow of 
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external energy is consistent, then the system can be maintained in a state (or a series of states) that 
can be called far from equilibrium (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977).  That comprises our first loophole—as 
long as there is a consistent flow of energy into an open system, there is a chance that the system 
can be maintained in an energetically ordered, far-from-equilibrium state. 
One example of such a continuously energetically ordered (far-from-equilibrium) system 
would be the elongated block of copper we discussed earlier, with a heat source on one end and a 
heat sink on the opposite end.  Another example would be the earth as it basks in the glow of the 
sun, always absorbing solar radiation on one side and emitting blackbody radiation (primarily in the 
infrared range) on the other.  Another example is biological organisms, all of which absorb energy in 
the form of food (or sunlight, in the case of photosynthetic organisms) and thereby maintain an 
energy imbalance in the metabolic gradient between the absorption, storage, and usage of that 
energy.  So far, this loophole accounts only for an imbalance of energy, or what we can call an 
energetic potential.  It’s a good start, but next we need to look at the further implications of that 
energetic potential. 
 
Dissipative Structures  
 
The second workaround to the orderliness tax laws is based on another pair of 
thermodynamic concepts that need to be introduced.  As the entropy of a system increases and 
energy comes to be spread out, a quantity briefly mentioned earlier, called the free energy of the 
system, decreases (in ideal cases, reaching zero as entropy reaches its maximum).  Free energy is the 
portion of the energy in a system that hasn’t yet been evenly dispersed or distributed (Gibbs 1873; 
Helmholtz 1882).  It is the fraction of the system’s energy that is still out of balance.  The reason it is 
important is that free energy is the only energy in a system that is available to perform what 
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physicists and chemists call useful work.  As a system evolves toward equilibrium and its energy 
becomes evenly distributed, the free energy will inevitably dwindle, and so work, in any isolated 
system or any system into which energy no longer flows, must eventually stop.  But in a system that 
is maintained far from equilibrium by a flow of external energy, some fraction of free energy will 
always be available, and so useful work can, in principle, always be done.   
Work itself is of vital importance to our topic because it takes work to move things with 
mass, and material organization can only be established—structure can only be built—by moving 
matter into new locations.  The workaround to the ratcheted braising tax law is that the free energy 
(created by the loophole in the second law of thermodynamics) can in principle be used to perform 
useful work that can create material organization.   
Prigogine dubbed systems that take advantage of these two creative accounting techniques 
for accumulating earnings in spite of powerful taxes dissipative structures, because the processes that 
construct or maintain the order in them can only do so at the cost of generating entropy and 
dissipating that entropy along with some energy (primarily in the form of heat) into the 
environment.  Dissipative structures exist in far-from-equilibrium systems that mine sources of 
energy from the environment, harness part of the free energy from within it to do (order-building) 
work, and return the unusable portion back to the environment in a state of increased entropy (see 
Prigogine 1967; Prigogine and Lefever 1968; Prigogine and Nicolis 1967; Prigogine and Stengers 
1984). 
The extraction of free energy from an environment is the basis for the biological concept of 
metabolism but, as we can see here, it is not an essentially biological notion; we’ve described it in 
purely physical terms.  Other dissipative structures in far-from-equilibrium systems, such as growing 
crystals and the orderly convection cells that form in tropical cyclones, all have mechanisms that 
exploit energy flowing through the system, in order to perform useful, structure-building work.  
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We’ll look at this distinction between biological and non-biological dissipative systems shortly, but 




Usefulness is a concept that comes with slippery overtones of subjectivity and teleology.  The 
term “useful work” sounds as if it is the kind of work that a person (or other agent) will benefit 
from.  If we claim that some kinds of work are useful while others are not, but also that the useful 
kind can occur in crystal growth or storm formation, and so on, then are we claiming that these 
kinds of phenomena are already, teleological patterns?  One would hope not. 
I think a better term for the kind of work that can be performed by free energy and that 
cannot be performed in a system at equilibrium might be “usable work”, which doesn’t imply that 
someone actually benefits from that work whenever it occurs, but just that one could, if one so 
desired.  I’ll stick with the term “useful work” because it is already in widespread currency with 
physicists and chemists, but I’d like to further clarify its meaning in order to remove any teleological 
impressions that might accidentally arise.   
For the purposes of our topic, I think the best way to understand this concept is to say that 
useful work is work that must be done while not simultaneously being undone.  Any time two 
particles interact (through, say, a collision in a gas) they perform work upon one another.  Each is 
made to move by the other.  But at equilibrium, there is an important sense in which, on average, 
the work that is done through any particular interaction is also simultaneously undone by other 
particles interacting at the same time.  Of course the individual changes—in those individual 
particles—are not undone, but the change to the overall distribution of energy is simultaneously 
undone.  This is ensured by the statistical nature of equilibrium.   
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In addition, there is a second result at equilibrium.  While there are material changes in an 
ever-moving gas (at every moment some particular particles will have gained some energy while 
others will have lost some) there can be no concerted material changes.  The work performed by the 
transfers of kinetic energy in those many particles at equilibrium remains uncoordinated and thus 
unable to work together in a uniform direction.  Because energetic disorder is at a maximum, the 
energetic exchanges through collisions are effectively random, and so the only effect this can have 
on material order is the disorganizing effect of braising.   
However, when a system is out of equilibrium, potentially far from equilibrium, then the 
imbalanced (free) energy, in its attempts to become balanced as it drives the system toward 
equilibrium, can concertedly push in a single direction—from the imbalanced regions where energy 
is more highly concentrated, towards the regions where energy is less concentrated.  When this 
happens, and the energetic flow in the system works concertedly, such organizational changes can 
occur as a gas pushing on a piston or gravitation pulling a nebular cloud of atoms towards the center 
of mass, or electrons flowing through wires to power electronic devices.  And, if properly harnessed 
by material constraints (engine cylinder walls, wire insulation, and so on . . .), this capacity for 
material change can potentially be used to contribute to the production of material orderliness (see 
also Carnot, 1824; Deacon 2013). 
 
Spontaneously Organizing Systems 
 
Along with Gibbs (1873) and Helmholtz (1882), who each developed part of the notion of 
free energy, Prigogine has painted us a nice background picture of the thermodynamic requirements 
essential to producing the kind of material orderliness that underlies teleology and life.  Teleological 
patterns can exist only in far-from-equilibrium, open systems because they are materially organized 
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patterns, and materially organized patterns can only come to exist and be maintained if there is a 
source of free energy that can be used to perform useful work in order to continually rebuild the 
material orderliness that ratcheted braising attempts to drain away.  But these thermodynamic 
requirements are only some of the prerequisites for teleological patterns.  And teleological patterns 
are only some of the materially organized patterns in our world.  As we’ve noted along the way, the 
same thermodynamic processes also give rise to other patterns; free energy is also metabolized into 
the concerted useful work that organizes such non-teleological dissipative structures as stars and 
planets and crystals and storms and so on. 
These other structures, and many more (a broader assortment of which are catalogued in 
Figure 2.5) form another category of phenomena that are often called spontaneously organizing patterns, 
because their organization seems to come out of nowhere, as a consequence of the laws of physics.59  




59 Although spontaneously organizing patterns are more often called self-organizing systems, I will avoid that phrase, as 
the word “self” has strong metaphysical implications, with regard to identity—implications that I think are more aptly 
applied to teleological patterns than to spontaneously organizing ones (see Chapter IX, pp. 435–7).  Also, while most 
people might map the category of teleological patterns onto organisms, I prefer to remain open to the idea of 
teleological patterns that are not strictly cell-biological life. 
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Figure 2.5:  Various familiar forms of non-teleological material order, also known as spontaneously 
organizing patterns:  (a) a star at the heart of a nebula; (b) the planet Saturn; (c) a spiral galaxy; (d) 
basalt columns; (e) a tropical storm; (f) a rippled bedform in desert sand; (g) a snowflake; (h) a fluorite 
crystal; (i) a soap bubble. (Nebula, Saturn, and galaxy photos courtesy of NASA.  Basalt column photo 
taken by Petr Brož.  Hurricane photo courtesy of NOAA. Snowflake photo taken by Kenneth 
Libbrecht.  Fluorite crystal photo taken by Géry Parent.  Bubble photo taken by Jeff Kubina.) 
 
The features shared by teleological patterns and spontaneously organizing patterns have long 
caused philosophical difficulty for those working towards a definition of life.  Suggestions about 
criteria for being alive have often included features such as growth, reproduction, and self-
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maintenance, each of which only operates when coupled with a metabolism.  But the main category 
of counterexample to this kind of definition typically has been various spontaneously organizing but 
clearly non-living patterns, examples of which are able to metabolize free energy that can then be 
used to reproduce (e.g. a candle flame), grow (e.g. a crystal) or to maintain their structure (e.g. 
storms).60   
What Prigogine has given us is the thermodynamic principles that allow generally for 
material organization in the world.  What have not yet been worked out are the principles that 
specify and guide the creation of that organization, as well as those principles that may allow 
discrimination between various kinds of material orderliness.  A theory of teleology will need to 
distinguish those dissipative structures that are teleological from similar structures that are 
spontaneously organizing yet neither alive nor goal-directed. 
We can make a short list now of some of the most obvious questions that Prigogine’s 
paradigm leaves open for exploration:  First, in any particular system, can enough material 
orderliness be produced to outstrip that which is lost to environmental braising?  Second, if material 
order is being produced in a particular system, what would make that materially ordered structure 
goal-directed as opposed to spontaneously organizing?  That is, are there characteristics of orderly 
patterns that can be used to differentiate between those that are merely orderly and those whose 
orderliness serves a purpose?  And third, in either teleological or spontaneously organizing patterns, 
what might serve as the source of information or the blueprint that directs the construction of 
orderliness, thereby solving the material coordination problem?  From where exactly do nature’s 
blueprints come?  There are almost certainly more questions than this, but I think being able to 
																																																								
60 We will look later at the ways in which a theory that distinguishes teleological patterns from spontaneously organizing 
patterns may help specify a definition of life, and we can compare it to the type of definition mentioned here, which is 
put instead in terms of an essentialist list of criteria.  For further discussions highlighting the difficulty of defining life in 
essentialist terms see, e.g., Cleland and Chyba (2002); and the various other contributions to Bedau and Cleland (2010).  
See also Popa (2004), Trifonov, (2011), as well as the various responses to Trifonov collected in Volume 29, Issue 4 of 
the Journal of Biomolecular Structure and Dynamics. 
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answer these ones will already constitute a major step in the scientific explanation of material 
orderliness. 
 
Cells, Cells, Cells, and ’celles 
 
It will help us later in seeing how our theory makes the distinction between teleological 
patterns and spontaneously organizing patterns, if we have a few examples of each to hold up for 
comparison.  Since we’ll see a number of teleological patterns throughout the dissertation, at the 
moment I will just introduce some commonly discussed examples of spontaneously organizing 
patterns (see e.g. Deacon 2013; Juarrero 1999; Prigogine and Stengers 1984).  But the goal here is 
more than just to familiarize ourselves with these examples; it is also to notice how these patterns 
resemble living systems in their growth, reproduction, and resistance to damage, while nonetheless 
lacking the hallmarks of teleology. 
We’ll look first at crystals (whose organization is based around a “unit cell”), then at storms 
(based on what is called a “convection cell”), then at another convection pattern that forms what are 
called “Bénard cells”, and lastly at a class of non-biological structures called “micelles”, which 
resemble biological cell-membranes both in their form and in their mode of assembly.61  Crystals and 
micelles are both relatively solid structures, while storms and Bénard cells are more quickly evolving 
forms of organization that exist only within fluids. 62  We will begin by looking at all four types of 
pattern, but it is important to note that teleological patterns, such as organisms, never arise as purely 
																																																								
61 It is a curious fact that most of the examples we’ll look at seem to have been labeled as “cells”, in one way or another.  
While the first three examples derive their name from Latin cella, which means storeroom or chamber, the etymological 
root of “micelle” derives separately, and only coincidentally, from Latin mica, which means crumb, with an added 
diminutive feminine plural ending (-ella). 
62 One category of spontaneously organizing patterns that we’ve already discussed—gravitationally formed celestial 
bodies—has both solid and fluid exemplars.  Stars are composed largely of plasma; planets such as Jupiter and Saturn, of 
gas; and other objects, including the earth, the moon, and the dwarf planets Ceres and Pluto, are predominantly solid.  
There also happen to be planets, such as the recently discovered UCF-1.01, which circles a star designated GJ 436, that 
are made mostly of liquid magma (Stevenson et al. 2012). 
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fluid entities (such as patterns in convection), nor do they tend to occur as purely solid entities (as 
with crystals).63 
By definition, a crystal is a set of particles (atoms or ions or molecules) that are organized 
through repetition at the microscopic scale.  Each species of crystal is specified by its unit cell—the 
smallest volume of atoms or ions that, when tessellated in three dimensions, will construct the 
crystal.  Crystals grow by the recurrent addition of the particles that form these unit cells, and those 
particles are usually moved into place by complex energetics, often including ionization from some 
source, chemical reaction, solvation, and then the thermodynamics by which ions or molecules come 
out of a supersaturated solution alongside the existing (seed) crystal and become more likely to bond 
to that seed than to re-dissolve.64  Although the overall story is often rather protracted, in short, 
crystal growth exploits some of the free energy that flows through an open system to organize some 
of the system’s material contents into a regular lattice (and we can be sure of this because crystals 
never form at equilibrium but always as part of the evolution of a dissipative system towards 
thermodynamic equilibrium).  In addition to their seeding and growth, crystals may also at times split 
into parts (or “cleave”) under stress, leaving each part to continue growing individually into distinct 
crystals in a process that thereby resembles reproduction. 
Our next example involves the structure of storms such as tropical cyclones.  A typical (non-
cyclonic) storm cell is an organized structure that contains an updraft and a downdraft, together 
allowing circulation of air between the upper and lower atmosphere.  The updraft that powers these 
																																																								
63 We can speculate for now that one reason that organisms are generally a balance between liquid and solid structure is 
that the balance provides a two-part strategy that helps them resist braising.  Unlike pure liquids, something with a partly 
solid component will be strong enough to resist the convective mixing and diffusion that might disorganize them.  And 
unlike pure solids, something with a partly liquid component will be adaptable enough to be able to rapidly move 
resources to repair damages. 
64 For instance, the selenite (gypsum) megacrystals in the Cave of the Crystals in Naica, Mexico, are hypothesized to have 
been formed through a series of stages in which sulfide ions dissolved in magma-heated, calcium-rich water, and were 
then married with slowly diffused diatomic oxygen to produce SO42- ions, after which both those ions and calcium ions 
slowly, over the course of a half million years, came out of supersaturated solution, and crystallized with hydration into 
CaSO4!2H2O (García-Ruiz et al. 2007). 
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cycles comes from the heating of air and evaporation of moisture over sun-warmed patches of 
ground or ocean.  The convection produced in this process lifts the water vapor up to form a 
cumulonimbus cloud, which, when it reaches cooler high atmospheric temperatures, condenses and 
then falls as rain or hail.  As the warm air rises, it leaves behind a low-pressure zone, which is then 
filled by drawing down cool air through the downdraft.   
Tropical cyclones (such as hurricanes and typhoons) are even more structured.  They form in 
roughly the same way, but some differences in their structure and conditions allow them to persist 
for quite long periods.  When a group of single-cell thunderstorms form near one another and then 
converge over the ocean (as often happens near Cape Verde, for instance, where warm air coming 
off of the Sahara meets the cooler and moist coastal region of West Africa), the updrafts of those 
storms may merge together, resulting in a significant low-pressure zone.  This depression attempts 
to refill partially by drawing downdrafts from above but also partially by drawing inflows of air from 
the surrounding surface region.  Those lower-atmosphere and surface winds, end up spiraling 
inward and, in the process, becoming heated as they pass over the warm ocean.  As the new air 
warms up, it fails to relieve the low-pressure zone that drew it inward, and instead comes to rise up 
to the upper atmosphere too, allowing the low-pressure zone to persist and to continue drawing in 




Figure 2.6:  Hurricane Luis, a tropical storm traveling over the Atlantic Ocean, September 3rd, 1995.  
While the description in the main text focuses on the energetics involved in forming and maintaining 
a storm, an image such as this reminds us of the material orderliness that those processes produce.  
Photo reprinted courtesy of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  
 
In the case of cyclones, we have a process that avails itself of free energy (extracted from the 
non-equilibrium gradient between the warm ocean and the cool upper atmosphere) to maintain an 
organizational structure for a lengthy period of time.  While crystals exhibit behaviors akin to growth 
and reproduction, the cyclonic process can, in some ways, be seen as akin to biological cell-
maintenance because not only is the structure sustained, but also small fluctuations in the shape of 
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the storm (due, for instance, to collision with islands) get “repaired” spontaneously by the same 
energetic processes.  Because of this, large tropical cyclones can persist for days or even weeks, 
unlike single-cell storms which usually disintegrate within about half an hour.65  
Our third example is based in a process called Rayleigh-Bénard convection, which occurs 
when a thin layer of viscous liquid is heated from below in a gravitational field.  At the start, thermal 
conductivity will transfer the heat energy, resulting in a linear temperature gradient from the bottom 
of the fluid to the top.  At some point, however, as the heating continues, the fluid will rather 
suddenly and spontaneously begin to flow in an organized pattern, wherein the cooler, denser, fluid 
at the top will sink and the warmer, less dense, fluid from the bottom will rise in localized, self- and 
mutually-reinforcing regions called Bénard cells.  The constant circulation within these convection 
cells is able to redistribute larger amounts of energy faster than conductive dynamics can.66   
 
																																																								
65 An example of extreme cyclonic persistence is Jupiter’s famous Great Red Spot, which has somewhat differing 
energetics but is also a kind of cyclone.  The Great Red Spot has lasted at least as long as astronomers have been 
continuously observing it (which is over 185 years now, and possibly much longer).  This longevity can be chalked up to 
the facts that the Great Red Spot has had a constant supply of energy, that it is kept more or less in place at low latitudes 
by interaction with other convection currents on the gas giant, and that surface friction in Jupiter’s thick atmosphere is 
far lower than that which cyclones on earth’s sea and land experience. 
66 See also the phenomenon of rose-window instability in a thin layer of low-conductivity fluid that is subjected to a 
high-voltage current (Niazi 2017; Pérez 1997). 
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Figure 2.7:  Bénard cells formed in silicone oil with powdered aluminum used as a tracer to create 
contrast.  A fascinating fact about Bénard cells is that one can disturb the cell walls with, say, a 
toothpick or a spoon, and watch as they often reform more or less where they originally were.  Photo 
reprinted courtesy of Vicente Perez Muñuzuri. 
 
What is most surprising about Bénard cells is not that convection takes over because it 
transfers heat more efficiently than conduction—that much is an everyday observation—but rather 
that the form of these convection cells is so stable.  They take shape with neat boundaries that are 
not permanent, but are nonetheless well defined and fairly persistent (see Figure 2.7).  As we saw 
also with cyclonic convection, the biological activity that Rayleigh-Bénard convection most 
resembles in this regard is the metabolic process of cell maintenance.  The boundaries of Bénard 
cells are able to resist moderate perturbations, quickly forming again after being nudged or disturbed 
with small instruments.   
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Fascinating as this phenomenon is, we need to be cautious in our analysis of it. The material 
order formed in Bénard cells is minimal.  When a fluid made of a single type of molecule (or other 
homogeneous mixture) is made to move through convection, the overall material organization 
undergoes very little change, as each displaced molecule comes to be quickly replaced by another 
similar one.  What is flowing in this circulation is primarily energy.  That is not to say that there is no 
material organization formed, but the boundaries and centers of the cells that we can pick out 
observationally, differ from the rest of the fluid only in variations of density and surface tension, not 
by (semi-) rigid chemical bonding.  The system is materially ordered, but neither highly nor durably 
so. 
We can move on to our last example now.  Micelles and their relatives (liposomes and 
phospholipid bilayers) are small structures that form by the spontaneous organization of certain 
molecules called surfactants, which are suspended in a liquid solvent (typically but not always water).  
Surfactants have the property of being amphiphilic, which simply means that they are elongated 
molecules possessing one end that is hydrophilic (attracted to water) and one end that is lipophilic 
(attracted to oils and not water).  
When the energetic conditions are right67, the hydrophilic ends of surfactants prefer to align 
with one another facing the water, so as to sequester the lipophilic (hydrophobic) ends together, in 
the now-protected interiors of the new structures they form.  The same general plan is apparent not 
just in micelles, but also in liposomes and bilayers (see, e.g., Bitounis, et al. 2012; Butt, Graf, and 
Kappl 2006).   
 
																																																								
67 Micelles form only above what is called the critical micelle temperature (or Krafft temperature), which allows the 
surfactants to be freed up from their crystalized precipitate form, for other interactions.  They also only form above the 
critical micelle concentration—a measure of how much surfactant is present in the solvent, and therefore of how likely 
the surfactant molecules are to run into one another in order for micelles and other such structures to grow.  
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Figure 2.8:  A schematic diagram of a micelle, composed of amphiphilic, fatty-acid molecules.  The 
hydrophilic ends of these molecules are the pink balls in the diagram, while the lipophilic ends are the 
blue “tails” hiding in the interior of the micelle. 
 
The processes of micelle formation and of crystal formation are quite different in some 
regards, but they share some thermodynamic aspects.  In each, the phase change from a solution 
devoid of the ordered structures to one that contains them is always one in which changes in either 
concentration or temperature create an energetic imbalance in the system, which is then dispersed 
(to bring the system toward equilibrium) by the physical reorganization that accompanies the 
crystallization or micellization.  Micelle formation also shares some properties with tropical cyclone 
development and Rayleigh-Bénard convection.  As with those other two processes, the mechanisms 
that produce micelles are also able to repair them—as long as the conditions for formation remain 
the same, any ruptures to an existing micelle or liposome are soon filled with more surfactant 
molecules and thereby closed up.  In micelles, we again see metabolic behaviors that appear to have 
some kinship to cell maintenance, by using energy and local molecular resources to reconstruct 
damage. 
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So as we’ve seen now, each one of these spontaneously organizing patterns results from a 
system that, in one manner or another, harnesses free energy from an out-of-equilibrium energy 
gradient to perform the work that coordinates the material organization of the pattern.  Some of 
them grow and some of them replicate; all of them come to exist, all are able to persist, and all can 
heal some degree of damage brought about by external perturbations.  Each seems to have some 
lifelike behaviors, and yet none of them has teleological tendencies.   
Most notably, unlike agents (such as organisms) whose activities call for explanations in 
what-for terms, the things done by crystals, storms, Bénard cells, and micelles can all be accounted 
for solely in how-come terms, consisting of the physical proclivities of the systems that create them 
and the parts that constitute them.  None of these patterns appear to be subjective or projective or 
to have strivings or goals of their own.  Some of the patterns seem to have plasticity and 
perseverance but, for one thing, plasticity and perseverance are traits that aren’t uniquely associated 
with teleology (think, again, of the pendulum or marble-in-bowl systems from the previous chapter) 
and, for another thing, the plasticity and perseverance in these spontaneously organizing systems is 
driven by the energetic processes of the whole system, rather than those of the material pattern that 




There is a sense in which Schrödinger’s analysis of life in terms of negative entropy is 
correct:  the second law is one constraint against which living things must struggle.  As entropy 
comes to a maximum at thermodynamic equilibrium, the free energy of a system gets used up and so 
the ability to do any work that can maintain any ordered state diminishes.  Without free energy, there 
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can only be an endless susceptibility to environmental braising, resulting in destruction and, 
eventually, certain death.   
But there is also a sense in which Schrödinger’s notion has constrained our thinking about 
what may account for life.  By focusing on the notions of entropy and the second law, scientists 
following Schrödinger have missed the point that teleological and vitalistic patterns are, in large part, 
forms of material order.  What it means for life to exist is not merely for patterns to struggle against 
energetic disorder, but more importantly for them to pursue environments of energetic order in 
order to extract a quotient of free energy that they can then use to do the concerted work it takes to 
struggle against material disorder.  Life is more than just orderliness; it is a particular kind of 
orderliness, and if we want to understand that specific kind of orderliness, we need to step out from 
under Schrödinger’s shadow and investigate the information-theoretic properties of material 
patterns, rather than those of heat. 
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C. Reality, Pattern, Organization, Causation 
 
Information is information, not matter or energy.  No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present 
day. 
 
—Norbert Wiener (1961, p. 132) 
 
So I ask you, dear reader, are temperature and pressure real things, or are they just façons de parler?  Is a rainbow 
a real thing, or is it nonexistent?  
 
—Douglas Hofstadter (2007, p. 188)  
 
Philosophers gather inquiries about what exists (or about what we can consider to be real) 
under the label “ontology”, a topic that is not only a mainstay in the field of metaphysics but also 
deeply linked with teleology.  In fact, the theory of teleology that we’ll explore in Part II constitutes a 
particularly profound ontological claim.  It rests upon a distinction between three major categories 
of patterns that can exist within our universe, two of which I have already named: spontaneously 
organizing patterns and teleological patterns.  The third major category consists of patterns that, 
because of incessant universal braising, become only less organized, never more so, over time.  I’ll 
call patterns in this third category ontological nonce, or just nonce.68  Teleological patterns and 
spontaneously organizing patterns are structured forms of material orderliness.  They are patterns 
																																																								
68 I have borrowed the word “nonce” from lexicography and cryptography where it refers to a word or a token of data 
that is intended to be used on just one occasion and then discarded.  The analogy here is that the patterns I call 
ontological nonce are also expected to exist only momentarily, and then bound to become something else.  Curiously, 
the term “nonce” has its etymological roots in the Middle English for “the one purpose” (then anes).  The word attracts 
me more, however, because it looks as if it is a portmanteau of “not” or “nothing” and “once”, thereby 
impressionistically reflecting my notion: patterns of ontological nonce can be considered to be not things (“nothings”), 
or things that exist unreliably, briefly, . . . or, as it were, just “once”. 
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brought about by reliable methods for creating order; blueprints for their creation and maintenance 
are distributed, somehow, within the world.  In contrast, items of ontological nonce might in some 
sense also count as patterns—they may be perceptible and thus, for a while, identifiable; but unlike 
the members of the other two categories, the material organization within them is fleeting and 
unreliable, and there are no blueprints anywhere that could contribute to their maintenance.69 
One of the key strengths of this tripartite theoretical distinction lies in the fact that it is not 
merely a philosophically ontological claim—that is, it is not metaphysics.  What I will present later is, 
rather, a mathematically ontological claim, a formulaic way to partition the space of all potential 
patterns.  The distinction produced by that manner of partitioning arises naturally, given a small set 
of (what I think are) physically justifiable assumptions about the material world.  Among those 
assumptions are, of course, the notions of material orderliness and braising that we’ve just explored, 
but also the basic ontological proposition that I’ll try to argue for now:  the claim that, at least in 
some reliable, overarching sense, our world is made principally of patterns. 
Some readers may already be inclined to see the world as pattern, or as information, or as 
mathematics, or may already have some other interpretation of reality that lies roughly along those 
lines, and if you are one of them, then what follows should be easy to swallow.  Such interpretations 
have certainly been prominently argued for before (Dennett 1991; Gershenson 2010; Hofstadter 
2007; Tegmark 2014).70  As we’ll see in a moment, a notion of this sort is also implicitly entailed by 
any doctrine that firmly marries the modern scientific worldview with the emergent perspective. I 
																																																								
69 Items of nonce may seem to persist for quite a while, relative to subjective human scales of time measurement; 
however, that persistence depends only upon their relationship to the local distribution of braising energy. 
70 In his 2014 book, Our Mathematical Universe, Tegmark follows Eugene Wigner (1960) in asking why mathematics is so 
strikingly effective at describing the world (see also Holland, 1998, who speaks of the “unreasonable effectiveness” of 
mathematics).  The answer that Tegmark gives is that the world is mathematics, in some strong sense of the term “is” 
that he leaves not fully explained.  This may seem a radical view to some but, in certain respects, I don’t think it differs 
too radically from the view I am giving here.  My assumption, based on the modern scientific worldview, is that the 
world consists of some basic parts, which, thanks to their regularities, may combine into untold myriads of patterns, all 
of which can at least be mathematically or informationally described (see, e.g., Galileo 1623).  And, at some point, when 
inquiring into the difference between “being” and “being describable as”, one may find oneself only a mild semantic 
stumble away from Tegmark’s view. 
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happen to think this latter conception is the clearest way to understand the world as consisting of 
patterns.  
 
The Emergent Perspective 
 
Here, I will follow Hofstadter (2007), who, in developing his claims that selves or souls are 
real things (and his ensuing arguments for just what kind of real things they are), bases his 
underlying argument for the-world-as-patterns in the notions of causation and emergence.   
Hofstadter frames his discussion in terms of “the causal potency of patterns”, by which he 
means that anything that is a pattern deserves distinct consideration as a thing of its own kind 
because the pattern itself has new, reliable consequences (causal potencies) over and above those 
distinct underlying consequences of the atoms and particles of which it is made.  To illustrate, he 
highlights “that evolution caused hearts to evolve, that religious dogmas have caused wars, that 
nostalgia inspired Chopin to write a certain étude, that intense professional jealousy has caused the 
writing of many a nasty book review, and so forth and so on.”  Hofstadter points out that the 
straightforward resolution to the tension that seems to exist between these higher-level kinds of 
causation and the physicist’s lower-level conception of causation in terms of the four fundamental 
interactions, lies in understanding that “these ‘macroscopic forces’ [are] merely ways of describing 
complex patterns engendered by basic physical forces”.  And he reminds us that this shouldn’t be a 
difficult leap to take, since physicists have already shown that many other macroscopic forces and 
phenomena, such as “friction, viscosity, translucency, pressure, and temperature can be understood 




Shape and Causal Dynamics 
 
We can perhaps briefly expand on Hofstadter’s way of putting things.  A physical pattern of 
interacting particles and their forces—an atom, a molecule, a bone, a hammer—is also distinct from 
those underlying particles because of the ways in which the correlations between the particles 
transform the potential interactions they may have with other patterns.  What otherwise would have 
been random (uncorrelated) interactions become new kinds of concerted joint activity.  The pattern 
itself—the organization among the particles—allows for behaviors different than those that the 
same particles would perform if they were not so correlated.  Roger Sperry (who, incidentally, also 
influenced Hofstadter’s view on these topics) gives an example of “a wheel rolling downhill [which] 
carries its atoms and molecules through a course in time and space and to a fate determined by the 
overall system properties of the wheel as a whole and regardless of the inclination of the individual 
atoms and molecules” (1980, p. 201; see also Sperry 1969).  The atoms in the wheel have no 
individual tendency to take the spiraling courses that they do, yet when arranged in the mutually 
constraining form of the whole wheel, they have no choice but to follow those paths.  It is the 
organization of the wheel that matters. 
To be more explicit, we can recall that physicists and chemists think of particles as 
resembling tiny point-like magnets that exhibit four very different types of “magnetism” (the four 
fundamental forces).  All of the world’s particles simultaneously push and pull on one another in 
these four independent ways.  And because of the complex interplay between the various forces in 
various kinds of particles and the varying strengths of those forces at varying ranges, the world 
comes to be filled with patterns of myriad kinds, some of which “like” to bind closely to one 
another, others of which like to push each other away, and others which just seem to be indifferent 
to one another (to speak teleologically about things that are not at all teleological).  Every pattern is 
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just a combination of these little “magnets” whose fields of pushing and pulling deform and 
combine to produce new, unique shapes with new, unique tendencies.  Chemistry, of course, gives 
us the clearest, simplest examples:  every type of ion or molecule has a specific shape that gives it 
characteristic—and often well-documented by now—behaviors with respect to other particular 
patterns.  But complex aggregates of particles that go beyond basic chemistry—macromolecules, 
polymers, everyday objects, and even large gravitationally bound coalitions—all have their individual 
capacities to affect other patterns, too.  Each pattern does what it does because the organization 
within its set of particles collaboratively produces its distinctively shaped causal dynamics that it then 
imposes upon the patterns around it. 
 
Four Kinds of Causation 
 
One thing that makes this view of patterns appealing is that the total picture that physicists 
have drawn for us turns out to account for three of the four classical Aristotelian “causes”—the 
material, formal, and efficient causes71.  All of our “how-come” explanations for why things come to 
be can be given in these terms.  When we explain something in terms of its material causes, what we 
are really talking about is the micro-dynamics created by the organization of the particles that make 
up the material.  The causal dynamics created by the shape of a thing at a very small scale explain, in 
part, why a thing is what it is or does what it does.  When we explain something in terms of its 
formal causes, we are talking about the macro-dynamics of the thing.  The causal dynamics of the 
overall shape of a thing explains another part of why a thing is what it is or does what it does.  And 
when we explain something in terms of its efficient causes, we are talking about the historical series 
of incidents in which the initial movements of various patterns, combined with the possible 
																																																								
71 We’ll explore the philosophical history of this classification in Chapter III. 
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interactions of those patterns by way of their material and formal causes, have come to result in 
some event or state of affairs (or the existence of some new pattern).   
The only “why” that is unaccounted for in all of this is the final (teleological) cause—the 
explanation of a thing in “what for” terms (see Chapter IV for a dissection of the word “for”).  
Teleological causes are not present in all events or objects in our world but, in those cases where 
they are present, they need to be accounted for.  As it turns out, viewing the world as consisting of 
dynamical patterns is the first step towards explaining the emergence of teleological causation.  The 
theory we will explore in Part II claims that a certain category of potential interactions between 
those patterns is what differentiates teleological organization from either spontaneous organization 
or lack of organization. 
 
The Summary of These Parts 
 
The perspective I’ve been advocating, from which we might see the world as being made of 
particles but populated by patterns of those particles, is not meant to be a complete accounting of the 
“furniture of the world” (a term philosophers often use to describe their theories of what exists).  
Although it may one day be possible to more rigorously defend some more careful version of this 
account, at the moment I am not working towards such a defense but only setting out the 
assumptions that my primary theoretical work will later rely upon. 
The account is incomplete for a number of reasons.  For one thing, I have been discussing 
only patterns that seem to be materially organized by the bonds within them, not patterns that seem 
to be organized primarily in time (as in sound waves), or organized in space, yet only correlated by 
incidental history rather than mutual bonding (as with the photons that make up the patterns we 
perceive as rainbows).  For another thing, the account does not address patterns created by a 
	 101	
process, such as the rippled bedforms seen in Figure 2.5.f. For a third thing, the account does not 
address abstract or distributed “objects”—such as governments or satellite communication 
networks—as patterns.  I tend to believe that many of these things (those that are not illusions) may 
be patterns in the very same sense72; but I am not yet prepared to carefully defend that position, and 
I prefer to postpone the depths of those analyses. 
At the moment, all we really need is a compelling argument that many things in our world are 
patterns of this sort, and that those many types of patterns may interact to cause changes in one 
another.  With that assumption to stand on, we can then begin to build the machinery (in Part II) 
that can be used to explore whether or not that assumption, along with some others, is enough to 
give rise to patterns or systems that behave teleologically.  I think it is. 
There is, however, a more concerning problem that I see with this account of patterns.  It 
seems to me that if we claim that the world is made of correlated groups of atoms, we will be 
plagued with the problem of identity.  Since every particle’s fields of force extend continuously and 
infinitely, how exactly should we carve the world into those groups, saying which parts count as 
being correlated and which do not?  How do we say that this proton and electron form an atom, but 
another nearby lone electron is not part of the same atom?  I’ll introduce the problem of identity in 
more depth after we address another ontological topic—that of patterns that are just illusions—but 
I won’t try to solve it until much later.  The answer as to which versions of a pattern count as being 
“that pattern” will turn out to be something very akin to the common notion of functional 
equivalence.  I will call it causal equivalence, because I would like to avoid using the term 
“functional” unless a pattern is involved in a teleological system.  That, however, is only a minor 
quibble over words (see also Chapters IV and V). 
																																																								
72 I am convinced both by Hofstadter’s lengthy argument by examples (as cited above and also drawn out in more detail 
in his 2007 book) and by the obvious possibility of long-distance correlations (potentially mediated by coordinating 
elements) that may account for the joint action of seemingly disjoint parts.  Communication, for instance, allows for the 




The human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature of 
things by mingling its own nature with it.  
 
—Francis Bacon (1620) 
 
When we look at the topic of function in Chapter IV, we’ll find that there is a special pattern 
that many scientists and philosophers come to see and that, in seeing it, they come to take it to be a 
legitimate phenomenon of their study—a pattern that is really out there, in the world.  The particular 
pattern I am talking about here goes by the name “proper function”, a term that refers to the idea 
that an item (for example, a heart or an eye or a pen or a chair) might have a duty to carry out 
regardless of context, or of damage, or even of a failure to have been properly produced.  A proper 
function of an item is a property that is imagined to have been bestowed upon the item and then, 
somehow, to reside metaphysically within it. 
When we come to that discussion, I will dispute the claim that functions are properties of 
this sort, claiming instead that this commonly observed pattern is only the result of a shadow cast 
upon the mind with such regularity that we find it hard to believe that it is not a constant part of the 
world.  I don’t intend to dispute that items may function; what I dispute is that they have functions. 
A bit later, in Chapter VII, we’ll find that there is another pattern that a preponderance of 
modern scientists and philosophers admit seeing, and yet which they take to be an illegitimate 
phenomenon not worthy of serious study—a purported illusion that they refuse to believe 
veridically reflects any actual facet of the reality we live in.  This pattern—goal-directedness—is in 
fact one of the central topics of study in this dissertation.   
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In that case, my disagreement will travel in the opposite direction.  I will claim that goal-
directedness is very much an objective pattern that occurs in our world, and that we have no 
convincing basis—not a shred of evidence—upon which to base any disbelief in it. 
Because of these two very fundamental disagreements that I hold with a large number of 
scientists and philosophers about the nature of the subject matter of teleology, I must spend a few 
pages now discussing the notion of illusion, and the criteria by which we ought to recognize some 
perceived patterns as being real, while discounting the objective existence of others.  I hope to 
remind us of the tools we have available, used regularly both in everyday reasoning and in the 
scientific method, to determine which of the patterns in our perception reflect the outside world 




One widespread although not too troublesome illusion is the notion that things have 
colors—for instance, that the sky is blue or grass is green or apples are red.  For some the illusion is 
pervasive: to children, that the sky is blue seems incontrovertibly true.  Even for the scientifically 
educated who know well that things change colors under varying circumstances (and that the vibrant 
and varied qualities of coloredness only exist in the minds of perceptual creatures), the illusion of 
color constancy is still reflected in our everyday ways of talking about colored things. 
Illusions such as color constancy are often called “useful fictions” because, while the 
impressions they give us about the world are false, in general it doesn’t hurt to talk about them as if 
they were true.73  For most practical purposes that relate for instance to apples, speaking of them as 
																																																								
73 The most pervasive illusion of all is the indispensable fiction whereby our internal perceptual experiences of each facet 
of the world are collectively brought together to appear as if they simply are the outside world. 
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if redness were an intrinsic property won’t cause any confusion and it will actually help us greatly in 
categorizing and collecting apples. 
However, at some point in scientific inquiry our needs change and we want to understand a 
phenomenon in all the ways it manifests, including not just its common and central cases but also its 
exceptional or boundary cases too.  At some point for instance we no longer want to just collect 
apples; we also want to understand both the nature of light and that of vision (or, in my case, the 
nature of function and that of goal-directedness).  And when we reach that point in our inquiry, we 
need to carefully work through which of our perceptions about the phenomena related to our topic 
are real and which are illusory, eventually replacing, for instance, the idea that “things have colors” 
with the idea that “things reliably appear colored” (due to their, and our, reliable interactions with 
light). 
 
Determining Illusion  
 
So how do we know when a pattern that we are observing is an illusion?  Well, obviously we 
can’t always know; that’s the nature of illusion.  But there can be some telltale signs, and I think 
looking at a few more examples of well-known illusions will help us remember how to look for 
those indicators.   
As most of us are aware, the image of a ball moving across a movie screen is not a ball at all, 
and neither is it even an image of a ball moving across the screen.  There are actually two 
simultaneous illusions.  One is the cinematic illusion of motion, created by way of a series of images 
presented in quick succession at different locations.  And the other is what we can call Magritte’s 
illusion:  there is no ball on the screen just as there is no pipe on Magritte’s canvas—there is only the 




Figure 2.9:  The Treachery of Images, a 1929 oil-on-canvas painting by René Magritte, © 2018 C. 
Herscovici / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York.  The caption translates to “This is not a pipe”, 
which is of course true.  Magritte’s point—Magritte’s illusion—is that, in the case of paintings and 
photographs and so on, our minds have a tendency to reconstruct the whole of the three-dimensional 
objects depicted.   
 
One way for the naïve moviegoer74 to determine that a cinematic ball is not real would be to 
interfere with the screen’s ability to reflect an image, for instance by shaking it, or viewing it from 
the side, or coating it with VantablackTM.75  Another way would be to throw another (real) ball at the 
first one; we would find the two balls wouldn’t interact the way we normally would expect.  A third 
																																																								
74 For an early philosophical exploration of cinematic illusion, see Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” (The Republic, 514a-
520a). In the story, Socrates describes a group of people chained inside a dark cave where their only perception of the 
world is through a puppet show projected upon on the wall by firelight.  In order to prevent the individuals in the cave 
from discovering the illusion, Socrates designs the story such that any chance for manipulation is wholly (even if 
unrealistically) restricted. 
75 VantablackTM is currently the world’s blackest artificial substance.  It absorbs more than 99.9% of visible spectrum 
light, reflecting almost none.  The material has many potential uses, but would make for the worst possible movie screen. 
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way would be to shine a bright white light at the ball to try to highlight it; the actual effect will be to 
drown out the image.  A fourth way would be to discover the projector and the filmstrip, and to 
interfere in any of a number of ways with how the light is cast onto the screen.  Any of these little 
interactive experiments would expose the fact that there is no ball—none of the predictable causal 
effects of “ballishness” take place.76  And yet if there really was a ball, the same experiments would 
inform us somewhat by neither destroying the ball nor interfering with our perception of it.  (For 
more on predictive success as a diagnostic of the reality of perceived patterns, see Dennett 1991; but 
for complicating cases, see the above discussion on useful fictions, such as color constancy.) 
Have a look at the Hermann grid illusion shown below in Figure 2.10.  One way to notice 
that the intersections in this image don’t really harbor little glowing circles is to try to train one’s eyes 
upon one of those circles.  When we do, the one we are trying to look at disappears.  They all flicker 




76 To put it in more scientific terms:  The hypothesis is that there is a ball. The prediction, from that hypothesis, is that 
manipulations such as painting the screen or shining a light at it should change little or nothing about the ball (hitting it, 
however, might change its trajectory).  If any of those predictions turns out to be false, then we have evidence suggesting 
that the hypothesis is false—there is no ball. 
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Figure 2.10:  The Hermann grid illusion.  The appearance of scintillating grey dots, at the intersections 
of the white lines, occurs only in our minds (it is produced somewhere between the retina and our 
conscious experience of the image) rather than in the outside world (somewhere on the page or 
between the page and the retina). 
 
One way to notice that the earth is not flat is to lift oneself up from the surface of the earth 
and to look at it from a distance (see Figure 2.11).  One way to notice that the sun does not go 
around the earth is to stand back from them both and watch how they behave in a richer context 
(including, for instance, the other planets).  One way to notice that the color of the sky is not a 
constant blue is to pay attention to its changing tint as one moves one’s eyes from the horizon to 
overhead.  Another way is to watch it over the course of a day; during a sunset the blueness 
disappears entirely as the sky instead takes on shades of yellow and red.77 
 
																																																								
77 And this effect isn’t caused by redness obstructing our view of the naturally blue sky.  The sky is red for the very same 
reason it is usually blue—more of those wavelengths are being filtered out of white sunlight and bent towards our eyes.  
It is possible for the blue sky to actually turn red because it was never intrinsically blue in the first place. 
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Figure 2.11.  The earth, with a diameter of nearly eight thousand miles, viewed from a vantage point 
about twenty miles above its surface.  The curvature is slight but obvious and, according to the 
photographer who took the picture, not an artifact of lens aberration.  Note also:  from this 
perspective the sky happens still to be blue.  
 
In short, we can recognize an illusion any time we discover that our observation of a pattern 
has systematic exceptions.  We can know that the pattern in our mind is not in the world when that 
pattern arises, at least in part, as a result of a limited perspective, or a limited perceptual system, or a 
limited mode of interaction with the world, and when the pattern fails to arise as that perspective, 
perceptual system, or mode of interaction changes in some way.  And we can determine that one of 
these limitations has been afflicting us whenever we find we can reliably manipulate some aspect of 
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the perceptual situation—but not any aspect of the apparently observed pattern itself78—and thereby 
find a way to reliably cause the pattern to disappear.   
As simple as that may sound, the point has been lost time and again.  It was lost on those 
who, faced with Copernicus’ evidence, still believed the sun to go around the earth.  And it is lost on 
anyone today who might still believe objects to truly have constant colors or weights (or those who 
believe jokes to be inherently funny; see, e.g. the discussion in Hurley, Dennett, and Adams 2011).  
Illusions often confound us in spite of reason.  We may willingly ignore the circumstances (such as a 
sunset) that make a pattern (such as the sky being blue) disappear, and by doing so we may let 
ourselves fall for an illusion.  I’ll spend most of Chapter IV and part of Chapter V trying to show 
that our common intuitions about the existence of proper functions have systematic exceptions that 
are just about as easy to recognize as sunsets, and yet which many of us are somehow unwilling to 
take as evidence that proper functions are a kind of illusion. 
      
Evidential Onus 
 
As I said, however, my work in Chapter VII will cut the other way.  Rather than trying to 
prove that a widely observed pattern is an illusion; I will try to make the case that a widely observed 
pattern is not an illusion.   
The important contrast that warrants emphasizing “is” and “is not” does not lie in the 
difference between proving and disproving (that is a critical but distinct issue in science and logic), 
but rather in the difference between going with and going against the weight of evidence.  As Hume 
showed us long ago, when there is debate between parties about whether to believe some claim, we 
																																																								
78 Of course one wouldn’t want to manipulate the pattern itself—the point is to see if the pattern is really out there in 
the world; damaging or destroying the pattern ensures that it no longer is.  To repeat, what we want to do is only to alter 
other parts of the world and our interaction with the world to see if the pattern disappears as a result of those other 
factors. 
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can often assess which side of the debate ought to have more work to do in order to make their case 
convincing.  The answer is simply that the side whose claim is initially less credible (given the prior 
evidence) must provide proportionally more new evidence to support it (Hume 1748; see also 
Laplace 1812).   
For example, we should expect it to take more than one mail-order catalog advertising dry-
germinating seeds to convince an old farmer that there is a new and different way to grow crops 
during a drought.  Even in drastic times, the farmer won’t even blink before dismissing the 
advertisement out of hand.  The salesperson or charlatan who is selling the dry-germinating seeds 
has an enormous burden of proof to overcome, and the onus is on them to powerfully prove that 
their incredible seeds work. 
Hume’s own example was the idea of life after death:  Since we know with great certainty, 
from the testimony of a culture made of millions or billions of historical observers, that no person 
has ever come back from the dead, then it should take much more than two or three earnest-
sounding-people’s testimony to overthrow that conviction.  It should take, Hume points out, even 
more than our own direct witnessing of an apparent corpse returning to life, since the likelihood that 
we have been deceived in the one miraculous-seeming instance is vastly greater than the likelihood 
that we and everyone else have been deceived in the myriad-myriad episodes that formed our prior 
conviction.79  The onus is on those who would like us to believe in life after death, to provide, as 
Carl Sagan put it, extraordinary evidence for their extraordinary claim (Sagan 1979). 
In the case of the illusion of color constancy, the prior evidence that things have colors was 
(and still is) pervasive, and so color constancy is in fact the reasonable thing to believe, at first.  The 
onus therefore was in fact upon the scientists of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries to provide evidence of how the phenomena of color arise so regularly without being 
																																																								
79 As the reader may suspect, this notion can be, and has been, cast in terms of Bayesian reasoning (see, e.g., Borges and 
Stern 2007; Brown 1970; Madruga et al. 2003; Pigliucci and Boudry 2013).  
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intrinsic properties of objects (and they did this admirably).  In the case of proper functions, the 
most common prior belief today is also that they do exist, and so if I’d like to show otherwise, then 
the evidential onus in fact rests on my shoulders.  This is why, in Chapters IV and V, I must put 
dozens of pages of effort into producing real examples that (hopefully) can alter our perception and 
thereby dispel the illusion.   
On the other hand, as I’ll argue in Chapter VII, the pervasive prior evidence about the 
phenomenon of goal-directedness is also that it is a pattern that does indeed exist, and so, quite 
similarly, the onus should not be on me or any other believer to prove that it does exist.  The burden 
of proof should instead rest on the shoulders of those who disbelieve in that pattern to provide 
overwhelming evidence to the rest of us that our common impression of the phenomenon is an 
illusion.  The onus is on them to find a way to change our perspective on organisms—without 






Equilibrium systems fail to be genuinely goal-directed when their equilibrium maintaining behavior is of no value for 
anything. 
 
—Mark Bedau (1992a, p. 38)80 
 
In the previous chapter we started to look at the sometimes value-laden topic of normativity.  
There, I distinguished between, on the one hand, objective, comparative norms (such as whether 
Ceres ought to continue along its orbit around the sun tomorrow) and, on the other hand, 
subjective, evaluative norms (such as whether we ought to keep the fish we’ve caught cool until we 
intend to eat them).  I pointed out that the evaluative type of norm is of central importance to the 
notion of goal-directedness.  There can be no goal without some kind of accompanying subjective 
standard by which one could evaluate whether the agent whose goal it is has or has not achieved the 
goal.  That is to say, evaluative norms can explain (whereas comparative ones cannot) what it is that 
ought or ought not happen in order that an agent can be said to have achieved its goal.    
The notions of value and evaluation are intimately tied in with teleology.  Achieving a goal is 
good for the goal-directed agent, and not achieving it is either neutral or, more often, bad for that 
agent.  Part of understanding teleology in its entirety will mean understanding what it means for 
something to be good or bad for a goal-directed agent and its goals.  Thus a theory of teleology 
needs to be paired with an explanation of how benefit may accrue to an agent and how that benefit 
may be evaluable. 
																																																								
80 Bedau’s use of the word “equilibrium” here refers not to thermodynamic equilibrium, but to state-maintaining 
(cybernetic) systems, a topic we’ll look at in Chapter III. 
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At present, however, the notion of value is a deeply metaphysical one, over which there is 
plenty of debate amongst philosophers.  It stands at the core of both ethics and economics, each of 
which has been studied extensively over the ages, and yet, despite these millennia of analyses, it is so 
far unclear just what physical features—or physically emergent properties made of space, time, 
atoms, and forces—could account for it.  Just as is the case with goal-directedness, there is a prior, 
objective world—the world of physics and chemistry but not of agents and psychology—in which 
value simply does not exist, and then there is the full-fledged biological, psychological, economical 
world, which, in large part, revolves around the perception of, striving for, and trade in value.  The 
question is: by what means did the former transform into the latter?  From where in our world did 
the phenomenon of value emerge? 
 
An Energetic Hypothesis about Value 
 
From the definition of a dissipative system, one might come to think that value may be a 
function of energy or, at least, of usable free energy.  Indeed, I happen to have run across a recent 
theory of economic value that makes just this presumption:  “Organized forms of matter, such as 
organisms, are examples of dissipative structures that feed on the opportunity to create a flow of 
free value to maintain their structure and to grow and develop.” (Roels 2012).  What Roels means, 
when he describes freely flowing value, is the ability of dissipative structures to exploit the free 
energy from within an external energy gradient that flows through an environment (for instance, 
solar radiation, here on earth) to extract work (see also Costanza 2004, for a similar perspective). 
I admit that it seems reasonable at first to think that if free energy is irreplaceable in its role 
in creating the valuable structures that make up organisms and their artifacts, then it just may be the 
fundamental currency of value.  After all, one might also note that trade in energy is the most 
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significant cornerstone of global financial markets (especially if we consider not only industrial 
sources of energy such as oil, coal, and natural gas but also biological sources such as wheat, rice, 
and corn).  However, as is so often the case, first impressions can be misleading.   
To begin with, there is another freely available feature of the world that dissipative structures 
and processes feed on hungrily and depend on irreplaceably in order to maintain their structure and 
to grow and develop.  I am speaking of course of atoms.  Without a constant flow of available 
matter, dissipative systems could neither grow nor rebuild lost structure.  Perhaps we should say 
instead that it is atoms that are the source of value?   
Or perhaps we should fork Roels’ theory, so that one tine of value might be constituted by 
free energy while another consists of matter?  With a fork that accounts for the contributions of 
both material and activity, we could seemingly have our metaphysical cake and eat it too.  But there 
is an even more fundamental problem with this account that the forking strategy leaves unresolved.  
Even if freely flowing atoms and energy were both elementary sources of value, that would mean 
that anything that came to be, through the interaction of atoms and energy, would be a beneficiary 
of value.  The problem here is that that describes literally every pattern in the entire universe.  There 
would be no distinction between the subjective and the objective—no account of what delineates a 
particular kind of pattern as being the agential kind, to which notions of value and benefit may apply, 
in contrast with the remainder of non-agential patterns, for which value judgments are simply 
inappropriate or irrelevant. 
 
A Temporal Hypothesis about Value 
 
In order to elucidate the distinction between the objective and the subjective (and also to 
account for the evaluative norms that underpin teleology), we are going to need a different 
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hypothesis about value and benefit.  Value will need to depend in some way on a resource that is 
differentially available to subjective and objective patterns in the world—a resource that is important 
to the one and irrelevant to the other.  The answer that I believe supports this distinction, and that 
I’ll argue for in detail in Part II, is time. 
In short, the idea I’ll offer later is that free energy and material are not intrinsically valuable, 
but they can become valuable (and then can be evaluated) when used in the right way—namely, by 
living, teleologically organized patterns—in order to buy more time.  I’ll argue that what teleological 
patterns do is to use both free energy and material in order to perform constructive work . . . but not 
just any constructive work.  They use these resources to perform the specific constructive work that 
ensures those same patterns—that is, themselves—continue to exist.  In this regard, teleological 
patterns can be put in sharp contrast with both spontaneously organizing patterns and ontological 
nonce, both of which may also consume free energy and material in undergoing structural changes, 
but neither of which is able to buy itself more time.  The difference can be found in the nature of 
these categories.  Spontaneously organizing patterns have all the time they need from the get-go—
they are bound to exist as long as their energetic and material precursors (co-) exist.  Stars and 
planets and crystals simply form when the conditions are right.  In contrast, ontological nonce, by its 
very definition, has no time—such patterns are bound not to exist more than momentarily,81 except 
as fleeting intermediate states in the constant ebb and flow of universal change.  The notion of value 
applies neither to patterns that are bound to exist nor to those that are bound not to exist; it applies 
only to patterns whose existential fate can change.  As we will discover, that is just what teleological 
patterns are.   
  
																																																								
81 This is a broad sense of the term “momentarily” that can only be understood relative to the local background 




The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians 
down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and 
stronger timber in their place [so completely] that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the 
logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it 
was not the same. 
 
—Plutarch, Theseus (75 AD) 
 
The question of identity is one of the oldest problems in metaphysics, and the paradox of 
Theseus’ ship, as described above by Plutarch, is one of the clearest illustrations of the problem.   
Just what physical criteria can we use to determine the identity of the ship, or of any other object in 
the world?  If atoms (or planks) are constantly being shed from and adjoined to objects82, then what 
possibility could there ever be of giving a definition of an object in enduring objective terms?  How 
could something ever be precisely the same over time? 
In this work, I am going to propose what I believe to be a complete answer to the ancient 
problem of identity.  There can be no objective theory of goals or of goal-directed agents without an 
objective theory of what constitutes the agent whose goals they are, or who benefits from the 
achievement of those goals.  The theory of teleology that we will examine in Part II is one in which 
certain types of patterns are, thanks to a special trick in their organization, able to maintain their own 
identity in the face of constant braising. 
																																																								
82 And, at some time scale, this is certainly the case for every object in existence. Fluids flow, liquids evaporate, gases 
condense, metals corrode, amorphous solids sag under gravity . . . Even more ubiquitously, heat and background 
radiation are constantly braising objects, causing sometimes tiny but nonetheless generally irreversible rearrangements of 
atoms. 
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My answer to the general question of identity, however, comes in two independent halves, 
which we can distinguish by using the labels identity and identifiability.  The idea is that some patterns 
in the world have true, objective identities, while the rest are merely subjectively identifiable, relative to 
some observer’s purposes.  Identity and identifiability are both ways to group various patterns 
together according to some measure of sameness, but I’ll argue that they do so on fundamentally 
different grounds, which can be distinguished primarily in terms of purpose.  I’ll try to clarify that 




The notion of identifiability relates to the apparent identity that an act of categorization gives 
to an object such as Theseus’ ship or, for that matter, most random lumps of material floating 
anywhere in the universe.  Identifiable things do of course have a kind of sameness to them; that’s 
what makes them identifiable.  But that sameness has no independent objective measure. It is a 
sameness that depends upon the identifying intentions—the purposes—of a teleological observer. 
The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus famously emphasized the absence of identity in 
things that are identifiable with his quip “no man steps into the same river twice”.  While it is true that 
rivers are always changing, it seems philosophically troubling to claim that the Delaware that we see 
today is not the same river that General Washington famously crossed with his troops during the 
American Revolution, or that the Nile that the historian Herodotus wrote about is not the same 
river that the ruins of the ancient capital of Memphis still stand beside.  Despite the changes in the 
courses of these rivers, we feel that they are the same rivers they once were.  That is, we can still 
identify these and other rivers, as long as we assume some subjective criteria, the contravention or 
satisfaction of which can be used to judge whether any changes in a particular river are of a 
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sufficient scale or kind to warrant either dismissing or retaining our judgment of its (relative) 
identity.  If a dam diverts a river and the water that would have arrived in one place now takes a 
somewhat different path, we are free to decide whether or not, according to our criteria—that is, for 
our purposes—it should be called the same river.83   
In other words, we (and other agents) are able to identify objects based on our choices of 
subjectively essential features, but they—the objects—don’t have any kind of objectively essential features 
that can be universally relied upon for identification over time.  Nothing in particular—no solitary 
essential feature or group of features—needs to remain the same about such objects in order for 
them to have a relative identity; they simply need to remain similar enough to continue serving some 
agent’s purposes, so that that agent will continue to be willing to identify the object as the same 
thing (Wittgenstein 1953).   
Although things that have true identities are also typically identifiable, the majority of 
identifiable things can be equated with the earlier-described category of ontological nonce.  That is, 
they are things that may have an informational description at any one moment, but they are subject 
to braising, and thus ultimately can only be maintained to be the same—according to any subjective 
measure by which they are claimed to be the same—through the intentional efforts of an agent who 
desires that maintenance.  Absent any such efforts, they are bound to exist as one pattern at one 
moment, and a different pattern at the next.  Like Theseus’ ship, which goes through a continuous 





83 This phrase, “for our purposes” (or, similarly, “for current purposes” or “for the sake of this discussion”), allows us to 
create an ad-hoc category, often labeled with a word—old or new—that serves to bring a group into agreement as to 
what the criteria are that will be used to identify a particular thing.  The rhetorical tool is necessary only if the criteria are 
not already publicly agreed upon—for instance, in the dictionary or encyclopedic definitions of a term.  After all, cultural 
conventions such as words serve the very same purpose, just with a longer and broader established history of agreement. 
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The Hard Problem of Identity 
 
The solution to that half of the problem of identity is relatively simple, and the reader will 
have noticed that the concept of purpose lies at its heart—identifiability exists only with respect to a 
(real or imagined) purposeful identifying agent.  But this leaves unresolved the question of what 
accounts, in the first place, for what I called identity, which brings into existence those subjective, 
teleological agents who have the capacity to identify things for their purposes.  It cannot be that the 
identity of such agents is also relative to some other subjective external judge, or else the logic would 
be regressive, with no answer ultimately given.   
We can call this second, deeper quandary “the true problem of identity” or, mimicking 
David Chalmers’ (1995, 1996) distinction regarding various problems of consciousness, “the hard 
problem of identity”84.  An answer to the hard problem of identity stands at the hard core of the 
modern theory of teleology that I’ll describe in Part II.  Although the short version of that answer, 
which I’ll give now, may at first seem simplistic and tautological, that impression will fade when we 
begin to understand what it takes to realize that claim.  The simple answer is that the identity of a 
teleological agent must, in some regard, remain precisely the same across time.  In order to have an 
intrinsic identity of one’s own, one must be truly and objectively identical to oneself.  Something really 
must not change.  This seems obvious, but it also seems inconsistent with the statistical, 
thermodynamic results of braising, whereby the atomic structures of objects are constantly being 
reorganized.  However, in Chapter IX, we will look at a more abstract formulation, given in terms of 
both organizational information and time; that formulation will be able to make rigorous the notion of an 
item’s remaining truly identical, despite relentless environmental braising. 
																																																								
84 The hard problem of identity deserves the name “hard” because it has gone unanswered for millennia; however, I 
believe it to be solvable in materialist terms (and I will make an attempt to solve it in Part II of this work).  This can be 
put in contrast with Chalmers’ own “hard problem of consciousness”, which he has dubiously labeled “hard” because he 
claims that there is no materialist solution to the problem and that we have no recourse but to resort to an immaterial 
(dualist) solution. 
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Revisiting the Ancient Paradox 
 
We can return now to the problem of Theseus’ ship and the “easy problem” of relative 
identity.  At the cost of requiring a theory of teleology in our world (which is a price I am prepared 
to suggest we can pay), our theory of identifiability resolves the ancient paradox by rejecting the 
question outright:  The ship never had an individual (true) identity in the first place, and so, when it 
changes in its material constitution, it still does not have such an identity.  Instead, the ship, like any 
object, always had the possibility of fulfilling any number of identity roles with respect to various 
subjective, teleological agents’ purposes in making the identification.  
Crucially, if two (or more) agents have differing purposes for considering the ship to be a 
ship—if it serves different functional roles in the different agents’ conceptions—then when the ship 
changes materially in any way, its identity from each perspective will have to be re-evaluated, 
resulting potentially in conflicting opinions.  After most of the ship’s planks have been replaced, 
Theseus himself will likely consider the new bundle of freshly installed planks to be his own ship, 
but ontological pirates—crazy imaginary thieves who would attempt to steal by merely reinterpreting 
the identities of items in deeds and titles of ownership—may consider this floatable bundle of planks 
to be a new ship, up for grabs, and they may even consider Theseus’ ship to lie in a corner of the 
shipyard in the form of an abandoned pile of old disassembled planks.  Both claims are subjective 
claims of identifiability that are made relative only to one’s purposes; there is no objective truth to the 
matter.  The reason Theseus can win this argument is not that his claim is more objective, but rather 
that he has also paid for the purchase and installation of all the new planks, and so those new planks, 
	 121	
in whatever form they take, are actually his, too (and he has the rule of law on his side, so the society 
will back him up).85   
 
The Fundaments of Subjectivity 
 
We’ve spoken now about both value and identity, two concepts that—much like the topic of 
goal-directedness itself—absolutely permeate the subjective realms of biology, psychology, 
economics, and so on, and yet never show up in the objective worlds of pure physics or chemistry.  
The phenomena behind these two presently metaphysical concepts form what I will call the 
fundaments of subjectivity.  They both are involved in every facet of our world that can be labeled 
teleological or agentive; and teleology or agency is involved, in one manner or another (typically as 
the subject), in every phenomenon that can be labeled as subjective.   
To make it clear, my claim is that a teleological pattern can only exist if (i) it has an identity, 
meaning that its goals can be said to be its own, and if (ii) contributions can, in principle, be made 
toward the satisfaction of its goals—if it can benefit by its goals being achieved.  Without these 
fundaments, there can be no goals, and thus no goal-directed patterns.  Without these fundaments, there 
can be no agents and no agency—no actors that can strive to attain their goals.  Without these 
fundaments, the subjective aspects of the world do not exist. 
My contention is that solutions to the metaphysical problems of value and identity are key 
factors in finding a theory of teleology.  These are the main problems that challenge us as we seek to 
bring subjectivity, teleology, and agency under scientific consideration.  And so, on my view, any 
																																																								
85 The sorites paradox—named after the Greek word for “heap”—asks a question similar to that of Theseus’ ship. We 
might notice that the removal of any single grain of sand from a heap leaves behind “the same heap”, and yet, if the 
process is repeated enough times, the heap will complete disappear.  The theory of identity I offer resolves this paradox, 
too, by claiming that the heap of sand never had an objective identity to be lost—it was always merely identifiable, as a heap 
relative to our purposes or intentions.  And so, just as we used our judgment to define it as a heap in the first place, we 
are also free to draw a subjective line that defines when it no longer is a heap. 
	 122	
teleological theory ought to focus primarily on understanding the kinds of material organization that 
account for the phenomena underlying these two concepts. 
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G. Agency and Natural Selection 
 
The replicator approach [to understanding natural selection], in many versions, is designed to mesh with an “agential” 
way of looking at evolution, a perspective in which we see the entities in an evolutionary process as pursuing goals, 
having interests, and using strategies. 
 
—Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 36) 
 
To be clear, in the quote above, Godfrey-Smith is elucidating a viewpoint that he and a large 
number of eminent evolutionary biologists do not endorse.  Godfrey-Smith does appreciate the 
modern view that genes seem to be a more likely unit for natural selection to act upon (at least more 
so than species ; I’ll say more about this debate below), but he resists viewing genes as agents that 
would, as he says, have goals, interests, and strategies.  A number of our later discussions will refer 
to natural selection, both in and of itself and in its relation to agency, and so I need to introduce 
those concepts now 86 .  Although I am placing natural selection in this chapter alongside 
thermodynamics, existence, causation, identity, value, and so on, I want to avoid giving the 
impression that the process of evolution is in some way as fundamental to teleology as are those 
other topics.  I think an impression of that sort would be an illusion.  There is, of course, intuitively, 
a very deep relationship between evolution and teleology (since both have profound connections to 
life and biology), but I think the usual perception of that relationship is entirely upside-down. 
Today, the popular way to understand the link between evolution and teleology is that the 
purposeful things that exist in the world are the products (or, in the case of artifacts, the products of 
																																																								
86 The process of evolution itself is also sometimes imagined to be agentive, as the development of traits that serve 
purposes seems to require some intention for those purposes to be served.  Today, this is widely understood to be a false 
impression.  I will address and dismiss the notion in more detail in the next chapter. 
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the products) of natural selection.  Under that conception, evolution is a natural (non-human) 
designer whose work, over the ages, comes to create all the reasons and purposes in the natural 
world.  The eye was designed for sight; the wing was designed for flight.  A thing is for something—
it serves a purpose—if it has been designed for it (see, e.g., Allen and Bekoff 1995a; Dennett 2014; 
Godfrey-Smith 1993, 1994; Griffiths 1993; Kitcher 1993; Millikan 1984, 1989a, 2002). 
I think this viewpoint is so enticing that I will spend quite a number of pages in Chapter IV 
attempting to debunk the intuition it is based on, which I call “the design fallacy”.  Certainly there is 
a sense in which most biological traits have been crafted in part by natural selection, and so whatever 
purpose these traits serve owes its existence in part to natural selection.  However, when I expose 
the design fallacy, I will conclude that rather than viewing evolution as giving rise to teleological 
patterns, we should see things in precisely the opposite way:  being teleological is one of the rare 
ways87 that a pattern can stick around in this world long enough to be subjected to natural 
selection88. 
A pioneering version of the agency-based view, initiated by William Hamilton (1963, 1964) 
and George Williams (1966), though developed most completely by Richard Dawkins (1976, 1978, 
1982), claims that replicators—the underlying substrate upon which the process of natural selection 
operates—are themselves agentive, teleological, and natural potential beneficiaries.  Dawkins’ (1976) 
title, The Selfish Gene, highlights the idea clearly:  germ-line genes (not organisms, and not somatic 
genes) are the ultimate replicators in biology . . . and their behavior is selfish.  That is to say, these 
genes are agents (they have selves) whose many extended behaviors are performed ultimately for 
their own benefit; whatever it is they do is done in order that they may replicate.  I want us to take note 
																																																								
87 As I see it, the other potential way of sticking around long enough is by being a spontaneously organizing system, but 
even then, only some such systems have what it takes to be subject to natural selection. 
88 One might protest, “Couldn’t both be true?”, and I think it a fair question.  But once we see the theory of teleology, in 
Part II, we’ll have more reason to see that a teleological nature of things can in principle exist independently of the 
selective processes that later come to work upon those things. 
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of the normative aspect of these assertions, and of the “in order that” clause emphasized above; this is 
an absolutely teleological claim: the goal of replicators is to replicate.   
The assumption underlying this view is that genes are the things that are most faithfully and 
continuously reproduced in biological reproduction, and so it is only they that can be said to 
benefit—in terms of longevity—from successful replication, and it is only on them that natural 
selection must ultimately be operating.  On the contrary, suggests Dawkins, organisms, as the 
sometimes extended and complex phenotypes of those genes, should be seen not as replicators but as 
temporary, replaceable vehicles that are driven about in the world by the actual replicators.  Such 
vehicles interact with the environment on the replicators’ behalf (Dawkins 1976, 1978, 1982; see also 
Dennett 1995; Haig 1997; Hull 1978; Maynard Smith 1998).  He writes:  
 
Four thousand million years on, what was to be the fate of the ancient replicators?  
They did not die out, for they are past masters of the survival arts. But do not look 
for them floating loose in the sea; they gave up that cavalier freedom long ago. Now 
they swarm in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic lumbering robots, sealed off from 
the outside world, communicating with it by tortuous indirect routes, manipulating it 
by remote control.    
They are in you and in me; they created us, body and mind; and their preservation is 
the ultimate rationale for our existence. They have come a long way, those 
replicators. Now they go by the name of genes, and we are their survival machines. 
(Dawkins 1976, pp. 19–20) 
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The story here is gripping.  These little creatures—genes—who once replicated on their own 
(perhaps in an RNA-world scenario89) are the agentive, teleological, beneficiaries of their own 
behaviors.  And having become highly developed through evolutionary processes, their main activity 
today, in order to promote their own goals (of replication), is to build and then direct machines that 
do most of the dirty work of survival for them.  They are managers, par excellence. 
I don’t want to relinquish the powerful intuition in this picture.  However, this very intuitive 
view (now called the “gene’s-eye perspective”) has come under reasonable, fervent attack from other 
scientists (like Godfrey-Smith, above), who also find it powerfully intuitive that simple material 
objects such as genes simply can’t be the kind of agents Dawkins would want them to be—they 
don’t have goals or subjective perspectives, and they aren’t subject to an evaluative kind of 
normativity.  There is nothing these molecules ought to do, and there is no way that anything might 
be objectively good or bad for them—no more than for any other molecules.  Genes are just certain 
nucleotide polymers that undergo interesting physical and chemical interactions when located within 
the context of intercellular machinery, but that are otherwise relatively inert.  That is, they might play 
a role within agents, but they can’t themselves be agents (see also, e.g., Brown 1998; Symons 1981). 
Considerations of this sort have led Dawkins and a cohort of sympathetic theorists to 
moderate their claims, suggesting that genes aren’t literally agents, but that the most useful way to 
think about how evolution works is to treat them as agents (Dawkins 1976; Dennett 1987, 1995; 
Haig 1997; Maynard Smith 1998).  This scaled-back version of the agentive claim represents a 
conciliatory middle ground just where one is needed.  One must reckon both with the perception of 
agentive activity and with the materialist reality at the same time.  But in taking all the bite out of 
Dawkins’ powerful intuition, I think a compromise of this sort gives too much to the other side.   
																																																								
89 This origin-of-life scenario considers that RNA can serve not only as a replicating molecule but also as an enzyme for 
the replication of other RNA strands.  In cooperation, groups of various enzymatic RNA strands could help one another 
replicate without needing the other machinery that makes up cells (see, e.g., Crick 1968; Gilbert 1986; Kauffman 2000; 
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Orgel 1968; Woese 1967). 
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Dennett (e.g., 2005) offers a position that is a step closer to what I will suggest.  For Dennett, 
it is important to note that genes aren’t molecules of DNA.  They are strands of information that are 
usually embodied as molecules of DNA; it is the information, not the physical instantiation, that is 
central to their nature.  While I appreciate the abstraction in this perspective, I think it still doesn’t 
go far enough.  Genes defined informationally still don’t have agentive qualities on their own; they 
are still inert except in the context of machinery that can operate upon them, and we must still take 
them as agents only metaphorically.   
We can locate a different middle ground by agreeing with Dawkins and Dennett that there 
should be some pattern that is minimally agentive and teleological and whose behaviors can be said to 
be for its own benefit, while also agreeing with critics of the gene’s-eye perspective that such a 
minimally teleological (or agentive) pattern cannot be so simple as a strand of DNA or even an 
informational gene.   
What we’re going to see in Part II is that the teleological patterns I will describe there can fill 
this role.  They can be the literal agents that are required to make Dawkins’ account of lumbering 
robotic survival machines work.  Those patterns are able to benefit, and their status as agents comes 
from the fact that they have true identities and can behave on their own behalf, thus providing their 
own benefit.  This notion can replace that of a gene as a replicator90 while still supporting the literal 
version of Dawkins’ normative and agentive claims, thus leaving the rest of his marvelous picture 
intact.  At the same time, it shouldn’t offend the materialist sensibilities of his critics, because the 
account won’t rely on an indefensible notion of agency within something so simple as individual 
molecules or strands of information.  
In the meantime, now, I’ll further outline the classical statement of natural selection, and 
some relevant modern adjustments to it.  
																																																								
90 Or, really, as a persistor, replication being seen as a principal variety of persistence.   
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The Rudiments of Selection 
 
The basic process of natural selection is widely understood today but, to avoid any possible 
misunderstandings, I will briefly sketch it out here.  The classical definition is that evolution by 
natural selection is the process by which reproducing populations change in their statistical makeup 
whenever (i) there is variation among the members of the population; (ii) that variation can be 
passed from parents to offspring; and (iii) different variants have differing levels of “fitness” (as 
measured by the number of offspring, or sometimes grand-offspring, that they can be expected to 
produce).  The process ensures that the variants that have higher reproductive success rates will (in 
relative terms) flourish, as compared with those that have lower rates, which will (again, relatively) 
flounder.  Selection itself is the process by which variants live or die according to their fitness, 
resulting in a degree of representation within the population that reflects that fitness.  Evolution—
paradigmatic evolution by natural selection—is said to occur when this process of selection is 
combined with a moderate rate of mutation or other source of variation, and when that variation is 
able to create individuals with incrementally greater fitness, the overall result being turnover in the 




The above may sound fairly straightforward, but things are never quite so simple.  Among 
scientists, there is no dispute that the classical statement is what ultimately accounts for the 
development of complex traits such as eyes, brains, and circulatory systems.  However it is also 
becoming widely recognized that the classical statement is an essentialist claim, and that there is good 
reason to believe that it doesn’t reflect all instances of population behavior.  A more modern 
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statement of natural selection was given in recent years by Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009), who has 
attempted to amend the classical definition by recasting it in terms of Darwinian populations—groups 
of interacting individuals that have graded attribute membership along a number of dimensions91.  
On Godfrey-Smith’s account, some such populations are central, paradigmatic cases wherein all the 
factors that lead to full-throttled evolution are aligned, while other populations are more minimal or 
limited cases, differing on one or another dimension, leading often (but not always) to some degree 
of selection.  Furthermore, depending on various features of the population, even when there is 
selection, there may not always be evolution.   
Later, when we review theories of function and teleology that rely on natural selection in 
their specification, it will be useful to recollect the various ingredients that make up selection 
(reproduction, variation, heritability, and differential fitness of variants) and to ask ourselves which 
of those ingredients a theorist might be claiming underlie teleological phenomena, and whether the 
theorist has some reasoned analysis underlying such a judgment.  Can individuals that are unable to 
reproduce have functional parts or behaviors?  If a developmental mutation turns out to be useful to 
an organism but goes uninherited, does it serve a purpose for that individual?  In general, if one 
claims that natural selection grants functions to traits, is it the whole recipe that matters . . . or 
should our theories focus only on some subset (and, if so, which subset?) of the ingredients that 
make up Darwinian populations?  In the end, I’ll claim that the entire endeavor is misguided; 
however, in making that difficult diagnosis clearly, I will have to hold some theorists’ feet to the fire 
by asking just what it is about natural selection that they think has teleological power, and why.   
																																																								
91 The particulars of these dimensions are interesting, but not entirely relevant to my work here, which does not center 
on evolution but only hopes to understand the relationships between various selection processes and the teleological 
patterns that often take part in them.  However, for those who are curious, the first dimensions that Godfrey-Smith 
analyzes include the fidelity of heredity, the abundance of variation, the competitive interaction with respect to 
reproduction, the continuity (or smoothness) of the fitness landscape, and the level to which fitness differences depend 
upon intrinsic properties of the individuals of a population (2011, p. 63).  Variations along each of these dimensions 





If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any 
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter 
of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. 
 
—David Hume (1748) 
 
If the aim of physical theories is to explain experimental laws, theoretical physics is not an autonomous science; it is 
subordinate to metaphysics. 
 
—Pierre Duhem (1906) 
 
In the epigraph at the start of the chapter, I quoted an entry from the Oxford English 
Dictionary that defines metaphysics as the study of many of the topics that we’ve now begun to 
explore.  The OED’s next entry amends the first by claiming metaphysics is “the study of 
phenomena beyond the scope of scientific inquiry.”  I don’t agree with the connotation of permanence in 
the phrase “beyond the scope” but nonetheless I prefer this latter definition because of its generality. 
The definition that lists various member topics of the field is problematic because that list of 
topics has been prone to undergoing constant revision throughout the history of philosophy.  Over 
the millennia, phenomena that were once seen to be topics of metaphysics came to eventually be 
understood scientifically, while other phenomena once thought to be topics of physics came to be 
reclassified as metaphysics, based on judgments that those phenomena were unmeasurable or 
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unfalsifiable (van Inwagen and Sullivan 2016).92  In this regard I see metaphysics as a placeholder—a 
kind of ad hoc category into which we tend to toss the study of any phenomena for which we don’t 
yet have an empirical approach.  However, it might be fruitful instead to categorize these topics as 
proto-physics (or else to consider the term “metaphysics” to simply mean proto-physics) in order to 
emphasize some hope for our future potential to understand them.  
Hume’s empirical stance in the epigraph above is of course well taken; we should certainly 
put stock largely in ideas that we can numerically quantify and experimentally verify as being 
(approximately) correct.  But the value in metaphysical (or proto-physical) practice is not in its 
always being able to offer correct theories.  It is rather in giving us a space wherein, and a set of 
discursive tools with which, we can cast our nets broadly in search of correct theories.  It is then up 
to science to figure out how to take those exploratory ideas, make them testable, and figure out 
which ones are closest to correct.   
So the fact that these topics are not today subject to empirical scientific study doesn’t mean 
they are unscientific; it only means that these are phenomena for which empirical science is still in 
need of guidance, from philosophy and theoretical science, in discovering how to approach them.  
One day, I suspect, most of the topics now considered to be parts of metaphysics—especially those 
topics closely linked with subjectivity and teleology, and addressed here in this chapter—will be 
topics of study in physics itself, or in science more generally.  
  
																																																								
92 I regard judgments of unfalsifiability to be just that: judgments, which are themselves subject to fallibility; and so I 
generally regard reasoning that uses such judgments to conclude that some particular idea may be unscientific to be 
simply unimaginative.  It is not clear to me that any topic for which there is a pattern to observe and explore could be 
fundamentally unscientific—only, perhaps, technically and thus temporarily unscientific. 
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Chapter III 
Finalism and Vitalism:  A Brief History of Western Teleology 
 
The notion of teleology arose most probably as a result of man's reflection on the circumstances connected with his own 
voluntary actions. The anticipated outcome of his actions can be envisaged by man as the goal or purpose towards which 
he directs his activity. Human actions can be said to be purposeful when they are intentionally directed towards the 
obtention of a goal. 
 
—Francisco Ayala (1970:8) 
 
Teleological thinking has had a checkered existence, cycling through phase after phase of 
acceptance and rejection throughout the history of science and philosophy, 
 
(+) from ancient animistic teleology  
(–) to the mechanical purposelessness of early Greek materialism and atomism  
(+) to both Platonic and Aristotelian finality93 and, later, the Christian theological teleology 
that lasted through the middle ages  
(–) to the teleological dismissal rooted in the mechanistic ideas of the scientific revolution  
(+) to eighteenth and nineteenth-century vitalist views, and then  
(–) to the eventual abandonment of vitalism.   
 
In this chapter, I’ll review this history of teleological thinking up until about the nineteen-thirties.  
The history can be divided into two parts, both of which span the same period yet have often been 
																																																								
93 An early term for goal-directedness that, as we’ll see shortly, puts purposiveness in terms of causality rooted in ends. 
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treated as separate topics: Finalism is broadly concerned with goal-directed phenomena in the world 
while vitalism claims to be more narrowly concerned with life and living processes (although, as we’ll 
see, vitalist hypotheses are also steeped with goal-directedness).  We’ll first review the development 
of finalism, beginning from its pre-philosophical roots and continuing through until the scientific 
revolution.  Then we’ll return to review vitalism, tracing that tradition also from its ancient 
metaphysical roots through to its interactions with the scientific developments of the past two 
centuries.    
By the time vitalism was banished entirely, many expected that teleological thinking might 
finally disappear along with it.  It seems that many still hope it will, or think it already has (see 
Chapter VII).  But the cycles of acceptance and rejection didn’t end there.   
In the nineteen-forties, a new theory of goal-directedness—the cybernetic theory—was 
developed and it remained a well-regarded hypothesis for a number of decades before falling out of 
fashion later in the twentieth century.  The basis of the cybernetic theory of goals is that any 
cybernetic system—one that involves a negative feedback process that homes in on a state—is 
thereby goal-directed toward that state (Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow 1943; Rosenblueth and 
Wiener 1950; see also Braithwaite 1953; Maxwell 1868; Nagel 1977; Scheffler 1959; Taylor 
1950a, 1950b).  The most classic illustrations of this are the stabilizing or homing mechanisms of a 
thermostat or of a heat-seeking missile94, although other stock examples include the various kinds of 
homeostatic mechanisms in biological organisms.  The cybernetic proposal satisfied materialist and 
mechanistic sensibilities handily because its explanation of goal-directedness was both plainly non-
enchanted and clearly present in both artifacts and organisms; however, when subjected to analysis it 
																																																								
94 The so-called Watt governor for controlling the speed of a steam engine is another commonly used instructional 
example.  
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eventually could not withstand the force of counterexamples, and at this point the hypothesis has 
been more or less abandoned.95  
In the sixties and seventies, focus on teleological phenomena shifted sharply.  As interest in 
the cybernetic theory waned, a literature debating the notion of function waxed, quickly taking hold of 
philosophical and scientific attention in biology.  As we’ll see, the majority of writers in this new 
(and still ongoing) tradition have, with few exceptions, turned out to be largely dismissive of goal-
directedness.  These topics from the latter twentieth century will form the central subjects of 
chapters IV, V, and VII.  In the meantime, though, let’s finish making our way through the previous 
two and a half millennia of teleological history.   
  
																																																								
95 For instance, the behavior of a pendulum bob or a marble in a bowl, as analyzed in Chapter I, are both cases of 




Animism is by many regarded as the earliest form which religion took, and as the root from which was derived all 
religious beliefs which the world has known, and was also the earliest basis of all that is dignified by the name of 
culture. 
 
—George William Gilmore (1919) 
 
Human teleological thinking really begins with our own intuitions about things in the world 
that seem to behave as if they had a will of their own.  At base we view ourselves, as well as our 
comrades and our enemies, as having goals and as attempting to see them through.  But we also 
project goal-directedness out onto numerous other aspects of the world, some of which appear to 
be striving for something, and others of which we see as thwarting our own strivings.   
It is easy to come to believe that capricious, unseen agents may be the causes behind some 
of the phenomena we don’t understand.  For instance, the motions and behaviors of dust devils and 
of storms, or of earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis, frequently tempt us to see nature itself as 
being goal-directed.  And the spooky feeling we get when doors seem to close on their own or when 
we hear rhythms that are lifelike (such as footsteps, when we know there couldn’t be anyone up in 
the attic) is due to the mental projection of goal-directedness or agency—of spirits whose intentional 
behaviors we believe we may be witnessing—out onto the world.  In cases such as these, when we 
are unaware of the invisible drafts, distant earthquakes, or sun-warmed patches of the sea that can 
genuinely explain the phenomena we observe, the notions of ghosts and gods can easily fill the 
explanatory gap. 
We are even tempted to project goal-directed intentions in more ordinary circumstances.  
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When we are walking in a crowd and another person happens to step on our heel twice, successively, 
we sometimes jump to the conclusion that these paired accidents were actually done “on purpose”.  
We might assume malicious goal-directedness and it is especially easy to assume because we know 
that people are generally goal-directed creatures, even if the double heel-step was only coincidental.  
At other times, there are persistent physical phenomena that occasionally appear goal-directed to us.  
For instance, when objects refuse to cooperate with us, such as statically charged hairs standing up 
despite our combing efforts or when a nut or bolt resists loosening, we sometimes plead with the 
stubborn objects as if their obstinacy were mischievously intentional. 
Outside of the context of scientific inquiry and logical reasoning (both recent and rare 
modes of thought96), we humans tend to be overconfident in our ability to explain the world around 
us, often falling back simply on the most accessible explanations for the phenomena we observe 
(Rozenblit and Keil 2002).  That explanatory confidence, in combination with the analogy from our 
own goal-directed behavior, makes it easy to project willfulness and desires upon various objects and 
parts of nature, especially in situations when no competing explanation—say, from a culture of 
science—is obvious.  Spirits, ghosts, and gods, and other spirited entities emerge, from our 
imaginations, to inhabit the world.   
Psychologists and anthropologists use the word “animism” to describe beliefs of this sort, 
which, they have found, show up commonly both in individual and cultural adolescence97.  At the 
																																																								
96 The scientific method was introduced to our culture only a handful of centuries ago (Bacon 1620) and formal logic, 
while being introduced at first a few thousand years ago, was only fully formalized during the past two hundred years (e.g. 
Russell 1918). 
97 It is reasonable to wonder whether animism also appears in alternative phylogenetic branches.  Take apes, for 
instance—some of whom can limitedly use human language and who rudimentarily understand the sequential nature of 
numbers—do they project goal-directedness onto others?  At the least, we might wonder whether they believe that 
patterns such as rolling stones or dust devils are alive.  Perhaps a good set of experiments might one day discern how 
they behave toward simple, seemingly goal-directed robots.  In the meantime we can speculate from the theory-of-mind 
literature since, to the extent that chimpanzees can attribute intentions and other mental states to one another and to 
humans, we can wonder whether they also can or do attribute those states to nonliving objects.  But the literature on this 
topic is divided and the best evidence suggests that even if chimps or bonobos do have a theory of mind, the degree to 
which they have it pales in comparison to the highly productive tool that we humans have (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; 
Call and Tomasello 2008; Hare et al. 2001; Povinelli et al. 1990; Povinelli and Vonk 2003; Premack and Woodruff 1978).  
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individual level, the attribution of goals begins quite early.  By six months of age, infants show an 
ability to distinguish between random motion and “biological” motion (Bertenthal 1993; Rochat et 
al. 1997) and somewhere between then and eighteen months they begin regularly inferring the goal-
directed actions of people (Meltzoff 1995; see also Woodward 1998) and even attributing goal-
directedness to animated shapes (Csibra 1998; Csibra et al. 1999; Gergely and Csibra 2003; Gergely et 
al. 1995; Keil 1994, 1995).  Later, in what Piaget called the “pre-operational” stage of childhood 
development (roughly ages two to seven), children commonly make use of an animistic explanatory 
strategy in which they often assume that objects are much like people, and may characterize them as 
having feelings, desires, goals, and intentional behaviors (Piaget 1929, 1951; Piaget and Cook 1952).  
As we have all seen, even adults who “know better” frequently animate objects of many kinds—
power tools and other machines are, in the minds of their users, imbued with the desire to cut us or 
crush us and so we treat them with respect so as not to be subjected to their ire; favorite cars or 
other implements are named and imbued with personalities; and we sometimes have lengthy 
monologues (some might say dialogues) not only with pets but even with plush toys.  It is debatable 
how seriously these kinds of attributions are taken, but given that a great many adults still believe in 




Research has found that eye gaze appears to be a central signal that helps apes make attributions of knowledge, 
attention, or intention, and so, at least at first blush, it seems unlikely that these animals would be able to attribute 
willfulness to faceless patterns such as stones or storms. 
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Figure 3.1:  The volleyball named Wilson, who served as Tom Hanks’ character’s companion, in the 
movie Cast Away. 
  
At the cultural level, anthropologists consider animism to be “an idea of pervading life and 
will in nature . . . a belief in personal souls animating even what we call inanimate bodies” (Tylor 
1871).  And cultural memory supplements anthropological research in reminding us that animistic 
beliefs of one sort or another existed in most early societies.  We have all heard of tree spirits, water 
sprites, and other fairies; various angels and demons; the spirits that cause diseases; the spirit of the 
mountain or of the volcano to whom a child must sometimes be sacrificed98,99; or the soul of the 
forest, or the will of the sea, or of the storm; and so on . . .  If we combine individual animism with a 
scientific naïvety and a cultural tradition of storytelling, one can easily see how a rich cultural 
mythos, and eventually a pantheon, might develop to explain the phenomena of the world in terms 
																																																								
98 See, e.g., Wade (2013) and Wilson et al. (2013), for various discussions of human sacrifice—capacocha—made to the 
mountain gods in Incan culture; Romey (2018) for exposition of a recently discovered Chimú site where Gabriel Prieto 
and John Verano have excavated the remains of over 140 sacrificed children; and also Gibbons (2012) for a survey of 
other sacrifices in cultures around the world.   
99 Even today, the legend of Pele the goddess of fire and of the volcano is still widely recounted and respected in 
Hawai’i. 
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of the spirits that direct it.   
Although animistic beliefs play no role in the philosophical and scientific discourse about 
nature today (aside from as a subject in anthropological study), such beliefs are historically significant 
as they provide the backdrop for the remainder of the teleological thinking that has occurred over 
the millennia.  They also draw our attention to the instinctually teleological lens through which we 





Nothing happens in vain, but everything from reason and by necessity. 
 
– Leucippus (as cited in Taylor 1999) 
 
Pre-Socratic Greek Thought 
 
As the earliest philosophers began to reason about the structure of the world, the first of 
these to have a significant impact on teleological thinking were the early Greek materialists and 
atomists.  As we’ll see, the account they arrived at, over the course of a few generations, has a 
surprising amount in common with modern materialism in terms both of its underlying physics and 
its anti-teleological leanings.  In order to see how teleology is excluded from their account, let’s 
quickly trace the development of these ideas from Eleatic materialism to Democritean atomism. 
The Eleatic philosophers, in particular Parmenides and Melissus, first proposed their 
materialist account of the world as a reaction against the animistic and hylozoist views of their 
forebears.  These philosophers proposed that the minuscule substances of our world are solid, eternal, 
impassable, and indestructible and, importantly, not living, willful, conscious, or soul bearing100.  One 
peculiarity of Parmenides’ view was that, by way of a rather contorted argument that I shall not 
attempt to reproduce here, change is impossible and thus time itself is illusory.  A related peculiarity 
was Melissus’ argument that space (or “void”) cannot exist because, by definition, nothingness does 
																																																								
100 The earlier philosopher, Thales of Miletus, regarded by Aristotle as the very first Greek philosopher, was a 
thoroughgoing animist, or “hylozoist”—a term which means he believed that all matter, animate and inanimate, is alive 
and willful, or even possibly conscious. 
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not exist.  Despite these strange defects that contradict everyday experience, the writings of the 
Eleatic tradition are the earliest written record we have of a truly disenchanted materialism. 
A generation or so later, a philosopher by the name of Anaxagoras published a work 
expounding among other things a materialist philosophy intended to revise Parmenides’ peculiar 
view on change.  Anaxagoras claimed that elemental materials come in many kinds that are infinitely 
divisible and, by being mixed in various proportions, these elemental materials compose the many 
tangible materials we know—the perceptible nature of a thing being established by whatever 
elemental material that thing contains in the highest proportion.  For Anaxagoras change consists in 
the various mechanical interactions that adjust those proportions (Barnes 1982). 
The early atomists Leucippus101 and Democritus added to Anaxagoras’ elemental picture, 
firstly, that substances are composed of basic, indivisible and immutable objects—atoms—of which 
there are an infinite number, sortable into many, many types, and, secondly (contra Melissus) that 
there is an enormous space—the void—in which these many atoms move about and interact with one 
another.  On Democritus’ account, the atoms were outfitted with various ways of interacting; some 
had hooks and eyelets, or balls and sockets, in order to connect to one another as solids, others were 
smooth and slippery, accounting for the fluidity of liquids.  Everything that occurs, on the atomist 
account, can be attributed to the mechanical interactions of various kinds of atoms (Barnes 1982). 
These ancient materialist views were important to teleological thinking not just for what they 
said about the material constitution of the world, but for what they didn’t say about the causal 
organization of the world:  Since the cause of all the substances and objects and their arrangements 
in the world can purportedly be accounted for fully by the mechanical natures and motions of atoms 
within the void, atomism avoids making animistic and theological claims about the behavior and 
																																																								
101 It is apparently unclear whether Leucippus was a real person, but of interest here is only the work attributed to him. 
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organization of things.  In ancient atomism, matter is not alive and nothing is to be accounted for in 




The philosophers of the Athenian school accepted the Pre-Socratic materialism in part, but 
found that there was much more to be explained in our world than merely the physical behavior of 
materials. 
In Plato’s dialogue the Phaedo, Socrates describes his disappointment upon reading 
Anaxagoras’ book.  He had hoped to find an explanation of the way the world is arranged in terms 
of what was “best” and he said that these are answers he would have paid dearly for, and yet he 
found nothing of the sort.  The notion of “best”, here, implies that Socrates wanted the 
arrangements of the world to be explained as not just behaving the way they do in terms of material 
causes, but doing so for some reason that someone thinks is good—that serves some normative 
purpose.  He said, if given in terms of what was best, “I should be satisfied with the explanation 
given, and not want any other sort of cause,” while a description of the world in terms only of 
materialist mechanisms leaves some things unexplained. 
Socrates explains the difference between material mechanism and his notion of “the best” 
with an analogy, describing the reasons he sits in a jail cell rather than “playing truant” and trying to 
escape.  First, he gives what he thinks Anaxagoras and the atomists would describe as the cause of 
his sitting there.  They would say, he suggests: 
 
I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he 
would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, 
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and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and 
skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the 
contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why 
I am sitting here in a curved posture. (Phaedo 98) 
 
He contrasts this material cause with what he claims is the true cause of his sitting there.   
 
The Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it 
better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence . . . It may be said, 
indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot 
execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is 
the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless 
and idle mode of speaking (Phaedo 99). 
 
The true cause of his behavior, Socrates believes, is an end, a purpose . . . a conscious choice of what 
is best which directs his behavior.  He also tells us that the orderly arrangement of the cosmos is, 
somehow, what is best, and that it is similarly directed towards some ends, though he admits he does 
not have an explanation of quite what ends or whose those might be, nor how they might effect that 
arrangement. 
In the Timaeus, however, Plato’s eponymous character placates Socrates with just such an 
explanation.  While Timaeus tells us that the structure of the universe follows orderly, mechanistic 
rules, nonetheless this is because a creator intended it . . . for the best. 
 
Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an 
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irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder [the creator] brought order, 
considering that this was in every way better than the other (Timaeus 30). 
 
With this explanation, Timaeus and Socrates accept both material causes and ends as influencing the 
way the world is—they accept both “how come” and “what for” reasons—though, as we soon find 
out, one is more influential than the other. 
 
The creation is mixed, being made up of necessity and mind. Mind, the ruling power, 
persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection, and thus 
and after this manner in the beginning, when the influence of reason got the better 
of necessity, the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell of the way in 
which the work was accomplished, he must include the other influence of the 
variable cause as well. (Timaeus 48)  
 
According to Plato’s writings, then, the reasons why the world is the way it is fall into two 
broad categories that work together. “Necessity” is the mechanical, physical description of how 
something comes to be—the material cause. “Mind”, which he finds to be more dominant (i.e. 
“reason got the better of necessity”), is the description of why something comes to be—the final 
cause, as it has come to be known102.  This kind of reason has its source in the mind of a creator and 
it is that creator’s intentions and aesthetic principles that explain why the world is the way it is.  And 
so Plato rejects the purity of mechanism of the atomists and, instead, reintroduces ends into our 
worldview.  They are, however, no longer the ends of animistic spirits but instead those of a god103.   
																																																								
102 The term “final” here does not mean “last”, in the sense for example that there is some order or priority to the 
causes; it refers instead to the fact that this kind of cause (of a phenomenon) is an end or a result. 




Aristotle inherited from Plato104 the idea that the physical explanation of many things leaves 
us wanting for a further, finalistic explanation of some sort.  Much as the Platonic account is framed 
in opposition to Anaxagoras’ materialism, so Aristotle framed his own in opposition to Democritus’ 
atomism.   
 
Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the 
operations of nature.  Now they are necessary, it is true, but yet they are for a final 
cause and for the sake of what is best in each case.” (Generation of Animals V.8)   
 
While both Plato and Aristotle found material explanations to overlook final causes, that is really 
where the similarities between their teleological accounts end.   
In both his Physics (II.3) and his Metaphysics (V.2), Aristotle distinguishes a total of four types 
of causes—or categories of reasons—that can be used to describe why the world is the way it is.  
Three of these, the material, formal, and efficient causes are all further subdivisions of Plato’s 
“necessity” and, taken together, they align more or less with the modern physical account of 
causation, as described in the previous chapter.  Aristotle’s final cause aligns with Plato’s in 
describing the role of ends in satisfying our explanatory curiosity but, while Plato attributed finality 
to “mind”, for Aristotle final causes are the products of nature alone; the representation that occurs 
in a mind is inessential.   
 
																																																								
104 It is conventional to refer to the views given in Plato’s writings as being his, even though Plato, by writing in the form 
of dialogues, attributes the ideas to his teacher, Socrates, and other contemporaneous thinkers and students of Socrates 
(such as Timaeus).  I’ll stick with the convention. 
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This is most obvious in the animals other than man: they make things neither by art 
nor after inquiry or deliberation. Wherefore people discuss whether it is by 
intelligence or by some other faculty that these creatures work, spiders, ants, and the 
like [. . .] It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not 
observe the agent deliberating. (Physics II.8)  
 
Aristotle sees final causes as being rooted not in the mind of a designer or any other agent but 
instead in “natures”—reasons that are embodied in the structures of items and organisms 
themselves.  With this idea, he introduces the notion of function to teleology—each part of a body, he 
says, is made, and thus has it in its nature, to serve some partial end (On the Parts of Animals I.5) and 
he gives descriptions, throughout some of his works, of the various parts of anatomy and the ends 
that they serve.  The phrase that best captures this aspect of Aristotelian finality, and which he 
frequently repeats is “that for the sake of which”—the end which justifies the existence of an item 
or its behavior.  So, health is that for the sake of which there is walking and the windpipe is that for 
the sake of which there exists the neck (“For [the neck] acts as a defense to [the windpipe] and to 
the esophagus, encircling them and keeping them from injury”, On The Parts of Animals IV.10).  
Translating these ideas into today’s vernacular, we might say that a function of walking is 
maintaining or improving health and a function of the neck is defending the windpipe and the 
esophagus.   
Ultimately, the kinds of items that Aristotle attributes a “that for the sake of which” type of 
finality to can be categorized into four main groups:  Actions performed for the sake of something, 
objects which exist for the sake of something, processes in organisms which occur for the sake of 
the organism; and parts of organisms which exist for the sake of the organism (Charles 1995; see 
also Ariew 2002).  The idea that these categories of items have functions has been popular again in 
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recent decades, though writers in the modern tradition hesitate to refer to such things as being end-
directed.   
 
A Recap of Ancient Teleology 
  
While “the prima facie teleological characteristics”105 of the world inspire animistic beliefs and 
teleological folk-theories in all of us, it was Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle who first set the agenda 
for Western teleological thinking by distilling into writing the three incommensurable, central 
hypotheses about purposiveness that would go on to be debated for millennia.  Each is superficially 
plausible but the debate has raged endlessly primarily because each is also, in one way or another, 
unable to fully satisfy our curiosity.  Let’s briefly review all three, before moving on to see how that 
debate has since unfolded. 
Democritus gives us the atomistic viewpoint that there are no ends in our world.  On this 
account, teleology is a gratuitous impression irrelevant to explanations of what is, ultimately, a 
material world. While atomism has been updated heavily in the intervening millennia, modern 
materialism is in broad detail similar to the Democritean and Anaxagoran versions, and so 
something like the teleology-free account of the ancient atomists also holds sway with a majority of 
today’s scientists. 
Aristotle suggests that there is a kind of immanent or intrinsic end-directedness in both 
organisms and artifacts that underpins the arrangements of both the human and the biological 
worlds, accounting for the way items and behaviors can be described in terms of what they are for.  
This view has gone in and out of vogue over the centuries but, for lack of a naturalistic explanation 
																																																								
105 This phrase comes from Bedau and Cleland (2010) who intend to emphasize the fact that it isn’t, or shouldn’t be, 
controversial that we observe goal-directedness in the world; the controversy should only surround our ideas of what 
accounts for those observations. 
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of Aristotle’s natures, it is largely out of favor today, except in terms of modern function theory, 
which can be thought of as Aristotelian, though it typically eschews final causation and end-
directedness.   
Plato offers an account of intentional teleology with both human and deistic expressions that 
has sat well with creationists and theologians throughout history, and even today.  From a certain 
angle, this account seems to be simpler than Aristotle’s—if organisms are seen as a god’s artifacts, 
then all the things we observe that appear to be arranged for some end stem simply from their 
having been created by some intentional agent.  Ends are simply intentions or desires.  Since, of the 
three ancient accounts, Plato’s had the most influence over the next two thousand years, let’s look at 




C. The Teleological Argument 
 
For it is a Sign a Man is a wilful, perverse Atheist, that will impute so glorious a Work, as the Creation is, to any 
Thing, yea, a mere Nothing (as Chance is) rather than to God. 
 
—William Derham (1713:328) 
 
The general account voiced by Socrates and Timaeus remained a common argument for the 
existence of a creator throughout later antiquity and the middle ages, being repeated, for example, by 
St. Augustine (in his City of God), St. Thomas Aquinas (in his Summa Theologiae), and John Ray (1691) 
of the Christian faith, and by the philosophers Averroes (in his Tahafut Al-Tahafut) and Al-Ghazali 
(in his al-Hikmah fi makhluqat Allah) of the Islamic faith, as well as by Maimonides of the Jewish faith 
(in his Moreh Nevukhim). It eventually became known as the “teleological argument” or, more 
commonly, the “argument from design”106 since it starts with the observation that some things in the 
natural world appear to be designed, and then reasons by analogy to the existence of a designer—
typically some god or other.  On this view, the purposes we find in the natural world all derive 
somehow from a creator’s intentions the same way that the purposes we find in human artifacts 
derive from our own intentions. 
The now-classic form of the argument is what’s known as the watchmaker analogy, which 
shows up first in Cicero’s writing, dating from 45 BCE.  
 
When we see something moved by machinery, like an orrery or clock or many other 
such things, we do not doubt that these contrivances are the work of reason; when 
																																																								
106 Paley (1802) appears to be the first to use the name “argument from design”. 
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therefore we behold the whole compass of the heaven moving with revolutions of 
marvellous velocity and executing with perfect regularity the annual changes of the 
seasons with absolute safety and security for all things, how can we doubt that all this 
is effected not merely by reason, but by a reason that is transcendent and divine. (De 
Natura Deorum)107 
 
The analogy has been transmitted mostly unchanged over the centuries and today it is still a 
mainstay for proponents of intelligent design, but it was William Paley who, in the early nineteenth 
century, provided what is now the most-cited version of the argument.   Paley’s argument begins by 
questioning what we might think if we discovered a pocket watch in a heathland.  The assumption 
he foists upon us (not unreasonably) is that the watch had not simply come to be there by geological 
forces as a rock might have, but had instead been created by a designer and somehow left in the 
heath.  
 
This mechanism being observed . . . the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the 
watch must have had a maker: that there must have existed, at some time, and at 
some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we 




107 Another more oft-quoted passage from the same work is the following:  “When you see a statue or a painting, you 
recognize the exercise of art; when you observe from a distance the course of a ship, you do not hesitate to assume that 
its motion is guided by reason and by art; when you look at a sun-dial or a water-clock, you infer that it tells the time by 
art and not by chance; how then can it be consistent to suppose that the world, which includes both the works of art in 
question, the craftsmen who made them, and everything else besides, can be devoid of purpose and of reason?” (De 
Natura Deorum). 
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Paley then suggests that if we were to discover not a watch but a self-replicating watch, such a 
discovery would not change our convictions but only “increase, beyond measure, our admiration of 
the skill, which had been employed in the formation of the machine” (ibid).  We would be 
convinced beyond a doubt that such a complex machine had to have been the creation of an 
artificer.  And he concludes by suggesting it is absurd to imagine that a self-replicating machine 
could have come to exist by any method other than art and skill, stating at the last, “Yet this is 
atheism” (ibid).  We are meant to accept that biological organisms are equivalent to such self-
replicating watches and so we must recognize that their forms could only have sprung from the 
mind of a magnificent designer. 
Modern proponents of evolutionary theory have often argued against Paley on the basic 
premise that, while the watchmaker analogy makes it clear that design in biology needs to be 
explained, it doesn’t justify the conclusion that only a divine designer could explain it.  Not only 
would the divine designer itself be a magnificent machine still requiring explanation (making Paley’s 
argument regressive) but we also have a very elegant (and non-regressive) alternative explanation for 
the existence of organisms: natural selection.  Descent with modification is a natural form of design 
that requires no foresight or intention in order to create complex biological mechanisms (Darwin 
1959; Dawkins 1986, 2006; Dennett 1995)108.   
I am of course loath to add apparent fuel to the creationist’s furnace.  It is, however, worth 
examining a hole left behind by the considerations just mentioned:  Ruling out divine design, does not 
necessarily rule out all divine teleology.  Another teleological argument—call it the “argument from 
vitality”—can at least be imagined.  That is to say, the creationist may happily accept evolution by 
																																																								
108 Although I find the points just mentioned to be the most convincing arguments against the watchmaker analogy, 
others have also been given (see e.g. Hume 1779; Mill 1874; Salmon 1978; Richerson and Boyd 1995; Voltaire 1734). 
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natural selection109 as a replacement for divine design in creating the complexity of biological 
mechanisms and yet they may still wonder why it is that the items created by that process are not 
only intricate (as design might create), but also purposeful and vitalistic.  Could not a god have set into 
motion the process of evolution and yet also seeded the first organisms with a special kind of 
purposiveness or a spark of life that is then passed down the reproductive and evolutionary line? 
Gánti (2003) argues, as will I, that while Darwinian evolution explains the history and 
diversity of life, it indeed leaves its vitality and purposiveness entirely unexplained (see also Mayr 
1997; Oparin 1964; and Schrödinger 1967).  And in fact, near the end of Charles Darwin’s life, in a 
letter to his friend T.H. Farrer, Darwin wrote “[I]f we consider the whole universe, the mind refuses 
to look at it as the outcome of chance—that is, without design or purpose.  The whole question 
seems to me insoluble” (Darwin and Seward 1903).  The very man who eradicated intentional design 
from our understanding of the evolution and adaptation of organisms was still mystified by the 
purposiveness found in the world.  But is the argument from vitality—reasoning to the existence of 
a divine life-giver—the answer to these mysteries?  I don’t think it is. 
As we saw, there were two parts to the modern dismissal of the argument from design.  The 
first—that it is regressive—shows that nothing is answered by the divine hypothesis.  The second—
that there is a plausible and non-regressive alternative—shows that we are not stuck in a position 
where we need a divine hypothesis.  We have a better answer.  The same two types of contention 
can also dismiss the argument from vitality.  First, the notion that a (living, purposive) god makes 
biological items alive and purposive is just as regressive as is the argument from design.  It invites 
the question: what makes the god itself alive and purposive in the first place?  As with the argument 
from design, the divine answer is simply not a good answer because, while it tells a story, it entirely 
																																																								
109 Indeed, it has been suggested that had Paley lived long enough to learn of Darwin’s breakthrough, that he would have 
embraced evolution by natural selection and found it compatible with his theistic beliefs, much as Darwin himself and a 
number of his contemporaries did (Shapiro 2009).  
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fails in terms of explaining the phenomenon for which we are seeking an explanation.  Second, a 
god is only one hypothesis of possibly many.  And, while it is true that we don’t yet have a strong 
alternative explanation to account for vitality and purposiveness, that doesn’t mean one can’t be 
found.  As we’ll see later, theorists have been attempting to find just such an alternative.  
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D. The Scientific Revolution 
 
One of [Darwin's] greatest accomplishments was to bring the teleological aspects of nature into the realm of science.  
He substituted a scientific teleology for a theological one.  The teleology of nature could now be explained, at least in 
principle, as the result of natural laws manifested in natural processes, without recourse to an external creator or to 
spiritual or nonmaterial forces. At that point biology came into maturity as a science.  
 
—Francisco Ayala (1968) 
 
In the seventeenth century, for the first time since the period of the ancient atomists, a new 
philosophical rejection of teleology began to gain traction.  As physics developed, it became clearer 
and clearer that there was no place for ends in the mechanics of physical nature; and, on the 
assumption that biology and human affairs were all parts of the physical world, philosophers began 
to push the notion that, even in these realms, ends may be superfluous. 
The start of this rejection came when Francis Bacon published his Novum Organum in 1620, 
therein denouncing final causes in favor of material, formal and efficient causes, and going so far as 
to say “Of these [Aristotle’s four causes], however, [the final cause] is so far from being beneficial, 
that it even corrupts the sciences, except in the intercourse of man with man”.   
A similar sentiment is implied in Galileo’s work from around the same time. His 1616 
Discourse on the Tides and his posthumous De Motu (“On Motion”) both speak of “fundamental 
causes”, “true causes” and “primary causes”, every mention of which is based in physical 
concepts—material, formal, and efficient causes—rather than reasons or ends.  In Il Saggiatore (“The 
Assayer”, 1623) Galileo illustrated his vision for natural philosophy (which at the time meant 
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physics) to be performed purely in the language of mathematics, notably excluding any mention of 
ends or reasons.  Galileo’s physics doesn’t ask what the behaviors of objects are for.  
Eventually, as the scientific revolution got into full swing in the middle of the century, 
philosophers, too, took up the fight.  René Descartes was convinced that biological systems are just 
complex fluid mechanical (physical) machines and that mechanistic, physical explanations can 
account for their behavior.  With a tone similar to Bacon’s, Descartes explicitly and repeatedly 
renounced final causes (Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, 1641; Principia Philosophiae, 1644; see also, de 
la Mettrie 1748)110.   
Benedict de Spinoza made a still stronger statement, in the appendix to book I of The Ethics, 
where he argued that “nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human 
figments”.  Spinoza meant to account for the illusion of teleology and so blamed the appearance of 
purposes in nature on our tendency to (falsely) believe that if we did not create things for our own 
purposes, the gods would have done so for us.  He cemented his position with what is possibly the 
first argument against finality in terms of backwards causation.  He says “That which is really a cause 
it considers as an effect, and vice versâ: it makes that which is by nature first to be last.” (1677).   
 
Newton and Laplace 
 
It is said that humanity made good in full on the scientific revolution in 1687, when Isaac 
Newton published his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, but it was here that the scientific 
rejection of teleology actually saw some resistance.  Although Newton’s publication may have laid 
the groundwork for the demise of teleology, he himself was unable to accept that there were no ends 
in physics.  It wasn’t until the turn of the nineteenth century that the work of Pierre-Simon Laplace 
																																																								
110 According to Simmons’ (2001) interpretation, despite Descartes’ arguing against finality, he may have held some 
“latent teleology” in the ways he sometimes discussed the body and its role in survival. 
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appeared to tie up the loose ends that Newton noticed, at last convincing many that there really was 
no place for final causation in physics. 
Like Galileo, Newton argued for a practical, natural style of reasoning in science, based 
largely in mathematics.  At the start of Book Three of the Principia, in a section entitled 
“Hypotheses” (in later editions, “Rules for Reasoning in Natural Philosophy”), he stated the now 
famous Hypothesis I. 
 
Hypothesis I:  Causas rerum naturalium non plures admitti debere, qu`am quæ & 
vera sint & earum Phænomenis explicandis sufficiunt. Natura enim simplex est & 
rerum causis superfluis non luxuriat.  
 
English Translation:  We ought admit no more causes of natural things than those 
that are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena.  Nature is in fact simple 
and doesn’t luxuriate in unnecessary causes. 
 
In other words, Hypothesis I asks us to take an explanation as complete if it is fully predictive of the 
phenomenon it is meant to explain. It is through this dictum, still widely regarded and followed by 
scientists today, that teleology might have been properly banished from physical (though not 
biological) science111.  That is, if, for instance, the material cause of gravitation can explain the 
motions of bodies, then we should not look further for a final cause in the motion of bodies, since 
there is nothing left to be explained.   
																																																								
111 In his second edition, published in 1713, Newton added his famous dictum, “hypotheses non fingo” or, in English “I 
do not make (or contrive) hypotheses”.  Though often quoted with this brevity, the claim is difficult to comprehend as 
such, considering that Newton regularly worked from and sometimes published hypotheses.  In its context, though, we 
find that what Newton meant by the dictum is that explanations of physical phenomena that are based in observations 
do not require us to hypothesize further “deeper reasons” for their occurrence.  In short, he was arguing against 
animistic, occult, vitalistic, and teleological explanations for physical phenomena. 
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But Newton himself was unconvinced that his mechanistic physics was complete.  He felt 
that the motions of bodies were not fully explained and he was puzzled still as to the nature of 
gravitation.  In a letter to Richard Bentley, he confessed to believing that agency guides gravitation. 
 
That gravity should be innate inherent & essential to matter so that one body may 
act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of any thing 
else by & through which their action or force may be conveyed from one to another 
is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters 
any competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an 
agent acting constantly according to certain laws, but whether this agent be material 
or immaterial is a question I have left to the consideration of my readers (1692b). 
 
Combined with both his theological beliefs and the regularity of the solar system, this convinced him 
of something much like the watchmaker analogy.  In another letter to Bentley, he suggested that 
there is an intelligent designer who set up the world just so, and who occasionally intervenes in order 
to keep things running. 
 
To make this systeme therefore with all its motions, required a Cause which 
understood & compared together the quantities of matter in the several bodies of the 
Sun & Planets & the gravitating powers resulting from thence, the several distances 
of the primary Planets from the Sun & secondary ones from Saturn Iupiter & the 
earth, & the velocities with which these Planets could revolve at those distances 
about those quantities of matter in the central bodies. And to compare & adjust all 
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these things together in so great a variety of bodies argues that cause to be not blind 
& fortuitous, but very well skilled in Mechanicks & Geometry. (1692a)  
 
The argument is that the precision required to arrange the orbits of the planets such that gravity 
would then keep them orbiting is an astonishing feat requiring a careful architect.   
In addition, Newton noticed that the orbital speeds of Jupiter and Saturn were such that 
Jupiter’s orbit would shrink and Saturn’s expand, causing the solar system to eventually fall apart.  
He assumed that this could not happen, however, and so conjectured (1704) that the creator, so 
“skilled in Mechanicks and Geometry”, had arranged the eccentric orbits of the comets such that 
they would pass by the planets occasionally, thus restabilizing their orbits (see also Amundson 1996; 
Ariew 2002).  We now know that the comets play no such role and, while there is some stability in 
the planetary orbits, the solar system is in fact chaotic and those orbits will, over longer time spans, 
vary widely and eventually decay catastrophically112.  The extreme regularity that Newton attributed 
to the design or intervention of a god simply doesn’t exist (Walsh 2009; Walsh et al. 2011). 
Ultimately, despite his commitment in the Principia to a mathematical, material physics 
without unnecessary causes, Newton was unable to believe that the behaviors of celestial bodies 
could be explained without agentive intervention.  He still believed in a kind of Platonic creator 
whose purposive hand was behind it all.  According to Ariew (2002, 2007; see also Amundson 
1996), it was Laplace, who ultimately closed the book on teleology in physics.  Laplace ushered in 
this conclusion, in the first place, with his early explanations of the formation of the solar system 
(1796) which precluded an architect, and his (not quite right) discovery that the orbits of Jupiter and 
Saturn would self-correct, which allayed Newtonian concerns about the necessity of a designer and 
maintainer for continued stability of the solar system.  Laplace’s divinity-free version of Newtonian 
																																																								
112 As it turns out, modern models indicate that the interactions between the planets are unlikely to catastrophically 
disturb one another’s orbits for at least many millions, if not billions, of years (Hayes 2007). 
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physics was further fortified as he developed his (1814) philosophy of determinism, which ruled out 
any design or intervention in the motions of matter.   It is at this point that western culture finally 
arrived at the deterministic materialism that underlies the modern scientific worldview, making space 
for the development of atomism and 20th-century particle physics, but also laying the foundations 
for the largely anti-teleological bias that persists today.  
 
Kant’s Biological Teleology 
 
Much of Kant’s (1790) Critique of the Power of Judgment is an attempt to account for the goal-
directedness found in biology.  I must admit, I find it difficult to confidently interpret Kant’s 
teleological work as a whole, partly because of his style of writing, but also because he offers both 
Platonic and Aristotelian aspects, which seem to me in conflict with one another.  However, the 
Aristotelian branch of his work has notable innovations as compared to any writer before him, 
including his treatment of artifacts in terms of their service and his treatment of organisms in terms 
of their self-directed causality.  Within these two ideas lies an important germ of the account I’ll 
describe later. 
The more Aristotelian aspect of Kant’s account shows up in his discussion of “the special 
character of things as natural ends” (§64) wherein, like Aristotle, he discusses an innate or immanent 
type of purposiveness that exists in organisms.  Kant says “provisionally . . . a thing exists as a 
natural end if it is cause and effect of itself” (1790: 243) and he enumerates three ways in which a 
thing might be both cause and effect of itself.  First, something might be a replicator—a tree, he 
says, generates another tree and so is cause and effect of itself as a species.  Second, the tree also 
generates itself through growth and development.  And, third, the tree’s various parts have a reciprocal 
dependency upon one another such that each contributes to the preservation of the others and, all 
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together, the tree’s parts maintain preservation of itself—a process he calls “self-help” (ibid: 244) and 
which essentially prefigures Maturana and Varela’s (1973) theory of autopoiesis by nearly two 
centuries (see also Cuvier 1798).  Along with the notion of “cause and effect of itself”, two of these 
three examples—replication and autopoiesis—will be central to the account of teleology I will 
describe in part II. 
For Kant, the purposiveness of artifacts is not internal, the way it is for organisms; it is, he 
says, “an entirely different concept”.  Principally he speaks of the way organisms use one another to 
serve their own needs (for instance the animal kingdom gets nourishment by feeding on the 
vegetable kingdom) but the same reasoning applies to artifacts as well which get their purposes from 
their organismic users.  He says, “By external [or relative] purposiveness I mean that in which one 
thing in nature serves another as the means to an end” (ibid: §82, p. 293).  This, too, is important to 
the account I will describe in part II. 
 
Darwin, on Teleology 
 
Darwin’s (1859) work on evolution is rivaled in its contribution to biology only perhaps by 
the discovery of the structure and nature of DNA (Watson and Crick 1953).  As an explanation of 
both the diversity of life and of its astonishingly designed character, the theory of natural selection 
was a monumental achievement for our understanding of the phenomena of life.  And yet it has 
been challenging for thinkers over the past century and a half to figure out just what teleological 
conclusions we can draw from Darwin’s theory.  Ernst Mayr cites conflicting interpretations: 
 
David Hull (1973) has recently stated that “evolutionary theory did away with 
teleology, and that is that,” yet, a few years earlier MacLeod (1957) had pronounced 
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“what is most challenging about Darwin, is his reintroduction of purpose into the 
natural world.” Obviously the two authors must mean very different things. (Mayr 
1974) 
 
In the same vein, Dennett (2014) points out that Karl Marx seems to agree with both Hull and 
MacLeod.  Here is Marx, writing just two years after the publication of On the Origin of Species:   
 
It is here that, for the first time, “teleology” in natural sciences is not only dealt a 
death blow but its rational meaning is empirically explained. (Marx 1861) 
 
Dennett suggests that Marx is equivocating; his “death blow” appears to banish teleology from the 
natural sciences while at the same time his empirical explanation of its “rational meaning” retains 
teleology by replacing various cosmic, animist, vitalist, and theological views with a natural 
Darwinian explanation of some sort (Dennett 2014).  
Darwin himself did not know quite what to make of teleology either.  He’d read Paley’s work 
during his time studying at Christ’s College in Cambridge and, at the time, apparently was convinced 
by the argument from design (Darwin 1860:258).  Over the decades to come, however, he came to 
realize that his own theory of evolution by natural selection rendered a designer in biology 
unnecessarily redundant. 
Yet, abandoning the argument from design did not give Darwin anti-teleological leanings.  
As James Lennox writes, Darwin wrote openly of final causes throughout his Species Notebooks 
(Barrett et al. 1987), using the term synonymously with claims about what a trait is for, and he 




More importantly than his bare use of the term, however, are his consistent 
arguments that natural selection acts for the good of each being, and that its 
products are present for various functions, purposes and ends (Darwin 1964, 149, 
152, 224, 237, 451).  As John Beatty (1990, 127) and Ernst Mayr (1988, 241) point 
out, that was all Albert von Kölliker, a contemporary of Darwin's and a critic of 
teleology, needed to be assured that Darwin was a teleologist. (Lennox 1993) 
   
We also know, from a series of exchanges between Darwin and the Harvard University botanist, Asa 
Gray, that even after the publication of his theory, Darwin appeared entirely positive about teleology 
while largely113 negative about creation-style designedness.  In a review of Darwinian thinking in 
Nature, Gray wrote: 
 
Apropos to these papers, which furnish excellent illustrations of it, let us recognise 
Darwin's great service to Natural Science in bringing back to it Teleology: so that, 
instead of Morphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to 
Teleology. (Gray 1874: 81) 
 
Darwin agreed entirely, writing in a letter to Gray, “What you say about Teleology pleases me 
especially, and I do not think any one else has ever noticed the point” (Darwin 1959: 367). 
																																																								
113 There are moments where Darwin shows some conflict about design.  In particular, he writes to Gray, “On the other 
hand I cannot anyhow be contented to view this wonderful universe & especially the nature of man, & to conclude that 
everything is the result of brute force. I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the 
details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies me . 
. . ” (Darwin 1860:224) and, later, “[i]f anything is designed, certainly Man must be; yet I cannot admit that man's 
rudimentary mammae . . . & pug-nose were designed . . ..  I am in thick mud;--the orthodox would say in fetid 
abominable mud” (Darwin 1861:369). 
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Perhaps the interpretation that best makes sense of both the quote from Marx and Darwin’s 
own ostensible equivocation is that Platonic, theological, teleology—Paley’s argument from 
design—is dealt a deathblow while Darwinian processes can account for—or at least be consistent 
with—the reasons biological items seem to be functional or serve ends, in the immanent, 
Aristotelian, sense.   
I think this is the case.  However, there are at least two manners in which the post-
Darwinian thinker might conceive of an intrinsic, Aristotelian end-directedness.  One way is for 
natural selection to have furnished, and to be the full explanation of, those ends.  Dennett puts it 
this way:  “[Darwinian] processes brought purposes and reasons into existence the same way they 
brought color vision (and hence colors) into existence: gradually.” (Dennett 2014: 49).  This is also 
the view that Marx and Darwin appear to have accepted and that numerous other authors in recent 
decades have espoused (see Ariew 2002; Lennox 1993; and the various contributors to the selected 
effects theory in Chapter V).  It is intuitive but I think it is ultimately an incomplete account. 
The other way to conceive of a post-Darwinian, Aristotelian end is to see items as having 
some kind of structural rather than historical nature that accounts for their end-directedness.  This is 
more closely aligned both with the vitalist position (discussion of which we’ll take up shortly) and 
the cybernetic theory (see above) and with the causal role and replication disposition theories that 
we’ll look at in Chapter V.   
Darwin’s theory nullifies the argument from design, but it doesn’t eliminate teleology (see 
also Butler 1879, 1880).  In fact, I’ll try to show later that Darwinian natural selection assumes 
teleology rather than accounting for it.  As we see from Darwin’s writing and from the writings of 
legions of evolutionary biologists since, discussion of the evolved traits of organisms is best couched 
in terms of the teleological question of what the trait is for, what purpose it serves, or what function 
it has (see Allen and Bekoff 1995a; Beckner 1969).  But this indicates a logic reversed from that of 
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natural selection creating purposes:  If a trait or new mutation turns out to be good for something, if 
it has or serves a purpose in the current environment, then it becomes a candidate for selection to 
thereby preserve its already teleological nature. 
 
Evolution as Teleological 
 
In the years following Darwin, it had sometimes been proposed that the process of 
evolution itself is, or is subject to, some kind of teleological or directive force by which the various 
biological items produced are progressively more advanced or lie upon an intended path (Berg 1926; 
Bergson 1911; Campbell 1985; Teilhard 1955; Eimer 1890, 1897; Haacke 1983; Kellogg 1907; 
Lovejoy 1936; Osborn 1934).  Along with some versions of this progressionism114, often comes the 
homocentric belief that, if humankind is not the pinnacle of the progression then it is certainly well 
along a singular directed path toward some ultimate end result that is perhaps similar to us.  
Depending on the version of the theory, the teleological force supposedly guiding 
progressionist evolution is taken either to be divine or somehow internal to organisms or their 
DNA, and evolution by progressionism has sometimes been taken to be an alternative theory to 
evolution by natural selection.  Darwin’s aforementioned colleague, Asa Gray, expressed a 
creationist version of the belief (1963a).  Darwin, however, respectfully disagreed. 
 
However much we may wish it, we can hardly follow Professor Asa Gray in his 
belief that "variation has been led along certain beneficial lines," like a stream "along 
definite and useful lines of irrigation.” (Darwin 1896:428) 
 
																																																								
114 Also called orthogenesis and, sometimes, autogenesis. 
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More recently, Nick Lane (2010) published an insightful examination of modern origin-of-life 
theories and of some of the most powerfully earth-changing biological paradigms to be developed 
by evolution since.  It is a delightful book to read but while Lane does not give an explicitly 
progressionist thesis, his title, Life Ascending, certainly implies one.  The progression he charts, from 
acellular metabolic processes to the development of replicating DNA, photosynthesis, and cell-walls 
to multicellularity and sexual reproduction and then to motility, vision, warm-bloodedness and 
finally the capacity for conscious reflection115, also raises an obvious question:  what accounts for the 
seemingly end-directed nature of evolutionary change?   
The answer to that question comes quite simply from the fact that we might tend to ignore 
the backwards and sideways movements, as well as the fatal missteps, that evolution constantly 
makes in its diffusive explorations116.  When natural selection was a nascent theory, and the tree of 
life was first being sketched, it was easy to imagine that evolution proceeded smoothly from simpler 
to more sophisticated “higher” organisms.  However, we now have heaps upon heaps of genetic and 
paleontological taxonomic evidence (as well as logical reasoning) that suggest evolution simply 
explores all directions, with many of its trials being unviable and not getting out of the blocks, and 
many others moving in directions not considered to be so-called progress.  The majority of these 
trials are largely invisible to us because, due to their unsuccessful nature, they leave far fewer records 
to be examined 117 .  As biologists in the twentieth century came to this understanding, the 
progressionist viewpoint simply lost its credibility (Mayr 1992; O’Grady 1984; Simpson 1949, 1953, 
1964; Weismann 1909).  While goal-directedness and function in organisms and artifacts are patterns 
																																																								
115 Lane’s last chapter is on the topic of death and, as he tells it, the way we humans experience (non-traumatic, 
senescent) death is as much a result of evolution as are the rest of the topics he covers (see also Medawar 1952; Williams 
1957).  In terms of Lane’s progression, however, it is something of an outlier that happens to be last in line simply 
because it couldn’t have been first.   
116 These evolutionary changes are not truly backwards or sideways, since there is no favored direction, just as the 
progressive-seeming moves are not forward.  Evolution simply explores any and all directions, through random 
mutation in genetic space. 
117 This notion is now called “survivorship bias”, following Abraham Wald’s exposure of an error in reasoning during 
analysis of damage patterns on surviving warplanes (Wald 1943; see also Taleb 2001, 2007). 
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worth investigation, there is no good reason to believe that the process of evolution itself is driven 
by any particular goal.   
 
Final Thoughts on Final Causation 
 
Belief in final causation, in a variety of forms, has come and gone over and over again as 
science and philosophy have advanced, but it has never disappeared entirely.  As we’ve just seen, 
even in the mid to late nineteenth century, there were still those, like Darwin, who believed in an 
immanent, Aristotelian teleology; those, such as Gray and followers of Paley, who believed in a 
theological, Platonic teleology; those, such as Wilhelm Haacke and Theodor Eimer, who believed in 
teleologically progressive evolution; and even those, such as Hermann von Helmholtz, Emil du 
Bois-Reymond, Karl Ludwig, and Ernst Brücke, who took a firmly materialist and anti-teleological, 
Democritean stance118.  The tension between, on the one hand, the developing materialist scientific 
worldview and, on the other hand, the existence of end-directed patterns that call out for teleological 
answers was never resolved, and still isn’t today.  We’ll see a bit more of this tension when we review 
the history of vitalism. 
  
																																																								
118 Helmholtz, du Bois-Reymond, Ludwig, and Brücke are famous for making a pact, swearing to denounce any non-
materialist principles in biology, in spite of the vitalist teachings of their mentor, Johannes Müller.  The text of the pact, 
known as “the Reymond-Brücke oath”, is: “No other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within 
the organism.  In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by these forces one has either to find the specific 
way or form of their action by means of the physical mathematical method, or to assume new forces equal in dignity to 





Every living thing therefore, whether animal or vegetable, owes its vitality to the heat contained within it. From this it 
must be inferred that this element of heat possesses in itself a vital force that pervades the whole world. 
 
—Cicero (De Natura Duorem: II.ix.24) 
 
Only an insufficient acquaintance with the forces of inorganic nature can account for the frequent denial of the existence 
of a special force in organic beings, and for the ascription to inorganic forces of modes of action which are opposed to 
their nature and which contradict their laws. . . . In living bodies there is added yet a fourth cause which dominates the 
force of cohesion and combines the elements in new forms so that they gain new qualities—forms and qualities which do 
not appear except in the organism. 
  
—Justus von Liebig (1844, as cited in Driesch 1914) 
 
The living and the non-living are, in general, clearly distinguishable, but precisely wherein lies the difference is not easily 
stated. To declare that a living being has a soul, by virtue of which it is alive, does not advance our knowledge very far. 
It merely restates the original problem and says tautologically that whatever lives has a principle of life. 
 






The Aspect of Vitality 
 
A living organism has a strange thermodynamic destiny different from other very similar 
bundles of matter.  One way to put this into stark relief is to think about what happens when we die. 
Think of a human who has just undergone ventricular fibrillation leading to cardiac arrest.  Very 
little, at first, has changed about the structure of the matter that we think of as that person—its heart 
has simply stopped beating properly.  For a short window of time, it may even be possible to restart 
the heart and keep the individual alive, but once that opportunity has passed, the thermodynamic 
future of the bundle of matter that once was that person is very different than had it not experienced 
the ventricular fibrillation.  The tendency toward thermodynamic equilibrium will drain the 
organized structure of its free energy, and the process of ratcheted braising will dismantle it much 
more quickly now than before119.  What is it that makes the same lump of matter at one moment 
alive, and at the next moment dead?  What strange vital force operates in the one and not the other? 
For a long time, theorists indeed believed there to be a vital force that inhabited living 
organisms and that accounted for the difference between the animate and the inanimate parts of our 
world.  This vitalism differs from some similar doctrines, including what I have been calling 
animism—the belief that willful spirits inhabit many or most items in our world—and Thales’ 
hylozoism—the belief that all matter is alive.  Vitalism posits an immaterial substance, force, or energy 
that animates just the living, and that is meant to account for many of the astonishing behaviors of 
biology, including development, growth, and reproduction, and more generally the aspect of vitality 
found throughout the biological world.   
																																																								
119 Jöns Jacob Berzelius made more or less this same observation in his (1827) Textbook of Chemistry, although he didn’t 
yet have the language of thermodynamics to use at the time.  See also the below section on Stahl’s ens activum (King 
1964). 
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There were two great waves of vitalism.  Following Hans Driesch (1914), we can call the 
members of the first wave, comprised of ancient philosophers and physicians, the early vitalists; 
members of the second wave—mainly biologists from the seventeenth to nineteenth century, 
including Driesch himself—can be called the later vitalists. 
The early vitalists’ concern was primarily to account for the aspect of vitality—for the 
animacy of biological activity, and for such facts as that of human and animal respiration and heat 
production.  Because these thinkers were broadly interested in the existence and the agentive 
behavior of living things, on the surface their vitalism may seem somewhat more teleological.  The 
question that the early vitalists meant to answer was some version of, “What accounts for the state 
of being alive?” and their answer was something along the lines of a soul120.   
The later scientific vitalists were trying to make sense of more specific biological phenomena 
such as embryological development, growth, self-maintenance, healing and regeneration, 
reproduction, so-called spontaneous generation121, animal movement, and heredity.  A key part of 
the mystery in all these phenomena was that that they were for the most part informational and 
organizational processes.  Organisms build themselves, rebuild themselves, and eventually reproduce 
themselves, passing their own structure down to their descendants, thereby creating non-decreasing 
(and often increasing) amounts of organization in the world and contradicting the thermodynamic 
imperative of thermal equilibrium.  It didn’t make sense to the vitalists that such organizational122 
processes as they observed—such obviously directed processes—could occur spontaneously, since 
such extreme organizing tendency rarely appears in non-biological quarters of the world.  There had 
to be something guiding these processes.  Absent the observations and experiments that made 
possible our modern understanding of cells, cellular processes, and the roles of DNA and other 
																																																								
120 In fact, if we translate “animacy” from the Latin root “anima” it more or less means soulfulness. 
121 The appearance of living organisms, especially molds and bacterial colonies, seemingly out of nowhere (although we 
now know this appearance to be illusory). 
122 In their time, these scientists wouldn’t have said informational. 
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cellular machinery in protein-synthesis and replication, the only available explanation was that some 
unseen force guided these processes.   
In fact, proposing such a metaphysical force was a laudably rational attempt at explanation.  
Despite vitalism now looking to us like a magical hypothesis, for its proponents it was rather a way 
of ruling out magic as an explanation:  a vital force of some sort could act as a theoretical 
promissory note—a thing to be searched for and further understood at a later date—while, in the 
meantime, one could avoid pretending that the mystery of observed informational, organizational, 
directed, non-equilibrium processes that characterizes life is illusory.  Ernst Mayr recently put it this 
way:   
 
It would be ahistorical to ridicule vitalism. When one reads the writings of one of the 
leading vitalists, like Driesch, one is forced to agree with him that many of the basic 
problems of biology simply cannot be solved by Cartesian philosophy, in which the 
organism is considered nothing but a machine (Mayr 2002). 
 
Vitalism has declined in popularity to the point that modern thinkers who seem to even imply such a 
doctrine are usually written off as dualist cranks.  But even today, ridicule of vitalism is a scientific 
conceit.  The aspect of vitality has not been explained.  Although the facts that concerned the 
vitalists—that living processes are informational, organizational, directed, and non-equilibrium—are 
partly explained by our understanding of the information-bearing properties of DNA, they are also 
partly still a mystery, and good suggestions to try to account for those facts have only recently begun 
to appear.  We still do not have a general biological principle that can account for the aspect of 





Like the animistic, theological, and immanent varieties of teleological thinking that we 
looked at in the previous section, vitalism too can trace its roots back to the ancient Greek 
philosophers.  Aristotle spoke of a “vital spark”, equated more or less with the soul, that was the 
driver of embryological development in animals (De Anima; De Generatione Animalium).  Later, the 
Stoic philosopher Cleanthes modified this idea of a spark, suggesting instead that the sun is the 
divine giver of all life, and that heat itself is the source of vitality that animates living beings (Cicero, 
De Natura Deorum)123.  This idea of a life-granting substance, eventually renamed “vis vitalis” (“vital 
force”) by Posidonius (b. 135 BCE), remained a central dogma of medical thought for many 
centuries.  And we can trace the idea, from there, as least as far forward as the Persian philosopher, 
Avicenna (11th century CE), who, following the prolific Roman physician Galen124, also wrote of an 
“innate heat” that is produced in the heart, the extinction of which is to be equated with death.  
Avicenna’s text, The Canon of Medicine, was reportedly used in teaching at medical schools as late as 






123 One might notice the affinity between Cleanthes’ idea and Prigogine’s modern thermodynamics of dissipative 
systems.  Under Prigogine’s interpretation, it is not necessarily heat but, still, it is ultimately energy that flows originally 
from the sun that powers the dissipative processes that allow the structures of terrestrial life to form and be maintained 
despite the second law of thermodynamics. 
124 Galen was a student of both Posidonius’ and Aristotle’s writings.  In his books On the Natural Faculties, and On the 
Usefulness of the Parts of the Body, he wrote of an “innate heat” and “vital flame” that operates in living beings.   
125  The 1911 edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica reports this fact (as cited in Wikisource, 
“1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Avicenna”, n.d.). 
126  Also as mentioned earlier, in the seventeenth century Leibniz came to consider kinetic energy—the transfer of which 
is heat—as a living motive force, and so he called it vis viva, quite similarly to Posidonius’ vis vitalis.  
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Ens Activum and Vis Essentialis 
 
As the later vitalists of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries began working in earnest 
toward understanding the organizational mysteries of biology (development, growth, reproduction, 
and so on . . .), an interesting trend developed whereby partial and proximate answers to each 
biological quandary were discovered, but, rather than fully satisfying our curiosity, these answers 
instead highlighted deeper organizational questions.  As a result, the researchers whose observations 
had helped them to (partially) solve those mysteries very typically would immediately follow up their 
answers with deeper vital hypotheses.  We can get a coarse sense of what this scientific vitalism 
looked like by reviewing a pair of early examples of the practice, from the physiologist Georg Ernst 
Stahl and the embryologist Caspar Friedrich Wolff, who are each representative of the tradition. 
Stahl, now often the target of ridicule for both his phlogiston theory and his vitalism, was 
highly influential for that vitalism during the Age of Enlightenment.  Although very much a 
materialist in his investigations of physiological mechanisms such as circulation, secretion, and 
excretion, Stahl also became convinced that there was something more that motivated the 
physiological mechanisms of life—a director, behind the scenes, that coordinates and animates the 
organism.  For instance, in noticing as we did above that dead organic bodies will decompose while 
living organisms do not and, recognizing that there needs to be a reason for this, Stahl proposed, 
much like the Greek philosophers, that there is an immaterial soul—he called it the ens activum or 
“active being”; the source of vitality—which directs the behaviors of the body and drives the 
mechanical motions of physiological processes to prevent decomposition (King 1964).  When the ens 
activum leaves the body at death, the maintenance machinery of the body is left without an operator, 
and so decomposition proceeds unchecked. 
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Wolff, through his microscopic observations of the development of plants and animals, 
effectively refuted the idea of preformation—the embryological notion that mature organisms 
simply grew larger from tiny, yet complete, versions of themselves127.  In place of preformationist 
thinking he reinstated Aristotle’s theory of epigenesis, which is organismic growth and development 
roughly as we understand it today (Wolff 1759).  Although Wolff’s detailed observational work made 
it clear that epigenesis occurs, it was unable to explain how the process worked or why it should be the 
case.  Since Wolff had no way of knowing what organizational structure could possibly control and 
direct the growth and differentiation of the parts of organisms, he gave in his embryological account 
an explanation by which seeds and embryos developed into organisms through the action of a 
metaphysical driving force which he called vis essentialis, the “essential force” which acted as an 
intelligent supervisor coordinating the assembly of organismic bodies. 
Both Stahl and Wolff’s vitalistic theories were meant to account for the agentive, 
directedness of certain observed biological phenomena once their discoveries of mechanistic 
answers failed to do so.  Whether it is Stahl’s “active being” doing the driving inside organisms, or 
Wolff’s supervisory agent playing the role of director, the vitalist hypothesis is one in which 
mechanism must be supplemented in some way with agentive properties in order to make sense of 
the observed organizational features (self-maintenance in Stahl’s case, and growth, development and 






127 One difficulty with the notion of preformation is that it requires a large (possibly infinite) number of future 
generations to have their preformed selves nested in the current one like a Russian matryoshka doll, and yet no answer is 
given by preformation theorists as to how that structure gets constructed in the first place. 
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Élan Vital and Entelechy 
 
The two most famous vitalist doctrines are also the most recent, each coming from the early 
twentieth century.  The first of these is Henri Bergson’s (1911) theory, laid out in his book Creative 
Evolution.  Bergson was a philosopher, not a biologist; so we should note that his form of vitalism 
does not fit with the biologist’s trend I’ve been describing.  Still, it deserves mention primarily 
because his élan vital, or vital impulse, is probably the most widely recognized term for a vitalist 
substance today. 
Bergson’s primary motivation in Creative Evolution was the sense of conflict he felt between 
the continuity of life forms (each living cell has a parent, making every individual on earth part of 
one big continuous family) and the discontinuity of the same forms (species, for instance, are quite 
distinct, as are the differentiated tissues of a large multicellular organism).  There are a number of 
parts to Bergson’s theory but, regarding life’s continuity in particular, he suggests that running 
through all organisms is a thread—his élan vital—which not only accounts for vitality but also for the 
passing down of that vitality through the generations, by way of the germ line.   
The other famous vitalism is Hans Driesch’s theory of “entelechies”, a term he borrowed 
from Aristotle.  Though it is somewhat debated what Aristotle meant by the term128, Driesch 
borrowed it to refer to the force he suspected exists in living cells that directs their processes of 
development.  Driesch was driven to this hypothesis when he separated the cells of a new two- or 
four-cell sea urchin embryo, and found that rather than growing into two half-organisms, as he 
																																																								
128 “Entelechy” is usually translated as “actuality” in opposition to “potentiality”, but just what that means and how it 
relates to other concepts is debated (Kosman 1969; Ross 1936; Charles 1994; Sachs 2005).  Sachs (1995) notes that the 
word’s roots in Aristotle's coinage are entelēs (ἐντελής, complete, full-grown) and echein (έχειν, to be a certain way by the 
continuing effort of holding on in that condition), but that, interestingly, it was also meant as a pun based in the terms 
endelecheia (ἐνδελέχεια, persistence) and telos (τέλος, completion).  Sachs (2005) sums this all up by remarking that, on his 
interpretation, “Entelecheia means continuing in a state of completeness, or being at an end which is of such a nature 
that it is only possible to be there by means of the continual expenditure of the effort required to stay there.”  The 
resemblance of this definition to many of the components of the theory of teleology that will be offered later is rather 
wide. 
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suspected would happen, each grew into a complete individual organism (that is to say, his divided 
embryos grew into twins and quadruplets).  The only explanation Driesch could muster at the time 
(this was half a century still before the discovery of the nature of DNA) was that the orderly division 
and growth of the cells was coordinated by an immaterial “mind-like” force (Driesch 1908).  As with 
Stahl and Wolff, Driesch’s experimental investigations brought to light some biological facts, but at 
the same time they highlighted deeper organizational questions about the principles of biology, 
which could only be answered in terms of an organizational tendency or force. 
 
The Retreat of Vitalism 
 
Clearly vitalism was a popular view.  In fact, despite occasional mechanistic dissent (e.g. 
Descartes 1664/1985), it seems to have been the dominant theory of life from antiquity up through 
the middle of the nineteenth century, holding some sway even into the early twentieth century.  By 
that time, though, its proponents simply ran out of steam and new patrons could no longer be 
enlisted.   
The retreat was due largely to two factors.  The first was the fact that while vital forces had 
often been hypothesized, an embarrassment of experiments had never once found evidence of them 
(Mayr, 2004, cites that there were literally thousands of experiments that came up empty-handed). 
The second factor was the accumulation of mechanistic advances that had been occurring in the 
golden era of mid-nineteenth-century biological theory—advances that seemed, to some, to finally 
explain or herald explanations for many of the phenomena that drove theorists to vital hypotheses in 
the first place. 
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To repeat our list, the phenomena that we are talking about are such vitalistic and 
organizational activities as embryological development, growth, self-maintenance, healing and 
regeneration, reproduction, spontaneous generation, animal movement, and heredity.   
The greatest contribution to solving most of these riddles was the development and 
maturation of the cell theory, which was completed in the eighteen-fifties and consists of the 
discoveries that  
 
(i) There are cells in biological organisms (Hooke 1665; van Leeuwenhoek)129;  
(ii) All living organisms and all their tissues are composed of cells (Dumortier 1832; 
Purkyně 1837; Schleiden 1838; and Schwann 1839)130; and  
(iii) All growth and development occurs by the division and propagation of cells 
(Dumortier 1832; Remak 1852; Virchow 1855)131.  
 
Around the same time that the cell theory was coming to completion, a number of other important 
developments were also taking place in biology.  Firstly, there was the organic chemistry revolution, 
which began with Wöhler’s (1828) kidney-free synthesis of urea but was greatly accelerated later by 
the carbon-chain theory of organic compounds (Couper 1858; Kekulé 1858).  What resulted was a 
realization that the compounds that make up cells and their products are the consequences only of 
																																																								
129 Van Leeuwenhoek never published his work, but his extensive correspondence with the Royal Society in London has 
been preserved.  A history of his discovery of microorganisms can be found in Dobell (1932). 
130 Schwann and Schleiden are usually credited with discovering the generalization that all living things are composed 
centrally of cells, but history is often blurry and imperfect.  For one thing, Schleiden’s work on plants duplicates 
Dumortier’s earlier work and so it is unclear whether any credit at all should go to Schleiden.  For another thing, the 
theory was not complete until animal and plant tissues were both seen to be the same, and so it is seems Dumortier (and 
perhaps Schleiden) deserve only partial credit for work contributing to the theory, since animal tissues were analyzed by 
Schwann and Purkyně.  Lastly, while Purkyně (often written “Purkinje” in English) stated the generalization first, 
Schwann is usually credited for the claim because, for whatever historical reasons, his work happened to be more 
influential, or widely read.  Perhaps all four should share the credit.  
131 Dumortier (1832) discovered cell division, or binary fission as it is also called; but it wasn’t until twenty years later that 
Remak and Virchow were each able to combine that notion with embryological theories, such as Wolff’s, in order to 
propose the generalization that growth occurs only through cell division. 
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chemical processes; the vital forces that had previously been hypothesized to be responsible for the 
construction of these larger molecules were unnecessary.  Secondly, in the year following the 
carbon-chain theory, Darwin (1859) proposed his theory of evolution by way of “descent with 
modification”, a further mechanization of the story of life that was able to account for the diversity 
and continuity of life forms.  Thirdly, spontaneous generation was erased from the list of mysteries, 
when in 1862 Louis Pasteur showed it to be an illusion132.  Fourthly, building on Lavoisier’s and 
Laplace’s (1780) work with guinea pigs that showed that breathing is essentially combustion133, 
Helmholtz (1845) proved the conservation of energy in both physical and biological systems and 
thereby disproved the existence of the vitalistic notion of a nonphysical “animal heat”.  Fifthly, Emil 
Du Bois-Reymond, a colleague of Helmholtz’s, showed with his (1848) physiology of nerve cells 
that animal movements were driven not by vital forces of any sort, but by electrochemical “action 
potentials”.  And, sixthly, over the next few decades, work on the nature of the chromosomes, 
found in the nuclei of cells, culminated in the discovery that these molecules—Schrödinger’s 
“aperiodic crystals”—are somehow the vectors of heredity (Boveri 1904; Sutton 1902, 1903), 
although it took another half-century for the mystery of heritable information to ultimately be 
solved in detail (Watson and Crick 1953).   
It really did seem as if the long list of mysteriously lively phenomena were ultimately being 
explained mechanistically, making any vitalistic hypotheses explanatorily redundant.  But by the early 
nineteen hundreds, one vital question still had not been answered:  If cells, their division, and their 
other physiological activities account for all the lively macroscopic mysteries that were being 
investigated . . . what accounts for the vitality of cells themselves?  As before, with every proximal 
																																																								
132 Pasteur duplicated and extended Spallanzani’s earlier experiments with boiled broths (Vallery-Radot 1928).  Life only 
appears in such Pasteurized broths when they are later allowed to be impregnated by air carrying dust particles that 
harbor cells.  This evidence further cemented Remak’s (1852) and Virchow’s (1858) conclusions that cell division alone 
accounts for growth.  As François-Vincent Raspail first put it, “omnis cellula e cellula”—all cells come from cells. 
133 Lavoisier and Laplace found that isolated guinea pigs produced the same amount of heat as chemical combustion that 
consumed the same amount of oxygen did. 
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mechanistic answer that biologists found, the question of what makes organisms lively was only 
pushed a little deeper, but never answered.  Vitalism was dead, but the aspect of vitality had still not 
been explained. 
 
Emergent Vitalism  
 
There are two major interpretations we can make of the vitalist doctrine, and the notion 
sounds very different depending which of these interpretations we choose.  I will call the two 
versions enchanted vitalism and emergent vitalism.  The enchanted form of the vitalist conjecture is 
what we tend to see when looking back on historical writings.  This is the thesis that there is 
something nonphysical in the world, something magical, spiritual, mystical, metaphysical, or what 
have you that somehow pervades living matter and brings it to life.  The élan vital (or entelechy, ens 
activum, vis essentialis, vis vitalis, or vis viva) is a transcendental life-stuff.  And this is the version that 
rightly offends the materialist.  This is not to say that there could not be an élan vital (science has had 
much success with the hypothesis of invisible items that account for observations: space, atoms, 
electrons, fields), but it is only to say that all efforts so far have shown that there is no such stuff. 
The emergent form of the conjecture is decidedly less extreme and posits only that there is 
some pattern—some still unknown, yet material, pattern—that is common to all living things and 
that accounts for their vitality.  It suggests that life and vitality are made possible by something 
ultimately investigable that is consistent with physics and chemistry, and that very likely has to do 
with the organization of living things.  This is, more or less, what was offered by the new breed of 
biological theorists, in the early twentieth-century, whose ideas came to be known as organicism or 
holism (Ritter 1919; Smuts 1926).  In an attempt to reconcile the material and mechanistic constraints 
of the prevailing scientific worldview with the explanatory goals of vitalist thought, the organicists 
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developed and embraced the now commonplace concept that “an [organized] whole is more than 
the sum of its parts”—that is, that organization plays a crucial role in explaining certain phenomena, 
and from this tradition emerged the basis for the now more widely used scientific concept of 
emergence (see, e.g., Goldstein 1939; Haldane 1931; Novikoff 1945; Ritter 1919; Ritter and Bailey 
1928; Russell 1930; Smuts 1926; and see also more recent organicism-revivalist authors including, 
e.g., Gilbert and Sarkar 2000; Kirschner et al. 2000).134 
The organicists were right—organization does give rise to the emergent quality of vitality.  
All one needs to do to see this is to take some living thing and disrupt its organization just slightly in 
certain ways in order to see its vitality quickly disintegrate.  For even a relatively large organism, 
something as organizationally modest as cardiac arrest, or the introduction of just a handful of the 
wrong type of molecules can result in terminal disorganization.  Despite the power of their 
fundamental insight, the organicists lacked a more specific theory.  There are plenty of things—shoe 
stores, hard drives, and even dead organisms—that are highly organized too, yet not vital in the 
least.  What really needs to be sorted out (even still today) in order to account for the aspect of 
vitality is just what kind of organization it is that matters. 
It didn’t take long for the emergent vitalism of the early nineteenth century to fall out of 
favor.  It was slow to produce fruit, weakened largely by a paucity of more specific hypotheses and, 
at the same time, the competing doctrine of materialism, which aimed to do away with all breeds of 
vitalism, was growing in power.  As the mechanistic fields of molecular biology, genetics, and 
evolutionary theory came to be highly productive in the years leading up to the discovery of the 
structure of DNA and especially in the decades that followed, work on these topics eventually came 
																																																								
134 The term “emergent” was coined for this usage by Lewes (1875).  For a classic exposition of the generality and 
breadth of the concept in understanding what does and does not exist in the world, and how myriad phenomena can be 
more than the sum of their parts, see Holland (1998). 
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to dominate biological thinking.  Concepts such as teleology and the holistic aspect of vitality were 
simply left behind in the wake of progress.   
That is . . . until the nineteen-seventies, when a relatively small number of theorists resumed 
work in the emergent vitalist tradition by trying to sort out just what kind of organization it is that 
matters in bringing about life (Eigen 1971, Ganti 1971, Kauffman 1971, Maturana and Varela 1973).  
In Part II, we’ll pick up the answer these theorists came up with, and develop it further.  The general 
picture is that the kind of organization that matters in creating goal-directedness and the aspect of 
vitality is based in Kant’s causal circularity, in which a thing is both cause and effect of itself.  Before 
we can develop that theory, we need to be confident that we understand the shape of our subject 
properly, and so, first we must take up a mining expedition through another wide tract of 






Just as a physicist might say that heating a gas causes it to expand, a biologist might say that heating a mammal 
causes it to sweat.  But a biologist might also say that a mammal sweats when heated in order to keep its temperature 
constant, while no physicist would say that a gas expands in order to keep its temperature constant—even though that 
is exactly what happens.  
 
—David Hull (1974) 
 
What, then, are the theoretical commitments implicit in the biological concept of function that distinguish the case of 
sweating from that of the expanding gas?  Why is constant temperature merely an effect of gas expansion while being 
the ‘function’ of sweating in mammals? 
  
—David Buller (1999) 
 
By far the bulk of recent literature in the field of teleology has concentrated its attention on 
answering the question, “What is a function?”135  As Aristotle put it through his use of the concept 
“that for the sake of which”, there is an undeniable temptation to see a relationship between 
function and purpose.  Whenever we ask what the function of a particular item is, it seems we could 
just as well replace the question and ask what the item is for, or what its purpose is.   
For example, if we ask, “What is the function of the standing rigging on a sailboat?” a 
reasonable answer would be that it is to stabilize the mast and to transfer force from the sails onto 
																																																								
135 Though the trend has accelerated since about the mid nineteen-sixties, the focus has been on functions for roughly 
eight or nine decades now, ever since vitalism lost its appeal. 
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the hull.  Not only is the rigging able to stabilize the mast and transfer the wind’s force, but that is 
very clearly what it is for; it is what it is there for and it is what it is meant for, it is what it was 
designed for, intended for, made for, and used for, and it is something it is usually particularly good 
for.  There is no doubt that that is what we would say is its purpose.  The same could be said of a 
biological trait such as the heart.  We can ask, “What is the purpose of the heart?” and get the same 
answer as when we ask, “What is the function of the heart?”  Our sense is that the heart is for 
pumping blood.  It is good for that, made for that, used for that, and it is there for that.  We 
(modern materialists) understand the heart’s being there in terms of a non-human sense of design—
in terms of the natural design of evolution by natural selection—but nonetheless we understand 
pumping blood as the heart’s purpose and as its function.  It really seems as if the questions “What 
is it for?”, “What is its purpose?”, and “What is its function?” are interchangeable since, in many 
cases, the same explanations answer all of them.  In this sense, having a function appears to be a 
centrally teleological phenomenon.  
The issue, however, is not nearly so clear-cut as this.  Indeed, many authors find the notion 
of teleology completely unacceptable because of concerns such as backwards causation and the 
subjective, value-laden nature of it.  These writers claim, despite the kind of obvious intuition above, 
that biologically functional items could not be for anything, since natural selection is a mindless 
rather than a foresighted process, a series of happy accidents without anyone behind the wheel who 
might intend or mean or cause the items of biology to serve their design objectives (e.g., Cummins 
1975, 2002; Davies 2001).  The position these authors take is that our tendency to describe 
biological items as “being for” something is merely a result of imaginative reflection . . . overactive 
analogizing, because teleology, they claim, is an illusion. 
Debate over this topic is lively.  I’ll introduce the numerous camps later, but for now it is 
enough to say that there are still other authors who, while seldom claiming that functions are 
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teleological, will nonetheless contend that we can understand many things as being “there for” 
something or as having been “designed for” something. 
My own position, which I’ll begin to lay out in this chapter but which won’t be fully fleshed 
out until the end of Part II, is that functioning is based on an evaluative kind of norm that justifies 
both the use of the word “for” and our understanding of function as a purposive notion.  One thing 
that sets my view apart is that it is neither anti-teleological nor grounded in the concepts of being 
“there for” or “designed for”.  As we will see, my view is also set apart by not accepting the notion 
of a function as being a pattern or phenomenon in the world centrally worth analysis.  I will argue 
that function is an illusion—a useful fiction much like colors—and that purpose or goal-directedness is the 




Still, since a theory of teleology would be remiss if it did not address the extensive existing 
literature on functions and if it also did not somehow account for our intuitions about the 
functioning of things that seem to have functions, I will spend this chapter and the next looking at 
the phenomenon of function, the concept that reflects it, the intuitions that accompany it, and the 
theories that have been presented to explain it.  
A significant portion of the analysis in these two chapters will be an unabashed conceptual 
analysis, a method that I defended earlier (pp. 29–39).  To recapitulate: I am using conceptual 
analysis not to develop a theory, but rather to outline a subject and to highlight the points in 
potential theories where significant inconsistencies with either intuitions or facts exist.  Here, I 
would like to add one more justification for my use of the method:  the bulk of the arguments 
presented in the existing literature on functions is itself based substantially on intuition and so, 
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before offering an alternative view (in Part II of the dissertation), I feel it is necessary at least to 
neutralize if not to reverse the appeal of some of those perceptions in favor of new ones.  I will 
attempt to reshape the way we perceive the subject before I offer an alternative theory of that 
subject.  As I mentioned above, unlike the majority of theorists in this field, I don’t believe that 
functions exist, yet I do believe that goal-directedness does, and those differences in belief already 
produce a radically different subject about which to theorize.  In addition, I believe the focus upon 
function instead of goal-directedness is supported by a broad conceptual edifice of problematic (yet 
very intuitive!) instincts that has significantly hampered progress in the field; in order to move 
forward, this entire set of ways of thinking must be overcome by carefully reconsidering many of 
our basic assumptions about the topic. A large part of what is to come in the next two chapters, 
then, will consist in questioning the intuitions of previous theorists and presenting new alternatives 
by using, among other things, the tools of (cautious) conceptual analysis.  It will be the job of Part II 
to provide a theory that can make sense of the new blend of intuitions that result from this analysis. 
With the foregoing considerations in mind, the rest of the chapter is laid out accordingly:  
First I will discuss the autonomy of biology among the sciences and the role that some think is 
played in it by the notion of function.  Then I will introduce the concept of function in broad 
strokes, mentioning some of the major observations that have been made about it.  Following that, 
we’ll look at how we use that concept in statements we make about the world, which comprise one 
form of “data” to which a definition or theory of the pattern underlying that concept might 
(limitedly) be held accountable.  Then I’ll try to develop some intuitions about what we mean when 
we say an item has a function and how this differs from an item serving a function.  There, I will begin 
to present my argument that items in the world do not in fact have functions.  In the two sections 
that follow, I’ll review two common intuitions that I believe are highly misleading and that tend to 
confuse much of our thinking about function.  The first is the intuition that the phenomenon of 
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design entails function.  The second is one of the intuitions discussed above—the idea that “What is 
it for?” is equivalent to “What is its function?”  Lastly, I’ll review the concept of accidents, which has 
long been used to evaluate theories of function, and I will ultimately show it to be an unproductive 
strategy—a red herring.  
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A. The Autonomy of Biology 
 
No evidence has been unearthed in our inquiries into genetics and molecular biology that would argue positively and 
persuasively for the inherent autonomy of biology.  Moreover, since genetics occupies a central position with respect to the 
problem of growth and differentiation of an organism, there is evidence that these processes will eventually admit of a 
complete chemical explanation.  
 
—Kenneth Schaffner (1967) 
 
Functional explanation is the trademark of biology.  Whenever it is necessary to assert the autonomy of biology against 
a reductionistic threat, the important role of functional explanation for a proper understanding of biological phenomena 
always features prominently in the argument. 
 
—Manfred Laubichler (1999) 
 
Schaffner and the other reductionists that Laubichler is concerned about in the epigraphs 
above might challenge us with a claim something along the lines of “Well, biology is just 
biochemistry—a species of chemistry—but the fundamental rules remain unchanged from those of 
any other chemistry:  thermodynamic imperatives still hold, mass and energy are still conserved, 
reactions still proceed only as allowed by energies of activation and catalysis, and so on . . .” Such a 
reductionist view is driven by the reasonable belief that there is no magic in biology—no extra-
physical substance or process that generates the liveliness in life.  The entelechy and élan vital of 
Driesch and Bergson’s respective metaphysics were never found, and vitalism died a cold death in 
the last century.   
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While we wouldn’t want to deny the details of the reductionist’s claim about the contribution 
of biochemistry to biology, some, such as Laubichler, observing what Monod (1972) called the 
projective behavior of biological organisms, may want to question the use of the word “just”.  Does 
biology just follow the rules of biochemistry?136  Or is there something more to being lively and 
projective?   
 
The Emergent Perspective 
 
Ernst Mayr, in his assertion of “The Autonomy of Biology” is one who wants to draw our 
attention to the possibility of taking the emergent perspective on biology. 
 
Nothing is as characteristic of biological processes as interactions at all levels, among 
genes of the genotype, between genes and tissues, between cells and other 
components of the organism, between the organism and its inanimate environment, 
and between different organisms. It is precisely this interaction of parts that gives 
nature as a whole, or the ecosystem, or the social group, or the organs of a single 
organism, its most pronounced characteristics. To repeat what I said before, rejecting 
the philosophy of reductionism is not an attack on analysis. No complex system can 
be understood except through careful analysis. However, the interactions of the 
components must be considered as much as the properties of the isolated 
components. And this is what the reductionists had neglected (Mayr 2002). 
																																																								
136 In the same paper cited above, Schaffner continues his reductionist disparagement of the autonomy of biology:  “The 
antireductionist biologist, accordingly, seems to be restricted to asserting a type of “make-believe” autonomy. He may 
plan, execute, and interpret his experiments without worrying about reduction to a molecular level, but this is no reason 
for maintaining that a biological entity is anything more than something ultimately characterizable and explicable by 
molecular biology.  [. . .]  This make-believe autonomy may well be heuristically valuable, though perhaps relative to a 
particular stage of development of the sciences. There seems to be no positive evidence, either logical or empirical, for 
any real autonomy.” (Schaffner 1967). 
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Perhaps what is special about living things and their unusual, projective behavior, Mayr reminds us, 
is not the parts that they are made of, but something emergent, something about their organization.  
But, of course, as Mayr’s list points out, presuming so leaves us mired in complication by the 
numerous levels and kinds of interactions that occur in biological systems.  Biology, like any major 
branch of science, is not a unitary phenomenon.  The question, then, as to whether biology as a 
whole can be reduced to chemistry and physics may in fact not be well-formed.  Instead, we might 
be better off asking individually whether the concepts of ecology can be reduced, whether the 
concepts of morphology can be reduced, whether the concepts of natural selection can be reduced 
(see Rosenberg 2006), whether the concepts of genetics can be reduced (see, e.g., Waters 1990), and 
whether the concepts of cellular processes and those of molecular biology can be reduced (see 
Campaner 2010; Elgin 2010; Sarkar 1998; Schaffner 1967; Weber 2005). 
There is no consensus on any of these questions yet, but as our understanding of many of 
these subfields progresses, it is becoming increasingly evident that many of the concepts in many of 
these subfields may largely, if not entirely, reduce.  Even if scientists haven’t yet worked out the 
minutiae of each, the general modes by which such reductions would take place are becoming 
increasingly well understood.  One question that remains for the emergentist is, once the molecular 
details of biology have been worked out in full, whether or not there might be any organizational 
principles of biology that remain irreducible.  Are there any candidates for general and thoroughly 
biological concepts that evade reduction and that thus could be considered emergent, purely 
biological, laws?137 
																																																								
137 The term “law of nature”, interpreted to mean completely exceptionless and non-derivative generalizations about the 
universe, is itself a controversial notion.  Some philosophers don’t think such laws exist, even in physics.  Others imagine 
they may be unknowable.  And others think maybe they exist but they are as yet unknown.  It is often argued, for 
instance, that Newton’s law of gravitation was ultimately found not to be exceptionless; why then should we assume any 
of our currently accepted laws to be? (e.g. Cartwright 1980).  For our purposes here, though, we can somewhat relax the 
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Natural Selection As a Law? 
 
The most obvious contender might be natural selection. It is certainly relevant to just about 
everything we consider biological and, if we take it to be, in Dennett’s (1995) terminology, a rote 
algorithm—a kind of mathematical or logical principle that is entirely substrate-independent—then 
it seems very law-like in its generality.  A number of authors have argued that it is indeed a 
fundamental law (see e.g. Dawkins 1983; Eigen 1983; Rosenberg 2001a, b, c, 2006).  Rosenberg 
(2006) points out that natural selection can occur on objects that he considers to be non-biological, 
such as autocatalytic, self-replicating molecules, and so he classifies natural selection as a physical 
rather than biological law, but a law nonetheless (see also Eigen 1983).  The argument is compelling, 
but there is also a second way to interpret this point—we could simply consider such replicating 
molecules to be “alive” or “biological”, thereby keeping natural selection in the realm of biology.  
That suggestion might offend the sensibilities of some theorists but not of others, though I suspect 
that is only because what is meant by the terms “alive” or “life” is not yet agreed upon.  For the 
moment, there is no need to resolve this issue; we will look at it again near the end of the 
dissertation. 
 
Function as a Law? 
 
Another possible contender is given by Laubichler’s reply to the reductionist: biological 
objects have functions (see also Ayala 1968; von Bertalanffy 1968; Mayr 1974/1988, 1992, 2002; and 
Williams 1966 for similar ideas). This answer is a good candidate, too, because function seems to be 
a general, biologically relevant, organizational concept far removed from the vast variability that 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
definition of “law”:  We are just interested in knowing if there are any general, predictive, and explanatory principles that 
underlie phenomena in biology. 
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exists in lower level biochemistry, cell biology, genetics, and ecology.  As we’ll see, though, we don’t 
currently have any theory of how function might reduce to physics and chemistry, and some even 
argue that it fundamentally cannot.  The main trouble, however, with attempting to develop a theory 
of function is that biologists and biophilosophers have been unable to agree upon precisely what the 
term “function” means and, without a definition, we have no basis upon which to either argue for or 
attempt to disprove reducibility.  For now, Laubichler’s answer remains somewhat hollow, as it only 




Some writers, particularly in philosophy of mind, have argued, in terms separate from 
biology, that functional kinds (such as wing, eye, handle, or brake) are in fact irreducible to physics.  
The argument, which goes by the name of “the multiple-realizability thesis” (see, e.g., Block and 
Fodor 1972; Fodor 1974; Kim 1996; Putnam 1975; Turing 1950) contends that since functional 
kinds can be physically realized in various ways and still perform “the same” function—that is, for 
instance, since either glass or Plexiglas or borosilicate or sapphire crystal can fulfill the function of 
letting light through (as in a window or lens)—there cannot be any kind of general, natural law 
defining functions in terms of their physical constituents or processes. According to the argument, 
the best generalizations that can be made about functional kinds will describe physically 
heterogeneous (disjunctive) categories (such as the category “glass or Plexiglas or borosilicate or 
sapphire or . . .”). 
Although the argument is at first blush quite convincing, there is some debate about whether 
Putnam, Block, Fodor, and Kim are right about this (see, e.g., Churchland 1986; Lewis 1969; 
Richardson 1979; Weber 2005).  For my part, I think that the multiple-realizability thesis may be 
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cause for concern about reducing individual functional kinds to general physical categories, but that 
it would miss the point if it were applied to the more general category of being functional.  I think 
“being functional” is a general pattern that, while accounting for quite heterogeneous types of 
effects (flight, sight, lifting, braking, and so on . . .) is likely to be realized by either a monopoly or a 
small oligopoly of structures in the same way that chemical bonds account for an exceedingly diverse 
array of chemicals (N2, H2O, CO2, NaCl, Fe2O3 nH2O, and on and on . . .), despite coming in only a 




It seems to me that there are three astounding high-level facts about biology.  The first is 
that there are things that are alive.  The second is that there is such an amazing diversity of things 
that are alive.  The third is that the many and diverse things that are alive are also so well adapted to 
their environments.  Perhaps three distinct (yet possibly related) explanations can account for these 
three facts. 
McShea and Brandon (2010) have suggested that “Biology’s First Law” is “the tendency for 
diversity and complexity to increase in evolutionary systems”.  Their argument is that this tendency 
is a statistical result of random change in reproducing populations, regardless of whether natural selection 
occurs.  A random walk through the space of possible organisms will behave the same way any 
random diffusive system does—eventually, the diffusing agents will explore all of the space 
excepting regions where there are barriers to exploration.  Diversity is a likely result.  I am inclined 
to agree with McShea and Brandon that the simple mathematical generality of their proposition also 
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warrants law-like status and that it precedes natural selection138.  However, since their idea depends 
on the prior existence of living things, it appears to me that perhaps this concept deserves to be 
called biology’s second law. 
I agree also with Rosenberg’s verdict: Natural selection appears to be an organizational 
principle general enough to be called a law, and while its applicability seems to generalize beyond 
genetic cell-biological systems, it appears to be largely explanatory of much of the realm of biological 
phenomena.  In particular, it explains impeccably the tendency of biological items to quite 
commonly be adapted. 
From the foregoing discussion, two questions remain.  First: Is there another law of biology, 
logically prior to McShea and Brandon’s diffusionary principle and Darwin’s (1859) theory of natural 
selection, able to account for the vitality of living things?  And, second:  What do we make of 
Laubichler’s (and others’) proposition that functional explanation accounts for the autonomy of 
biology?  I think the answers to these two questions will be convergent, though the answer to the 
second will turn the question on its head.  That is to say, by the time we sort out what it means for 
something to function, we will also understand what it means for something to be alive; it won’t, 
however, be function that brings about vitality but vice versa (after all, cogs and levers are functional 
but not in any way lively, on their own). 
  
																																																								
138 While some might argue that the tendency to diversity has always been an assumption of the theory of evolution by 
natural selection, I agree with McShea and Brandon that it can be conceptually useful to distinguish various components. 
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B. The Concept of Function 
 
It is necessary to conclude that the blood in animals is driven around in a particular circular motion; and that it moves 
perpetually, and that this is the action or the function of the heart, which by pulsation it performs, and it is entirely the 
motion and the pulsation of the heart that is the only cause.139 
 
—William Harvey (1628) 
 
What exactly do we mean when we ascribe a function to an object—what property or 
properties are we attributing to that object by such an ascription?  That is, when we say, for instance, 
that pumping blood is the function of the heart, what is it about pumping that makes that, as 
opposed to anything else the heart does, its function?  Put another way, when we inquire as to what 
the function of some object (such as the heart) is, what precisely is it that we are asking for?  What 
kind of an answer will satisfy us?  This is the sort of question that lies at the heart of defining the 
concept of function.  
The answer to an inquiry about a function—that is, an individual function (say, of the heart) 
rather than about function(ing) itself—usually takes the general form of a description of something 
that the item does in some manner, under some circumstances: “That particular thing the heart does 
that _____.”  But there is some debate as to just what phrase should fill in the blank here.  The 
following list paraphrases some of the more prominent attempts; in the next chapter, we’ll look at 
each of these in more detail. 
 
																																																								
139 This quote has been translated. The Latin original reads: “Necessarium est concludere circulari quodam motu in 
circuitu agitari in animalibus sanguinem; et esse in perpetuo motu, et hanc esse actionem sive functionem cordis, quam 
pulsu peragit, et omnino motus et pulsus cordis causam unam esse.” (William Harvey 1628). 
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Causal Roles (CR):  That particular thing the heart does that explains its role in the 
circulatory system that it is a part of (Cummins 1975, 2002; Davies 2001). 
 
Selected Effects (SE):  That particular thing the heart does (or, rather, that its ancestors 
did140) that accounts for why the heart has come to be there (Ayala 1970; Buller 1999; 
Griffiths 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1994; Neander 1983; Millikan 1984; Wright 1973). 
 
Replication Dispositions (RD):  That particular thing the heart does that explains how it 
contributes to the potential creation of future copies of itself (Bigelow and Pargetter 
1987; Canfield 1964; Griffiths 2009; Lewens 2004; Ruse 1971). 
 
Goal Contributions (GC):  That particular thing the heart does that contributes, in a 
general sense, to the achievement of a goal of some sort (Boorse 1976, 2002). 
 
Programmed Effects (PE):  That particular thing the heart does that it has been 
programmed to do (Mayr 1976/1988, 1992, 2002).141 
 
Valuable Effects (VE):  That particular thing the heart does that is good for its bearer 
(Bedau 1991, 1992, 1996, van Parijs 1982).142 
																																																								
140 The term “the heart” can be ambiguously interpreted as either a token descriptor—an individual heart—or a type 
descriptor—the category of all hearts.  The selected-effects account is implicitly a type analysis, so it is better to think of 
the term, here, as referring to a class of hearts—the reproductively established family, in Millikan’s (1984) terms—that a 
particular token may be a member of.    
141 Mayr’s analysis does not directly address the concept of function.  However, he makes it clear that this is because “the 
word function refers to two very different sets of phenomena” wherein it is “sometimes used for a physiological process 
and sometimes for the biological role of a feature in the life cycle of the organism” (see also Bock and von Wahlert 
1969).  Mayr finds biological roles to be teleological, but “physiological functioning of an organ” not to be (cf. the 
pluralist view described soon).  The quibble is minor:  What Mayr calls a function is not what most others do, but his 
theory of the teleology in biological roles is comparable to others’ theories of functions (1992, p. 123–4). 
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Not only is there debate as to which phrase might fill in the blank to complete the answer, 
but there has also been some doubt expressed about the idea that only one such phrase might do.  
One of the more common contemporary views is what’s known as the pluralist account and, far and 
away, the most common pluralist account is a hybrid that relies on both the causal role and the 
selected effects theories, employing each to explain some but not all uses of the term “function” 
(see, for example, Millikan 1989b; Godfrey-Smith 1993; Allen and Bekoff 1995).   
Perhaps the easiest way to understand pluralism is to note that different senses of the word 
“function” mean different things.  The pluralist suggestion is that there may simply be more than 
one core concept that we refer to as a function, and so we need multiple, parallel (disjunctive) 
definitions in order to account for all the ways we use the word.  As with any word, there certainly 
are multiple senses to the term “function” and we will explore many of them in the next section; 
however, I think the central phenomena in which all the theorists above are interested are actually 
unitary, and so, rather than turning to pluralism, I will give an account that attempts to unify them. 
  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
142 While van Parijs’s account is directly aimed at the concept of a function, Bedau avoids the term and claims that his is an 
account of teleology.  However, Bedau casts his discussion as an analysis of “in order to” statements, which are generally 
viewed in the literature as function statements (see Beckner 1969, e.g.), and he compares it directly with other function 
analyses, thereby adding it to that class implicitly.  At the least, then, we should agree with Bedau that his theory of 
teleology can be compared with function theories to the extent that those other theories are teleological. 
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C. Function statements 
 
The function of chlorophyll in plants is to enable plants to perform photosynthesis (that is, to form starch from carbon 
dioxide and water in the presence of sunlight). 
 
—Ernest Nagel (1961:403) 
 
The function of gills in fishes is respiration. 
 
—Francisco Ayala (1968:218) 
 
It is commonly taken that one central requirement for a theory of function is that the theory 
be able to make correct attributions of functions—to say with some authority that some feature is or 
is not a function of an item—and so theorists typically measure the success of their claims against a 
set of function statements that we would intuitively agree to be true.  If a theory cannot 
straightforwardly declare that the function of the heart is to pump blood, then it seems that either 
we must find a way to understand the heart’s pumping as a non-central example (or non-example) of 
what the theory purports to account for, or else something about the theory needs to be revised.  
Some philosophers of science (e.g., Neander 1991; Wouters 2005) find this to be too 
restrictive and would suggest that a theory of function need only account for the statements made 
by scientists in their practice, since there may be differences between the concept as it is used by 
specialists and as it is used by the rest of us143.  Others who find (conventional) conceptual analysis 
																																																								
143 However, see McLaughlin (2001:86) for an argument that “function” is not a technical term—it is not yet well-
defined—and so, for one thing, what we mean by “function” and what biologists mean by “function” might differ little, 
if at all and, for another thing, biologists’ concept of function may not be justifiably authoritative. 
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to be distasteful (e.g., Millikan 1989a) refuse to be held accountable to our intuitions about function 
statements at all.144 
I agree that it is possible, even likely, that our ordinary concept may not align with a 
specialist’s concept, much less with the structure of the world.  Nonetheless, I find function 
statements to be instructive.  Even though they cannot serve to produce a theory in the 
conventional conceptual analyst’s sense, function statements will be useful to us in grouping many 
of the phenomena in which we are interested, in revealing some of the regularities we perceive 
therein, and in serving as a preliminary form of data to ensure a certain kind of internal coherency of 
our theory.  The more central examples can be used to make false theories seem unlikely, and the 
more peripheral examples can be used to help us understand the fringes of a theoretical offering.  
Also, as we’ll see below, analyzing function statements themselves (and categories thereof, and 
regularities therein) can help to produce some insights that may clarify the subject we will be 
theorizing about.   
 
The Senses of “Function” 
 
As was noted in the previous section, “function”, like most words, is used in a number of 
varying senses and so it is important for us to spell out just what sense or senses of the word interest 
us, in order to understand which function statements should guide our theorizing and which others 
might simply be distracting.  I will largely follow other theorists in developing these sense-categories 
but, as will be seen, my interpretation of the key sense will differ significantly.  Even so, I think the 
																																																								
144 While Millikan takes her account to be a theoretical definition, not a conceptual analysis, she still claims that her 
“definition of ‘proper function’ may be read, roughly, as a theoretical definition of function . . . in the context ‘The/a 
function of ______ is ______’.” (1989a:291). This claim groups a certain set of implicit function statements that agree 
on a certain sense of the word.  And whether or not she claims her project to be conceptual analysis, her theoretical 
definition may be held accountable to that implicit set of function statements, for if the definition didn’t make sense of 
central cases such as “the function of the heart is pumping blood” then no one would take her definition seriously. 
	 198	
theory I offer later in some way accounts for all the function statements that previous theorists have 
concerned themselves with, but it does so by providing different accounts of each of the senses and 
so it is useful to individuate those senses first.   
Wright offers eight examples of the word “function” as used in sentences, showing some of 
the range of meanings it can convey, and he uses this list to zero in on the sense of the word that he 
thinks is under scrutiny in the project of defining biological function.  So far as I know, no one has 
disagreed with his assessment, at least in print.  Wimsatt (1972), following Nagel (1961), produced a 
similar list of word-senses, the details of which we’ll also look at shortly.  Here are Wright’s 
examples. 
 
W1. y = f(x) [or] The pressure of a gas is a function of its temperature.  
W2. The Apollonaut’s banquet was a major state function.  
W3. I simply can’t function when I’ve got a cold.  
W4. The heart functions in this way . . . (something about serial muscular 
contractions).  
W5. The function of the heart is pumping blood.  
W6. The function of the sweep-second hand on a watch is to make seconds easier 
to read.  
W7. Letting in light is one function of the windows of a house.  
W8. The wood box next to the fireplace currently functions as a dog’s sleeping 





To the list we could add a handful of similar ones:  
 
W9. The computer science instructor asked the class to write a “quicksort” function as 
homework.  
W10. The wristwatch performs four functions in addition to telling time. 
W11. In their function as legal adviser to the President, the Attorney General will give their 
opinion on matters in which the President is an interested party. 
W12. The bible in the soldier’s breast pocket functioned to stop a bullet from entering his 
heart (an example of this sort is used by Wright, 1973; and again by Boorse, 1976, 
2002). 
 
Some of these can be discarded quickly.  The meaning in W1 is derived from the idea of a 
relationship or process that maps items from one category or set (x-values or temperature values) 
onto those in another (y-values or pressure values).  In this sense, the relationship or process is 
derivatively named “a function” in order to indicate that it is an entity that serves a particular 
(mapping) purpose.  Leibniz appears to have been the first to extend the word this way; in his (1673) 
Methodus Tangentium Inversa, Seu de Functionibus he uses the term analogically to refer to the idea that a 
mathematical relationship performs a certain job (Swetz et al. 1995).  The meaning in W9 is further 
extended from the Leibnizian sense—functions written in computer languages are essentially 
instructions that carry out mathematical operations of varying complexity; functions of this sort are 
also more clearly conceived of as pieces of code that may be executed in order to accomplish a 
particular job (for a particular purpose).  Similarly, the meaning in W2 derives from the idea of 
formal gatherings serving certain (social) functions or purposes.  Wright suggests that both word 
senses W1 and W2 (to which I have also added W9) are irrelevant to the central question of function 
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that philosophers of biology and teleology are interested in (Wimsatt, 1972, makes a similar 
judgment).  I am happy to take that recommendation, and we’ll see why in just a few moments. 
Wright then names examples W5, W6, and W7 as the paradigm cases.  These are said to be 
the kinds of statements or claims that we should be interested in when we ask, “What is a function?”  
They are the functions of objects, parts, and traits.  In contrast, he points out that W3, W4, and W8 
(to which I will add W12) seem to be peripheral cases.  The best way to make this distinction 
straightforward is to recognize these latter examples as cases of verb-function and examples W5, W6, 
and W7 as cases of noun-function.   
The reason why W1, W2, and W9 were discarded earlier is a little clearer now if we continue 
this grammatical-role analysis: while each is also a type of noun-function, it is an object noun that, 
itself, refers to some entity, whereas the noun-functions in W5, W6, and W7 are all properties—the 
latter are not objects but things had by or served by other objects or entities.  In order to simplify this 
important distinction, we can call W1, W2, and W9 “object-functions” and W5, W6, and W7 
“property-functions” or, as is the custom in the literature, “proper functions” (Millikan 1984; 
Neander 1983).  The kind of functions that traditional function theorists seem to be centrally 
interested in are not just noun-functions but, more specifically, these proper functions. 
A possible question arises, though:  Does verb-functioning derive its meaning from the 
existence of proper functions or vice-versa?  That is, does having a function, in the first place, allow 
a thing to function in a certain way . . . or does functioning in a certain way allow us to say that a 
thing has a function?  In the next section, and throughout the dissertation, I’ll defend the idea that 
most theorists’ ultimate focus upon proper functions is misplaced.  I will argue that proper functions 
depend intimately upon verb-functioning and that our theory should reflect that, and that the very 
idea of having a function is in fact an illusion.  Nonetheless, I take it that a good theory of verb-
functioning should also explain clearly just how that illusion of proper functions arises from the 
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existence of verb-functioning, in order to justify—or at least explain—both the scientist’s and the 
layperson’s usage in attributing proper functions. 
We can look at the remaining examples now:  under this grammatical-role rubric, examples 
W10 and W11 should be categorized along with W5, W6, and W7.  The many functions of a modern 
wristwatch or pocket calculator or smartphone are all instances of proper functions.  Likewise, for a 
person to “have” a function (in their job), means they are meant to serve in a particular role for a 




Some fringe cases are worth pointing out now.  Lewens notes, “A physical chemist may ask 
‘What is the function of free radicals in the breakdown of atmospheric ozone?’” (2004, p. 119).  This 
usage corresponds closely to another use of the word:  In organic chemistry, scientists refer to a 
subset of the atoms that make up a molecule as a functional group or sometimes just as a function.  
“A functional group” or “a function” may at first appear to be an object-function, but what the 
name highlights is the characteristic set of reactions of the class of compounds that share this group 
of atoms, and so one might think of the propensity to take part in those reactions as being the 
property-function of that group of atoms, though the case is an outlier precisely because, while it is a 
property-function, traditional theorists wouldn’t consider it to be a proper function (the same goes 
for the function of free radicals in the breakdown of atmospheric ozone).  Lewens’ example suggests 
another similar one:  it can also be asked, “What is the function of the ozone layer in our 
atmosphere?” to which a coherent answer, involving the filtering of radiation or possibly the 
disintegration of meteoroids and other space debris, could be offered.  Similarly, we would accept an 
answer involving nitrogen fixation, ecosystem-level nutrient cycling, or vegetative spread to the 
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question, “What is the function of rhizomes in the forest ecosystem?” (see e.g. Guo et al. 2008; 
Helmisaari et al. 2007; Iversen et al. 2015).  These two examples appear also to be property-functions 
yet are generally not considered to be proper functions. 
For now, to be reasonably inclusive, we will retain all these examples of properties that are 
called functions on our list below, but we should note that they do differ somewhat from Wright’s 
paradigm cases.  We can follow Lewens, who suggested that the kind of claim in the free-radicals 
example will rarely be used “in concert with terms like ‘purpose,’ ‘problem,’ ‘solution,’ or ‘design’” 
(2004, p. 119).  The same holds for functional groups and the function of the ozone layer in our 
atmosphere.  These are nonetheless interesting fringe cases both worth consideration and requiring 
explanation of one sort or another.  I think the use of an analogy in our thinking explains why the 
word “function” applies to them, but describing the source of the analogy that allows the word to be 
further extended in this way will have to wait until we have a full theory of the more central cases. 
 
A Summary of Senses  
 
To summarize, we have analyzed the concept of function into its usage in four main 
categories of function statements.  Though it may be possible to further subdivide the categories, I 
think this level of granularity will serve us for what we need.   
 
[1] Proper functions, which have historically served as the central focus of the literature on 
function, are used to describe the functions an item has.  “The function of the heart is to 
pump blood”, “a function of a window is to let in light.”  I claim that these functions 
derive their status from verb-functions, though the manner in which they do so will 
require further argument. 
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[2] Verb functions are used to describe a role that an item plays.  “The heart functions as a 
pump . . . ”, “the box functions as a dog’s sleeping quarters”, and “the bible functioned to 
stop a bullet.”  This sense of the word “function” will be of central interest for our later 
theory. 
[3] Fringe functions are a kind of property-function that derive analogically from verb-
functions, in a manner different from how proper functions do.  No theorist has yet 
seriously looked at or made provisions for this category, for good reason, but 
nonetheless I think we can produce a satisfactory explanation for its existence and I will 
do so later.  
[4] Object functions are the least interesting category for our analysis.  These are objects 
called “functions” that have derived their names, by historical custom, from the 
particular property-functions that they serve. For instance, mathematical functions, 
computer programming functions, and events as a kind of function. 
 
The central sense in most analyses is proper functions but I will argue that this sense is only 
properly understood in terms of verb-functions and so, eventually, a fully explanatory theory will 
have to offer analyses of both.  In the meantime, here is a list of (both proper and fringe as well as 
verb) functions that I will refer back to, later in the dissertation.  
 
FS1. The principal function of a mammalian heart is as a pump to circulate blood 
through the vasculature of the body.   
FS2. In many birds, the function of wings is to allow flight. 
FS3. In many birds, one function of feathers is to aid in flight; another is to serve as 
insulation; a third is to act as waterproofing. 
	 204	
FS4. The function of the sweep-second hand on a watch is to make seconds easier 
to read.  
FS5. Letting in light is one function of the windows of a house. 
FS6. The function of a cog or a lever, in a machine, is the transference of rotational 
mechanical force. 
FS7. The function of a rock, used for some time as a paperweight, is to hold down 
papers on a desk.  
FS8. Stabilizing the mast and transferring the force from the sails onto the hull are 
the two main functions of standing rigging on a sailboat. 
FS9. “The function of a telephone is effecting rapid, convenient communication.” 
(Wright 1973) 
FS10.  The function of putting a stamp on a letter is to ensure that the letter gets 
delivered. 
FS11.  The function of writing to one’s congressional representative is to influence 
their decision.  
FS12.  In their function as legal adviser to the President, the Attorney General will 
give their opinion on matters in which the President is an interested party. 
FS13.  “The wood box next to the fireplace currently functions as a dog’s sleeping 
quarters.”  (Wright 1973) 
FS14.  The bible in the soldier’s breast pocket functioned to stop a bullet from 
entering his heart. (Boorse 2002; Wright 1973) 
FS15.  Protecting the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie is the function of the 
capitalist state (van Parijs 1983). 
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FS16.  Maintaining social cohesion is the function of religious ritual (van Parijs 
1983).145 
FS17.  “What is the function of free radicals in the breakdown of atmospheric 
ozone?” (Lewens 2004) 
FS18.  One function of the ozone layer in our atmosphere is to filter harmful 
radiation out, preventing it from reaching the surface of the planet. 
FS19.  The function of rhizomes in the forest ecosystem is the fixation of nitrogen. 
FS20.  The function of a soliloquy in a play is to inform the audience of a character’s 
inner ruminations. 
 
One thing that emerges quickly from this list is that objects or traits do not necessarily have 
or serve just one function.  The functions of feathers (FS3) are a clear example from biology, but 
multitasking happens in engineered artifacts as well:  in a diesel engine, the injectors have a return 
line through which excess fuel flows back to the tank during the injection cycle.  The return of the 
excess fuel is one function of this backflow; two more functions are the cooling and the lubrication 
of the injector mechanism by the fuel as it flows through it.  Currently, all modern theories of 
function can be made consistent with the fact that functions of objects are not unitary, so the issue 
of multi-functionality is not a major sticking point, but we need to ensure that any new theory also 
respects this fact. 
Another thing that emerges is that there seem to be just a few major classes of items that 
have functions—organisms and artifacts (though perhaps more properly, traits of organisms, and 
artifacts and their parts) and behaviors (such as FS10 and FS11).  The first two are commonly 
observed, while the third is only occasionally so.  One might also argue that social structures 
																																																								
145 Van Parijs’ examples are included because they come from a non-central field (neither organism nor artifact) and so 
make an interesting case.  They are both clearly property-functions.   
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(institutions) and behaviors make for different categories than organismic structures (traits) and 
behaviors, in which case there are five main categories.  Aside from van Parijs (1981), most recent 
writers have neglected social functions in favor of biological and artifactual functions; I include 
examples FS15 and FS16 for the sake of generality. There also seem to be some exceptions to these 
three (or five) categories.  For instance, neither the ozone layer nor the free radicals in it (FS17) are 
artifacts, organisms, traits, behaviors, or social structures, and a rock simply chosen as a paperweight 
(FS7) seems to blur the boundary between artifact and mere object.  Our later theory will need to 
clarify both the reason why functions seem to apply primarily to artifacts, organisms, and behaviors, 
and the reasons why exceptions such as these appear to occur.   
 
The Perspectival, Evaluative, and Teleological Senses 
 
Under Wimsatt’s (1972) analysis, our concept of proper function divides into three more 
specific senses.  He eventually suggests that all three may be roughly the same, and I agree.  But it is 
worth noticing the differences, at least at first, to get a sense for the ways that the concept can be 
stretched, and some of the common features that have been noticed. 
Using the perspectival sense of “function” means that only when viewed from a certain 
perspective are some of the causal consequences of an item its functions.  However, there is not 
necessarily a single privileged perspective from which such analyses can be made.  Wimsatt borrows 
this inherently subjective, context-sensitive sense from Kauffman’s (1971a) discussion of “parts 
explanations”, though it is also closely related to the CR analysis, which I’ll discuss more in the next 
chapter.  For Kauffman, it is important to note that there are various overlapping ways to divide 
items into parts and each provides different possible perspectives that highlight different functional 
roles that may be played.   
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Wimsatt’s evaluative sense of “function” derives from Lehman’s (1965) and Hempel’s (1965) 
notions in which a function exists when a part contributes to the proper operation of a system.146  
Proper operation, obviously, requires a standard of evaluation, and so evaluative functions are 
relativized to such a standard.  It is an open question as to what could provide this standard, but 
assuming for now that the intentions of a designer or a user might provide a standard, then in this 
sense a light bulb has a function only when it works to produce light.  This is at odds with Millikan’s 
intuition (which we’ll review soon) that a malfunctioning item still has a function.  The valuable-
effects analysis of function (that we’ll see in Chapter V) is an attempt to turn this sense into a 
theoretical claim. 
Wimsatt’s teleological sense of “function” means that the item “contributes to the attainment 
of some end or purpose of some user or system.”  Any artifact has an obvious function in this sense 
but, unless one believes in real goal-directedness in nature (as Wimsatt and I and only a few others 
seem to), organisms and their traits would not.  This teleological sense of “function” is picked up 
again seriously in the goal-contribution account given by Boorse.  
Lastly, in order to see why Wimsatt eventually groups all three senses, it is important to 
notice that both the evaluative and teleological senses can be seen as subclasses of the perspectival 
sense.  If we say that something has a function in the teleological sense, we are taking the 
perspective of the user or system to whose end or purpose the function contributes.  Having a 
purpose requires having a particular subjective perspective.  If we say that something has a function 
in the evaluative sense, we are taking the perspective of one who defines a particular (subjective) 
standard of performance.  In the end, a theory of function has to explain why functions are (i) 
perspectival, (ii) evaluative, and (iii) teleological; Wimsatt may be right, though, that all three can be 
explained by one model.  
																																																								
146 Here, the word “proper” should be taken to mean “correct” rather than “property”.  
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D. Improper Functions: The Illusion of Proper Functions 
 
We say the soldier’s Bible, on this occasion, performed the function of bullet-stopping . . . We do not say that stopping 
bullets was the function, or even a function, of the Bible, or that the Bible had this function. 
 
—Christopher Boorse (2002)147 
 
Unfortunately, philosophers’ attempts to provide rigorous analyses of teleological concepts frequently make little progress 
against ingrained ways of thinking about these concepts.  
 
      —Marc Bekoff and Colin Allen (1995:253) 
 
If we follow the past century of literature on the topic of function, we find ourselves 
interested principally in what I’ve just termed “property-functions”.  We find ourselves attributing a 
property to an item and then wondering what it is about the item itself (its history, its structure, its 
role) that allows it to have or to hold that property.  In fact, as mentioned earlier, the term of art 
introduced by both Neander (1983) and Millikan (1984) and adopted by many other philosophers 
since is “proper function”.  The word “proper” in this context is used not in the sense in which it 
means “correct” but in the sense in which it relates to ownership—a proper function is a property of 
an item. (Although, as we saw with fringe function-attributions such as the ozone layer, not quite all 
property-functions are considered to be proper functions.)  There is a deep assumption underlying 
this view that has gone largely unquestioned in this literature—the assumption that an item can in 
fact objectively have a function.  I think this assumption is false.  Things do not have functions.   
																																																								
147 The ideas in this section expand upon and were inspired by similar ideas introduced by Christopher Boorse (2002:71). 
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Saying that nothing has a function is not meant to deny the existence of functioning, though.  
On my view, functions are just things that are served rather than had.  They are properties not of an 
item, but of a relationship that an item may enter into, and their lifespans last only as long as those 
relationships do. Things can function, and things do function all the time, they just don’t have 
unwavering intrinsic functions.  
To get a first intuition for this idea, we can look at an analogy between function and the 
physical property of weight.  Weight’s close cousin, mass, can be called an intrinsic property148 of an 
item—invariant throughout the universe (as far as we know)—while weight itself varies in some way 
with respect to the item’s context (we can call it an extrinsic property)149.  For example, a bowling 
ball may have six kilograms of mass and, here on earth, it correspondingly weighs nearly 60 
newtons150, but on the surface of Mars it weighs less than half that much while its mass remains 
unchanged.  Furthermore, if we put that bowling ball aboard a spaceship bound from here to Mars, 
for most of the journey it will be relatively weightless despite not having undergone any change in 
mass.  The difference here is that while mass is a property solely of a physical object, weight is a 
property derived from a relationship between an object with mass and a particular environment—in 
this case, an environment in which another massive object exerts a gravitational force upon the 
object. 
																																																								
148 Though we must be careful not to confuse this intrinsic-extrinsic distinction with the identical terms that are 
sometimes used by physicists synonymously with the terms intensive and extensive properties.  On the intensive-
extensive distinction, mass is considered to be an extensive property, which means that it varies with regard to the 
quantity of material present (unlike, say, density, an intensive property which does not vary when a material is halved or 
otherwise divided).  
149 Extrinsic properties are sometimes called relational properties, though there is controversy over use of that term as a 
general synonym for extrinsic properties (Humberstone 1996). 
150 Six kilograms times approximately 9.8 meters per second squared of acceleration due to the gravitational pull of the 
earth. 
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While weight itself is not illusory151, here on earth it does present a (typically benign) illusion 
that we could term “the illusion of weight constancy”, a useful fiction by which we conceive of 
weights as fixed quantities because the context in relation to which they may vary—distance from 
massive objects such as the earth152—is so seldom varied that we imagine it to be universal153.  These 
days, young children and other people with little or no training in physics or engineering are the 
most susceptible to this particular illusion, though any of us could fall for it at one time or another 
and, not too many centuries ago, perhaps most of us did.   
Now what I am suggesting is that having a function is more like having a weight than it is 
like having a mass.  It is a property that is not intrinsic to the items that appear to have it and it is 
subject to variation—functions may come and go just as weight can, though, as I’ll explore 
momentarily, our very strong intuitions often seem to be that they cannot.   
One reason I suspect that functions appear to be fixed is that our typical modes of thought 
tend not to vary the contexts in relation to which functional status might vary.  We tend to think 
about traits mainly in relation to organisms and about artifacts mainly in relation to ourselves (as 
users), which are precisely the contexts in which such items are able to function.  We seldom imagine 
a record player floating alone through the vastness of space after the human world has been 
destroyed154, or a dismembered thumb that does not dream of reattachment.  And even when we 
force ourselves to picture items divorced like this from their usual contexts, we can’t help but 
continue thinking of the isolated item in terms of its usual contextualized behaviors.  We can’t shake 
the feeling that the thumb is for opposing the fingers in grasping, even when it is no longer able to 
																																																								
151 It is an observable and measurable pattern in the world that, ceteris paribus, we can use to make reliable predictions (see 
chapter II). 
152 Weight also varies with other forces that act upon the same body—for instance, your buoyancy affects your weight 
when you are submerged in water. 
153 See also the illusion of color constancy discussed in Chapter II. 
154 The unmanned space probes Voyager I and II, which were launched in 1977, contain the needle of just such a record 
player, along with instructions for its use and a record to be played, in the unlikely event that, one day, the ship is 
encountered (and found to be relatively undamaged) by distant beings. 
	 211	
do so, partly because the thumb either does that or it does nothing at all to speak of.  Aside from in 
its role in grasping, the thumb is an uninteresting object which we simply have no framework for 
thinking about, and the same goes for a record player taken outside of the context of a person using 
it to play records155.  Since we tend to think of items only in terms of how and when they are able to 
perform their central functions, that functioning seems to be ever-present in the item, when in fact 
the ever-presence is only in our minds, in our experiences with, and our thoughts about these items, 
and this, I suggest, contributes in large part to our belief that their functions are enduring properties, 
a belief which (following the analogy from weight) we can term “the illusion of function 
constancy”156.    
The suggestions above help to partially explain why we might be liable to see constant 
functions if they didn’t actually exist, but in order to fully expose the proposed illusion we still need 
reason to believe that functions may not actually be constant.  We need to show that the functions 
of items can come and go.  And while it should be obvious that, at some point in time, the material 
from which an item was eventually made did not have the item’s function and that one day down 
the line, when the item disintegrates, that same material will also no longer have a function, those 
boundaries may be too extreme to convince a skeptic who might claim that functions may appear 
and disintegrate in tandem with an item’s identity, but otherwise inhere in the item157.  What we need 
																																																								
155 Duncker (1945) named this bias “functional fixedness” after he showed its pervasiveness with his well-known candle-
box problem in which participants in a problem-solving task found it difficult to think of a matchbox as anything but a 
box for holding matches in.  Solving the candle-box problem required them to imagine the box being used instead as a 
small shelf (see also Frank and Ramscar, 2003).  Birch and Rabinowitz (1951) revealed a similar functional fixedness bias 
using an adaptation of Maier’s (1930, 1931) two-cord problem.  In Birch and Rabinowitz’s experiment, items previously 
used by the participants for a specific function (electrical switches and relays) seemed to be cognitively inaccessible for 
use in a novel way (e.g. as the bob of a pendulum) when later solving the problem of bringing two hanging cords 
together.   
156 A very similar illusion is the sense we get that a particular road or hotel or theme park or beach is always very busy, 
when, in reality, this sense is only because we are only ever on these roads or at those beaches at the times when 
everyone else also is, and so whenever we think of them, we think of them as we’ve experienced them: full of people 
(thanks to Seth Frey for pointing this out to me).   
157 Though, such a skeptic will surely be at pains to define what is meant by “an item’s identity”.   
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to show this kind of skeptic is that functions can come and go in items that remain largely or wholly 
unchanged.158 
However, breaking the illusion of function constancy in our minds, while leaving functional 
items largely intact, turns out to be a tricky matter for at least two reasons.  For one thing, our 
susceptibility to the illusion, along with the reinforcement it may receive from a linguistic 
community that has culturally codified the illusion, causes us to intuitively project functions (as 
enduring properties) onto items that behave functionally, or that are even just imagined to159, and so 
we cannot trust our own instincts and intuitions about the matter.  We cannot easily ask ourselves 
“Well, in a case such as X, does the item still have a function?”  For another thing, there appears to 
be a chain of fallacies that collude to reinforce the illusion of function constancy.  I will call the ones 
that I’ve identified by the following names:  the design fallacy, the malfunction fallacy, and “for”-
conflation.  Before arguing that functions can come and go, first I will briefly describe these fallacies; 
detailed discussion of each will come later. 
The design fallacy occurs when we believe that an item acquires its function through the 
process of having been designed.  So when we imagine a dismembered thumb or a phonograph 
floating alone in deep space and we find ourselves convinced that these items still have functions, 
part of what convinces us of that is the idea that these things have been designed, in one way or 
another, to perform certain behaviors.  We convince ourselves that such performances are what the 
items are for, regardless of whether the items ever actually perform them.  Once impregnated with 
that function, the thinking goes, the item retains it permanently (at least, perhaps, until the item 
																																																								
158 While use of the term “unchanged”, here, ultimately needs to be understood in terms of my discussion of identity in 
chapter II, the standard interpretation of the term is a near enough approximation in most cases. 
159 Imagine for instance, an archaeologist or anthropologist discovering an item that has been carefully formed in some 
way but which had never been intended for something—perhaps it was the negative of a machined item, the scrap left 
over from creating something else.  An object like this may have sharp edges, long lever-like members, evenly spaced 
holes, or various other marks of intention and function, yet it was never intended as any particular kind of tool.  Upon 
discovering such an item, the explorer might venture some guesses as to what purpose the item served and, if a 
particularly fitting explanation seemed to account for all the features of the item, then it would be labeled as having been 
made for just that and no one would be moved to dispute the function attribution, despite it being wrong. 
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disintegrates).  I must admit that, on the surface, this sounds more reasonable than fallacious, but I 
will examine (and try to dismantle) the intuition in a later section of this chapter. 
The malfunction fallacy occurs when we believe that an item that is unable to function 
(either because it was designed or made improperly or because it was damaged in the meantime) still 
“has” the function that it is unable to perform160. For instance, a corkscrew that is badly bent to the 
point that it can never be screwed into a cork again or a congenitally deformed liver that cannot 
perform its metabolic functions are both considered to “have” the functions which we consider to 
be their malfunctions because after all, despite their failures to perform, that is what the items are 
“for”, in some sense of the word (see, e.g., Griffiths 1993; Millikan 1989a; cf. also the topic of “for”-
conflation, below).  The intuition can be compelling to some of us, but so can its opposite—that is, 
the intuition that an item that fails to function simply either never had or no longer has that 
function.  A broken corkscrew can easily be thought of as nonfunctional or no-longer functional, 
rather than malfunctioning.  I am, at times, convinced by each of these opposing intuitions.  
However, if we follow out the implications of the claim that an item can never “have” a function in 
the first place, then there simply is no question of whether that item might keep or lose that function 
when it becomes deformed (because there never was a function in the first place that might be kept 
or lost).  Both intuitions would in fact be faulty.  I’ll argue against the malfunction fallacy in the next 
chapter when reviewing the SE analysis of function, whose proponents rest a series of their 
arguments upon the mistaken intuition. 
“For”-conflation is closely tied to both the previous fallacies.  The idea of a function (or a 
purpose) being what an item is for seems intuitive, but asking ourselves merely what an item is for 
																																																								
160 This is closely related to the issue raised earlier about items (such as the record player in deep space or the 
dismembered thumb) that are unable to function when removed from their context of usage.  There is a blurry boundary 
between them, of course.  A malfunctioning thumb is, for instance, one that has been crushed badly enough that it can 
no longer function whatsoever in attempts at grasping, but it has not been removed.  A decontextualized thumb is one 
that is no longer on a body even if, for instance, the entire forearm has been removed.  But it seems there can be no fine 
line separating these kinds of categories. 
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causes us to carelessly blend or simply mix up a broad array of concepts, each of which is sometimes 
abridged in our mental shorthand to just its attendant preposition: the word “for”.  Even though the 
dismembered thumb is no longer used for, nor good for anything in particular (especially grasping), and 
though it is certainly not there for anything (imagine, perhaps, it is lying on the ground), and although 
having been constructed by natural design means that it never was meant for nor intended for anything 
(in the sense of foresighted human intention), we still might imagine it to have been designed for or 
made for grasping (in the sense only of the natural design of evolution).  And so, while contemplating 
this particular thumb’s function, when we ask ourselves “What is the thumb for?”, an automatic 
assumption about just what kind of “for” we are talking about allows us to have an answer at the 
ready—an answer that, in the case of the thumb, happens to corroborate the design fallacy and 
make it easy to fall for the illusion of function constancy.  We thereby believe that a dismembered 
thumb that cannot function in any way still “has” the function of aiding in grasping, and this, 
furthermore, buttresses the malfunction fallacy.  If, however, we look at another case, say that of the 
phonograph, we can say that the item was designed for or intended for playing records, but only in the 
sense of human intention—human design, not natural design (cf. Lewens’ Artifact Model, p. 224, 
below).  And in further cases that I’ll explore later, neither of the design-based senses of “for” can 
play a role in our belief that a particular item is for a particular role, but in those cases the notions of 
used for or good for or there for seem to fit instead, and so we often find ourselves justifying our 
expectations of those items having functions in those terms.  The problem is this:  if we must cite 
widely varying concepts across the various cases, then the apparent unity of “being for” something 
does not validly justify judgments of whether or not an item has a function . . . unless some broader, 
more generic, part of “being for” somehow serves to unify these other relations.  I believe that is the 
case, but no plainly applicable taxonomy of “for” has yet been given to solve the problem.  I’ll 
review some ideas about the differing types of “for” in the next section.   
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At this point, keeping in mind the fallacies I’ve just alleged and the other concerns listed 
above, I can now attempt to show that functions are not constant properties held by items.  The 
alternative that I will advocate is, as I said earlier, that functions are served by items when those items 
are in a particular context of usage, and so they are properties, instead, of that relationship of usage.  
When that relationship is commonly held in the world (for instance, hearts or eyes or thumbs that 
are parts of a body and that disintegrate relatively quickly upon removal from the body), or when 
that relationship is commonly held in our minds (for instance, hammers or computers or 
phonographs that are either thought of in terms of their being used by us or else not thought of at 
all), then we come to ignore the context of the relationship and carelessly think of these items, 
themselves, as independently “having” the functions that they regularly serve.   
Let’s look now at the boundaries of those usage contexts to see if we can find places where 
functions can seem to come and go from items that remain unchanged, while their contexts vary.  
As I mentioned, it is easier to look at items that seem to gain functions, since the cognitive inertia of 
the illusion of function constancy tempts us to continue attributing functions to items that might 
otherwise seem to lose functions.  Both categories exist, but let’s begin with the easier one. 
Imagine you are just moving into a new home.  During your first night there, while in the 
process of unpacking, you set a small empty packing crate on the floor near the fireplace and leave a 
pillow inside.  Now imagine your dachshund chooses to sleep in this box (this scenario is drawn 
from Wright’s example given above as FS13).  In the event that something like this occurred, we 
would say that, for that night anyway, the box will serve the function of being a dog’s sleeping 
quarters, but we would not yet say that it has the function of being a dog’s sleeping quarters.  It is a 
packing crate that the dog happened to sleep in. 
If, however, you are too lazy either to move the box or to make a more proper bed for your 
dog, as the days turn into months and the months wear on into years, eventually we are willing to 
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say that the box now is the dog’s bed and that it now has the function of providing a warm, 
cushioned, comfortable and familiar place for the dog to sleep.  Nothing may have changed about 
the physical structure of the box, but time and repetition were able to transform it from being an 
item that we would say was serving a function—from verb-functioning as a bed—to being an item 
that we would say has a proper function, namely that of being a dog’s bed. 
One might interpret this to mean that the passing time somehow has the power to grant a 
function—to imbue an item with a function that was not originally there.  We can keep that 
possibility in mind but I think it is at best imprecise, not the least because no meaningful physical 
changes have occurred to the box during that time.  At worst it is an unwarranted hypothesis since 
we have no theoretical basis for suggesting that time alone has any direct causal capacity with respect 
to function.  The interpretation that convinces me instead is simply that, seeing that the box served 
in this capacity—served this function—for such a long time, we fall under an illusion of function 
constancy, forgetting or ignoring that the box once was a shipping crate or that it could one day be 
one again.  Aside from picking up a bit of dog odor and some slight wear and tear, the box is 
fundamentally unchanged in all meaningful physical respects, but what has changed is the purpose it 
has come to serve, the frequency with which it has come to serve it, and the limits of our imagination 
about what uses the box will serve during its existence.  Although we could imagine something more 
if compelled to, without any motivation to creatively repurpose the box, and after observing it 
serving as a dog’s bed for so long, we simply think of it only in terms of its serving as a dog’s bed. 
The key here, I propose, is that our attributions of functioning can vary with our perception 
of an item’s usage.  The more regularly an item is used for some purpose, the more likely we are to 
claim that the item “has the function” of serving that purpose.  Notice that anything can be 
repurposed in this way—a rock, functionless at first, could (again, without physical change) make its 
way into a primitive toolkit as a hammer, or onto a desk as a paperweight (FS7), or into a foyer as a 
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doorstop.  Despite having at first only functioned as one of these items, eventually—in a situation of 
increased regularity—we would call this particular rock the hammer or the paperweight or the 
doorstop and consider it to have the function that makes it what it is.  Nonetheless, what changed is 
nothing about the rock, but only something about the regularity of the relationship in which it is 
used and, principally, our conception of that relationship as being the thing that that rock does or is 
for. 
Cummins (1976) gives a similar example of a natural bowl-shaped depression in a large rock 
coming to be used one day to hold holy water in religious rituals.  Eventually, if these rituals are held 
regularly enough (and perhaps if the rock is revered enough never to be used in other manners) we 
are willing to say that the depression has the function of being a holy water vessel.  But when did it 
come to have that function, and what process or structure caused it to have that function?  It seems 
to me that we assign it as having that function only because we observe the regularity of it serving 
that function.  
The foregoing examples all involve items that seem to come to have functions without 
changing the item.  Most of them are found objects—artifacts primarily in the sense that they have 
come to be employed towards some end, though none of them were really designed or made; they 
just happened to already have the required features that allow them to serve particular purposes.  
The reason biological traits are conspicuously absent from these examples is simply that, once 
development is complete, traits of organisms appear to already have their functions161, and so it is 
less straightforward to look for a (biological) item that seemed not to have a function before coming 
to have one over time.  
																																																								
161 That is, if the trait has a function at all.  Spandrels—the space fillers that bridge the gaps between functional traits (cf 
Gould and Lewontin, 1979)—have no functions.  But if they came to be used in some way (over evolutionary time, not 
an individual lifespan), then they would be termed functional traits (or exaptations; cf Gould and Vrba 1982) in their own 
right and thus would not count as functionless items at the scale of an individual life. 
	 218	
We can look now at the category of functions that seem to disappear in items without 
changing the item. The best examples, I think, are situations of abandonment.  In the case of 
artifacts, we can imagine an archaeologist discovering a cache of fully preserved tools of an ancient 
civilization that were made for performing a job that we don’t need to perform in the modern era, 
for whatever reason.  Such tools might be labeled as having had the function, but no longer having 
the function.  It is the context of those ancient people and the job for which they once used the 
tools that allows the attribution of a function, but in the modern absence of that context, the tools 
may be quite identical in form to their original physical form and yet no longer have the function of 
doing whatever it is they once did.  In the case of organisms, we can similarly talk about items or 
traits such as molts.  When a crustacean or an insect or reptile gives up its outer skin or carapace, or 
when a bird sheds a season’s feathers for replacement, we are more inclined to think of these items 
as previously having had the functions they once served, but of no longer continuing to have those 
functions.  They are no longer skins or carapaces; they are molts.  Just as with the items discussed 
above that come to have functions, we consider these items first to have and then to lose their 
functions relative to their context of usage—when they can regularly serve a function, we consider 
them to have that function, and when they no longer serve in that capacity, we consider them to no 
longer have the function162.   
There are a couple of lessons I think we should learn from the recognition that functions 
can appear and disappear in items.  The first point I find important is the surprising claim I began 
with: that functions are not real properties of items.  Proper functions do not exist.  Things don’t 
have functions (TDHF)163. We should think of functional items not in terms of their having a 
																																																								
162 There is an interesting contrast between our intuition that a molted skin no longer has a function, and our intuition 
that a dismembered thumb might still have a function, when both can be classified equally as body parts removed from 
the body.   
163 From here forth, in this dissertation, I will use the abbreviation “TDHF” to continually emphasize the claim that 
Things Don’t Have Functions.  The claim that things do have functions is so deeply embedded in the belief system of our 
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function, but rather in terms of their serving a function, though often doing so very consistently and 
reliably.  This has broad implications for the philosophical analysis of function, since the modern 
debate has centered on the question of what the conditions are for an item to have a function.  I 
take it that there simply is no answer to that question, and so the hunt is futile.  Instead, we should 
try to understand what the conditions are for an item to serve a function and, perhaps further, to 
serve a function regularly, since it is such regular service that usually provides us with the illusion of 
function constancy that causes us to attribute or project proper functions.  The second point I want 
to take away from the foregoing analysis is that since usage plays a role in serving-a-function and the 
frequency of usage often plays a role in having-a-function, we should keep in mind that perhaps 
some part of the concept of usage should play a theoretical role in the underpinnings of functioning.  




culture and in most of the other literature that I will be citing and arguing about, that I will need to constantly and 
repeatedly remind us not to be lulled by this natural assumption.  When examining a theorist’s example that, say, “a wing 
has the function of flying”, we will need to take their theoretical point (whatever it may be) seriously while at the same 
time remembering that we are also dealing with a false claim.  At such times, I will attempt to point this out by stating, 
“TDHF!” but I may also lapse into repeating such phrases as “the function of X is Y” or “X has the function of Y”; I 
ask the reader to take such remarks not literally but elliptically for something more along the lines of “we perceive X to 
commonly function in capacity Y” . . .  
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E. “For”-Conflation: Designed For, Used For, Good For, Meant For . . . 
 
[I] am prepared, for the purposes of this paper, to let ‘What is it for?’ be a way of asking the same question as ‘What 
is its function?’ 
 
—Robert Cummins (2002)  
 
When developing intuitions about the subject of either function or purpose, an analyst is often 
inclined to ask themselves what an item is for, in the same way we did with the heart and the 
sailboat’s standing rigging in the introduction to this chapter, and the same way we do whenever we 
contemplate the function of any item such as those in the list of function statements on pp. 205–
207.  In fact, many theorists that we will encounter in the next chapter have framed their inquiries 
into function in terms of the question “what is it for?” (e.g. Cummins 2002; Melander 1997:45; 
Neander 1991b:454). 
Asking what an item is for may be unavoidable when thinking about functions but, as I 
pointed out while describing the illusion of function constancy, it runs us into trouble because the 
word “for” is often a linguistic shorthand that can be interpreted to mean a broad number of 
things—designed for (by blind natural selection), designed for (by foresighted humans), meant for, 
intended for, used for, made for, there for, done for, or good for, just to name the most common 
and general, purpose-related connotations164.  These many interpretations of the word “for” reflect 
quite diverse concepts that are often not made explicit.  When we are incautious in our thinking, we 
																																																								
164 There are plenty of more specific kinds of purpose-related fors—too many to analyze them all—but most are 
subclasses of those noted.  What is that pill taken for?  (For curing bacterial infections—this is a subcategory of “used 
for”.)  What are spices powdered for? (For releasing flavor molecules—this is a version of “done for”.)  Who are 
playgrounds built for?  (For the youth—this is some mixture of “made for” and “done for”.)   Similarly, the “for” in the 
sentence “She has an eye for fashion” can be replaced with “that is sensitive to”, which means, roughly, that the eye 
appears to have been made for that sensitivity or at least that the eye is good for that (made for, in this case is used in the 
sense that it has been trained for it—a kind of made for that actually depends on molding the plasticity of the brain that 
stands behind the eye). 
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may find ourselves tempted to blend together, mix up, or opportunistically choose from these 
concepts, thereby possibly confusing any analysis that may depend upon precision in the 
interpretation of the word “for”.  Just such precision is required, however, in an analysis of 
teleological terms such as function, purpose, and goal-directedness since, as noted, we draw some of 
our central intuitions about these topics from thinking in terms of the question “what is it for?” (See 
also Dennett 2014:49-50; Nissen, 1993:19-20). 
Later in this section, I’ll describe what I think may be the most basic type of “for” in 
teleology—the sense of the word that I think is universal to all functional claims and that I suggest 
truly justifies the intuition that functional and purposive items are for something or other.   
 
Lewens’ Artifact Model 
 
Perhaps the most important “for”-conflation to take note of is that which occurs between 
the two kinds of being designed for that lie at the core of what Tim Lewens (2004) calls “the artifact 
model of evolution”.  Lewens uses this term to refer to the way the analogy between human artifact 
design and the natural design of organisms makes it easy to treat the products of evolution as if they 
were artifacts.  These two processes of design, as well as their products, share some important 
similarities (and thus a name) but also some important dissimilarities . . . centrally, the presence in 
human design, and lack in natural design, of intention or foresight (Allen and Bekoff 1995b; Lewens 
2004: 115-116; Reiss 2009).  
While using the artifact model in reasoning about biological items can at times be useful, 
even indispensable, it can also lead one to mistakenly treat those items as if they and their functional 
relationships had been produced by a conscious designer or as if those items are optimally designed 
for their role, when they often are not.  Moreover, it encourages us to fall for the design fallacy, 
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coming to think that design might form the nexus between artifacts and organisms that contributes to 
their both being functional (see e.g., Griffiths 1993; Kitcher 1993).  I’ll attempt to dispel that notion 
in the next section; for now, let’s look at the two processes of design to see what they share and how 
they differ, and to get a handle on what theorists take design to be. 
Natural selection is considered to be the main contributor to the gradual refinement of 
biological traits that is taken to constitute natural design.  To review, natural selection is a process 
through which relatively more ineffective versions of a trait are filtered out (via relatively less 
successful reproduction of their bearers) while relatively more effective versions will survive more 
often, such that the offspring of the latter are more likely to comprise the next generation.  
Assuming a source of variation in the population (and assuming the selection pressures remain 
relatively unchanged) iteration of this process over many generations is able to create progressively 
more effective versions of a trait, and this progress is what is usually meant when people talk of 
“natural design”.  Because of the iterative, cumulative, trial-and-error nature of the process, natural 
design is often deemed a “generate-and-test” procedure, highlighting the two main factors in the 
process: construction and evaluation (Dennett 1995; see also Allen and Bekoff 1995b). 
Now we all understand the process of human design:  with widely varying degrees of 
engineering work, an idea is converted to a prototype through some kind of construction process.  
The prototype is then assessed to see if it works, after which modifications are iteratively made to 
the prototype until the designer is satisfied with the behavior of the item.  For obvious reasons, the 
iterative process in the human design of artifacts has been compared to the generate-and-test 
paradigm of natural design.  Theorists note that in human design the generating and the testing may 
occur in a few ways.  First, it may sometimes occur in the world over cultural timespans, as only the 
more useful artifacts, or the most useful versions of them, are selected to be copied and gradually 
modified by a culture.  Second, it may sometimes occur in the world over briefer timespans, as a 
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designer generates and then tests model after model, over the course of days, weeks, or months.  
And, third, it may sometimes occur in the mind of a designer, as modifications to an item are 
imagined rather than built, and their performance is mentally evaluated before being either forgotten 




Despite the fact that one process is driven by human intentions and the other is driven by 
chance, it is clear that human and natural design can be seen in some regard as quite the same 
procedure of generate-and-test.  Indeed, viewing them as the same in this way has led to one of the 
most fruitful courses of reasoning in biological study—the reverse-engineering or adaptationist 
stance that allows us to approach biological items as designed items in order to figure out how they 
work or what they are for (see, e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Dennett 1995; Hurley, Dennett and 
Adams 2011, 2013; Krebs and Davies 1997; Lewens 2004; Pinker 1997; Williams 1966). 
Dennett (1983, 1988, 1990, 1995) is perhaps the most vocal proponent of using the artifact 
model in the reverse-engineering of biological traits. 
 
Instead of trying to figure out what God intended, we try to figure out what reason, 
if any, “Mother Nature”—the process of evolution by natural selection itself—
“discerned” or “discriminated” for doing things one way rather than another. 
(Dennett 1995: 213) 
 
This adaptationism has been mocked by others in the field who point out that the adaptationist’s 
working assumption—that Mother Nature has designed things for reasons—seems to require a false 
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belief . . . namely that there is an agent we can call Mother Nature and that she designs solutions in 
order to solve certain problems (e.g., Gould and Lewontin 1979; Lewontin 1993)165.  But proponents 
of adaptationist thinking generally don’t agree with this caricature.  They argue that the adaptationist 
thinker doesn’t need to really believe that Mother Nature is a foresighted agent nor that “she” creates 
optimal solutions166 nor that every trait they are interested in was designed; instead they may simply 
proceed in their inquiry as if the products of natural selection had been designed, regardless of how 
they came to be.  That is to say, the analogy underlying the artifact model can be used heuristically, 
based upon the resemblance between the products of evolution and those of human artifice without 
taking seriously the notion that the processes that produce biological items fully resemble those that 




The question that some adaptationists may be asking, and the question that anti-
adaptationists rightly rebel against for its design implications, is “what is it designed for?”  Whether 
or not one differentiates between the two versions of design, this shouldn’t be the first question to 
ask when approaching a reverse-engineering task because it asks us not only to hypothesize how the 
item functions but also to hypothesize how the item historically came to be functional, under the 
assumption that the latter explains the former.  That is, the problematic version of adaptationist 
reverse-engineering assumes that an item is functional because it was designed to be, and so, to divine 
an item’s function, it requires reasoning about the item’s design history (though remember: TDHF).  
																																																								
165 The critique is richer than this, but the minutia of the debate over adaptationism goes beyond the scope of the 
current project. 
166 Lewens (2004: 47) points out that the failure of optimality assumptions applies equally to reasoning about artifact 
design.  Nothing about artifacts requires that they be optimally designed and, usually, they are not.  But we can still 
reverse-engineer artifacts by reasoning about what their various parts are for. 
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Examples where this assumption is false have now been widely explored.  The classic illustration is 
how the feather, which is functional in modern birds for flight, originally evolved on flightless 
dinosaurs, presumably for thermoregulation or possibly courtship or aggression displays (Gould and 
Vrba 1982; see also Ji and Ji 1996).  What feathers and many of their detailed features were 
(naturally) designed for is not the only thing they function to do today, and, despite our not knowing 
about their design history until recently, we were still able to sort out their function in flight.   
There is another question, though, that does most of the work of “what is it designed for?” 
without making any historical assumptions.  If we relinquish our commitment to identifying 
function with design (Allen and Bekoff 1995b) and ask instead “what is it good for?” we have a 
presently answerable question about an item’s functioning that can help us look for evidence about 
the ways an item is actually able to function  (Amundson and Lauder 1994).   
Of course, once one has answered “what is it good for?” not only does one already have an 
idea of how the item in question functions—that is, one has completed their reverse-engineering—
but one can then secondarily conjecture, albeit fallibly, as to how the item may have been designed for 
the behavior which we’ve discovered it is good for and, presumably, if one were so inclined, one 
could then attempt to inquire into historical facts for evidence supporting those secondary, design-
related hypotheses (Hurley, Dennett and Adams 2013).  It’s not that we can’t reason about a 
functional item’s history and its design, but that the inference runs in the opposite direction—from 
function to design rather than vice versa. 
 
Other Kinds of For 
 
Earlier, I examined the examples of a dismembered thumb and a phonograph far from any 
user, noting then that our intuitions about function in each case are based on differing senses of 
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having been designed for (if you recall, these examples were chosen because, in their hypothetical 
contexts, they are actually unable to function).  If being naturally designed for something and being 
humanly designed for something were the only two interpretations of “for” available then we might 
be convinced to subsume them under the more general generate-and-test concept of design.  
However there are cases of items that do function, in which our sense of “what they are for” may 
seem as if it’s neither of the design-based senses.  
Take for instance the case of someone building a swim dock at their lake house.  Imagine 
that, in an environmentally conscious effort to recycle materials, the handy homeowner constructs a 
wooden-framed deck into which they then pack hundreds of used plastic soda or water bottles for 
flotation.  In a case such as this, the bottles were neither humanly designed for this purpose nor 
naturally designed for this purpose.  But when we ask what the bottles are for in this dock, we will 
say that they are for flotation and what we mean by that is that their function in the dock is flotation.  
We have a function for which design, construed as generate-and-test, played a very limited role, if 
any at all.   
What may instead justify the use of “for” to describe the bottles’ functioning as flotation is 
that they were intended for the job, they are good for it, they are there for it, and they are being used for it.  
There is of course a sense in which design played a role in the bottles coming to be floats—the 
dock-builder intended them to serve in that manner as a part of the dock.  But the bottles 
themselves were neither made of the material they are made of nor molded into their form in order 
to serve this function.  They were designed not for holding air in and water out but just the 
opposite.  
One way to try to salvage the design-based interpretation would be to say that the bottles 
were designed for that function by a single round of generate-and-test.  The dock-building 
homeowner had the idea to use the bottles, tried them out, and since they successfully floated the 
	 227	
dock, rather than iterating the search for a better design, the homeowner just continued to use them.  
I think this is a fair characterization but what it points at is that the core part of being designed for 
some behavior or other is really not in iteration or accumulation but merely in the test part of 
generate-and-test . . . it is in the determination of whether the item in question is good for that 
behavior. 
 
What Is It Good For? 
 
In analyses of function, analysts have taken up various interpretations of “what is it for?”  
For instance, Kitcher (1993) seems to identify “what is it for?” with “what is it designed for?” while 
Wright (1973) takes it to mean “what is it there for?” and Bedau (1992) thinks the point of interest is 
“what is it good for?”  Other theorists are unspecific (e.g. Cummins 2002).   
As one can see from my explorations above, I’m inclined to agree with Bedau.  I think the 
many interpretations of “for” are all based on a core consisting of good for, as we already found with 
the two flavors of designed for.  But before mining for those additional intuitions, first we need to 
distinguish between two further senses of the notion of good for.  What I will call the personal sense 
of “good for” is the one in which an item brings benefit to a beneficiary:  The measles vaccine is good 
for children.  A little sleep would be good for me.  This is the sense which Bedau uses, and it can be 
put in contrast with the impersonal sense of “good for” in which an item is particularly suitable for a 
certain task: The pen is good for writing.  The screwdriver is good for prying.  The discarded soda 
bottles are good for flotation.  The difference between the personal and the impersonal is between 
being good for someone (providing benefit) and being good for something (being well suited).   
There is a relationship, though, between these two senses: Whenever something is suited to a 
particular task, the fact that we think of it as impersonally good for that job derives in part from its 
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causal capacities but also in part from the fact that that job is personally good for some agent who 
benefits from its performance.  An enormous meteor is particularly capable of extinguishing life on a 
planet but we wouldn’t say it is suitable for that.  Despite being able to cause mass extinction, there is 
no sense in which we would say this is good (except in the bizarre hypothetical in which someone had 
massively genocidal intentions; but the exception just proves the point).  On the other hand, the 
bottles are good for flotation, the screwdriver is good for prying, the pen is good for writing, and the 
phonograph is good for playing records, whenever there exists someone who has the intention of 
using these items for these actions . . . that is, whenever these actions are beneficial to or (personally) 
good for that person.  Similarly, the wing is good for flying, the eye is good for seeing, and the 
thumb is good for grasping whenever they are able to be used for these things by the beneficiary 
organism that owns them.  But the thumb we removed from a body earlier is no longer good for 
grasping, since, after all, it is no longer able to. 
Ultimately, what I am suggesting is that hiding behind every version of “what is it for?” is a 
beneficiary—the subject whom it is for.  Anything that is personally good for some agent has a direct 
beneficiary; anything that is impersonally good for some activity is so suitable because that activity is 
good for some agent; and anything that is for something in any other manner—(naturally) designed 
for, (humanly) designed for, used for, meant for, intended for, made for, there for, done for—is, in 
one way or another, good for whatever or whomever it is for.  To confirm this impression, we can 
look at each of the cases.   
Our analysis of the impersonal sense of good for raised again the issue explored in the 
previous section about usage of an item: when something is suitable for something it is suited to be 
used, and to be used for something is to bring benefit to a user by serving them in one way or 
another.   
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We saw earlier that being designed for, whether it is human design or natural design, is to go 
through a process, which, crucially, contains a step (testing) that determines whether an item is good 
(to be used) for whatever it is that we consider the item to be designed for.   
To be meant for or intended for something is central to human (though not natural) design, but 
these terms extend to purposiveness that goes beyond the design of artifacts as well.  Whether or 
not it succeeds, a particular action, such as throwing, might be intended for creating some effect or done 
for the sake of that effect; a more abstract artifact, such as a message, may be meant for impacting a 
particular audience.  In all cases, though, these performances are good for something or other—they 
are intended or done in order to achieve (or at least to create a chance of achieving) a benefit their 
performer perceives.   
At a different margin of the notion of design, a part of an item, such as the primer bulb on a 
lawnmower engine, can be said to be there for whatever role it plays in the whole item (Cummins 
2002) but that role requires the part being impersonally good for playing that role, and it only makes 
sense in terms of the overall item’s being used for whatever it does.  Alternatively, a whole 
lawnmower in the gardener’s shed might have been placed there for the gardener’s ease of access.  
This sense of being there for is also purposive, but the meaning is closer to meant for or intended for than 
it is to designed for or used for.  Still, the lawnmower’s placement is rooted in its being good for the 
gardener. 
At the end of the day, in any case of any thing (an arrangement or intention or action or 
item) being for something or other, we can find a subject whose benefit from that thing underlies 
the conception of the thing as “being for” something or other.  These brief explorations may not be 
strong enough to win over the skeptic of conceptual analysis, but the challenge, in order to discount 
these intuitions will be to find an example in which some version of being good for, meant for, 
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designed for, or used for, does not have a subject, implicit or explicit, whom the item, event, or 
action is ultimately for, in one way or another. 
It is my contention that if a theory of function is understood to be taken in terms of the 
question “what is it for?” (as Cummins put it so directly, in the epigraph to this section) then this 
pattern of being for some agent, is what the theory ultimately needs to explain.  Furthermore, I 
suggest we will become sorely misled if we attempt to interpret “what is it for?” in terms only of 
being designed for (Kitcher 1993) or of being there for (Wright 1973) or, worse, in terms of 
differing senses of being for, when analyzing different cases.  The notion that ties these all together 
is that things that are for something or other are good for someone or other. 
The wrench in the works that will have to be worked out first is that the notion of benefit or 
“good” is, at this point, entirely undefined. 
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F. The Design Fallacy 
 
If an artifact was explicitly designed to do something, that usually determines its function, irrespective of how well or 
badly it does the thing it was supposed to do. 
 
—Larry Wright (1973) 
 
Roman coins, even if they are in mint condition, are no longer money, that is, they no longer have the function of being 
legal tender. 
 
      —Peter McLaughlin (2001:48) 
 
Objects identical to our knives and saws would have no function at all if produced by some random process on a planet 
devoid of life. 
 
      —Christopher Boorse (2002:68) 
 
Shortly ago, I alleged that we are susceptible to a number of errors in the ways we 
conceptualize functions.  I called one of those errors “the design fallacy” and described it as the 
tendency to believe that an item has its functions by virtue of the fact that it was designed.  In other 
words, we are often led to believe that design may grant functions to items.  Not only is this a 
common intuition (see, e.g., Allen and Bekoff 1995: 614; Griffiths 1993: 418; Millikan 1984: 17; 
Williams 1966: 9; and Wright 1973: 146), but it has also been offered as a theory of function 
(Kitcher 1993).  In the previous section, I began to argue against the role of design in function by 
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drawing attention to the differences between natural design and human design.  I will continue with 
my attempt to nullify that intuition now, in order to help us avoid theories of function that I think 
are wrongly based in design and also in order to bolster my earlier argument against the existence of 
proper functions. 
The faulty intuition seems largely rooted in two seemingly evident facts.  First is the 
perception that every place where we find functioning, we see that the items were designed, and 
every place where we see designed items, they appear to have functions—and this seems to be the 
case for artifacts as well as organisms and behaviors.  Second is the perception that artifacts appear 
to be designed for their functions and that creating functional items is in fact what design is.  Why else 
would we design something if not in order to create a functional item?  This second notion comes 
with a biological extension, using Lewens’ artifact model, whereby we presume (carelessly) that 
organisms are also designed for their functions, despite our being aware of the fact that modern 
evolutionary theory clearly understands natural design to be an impersonal process in which items 
simply cannot be designed to perform a preconceived function (see also McLaughlin 2001; Ruse 
1981). 
I will argue against both perceptions below.  My conclusion will be that design never grants 
functioning, and that our conception of the relationship between design and function should be 
inverted167. I’ll suggest that while design often plays a role in constructing items that are functional, it is 
the possibility of a relationship of function that is actually prerequisite to the process of design 
rather than vice versa.  It is the normative role that successful functioning plays (as a stopping-point in 
the process of designing) that underpins the relationship between functioning and design. Items are 
functional because of the fit between their individual forms and a particular user and context of use.  
That relationship can exist whether or not design occurs.   
																																																								
167 See also Allen and Bekoff (1995a, 1995b) for arguments against the equivalence of design and function. 
	 233	
If a norm of functioning were prerequisite to designing (as I am proposing), then we would 
expect to see situations in which design may be attempted but fails to meet those norms, resulting in 
incomplete designs that fail to function.  We would also expect to see situations in which 
functioning occurred naturally or simply without requiring design to achieve them—situations in 
which the functional norms are met (somehow) without the effortful intervention of a designer.  
Examples will show that both these categories exist—that the correlation between design and 
function is incomplete—and this should lead us to infer that rather than design having the capacity 
to grant functions absolutely, something more like the notion just described takes place: functioning 
is a prior norm that plays a role in guiding design toward the construction of items that seem to have 
functions.  This would still explain the regularity with which function and design appear together, 
but it would also explain the exceptions in which they don’t. 
Under this view, design doesn’t guarantee or grant anything, but it increases the likelihood of 
an item becoming functional.  It helps to ensure that an item will have certain regularities in its form 
and behavior that will lead us to conceive of those regularities as the nature of the item and that will 
keep us from conceiving of the item in other ways (Birch and Rabinowitz 1951; Duncker 1945) 




Design and functioning do regularly appear together but, for one thing, correlation is not 
causation and, for another thing, as it turns out, there are systematic exceptions to the regularity.  
We can find examples both of things that are designed but that do not clearly have functions168, and 
																																																								
168 Of course, I am granting too much here, since things never have functions (TDHF). 
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of things that seem to have functions but were clearly not designed, making the conclusion that 
design grants function tenuous at best (see also McLaughlin 2001; Sorabji 1964).  
We can begin by recalling the examples from earlier:  The dog’s sleeping box, Cummins’ 
depression in a stone used as a holy-water vessel, bottles used as flotation, and rocks used in various 
capacities as hammers, paperweights, or doorstops.  In each of these cases, design (understood as 
generate-and-test) plays no role in the item either coming to be functional or coming to be 
construed as having a function.  Allen and Bekoff (1995b) also give the examples of driftwood, 
seashells, and a taxidermist’s preserved grizzly bear, all used as decorative items.  Items such as these 
serve aesthetic functions without having been designed for such aesthetics (they were simply chosen; 
in many cases, merely collected from the shore)169.  
Conversely, there are items that have been designed but do not function, though making this 
clear is much less straightforward.  One example would be the oodles of food products that are 
manufactured every year but that go forever uneaten as they pass their expiration dates and 
eventually get sent to landfill.  Similarly, there are masses of electronic products that remain unsold, 
on shelves, well beyond the time at which they become antiquated or made obsolete by newer 
models.  None of these products ever serves a function.  As I’ve mentioned, though, it may be 
difficult for us to overcome our prejudices in cases like these—the intuition that these items have a 
function despite not serving it is strong, since the illusion of function constancy and the design 
fallacy and malfunction fallacy are so deeply rooted in our minds and our culture.  To try to 
appreciate design without function, it is probably best to look instead at items that have not been 
successfully designed, since well-designed items typically succeed at functioning, making it difficult 
to see them as non-functional. 
																																																								
169 It is worth noting that all of the various kinds of examples just cited have, instead of a “designed for” relation, a 
“used for” relation of some sort.   Being used in some respect appears to make an item functional.  Being conceived of 
only in terms of that use appears to make an item have a function. 
	 235	
Millikan borrows an example from a poem called “The Engineer” (Milne 1927) in which the 
character Christopher Robin has designed a brake for a train made from “a string sort of thing” and 
claims, despite its failing to smoothly stop the train, that “it’s a very good brake” (Millikan 1989a: 
296)170.  With this quote, Millikan wants to support both the design fallacy and the malfunction 
fallacy; she wants to say that Christopher Robin is right, it is a brake—the item has the function of 
braking despite being unable to do so, and this is because that is what it was designed for171.   
What Christopher Robin is really doing with his claim, however, can be classified as 
metonymy or metaphor.  He is alleging that in his own opinion it is a very good brake concept—a very 
good idea for a brake.  The entirely nonfunctional so-called brake that he is holding in his hand, and 
apparently referring to, is cognitively standing in for the concept of a particular abstract brake 
design, which is the true referent of his remark.  The so-called brake itself is not a very good brake, 
nor is it even a brake at all; it is a piece of string that does nothing of the braking sort, and so, taken 
literally, Christopher Robin’s claim is false.  He and Millikan are of course both aware of this—the 
sentence can still be true as long as we realize it is not a claim about the actual string sort of thing 
but instead a claim about a concept.  But still it remains to be seen whether or not any brake of the 
kind that Christopher Robin has in mind would be functional in the slightest, much less “very 
good”.  If none of them will ever be shown to be functional—if Christopher Robin’s idea fails to 
capture the physical essence of braking in any way—then it would simply be improper (however 
convenient) to use a functional category (“a brake”) to describe any of them.  If we want to use the 
category “a brake” to describe things that are simply meant to be brakes, or things that we hope will 
																																																								
170 This is how Millikan quotes it, though if we look back at Milne, the actual quote is:   “It’s a good sort of brake, but it 
hasn’t worked yet” (1927).  The discussion here is about Millikan’s use of her version of the quote, so I will follow that, 
ignoring Milne’s original text. 
171 The problem that spurs Millikan’s musing on the string sort of thing is described in this quote which precedes her 
text on Christopher Robin:  “For example, exactly what sorts of (current) properties must an item have in common with 
some functioning token or other of a can opener in order to count as a can opener that doesn’t work? The question is absurd 
on its face” (1989, italics added).  My answer to the question is simple:  None.  A can-opener that doesn’t work (which is 
to say, an item that is not a can-opener) need not have any properties in common with a can-opener that does work. 
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perform braking, or things that represent a particular brake concept but are not actually functional as 
brakes, that is a fine use of language, but we must be aware of the metaphor we are using and 
vigilant with ourselves not to allow it to influence our theory of the functional category of brakes, let 
alone our more general theories of function and design themselves, which may be derived from or 
colored by our intuitions about such example categories.   
My claim here opposes Millikan’s intuition:  Christopher Robin’s string sort of thing does 
not have the function of braking (primarily because TDHF, but also) because it simply fails to 
function as a brake, and we haven’t yet any reason to believe that it in fact “is a brake”.  To the 
extent that anything Christopher Robin did resembled designing (and Millikan would indeed have us 
imagine a world in which his process would be considered design), that process neither made the 
string sort of thing functional nor christened it into the functional category of “brake” nor gave it a 
function.  It is just a string sort of thing that we would be mistaken about if we called it a brake. 
Allen and Bekoff make the following claim, similar to Millikan’s.   
 
Prior to the 1903 Wright Flyer, many contraptions were designed for heavier-than-
air powered flight, yet none of them flew. Modern aviation did not have to get off 
the ground (pun by design!) for it to be the case that the function of those 
remarkable contraptions was to fly. It was their function to fly because that is what 
they were designed (albeit poorly) to do.  (Allen and Bekoff 1995b: 614)   
 
Although I agree that this could seem intuitive, the same considerations as with Christopher Robin’s 
so-called brake hold.  These were not flying machines; they were so-called flying machines, hopeful 
flying machines.  In this case, the word “function” is standing in for the concept of “intended 
function” or “hopeful function”.  Certainly it doesn’t mean successful function.  It is better to say that 
	 237	
the intended functioning of those remarkable contraptions was to fly. Allen and Bekoff ’s intuition 
seems to imply that intended function—merely wanting something to fly—constitutes designing 
something to fly.  On that view, as long as they were intended to function in flight, they will have 
such a function.   
Surprisingly, the same prejudices don’t appear so strongly when we look at organismic traits, 
and I suspect this is because when reasoning about organismic traits, we don’t bring to the analysis 
any sense of intention.  In the case of organisms, when a new item does not work, we don’t take the 
item to be a designed item; we take it to be a failed byproduct of the design process, while its 
competitors that do work are the ones that, we would say, have been designed.  We don’t say that a 
wing without feathers has the function of flying though it simply can’t do so; we say that it is the 
result of an adverse mutation that destroyed in it the function of flying, which its ancestors had. 
Allen and Bekoff’s intuition that design grants function seems to rely on a belief that 
intention is sufficient for human design to grant functions (“It was their function . . . because that is 
what they were designed . . . to do”).  Another view might suggest that another feature of design 
(say, generate-and-test) grants functions (even if the item fails to function) 172.  In order to adjudicate 
between these possibilities, it is worth looking at what roles intention and generate-and-test may play 
both in the process of design and the process of items coming to be functional.  Let’s do that now.   
 
Does Design Construed as Intention Grant Function?  
 
If design is merely intention, then an item need not succeed at functioning to have been 
designed.  We could make attributions such as those from above: hopeful-handbrakes that don’t halt 
anything and hopeful-helicopters that can’t hover can still have functions.  But how far can we take 
																																																								
172 I’ll also address these issues again in the next chapter when I discuss the malfunction fallacy. 
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this idea?  Can I say that a six-year-old’s drawing of a fantastical airship was designed to fly and 
therefore the model made from it “has the function of powered flight”?  Can I present my own 
design for a perpetual-motion machine and claim it has the function of producing infinite energy?  If 
I say I’ve just designed this piece of origami now sitting upon my desk such that when I pull on two 
opposing tabs, it will open up and swallow the earth . . . does that mean such a piece of paper has the 
function of swallowing the earth?  Intuitions about these cases might differ from those about our earlier 
examples (handbrakes and helicopters).  One might respond, “Well, those aren’t serious designs!” but 
it seems as if the line between serious and non-serious designs will be difficult to draw.  As the six-
year-old grows and becomes more and more sophisticated about aerodynamics and buoyancy and so 
on, their designs will eventually come to resemble those of 19th-century “airplane” designers who 
were very serious but nonetheless failed in all their attempts to design and build functional flying 
machines.  It is unclear how we would distinguish between serious designs that grant functions and 
silly designs that don’t. 
In any event, the idea of a “serious design” wouldn’t get us any further.  Take, for instance, a 
pair of scissors that cannot yet cut paper until we adjoin the two blades with the screw that acts as 
their fulcrum.  This can be called a serious design not least because we know it will eventually 
successfully function to cut paper.  But when does the design-minded theorist claim that these 
scissors come to have their function?  If function is granted by the intention component of design, 
then it seems the parts need not be assembled since they and their interactions have already been 
seriously designed well before assembly.  If that is our principle though—if an item that is not yet 
able to function can have a function as long as it was intended for it—then we can imagine the metal 
ingots that are destined to become those blades and that screw already have their functions before 
they are forged and cut.  This begins to sound absurd, and it sounds even more so when we back the 
	 239	
clock up further to when the metal is distributed in ore somewhere in a future iron mine or when it 
is being fashioned from lighter elements in a nearby stellar fusion reactor.  
Intention alone seems insufficient to constitute the kind of design that is imagined to grant 
function (not to mention TDHF) and, furthermore, if intention did play a role in granting function 
in artifacts, then the design-minded theorist would have trouble extending the notion to explain 
function in organisms without resorting to the intentions of a divine creator.   
 
The Design-and-Construction Gradation Problem 
 
We can call the above absurdity about when the iron that becomes a pair of scissors comes 
to have its function by the name “the design-and-construction gradation problem”, and it may be 
useful to state the problem in other ways.  Anytime an item is created, if it is to have a function in 
black-and-white terms, then we face the question of just when it comes to have that function.   
If one held a theory (or even an intuition) that design granted functions, then in justifying 
that belief, one would ideally like to know just what part of the design process performed this 
christening.  It would be meaningful to ask just how and when a designed item gets its function—by 
what means does design grant function?  It would also be meaningful to ask by what procedure, 
over the course of an item’s existence, it might lose its function.  Certainly there is no reverse 
process—“undesigning”—that may eliminate a function, though “unbuilding”—disintegration—
may173. 
I just argued against the proposal that design might be designated as the intention behind an 
item.  Perhaps what matters, then, is the process of turning an idea or intention into an actual 
physical item?  But if we must build the item, then when in the process of construction does it get its 
																																																								
173 Perhaps, however, a look at the types of events that do take functions away can help clarify what is central to 
functioning. 
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function? When its prototype is complete?  When the item’s materials have been apportioned and 
reserved for it?  When all the parts have been prepared (as in the disassembled scissors)? Or when 
the item itself is complete?  And, besides, by what standard are we to judge the completion of any 
particular stage? 
The central problem here is that functions had (or granted) are taken to be binary properties 
while the items that supposedly eventually have these functions go through gradual, fractional, 
piecemeal processes both in their design and their construction (not to mention that design and 
construction are often simultaneous and inseparable processes).   It seems to me that the only way 
to make sense of this disparity would be to mark functions as existing upon some kind of 
completion standard—an endpoint of some sort—since finding a threshold in the middle of the 
process seems hopeless. 
Imagine someone were designing a bladder for carrying a gallon of water to a location that 
requires over an hour of walking in order to get there.  Imagine their first model is made of sewn 
canvas (call it Mark I) and that it ends up holding the water for three seconds before deflating.  
Would we say that Mark I has the function of holding water for over an hour?  I think we wouldn’t.  
Now imagine that, upon the discovery that it didn’t work, the designer gets the idea to coat the 
material with a rubber of some sort before sewing it.  Mark II holds the water for about a minute—
it leaks out through the seams only.  This is better than Mark I, but not nearly what the final product 
needs to do—so does Mark II have the function of holding water for over an hour?  Still no.  
Finally, our water-toting designer gets the idea to put their rubber compound into the seams before 
sewing up the layers of fabric, and this happens to seal up the device so that Mark III indeed holds a 
gallon of water for many hours.  At this point I think we would fairly say that the item has the 
function of holding water as hoped.  But as we look back on the process, it is clear that what was 
required in order to finally christen the item with its function was a successful comparison to a 
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metric—a normative standard of functioning by which the product could be measured and the 
iterative process of design could be halted.  
 
Does Design Construed as Generate-and-Test Grant Function? 
 
One answer to the scissors question is to claim that function is granted at the moment when 
that screw is fully tightened into place fixing the relation between the blades—when construction of 
the item is completed and the design is finally and fully implemented.  If this were the case, though, 
how would we determine that the design is fully implemented?  What marks that threshold? 
One way to know would be to see if the item reflects the idea or the intention by physical 
specification—that is, if it looks like the blueprint in all measurable ways.  But if that were the case, 
it would mean little more than a return to the (unsuccessful) intention-centered theory of design or 
else a joint-criterion theory in which both intention and construction to the (physical) specifications 
of that intention together grant function.  Fully assembled versions of the six-year-old’s airship or of 
my perpetual-motion machine or of the earth-swallowing origami would have functions as long as 
they were physically built to spec.  Unless we are prepared to grant functions to all fantastical ideas 
that don’t work, we need to abandon the notion that this kind of design could grant functions. 
Another way to say that the design is fully implemented would be to see if it does the job 
intended in the idea . . . that is, to ask whether or not the item measures up to the functional 
specification, rather than the physical specification, of the blueprint.  This sounds reasonable, and it 
also prods us to consider design as a more dynamically normative procedure than in some of the 
foregoing analyses—something along the lines of a generate-and-test procedure.  This kind of design 
can be seen as the refinement of an idea or a prototype until something that began as a rough inkling 
in the mind becomes an actual artifact in the world.  Checking a model against the functional 
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specification acts as feedback that drives the design process.  A scissors design would not be 
complete until the prototype was able to cut paper; a winged device would not be considered a flying 
machine until it was able to fly; a pouch would not be considered a water bladder until it was able to 
carry water.  I submit that the failed machines that Allen and Bekoff label as “having the function” 
of flight would not have been so labeled by the engineers that were building and testing them, 
because they would not have considered their work (of building a flying machine) to be done until 
testing succeeded174.  An item that has been designed but that does not function will be either 
discarded or designed further until it does function, at which point it will then fit its intended 
functional category.   
It seems reasonable to say that design construed as generate-and-test can grant function, 
when both parts of that formula have been performed.  But here’s the rub: if successful functioning is 
the norm by which design is measured, if the final state of being able to function marks the end of the 
design process, then design itself must be defined in terms of functioning, not vice versa.  Generate-
and-test relies upon an external metric for measuring functionality—a metric that exists prior to, and 
thus needs to be defined independently from, design.  In human design, that metric may be the idea 
or intention to which we compare an item before proclaiming it complete.  In natural design, that 
metric is something along the lines of successful survival and reproduction.  Because of the 
dependency of design upon functioning, it would be circular to consider function to be granted by 





174 They might have considered their work of building “Mark I” done when they completed this particular model.  They 
might even have boldly claimed, “This is my flying machine” before a test flight, but the uncertainty in their hearts 
would have kept them aware of the optimism and imprecision of that statement. 
	 243	
Designed Not to Function 
 
As an interesting aside, one may design items specifically such that they are not able to 
function.  A number of artists have done just this, designing items that resemble familiar functional 
items but with single minimal changes that render them nonfunctional.  Figure 4.1 show some 
examples of works made by the contemporary Greek artist, Katerina Kamprani.  A watering can that 
cannot water, a fork that cannot skewer, intolerably slow shakers, pot handles that cannot lift, a 
broom that cannot sweep, and so on . . .   
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Objects designed not to function how we might want them to (reprinted with permission 
from the artist Katerina Kamprani). 
 
Now these items have been designed to function as pieces of art—to provoke thought—not 
to function in the ways viewers might imagine they ought to function, and so they are not 
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counterexamples to the idea that design might grant function.  But they are interesting, nonetheless, 
as they bring to light the fact that, as actual designers of these items, we would not consider them to 
yet have their functions until they were completed—until (at least) one more iteration in the design 
process developed them to a state in which they were able to function.  Design would not be 
complete, in these cases, until our models matched up with functional norms. 
 
There!  It Works!  
 
When we are designing a new item, we fiddle with materials and put them together in 
various ways, guided by varying degrees of theory and engineering knowledge.  Sometimes our first 
attempt works, sometimes it takes iteration after iteration to get to what we want, and sometimes no 
attempt ever works.  But either way, we know when we’ve reached the crucial stage in the design 
process when suddenly the item does what we wanted it to.  The inventor is rewarded when their 
invention succeeds.  And when the contraption (which the inventor might have been depressed 
about for weeks because of its resemblance to a piece of junk) finally, with one last tweak, succeeds, 
the declaration usually uttered is something along the lines of “There!  It works!”  What that 
utterance means is that the item suddenly has the form that gives it a functional capacity in a 
particular context.  When it is tested, when it is used successfully in a particular way, when it shows 
itself to have certain capacities that allow it to be used in that way, then we recognize that, at last, it 
has become functional.  Surely the designing and tweaking process contributed to giving it that 
form.  But it is the form itself—the causal capacities in the item itself (in the context of a particular 






Much of the foregoing analysis focused on artifacts rather than on the traits of organisms.  
That bias occurred largely because I have been analyzing examples borrowed from a literature that, 
whenever discussing these intuitions about design, has focused solely on intuitions about artifacts 
(see, e.g., Allen and Bekoff 1995: 614; Griffiths 1993: 418; Millikan 1984: 17; and Wright 1973: 
146)175.  And the bias within that literature, itself, occurs partly because intention is the wrench in the 
works that helps create the troublesome intuition—it is the notion that (falsely, but intuitively) ties 
human design to function by allowing us to think that an item’s function is whatever the item was 
intended for, whether or not the item achieves any degree of match with that intention.  This is 
apparent because the same intuitions are not as strong (and probably thus not as commonly cited) in 
the realm of organismic traits, where intentions play no role.  For instance, although it seems easy to 
claim that the function of birds’ wings is to fly because that is what they were naturally designed for, 
it is much harder to claim, “The function of those remarkable contraptions (mutant birds’ wings that 
can’t fly) is to fly, because that is what they were designed for.”176  And yet, that is precisely the kind 
of claim that would be necessary to justify a belief that natural design grants function since, if 
Mother Nature were to be endowed with such a power, she would have to grant functions across 
the board, regardless of any kind of success or failure (if we follow the analogous claims made in the 
artifact case).  My point here is that the very same claim that was being used as a central intuition in 
the world of artifacts would sound entirely unmotivated in the world of organisms and their traits.   
Since intention doesn’t play a role in natural design, the question of just what part of the 
design process grants function here can only come down to the generate-and-test procedure 
																																																								
175 And this in spite of the fact that the intention of every one of these authors was to argue for biological function! 
176 We would just consider the mutant birds not to have been designed and their handicapped, nonflying wings to be 
functionless.  
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(assuming design grants function).  But just as we saw with artifacts, this would be circular, since 
testing (the success or failure of an organism bearing a trait) consists in measuring functionality.  The 
notion of functioning must be independent of generate-and-test design.   
There are also counterexamples that will help to dissociate natural design from function.  
First, there are things that have been naturally designed but that do not function.  We call them 
vestiges.  These items may have quite the same form as they did when they were functional; they 
may even still be capable of functioning if they were to be employed by their bearers, but they have 
fallen completely out of use because the environmental challenge which their function helps to solve 
is no longer faced by their bearers.  Thus we humans tote around a vermiform appendix, which may 
be able to aid in the digestion of something we no longer eat, but which goes unused probably our 
entire lives177.  Luckily it is not too heavy. 
Second, there are things that function but which have not been naturally designed for that 
function.  For instance, the ears and the nose were never designed to hold up eyeglasses, but they 
function in this way.  Likewise the hips hold up pants, and the ring finger functions to provide a 
location for displaying social cues about mating availability.  Although we would not say that these 
traits have this function, we would say it is a way in which they may function (and TDHF!) 
One more issue that bears on whether natural design may grant function is the biological 
analogue of the design-and-construction gradation problem.  We can call it “the developmental 
gradation problem”.  Think, for example, of the liver of a goose.  We might ask, as the goose 
develops from embryo to adult, when the liver comes to have its function and by what mechanism.  
At some point there was a proto-liver, a small mass of undifferentiated stem cells that would 
eventually become liver cells and we can all agree that this proto-liver neither “had the functions” 
																																																								
177 This view may be outdated.  It is unclear whether our appendix is never used, or only occasionally or non-critically 
used.  All we know for sure is that when the organ is removed, people seem to get on just fine and lead long healthy lives 
without it.  New theories, however, suggest various uses for it (e.g., Bollinger et al. 2007; Zahid 2004).  Nonetheless, using 
the traditional view of the organ as a vestigial trait makes for a clear example. 
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nor served the functions that an adult liver typically does.  At some later point in the lifetime of the 
goose, there comes to be a fully functional liver, and the question is: How and when did the 
functionless proto-liver come to have the functions of a liver?  Just what process conferred a 
function upon the liver?  If it has its function “because it was designed”, then the developmental 
details would seem to be irrelevant and it would have had that function all along, but this is an 
absurdity similar to that of the metal that will one day become the scissors.  If, instead, the function 
is granted somewhere in the process of development, it would seem arbitrary to draw a line 
anywhere except the point at which the liver comes to be in a functional relationship—when it 
comes to play a particular role.   But if that is when the liver at last has its function then we should 
consider function to be not a result of design but of an item’s form and the role that that form is 
able to play (in a particular context), just as we found to be the case with artifacts. 
 
Design and Function 
 
At this point we’ve doubly dissociated design and function in both organisms and artifacts.  
The two patterns commonly occur together, but there are regular exceptions.  Functioning can occur 
without any process of design (as in the bottles that can serve as floats or the nose that holds up 
eyeglasses).  And no matter what we take design to be—intention, construction, generate-and-test—
it doesn’t necessarily imply that its products will be functional . . . except when we take it to be a 
process that ends only when its products measure up to a functional test.  In that case, however, it is 
function that leads design, not vice versa.  As it turns out, this way of looking at it not only explains 
why functional things are very commonly designed and why designed things very commonly 
function, but also why this relation is merely a common one and not quite a necessary one. 
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G. The Function–Accident Distinction 
 
Very likely the central distinction of this analysis is that between the function of something and other things it does 
which are not its function (or one of its functions) . . . This is sometimes put as the distinction between a function, and 
something done merely “by accident.” Explaining the propriety of this way of speaking—that is, making sense of the 
function/accident distinction—is . . . perhaps the primary aim of the following analysis. 
 
—Larry Wright (1973) 
 
Making the supposition that functional effects are one kind of effect that a thing may have, 
philosophers have commonly taken it that if we can find a method for carving up the parent 
category of all effects that an item might have into those that are functional and those that are not, and if 
that method does not merely pick out a superficial mark of function, then we very likely have at least 
a close approximation to something that may serve to outline a definitive theory of function.  The 
comparison class that is usually cited is what’s called accidents or, alternatively, byproducts, incidental 
effects, or mere effects, and it is thought that a central criterion for a theory of function is that the theory 
should be able to make what is called the function–accident distinction (Aristotle Physics II.5,6; 
Buller 1998, 1999 [see the epigraph at the start of the current chapter]; Godfrey-Smith 1993; Lewens 
2004; Neander 1983; van Parijs 1982; Wright 1973).   
We can review the function–accident distinction in terms of our central example, the heart.  
A heart pumps blood but it also dephosphorylates ATP, creates heat, causes a pulse in the 
extremities, makes the sounds in the chest cavity that we refer to as “heartbeats”178, and in some 
																																																								
178 Of course, as many authors have pointed out (e.g., Wright 1973), once reconstrued in light of a doctor’s use of 
heartbeats to provide medical diagnoses, the heart can be seen to have the function of providing physiological 
indications, but the difference is important:  the heartbeat must be used by a doctor in order for the heart to have that 
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cultures, if it is a chicken heart, may serve as a barbecue item.  Not all of these properties are 
referred to as the heart’s function.  Some are byproducts—accidental effects of the heart’s behavior, 
or of its form or existence.  It seems that only pumping blood is what, in some central sense, the 




Some theorists have noticed, however, that there is something of a wrinkle in this function–
accident distinction.  In particular, there appear to be instances of accidental functioning.  One of the 
function statements recalled from earlier can serve as an example.  
 
AF1. (FS14) The bible in the soldier’s breast pocket functioned to stop a bullet from 
entering his heart. 
 
We understand AF1 to be a case in which the bible (or the belt buckle, as the story is sometimes 
told) just happened to accidentally, fortuitously, be in a place where it was able to intercept a bullet, 
and still we are comfortable thinking that it functioned to stop the bullet.  Boorse and Wright, both 
of who analyzed this case, also give a few more examples each. 
 
 




function and, really, we wouldn’t say it has the function so much as it serves the function, until the usage becomes 
widespread in our culture and its functioning in this way becomes commonplace. 
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AF3. A bee sting on my nose [might bring] me to a doctor, who spots a curable 
melanoma on my neck. (Boorse 2002) 
 
AF4. It is merely fortuitous that the nose supports eyeglasses; it is [a] happy chance 
that the heart throb is diagnostically significant; it would be the merest 
serendipity if the sixth rib were to be a particularly good pacemaker hook. 
(Wright 1973) 
 
Though the word “function” was not used explicitly in these examples, the situations in them can 
easily be described in terms of functioning, despite the fact that each example is based on an 
accidental occurrence.  If a theory of function is meant to distinguish between functions and 
accidents, then how should we interpret the foregoing situations?  
For Wright and for most other theorists that we’ll encounter, the conclusion to draw is that 
all functioning, whether intentional or accidental, fits in a category that is simply related to the kind of 
proper functions that those theorists are interested in.  Incidents of accidental functioning are not 
actually functional, these theorists claim.  They are simply random events in which things cause 
effects that are similar to the effects of things that might have real functions.  A bible stopping a 
bullet is similar to a Kevlar vest stopping a bullet, but only the Kevlar vest has that function, and so 
only the vest’s stopping of the bullet counts as real functioning.  Wright, referring to the common 
manner of speaking in which we use “function as” and “function to”, says, “we signal the difference 
by a standard sort of ‘let's pretend’ talk” (1973).  He thinks proper functions are real and verb 
functioning is pretend or illusion or just a manner of speaking179. 
																																																								
179 There certainly can be a bit of “let’s pretend” going on in these statements.  The class of item that a thing functioned 
as (say, a shield) is certainly not what the thing itself is, and so we are pretending the belt buckle or bible is a shield if we 
claim, for instance that “the bible functioned as a shield”.  But that’s the extent of the make-believe; that is all that the 
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Boorse (2002) sees it differently.  He finds it better to accept accidental functioning180 as a 
“weak” sense of function (as in “serving a function”) and non-accidental functioning as a “strong” 
sense (as in “having a function”).  Boorse thinks using these two categories of function statements 
serves him well because it allows his theory to be more broadly applicable (to all phenomena where 
items function) while also giving him a way to defend against criticisms that his theory doesn’t allow 
for a distinction between functions and accidents.  The difference between the weak and strong 
senses of function, for Boorse, lies in the frequency of their occurrence, with things that have a 
function being the ones that do function most regularly.  I largely agree with Boorse’s position here 
but the issue that he doesn’t resolve is the question of where on the spectrum of possible 
frequencies we might draw the line between functioning and having a function.  I suggest that, while 
the proper-function theorist would need to draw a line (proper functions are black-or-white, discrete 
phenomena), Boorse does not.  We can take just the opposite tack from Wright:  Wright claimed to 
solve the accidental functioning problem by dispensing with functioning in favor of having a function.  
Boorse tried to keep both.  But if we instead dispense of having a function in favor of functioning, 
then we need not draw a line at all because functioning is something that really happens in the 
world, while having a function is just a subjective judgment. 
 
Accidents Without Functions 
 
In the traditional conception of the function–accident distinction, a (proper) function—a 
class of activity that an item has it in its nature to perform—is being compared to uncontrollable 
events that occur.  This naturally seems like a clear category division along the (admittedly unclear) 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
“as” signifies.  It is important to note where the charade stops.  We are not pretending that the belt buckle or bible did in 
fact function.  It did.  We are not saying that it performed something like stopping a bullet, yet not quite.  It stopped a 
bullet.  The functioning of the belt buckle or bible was identical to that of a shield; it just happened not to be a shield.   
180 Along with other (verb-) functioning, such as the dog’s intentional, non-accidental, use of a box as a bed. 
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lines of “in its nature or not”, which then becomes the subject that a theory of function must define 
(what does the term “in its nature” mean?).  But tossing out proper functions in favor of (verb-) 
functioning, as I’ve advocated above, simply renders the distinction meaningless since neither 
functioning nor accidents are “in an item’s nature”.  The former is a relationship to some context 
that the item plays a role in; the latter is an event that may or may not occur.  If we see things this 
way, there is no problem with the kind of accidental functioning that occurs in bibles and belt 
buckles that function to block bullets, or in bee stings that function to bring Boorse to a doctor. 
The importance of this conclusion should not be overlooked.  The function–accident 
distinction has been used widely to judge whether a theory of function is adequate.  But it applies 
only to a theory that attempts to place proper functions as real properties in the world; if proper 
functions are illusions, as I’ve argued, then we are no longer talking about “the nature of ” items in 
and of themselves, and so the function–accident distinction simply has no meaning.   
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H. Things Don’t Have Functions 
 
We are accustomed to hearing about biological functions for various bodily organs.  The heart, the kidneys, and the 
pituitary gland, we are told, have functions—things they are, in this sense supposed to do.  The fact that these 
organs are supposed to do these things, the fact that they have their functions, is quite independent of what we think 
they are supposed to do.  Biologists discovered these functions; they didn’t invent or assign them. 
 
—Fred Dretske (1988:91) 
 
This chapter has raised a number of traditional issues that seem to accompany the analysis of 
function, but it has given very non-traditional answers to most of them.  What I have been trying to 
argue throughout the chapter is that we need to approach the philosophical analysis of function with 
a “forget everything you know” mindset.  In order to make progress, I believe we have to relinquish, 
all at once, a great many intuitions, preconceptions, and acculturated beliefs that we find coloring the 
way we currently see function.   
Central to that reform will be coming to grips with the idea that things don’t have functions 
(TDHF).  We have to throw out the very heart of function analysis—the belief in objective 
functions themselves—and replace it with a view of functioning as a relation between items and a 
context of usage.  Counter to what Dretske (for one) implies in the epigraph above, proper 
functions do not exist.  But still, functioning is an important pattern in our world; it ties together the 
tools of human artifice—from literal tools such as hammers and pencils to more communal tools 
such as words, halls of justice, or the scientific method—with the natural products of evolution, and 
the fact that there is a link that places all of these things on one continuum deserves a good 
explanation.  
	 254	
A number of other highly reformative perspectives come part and parcel with the disposal of 
proper functions.  First, I think we must relinquish the belief that design—whether by human 
artifice or natural selection—can grant function.  Second, I think malfunctioning items should be 
seen not as items with functions that fail, but as non-functional items that appear similar to 
functional ones (an argument to this end appears in the next chapter).  Third, I think we need to 
take care not to be misled when thinking of functional items in terms of the question “What is it 
for?”  And fourth, I argue that the function–accident distinction is an invalid concept by which to 
measure a theory of functioning.  If proper functions don’t exist, then accidents can be seen as 
functional on occasion, and non-functional at other times, rather than being set in strict opposition 
to functions.  If I am right in all of this, then the topic of functioning that I plan to analyze has very 
little in common with the topic of function that other theorists have previously analyzed. 
It may be overstating things to call this “reform” just yet; since I haven’t yet produced a 
replacement for all these notions, at the moment it is more of a demolition—a disassembly of a 
faulty conceptual edifice in order to recover the bricks, which, in the later chapters, may be useful in 
building a new structure.  But the demolition is not yet complete.  A number of other confusing 
intuitions underlie the various theories of function that have been offered.  Let’s turn our attention 






How can we explicate the biological concept of function, and explain what it means to say ‘the function of X is Y’, 
without invoking backward causation or panpsychism? Several theories in the philosophy of biology have attempted to 




In the previous chapter I discussed a handful of issues that are connected with the ways we 
conceptualize function without yet focusing on any particular theory of it.  It will be worthwhile now 
to examine the many theories that have been offered, not least because the presentation in Part II 
will lean heavily upon various pieces of those older ideas.  Most recent reviews of the literature on 
function have tended toward a convention of grouping the analyses into two or three main strands, 
while giving only occasional and dismissive mention to a handful of others that are considered to be 
more marginal. In this chapter I will review a slightly broader catalogue that focuses on the six 
categories of theory already listed (on p. 196), while still leaving some work largely unexamined.   
The often-overlooked views include those theories that claim that all of teleology arises from 
the human mind (e.g. Ducasse 1925; Nissen 1993, 1997; and Woodfield 1976) or another mind (e.g. 
that of a creator) 181; they also include the accounts (labeled as “recent pre-history” by Buller, 1999) 
that really set the stage for the modern debate but which have since been either superseded by or 
else assimilated into the modern debate (e.g. Hempel 1965; Lehman 1965; Nagel 1961; Rosenblueth 
et al., 1943; Scheffler 1959; Sommerhoff 1950, 1968; Sorabji 1964).  The modern debate that 
																																																								
181 These accounts will be reviewed briefly later. 
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supplants those contributions is generally taken to have begun about half a century ago, in the early 
nineteen-seventies.  
Of the views that will be looked-over rather than overlooked, the first three—the causal role 
theory (CR), the selected effects theory (SE), and the replication dispositions theory (RD)—are the 
usual suspects that, along with hybrid views amongst them, have received the most airtime in recent 
publications.  I’ll call them the three popular views.  The unpopular three are what I’ll call the goal 
contributions theory (GC), the valuable effects theory (VE), and the programmed effects theory 
(PE).  I suspect the reason these latter three analyses seldom garner serious attention is because they 
are each expressed in vague terms.  However, I would like the reader to pay particular attention to 
the unpopular views because, despite their imprecision in terms, I find each of them to be deeply 
intuitive, and because a slightly richer version of each will play a significant role in outlining the 
skeleton of the theory I’ll later advocate.   
I have arranged my review of the literature here with two chief goals in mind.  The more 
important of these goals is to mine useful insights from the existing work.  Each theory that has 
been presented is an attempt to account for some observations and intuitions that a theorist found 
to be of crucial interest in their analysis and, whether or not the theorist’s explanation ultimately 
succeeds, the observations it is derived from will be informative to my study.  A detailed analysis will 
help to catalog those observations, and the theory presented later can then be held accountable to 
try to explain the same phenomena as the predecessors it hopes to blend, amend, or displace.  That 
catalog will appear as a series of promissory notes distributed throughout the chapter, all of which I 
intend to repay in Part II of the dissertation.   
The second goal of this review will be to advance a set of critical reflections about each 
analysis in order to assess each one’s suitability to serve as a general theory of both functional and 
teleological phenomena.  I must qualify what I mean by this:  The theories we will look at have all 
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been (claimed to have been) developed for distinct reasons—some have been presented in order to 
buoy theories of semantics (Millikan 1984); some were developed in order to account for biomedical 
normality (Boorse 1976); some were meant primarily to analyze and explain complex capacities 
(Cummins 1983); some were meant to account only for biological function, agnostic of artifact 
function (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987; Godfrey-Smith 1994; Mayr 1992); and so on.  It is often 
unclear, however, just how narrowly or broadly applicable each author hopes their theory to be 
since, at times (especially in their critiques of one another), they all lapse into discussion of the more 
general notion of function or speak more widely of both artifacts and organisms.  
In terms of my project, there is no value in critiquing these theorists’ presentations with 
respect to their own stated goals; instead, as I said, I will perform my critique of each with regard to 
their suitability for sustaining my own explanatory aims.  I will proceed bluntly, and in doing so I will 
undoubtedly step on toes and make judgments that may seem misplaced or unfair, but my reason for 
doing so is that I am operationally focused only on my own goals:  I am digging through other 
people’s answers to their questions in order to find ideas that I can use to answer my questions. 
I will follow three central strategies in advancing my diagnostic concerns. The first strategy 
will be to use a set of examples—I’ll call them the “base cases”—to test how each theory accounts 
for the functional nature of the items in these cases.  All three are adapted from the list of function 
statements in Chapter IV.  
 
BC1. (FS1) The function of a heart is to pump blood in an animal. 
BC2. (FS6) The function of a cog is to translate rotational motion in a machine.  
BC3. (FS7) The function of a stone paperweight is to hold down papers on a desk. 
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The first case—the heart—is an organismal trait that has been used as a central example in 
nearly every analysis of function given in the literature.  It could easily have been the function of an 
eye, a wing, a gill, or a liver; any of these items should be treated similarly by any reasonable theory.  
But historically the heart has been analyzed most often and so I will keep with that tradition.  The 
second case is a typical part of an artifact—it is a somewhat generic example that tries to capture our 
intuitions about the ways artifacts are commonly made of interacting small functional parts.  The 
cog should be able to stand in equally for a piston in an engine, a strut in a truss, the screw that acts 
as a fulcrum in a pair of scissors, or the lid of a disposable coffee cup—any individual part of a 
multi-part mechanism.  The third base case is a less usually called upon artifact example that is 
meant to be uncontroversial in that we should not doubt its functionality, but that also helps, as we’ll 
see, to highlight theoretical complications in some cases.  One class of near equivalents may include 
simple cups and saucers and other functional artifacts that appear to have no smaller parts182, yet 
which serve functions as wholes (e.g. holding things); however, found objects that are employed 
toward various ends (for instance stone doorstops or projectiles, logs used for floating upon, or a 
stick used to beat the dust from a rug) are near equivalents on another measure because, like the 
paperweight, they also have no (relevant) evolutionary history or future—an important feature of 
some of the theories we’ll see. 
As we go through the chapter, we’ll find that none of the popular theories clearly accounts 
for all three cases, while the unpopular GC and VE theories perform admirably, and the other 
unpopular account, the PE theory, effectively fails the test.  The ways in which a particular theory 
fails to account for these base cases will, in most instances, suggest notions that will be useful in 
developing a new theory.  It is worth noting, also, that all three base cases are cases of something 
“having” a function but of course, TDHF!  Using these examples allows me to analyze existing 
																																																								
182 That is, on a certain measure of what counts as a “part”. 
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theories in their own terms, however I will try when I can to reframe these cases as items that are 
serving functions or being functional. 
The second critical strategy I will follow will be to borrow counterexamples from the 
existing debate.  The majority of the work in producing and defending, as well as criticizing, theories 
of function has been done using conceptual analysis.  Because of this tradition, there are thoughtful 
critics of each theory that have all found useful ways to review each other’s work and I will heavily 
borrow those analyses here in order to avoid reinventing these authors’ wheels183.  As with the first 
strategy, my intention in using these examples will be to use them to try both to narrow in upon 
what seems stout about each theory as well as to locate some places in which each may need to be 
buttressed or reworked (in order to serve my quite general aims). 
The third strategy will be to raise theoretical concerns with each analysis (again, with respect 
to my aims).  When employed against the popular theories, this strategy will turn up as efforts to 
show that there are evaluative-normative (see Chapter I, p. 23, for a definition of this term) or 
teleological terms implicit in each offering.  This suggests that each fundamentally requires 
underlying concepts of that variety in accounting for functions, even while superficially shunning 
them, ignoring them, mistaking them, or leaving them as unstated, hidden assumptions.  When 
employed against the unpopular theories, the third strategy will come as an attempt to show that 
each of these theories, which seem robust against many counterexamples, has a significant vagueness 
of terms underlying it (which likely accounts for its robustness against counterexamples), leaving the 
theory unable to do much in the way of real predictive or theoretical work.   
In addition, there is one major overarching theoretical concern that can be applied equally to 
each of the theories:  I’ve just argued in the previous chapter that functions are not the constant sort 
of properties of objects that we imagine them to be, yet virtually all theorists have been trying to 
																																																								
183 And to avoid introducing too many more new examples into an already cluttered body of literature. 
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account for an item’s property-functions—its “proper functions”—which I don’t think exist.  In this 




A. Causal Roles 
 
We are confronted by the all important question: are those processes in the organism, which we described as purposive, 
perhaps only purposive in virtue of a given structure or tectonic, of a “machine” in the widest sense, on the basis of 
which they play their part, being purposive therefore only in the sense in which processes in a machine made by men are 
purposive; or is there another special kind of teleology in the realm of organic life? 
 
—Hans Driesch (1914) 
 
While teleology seeks to answer a why-is-it-there question by answering a prior what-is-it-for question, functional 
analysis does not address a why-is-it-there question at all, but a how-does-it-work question. These last are answered by 
specifying the structure (design) of the system. 
 
—Robert Cummins (2002) 
 
The first of the three popular views that we’ll look at is what has come to be known as the 
Causal Role (CR)184 analysis of functions.  It is generally given in terms of the procedure called 
“functional analysis” by which an analyst decomposes systems into their functional parts, each of 
which plays a causal role in the system.185  The CR analysis considers a function to be the causal 
contribution of a part of a system to a behavioral capacity of the whole system (Cummins 1975, 2002; Davies 
2001; Prior 1985; see also Amundson and Lauder 1994; Lehman 1965; Hardcastle 2002; and Hempel 
																																																								
184 Following a pattern that has become conventional in the functions literature, I may sometimes refer to the causal role 
theory by the abbreviation “CR”.  The selected effects theory is also conventionally referred to as the “SE” theory, and I 
have developed two-letter abbreviations for the other principal function theories, which will show up in due course.  
Some writers also refer to functions as described by the CR theory as “Cummins functions” for obvious reasons, and I 
may at times also borrow this name. 
185 This is neither related to the branch of mathematics also called “functional analysis” nor to the psychotherapist’s 
protocol that goes by the same name. 
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1965).  It is important to notice that, on the CR analysis, a function exists relative to an item’s 
context—an item must reside within a particular “system” that has a particular “capacity” in order to 
have a function. 
So the function of the heart is given in the context of the capacity of the whole circulatory 
system to circulate blood and thereby transport oxygen, nutrients, and waste:  its function is to 
pump blood because that is what the heart does that contributes (causally) to effective circulation.  
Likewise, the function of a cog is whatever it does to keep the machine that it is a part of running 
properly (in its overall capacity as a particular kind of machine), and the function of a bird’s wing is 
whatever it does to aid the bird in the capacity of flight.  Each of these functional claims is made 
supposedly in light only of a causal contribution to the capacity of the larger system.   
The CR analysis stumbles, however, when asked to give the function of a stone used as a 
paperweight, doorstop, or projectile, since, in these cases, there appears to be no containing system 
that the stone is a part of and thus no “overall capacity” that is being contributed to.  This stumble 
suggests that perhaps one of two things is the case.   
The first possibility is that our conception of these stones as functioning is mistaken.  There 
are multiple ways that might happen.  For instance, perhaps stones used in these ways don’t actually 
function and the idea that they do is an illusion, and so our theory of function just doesn’t need to 
account for them, or perhaps our idea of function divides into two further senses—one that 
describes parts in systems and another one, for which a separate theory is necessary, that describes 
items not in systems but which are used whole.  At this point we can’t rule out such a possibility, but 
I am unconvinced and I think other considerations that we’ll come to later will give us reason to 
believe we can maintain unity within all perceived functioning.   
The second possibility is that the notion of being a “part” of a “containing system” may be 
just a near approximation of the notion that truly captures or describes all functioning.  That is, 
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perhaps something in the CR analysis as currently stated is imprecise and sharpening it will help find 
a new rubric under which we can consider parts within containing systems to be akin to non-part 
items such as the stone paperweight, which are simply used (functionally) by a person.  After all, 
even items such as a telephone (FS9) or a watch or a pocket calculator, each of which are made of 
many parts but are not themselves parts, still seem to have functions186 for which they are used and 
that a theory of functioning should try to account for. 
In looking for such an imprecision, one place we might inquire regards the issue of what 
should count as a system for the CR analysis.  And what should count as a part?  For instance, do 
“parts” need to be physically differentiated objects, like a cog or a screw?  One might argue that the 
lip of a cup and the base of a cup are different parts that serve different functions, but this could also 
be a slippery slope, as it requires an attempt to draw lines where only blurry boundaries exist (where 
does the lip of a cup end?)187.  Does the world come neatly packaged into systems and their parts, or 
is the human use of these categories due to perceptual or cognitive or cultural biases?  We’ll look at 
this problem more, below.  Perhaps the category of functional things has substantial overlap with 
things that we would like to call parts of systems because parts of systems are, for one reason or 
another, the most common type of functional object we see in the world while exceptions, such as 






186 Or, rather, they seem to be functional (since TDHF!) 
187 Don’t the individual masses of each atom in a stone causally contribute to the stone’s capacity of being heavy enough 
to hold down paper?  Are those atoms thereby each to be considered functional “parts”?  I think perhaps they should, 
but I don’t think that Cummins or other CR analysts usually conceive of parts in this way (see also Wimsatt 1986). 
188 One reason they might be the most common is simply the mathematical consequence that there are more parts of 




The stone paperweight is a problematic exclusion—a false negative—for the CR analysis, 
but the most common criticism of Cummins’ statement of function is that it is liberally inclusive of 
things that don’t seem to be functions—that is, it gives false positives. Citing many who have 
registered similar worries, Boorse (2002, p. 65), puts the point this way: 
  
It implies that the function of mists is to make rainbows (Bigelow and Pargetter 
1987: 184), the function of rocks in a river is to widen the river delta (Kitcher 1993: 
390), ‘the function of clouds [is] to make rain with which to fill the streams and 
rivers’ (Millikan 1989a: 294), and the function of a piece of dirt stuck in a pipe is to 
regulate the water flow (Griffiths 1993: 411). 
 
Although each of the so-called functional items here causally contributes to the greater capacity of 
the larger system it is in, few people would consider any of these items to actually have (or even 
serve) those functions. Somehow those contributions just don’t seem to be functional contributions.  
The examples in the previous list describe only physical systems, but Boorse (ibid) adds: 
 
Moreover, it creates false functions within biology too.  Relative to our capacity to 
die of fluke infestation, our liver’s capacity to house liver flukes is its function 
(Griffiths 1993: 411); relative to our ability to grow gigantic malignant tumors, 
oncogenes have many functions (Kitcher 1993:390; Melander 1997: 53-4). 
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These biological examples are perhaps complicated by the presence of other biological 
agents (the flukes and the cancer cells themselves) which might be construed as alternate and thus 
independent “systems” with capacities of their own to which a function might be considered 
relative.  Though to simplify this complication one could for instance adjust Griffiths’ liver fluke 
example:  Relative to our capacity to die of (or to acquire dementia from) mercury poisoning, the 
capacity of selenium to react with mercury is its biological function.  Also, Matthen (1988, p. 15) 
adds to the group of biological false positives the fact that, relative to the narwhal’s capacity to get 
stuck in mud, its enormous tusk has the function of weighing down the narwhal.   
In anticipation of some counterarguments, Cummins supplemented his definition with a 
seldom-cited set of conditions that he thought might further define the boundary separating 
functional things from nonfunctional things.  The conditions he gave stated that the extent to which 
an item has a function, rather than a mere effect, is relative to the degree that the functional capacity 
is (1) less sophisticated than, and (2) of a different type than the higher-level capacity that is 
explained; and also relative to (3) the degree of complexity in the system’s organization.  So he 
thought, for example, the joint facts that the throbbing of the heart is simpler than and different in 
type from circulation, and that the circulatory system has a relatively complicated organization, 
together help us properly attribute the function of the heart as pumping blood, while not attributing 
such false functions as heart sounds since the latter “differ little if at all in type and sophistication” 
from the throbbing of the heart that produces them (Cummins 1975)189.  Paul Sheldon Davies has 
recently attempted to champion the CR analysis by reconstruing Cummins’ three constraints as 
symptoms of the simpler idea that a function need only play its causal role in the context of a 
“hierarchical system” (Davies 2001; see also McShea 2012). 
																																																								
189 It seems, though, that this would also have the bizarre implication that the production of sounds through a process of 
“throbbing” could never be the function of anything, say for instance, an electromagnetic speaker or a wind-up alarm-
clock bell.  It also seems to imply that if we had a biological organ which was “meant to” create a thumping sound, the 
CR analysis would have to rule out the production of those sounds just as it does with heart sounds. 
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Even augmented by Cummins’ constraints (or viewed in Davies’ terms), though, the CR 
analysis is difficult to sustain, not least because the constraints all require subjective judgments as to 
just how different in type, how much less sophisticated, and how complexly organized the relevant 
parameters are.  Opinion on these matters may vary substantially.  For instance, it might seem to 
some but not to others that the narwhal’s tusk being heavy is simpler and different in type than the 
overall capacity for the narwhal to get stuck in mud.  And while one might argue that the capacity to 
get stuck in the mud seems not very complex in organization, the same arguments might 
erroneously exclude a counterweight from having the function of keeping a window sash from 
careening back down when lifted, or the lead worn on a free-diver’s belt from having the function of 
drawing the diver deep under water.  Why are these various functional weights considered functional 
but the narwhal’s tusk or the avalanche that holds down a skier not functional?  Also, using our 
mercury-poisoning modification of Griffiths’ example, it seems that the selenium reaction is simpler 
and different in type than the overall capacity to die of mercury poisoning, and that the method of 
death (which first requires the destruction of protective selenoenzymes, and then a set of 
biochemical processes that result in the neurodegenerative oxidation of now-unprotected brain 
tissues) is certainly complex in organization190 but, still, we wouldn’t want to thereby consider 
reactivity with mercury to be the biological function of selenium. 
Moreover, if a person had intentionally wedged Griffiths’ piece of dirt in the pipe in order to 
regulate water flow, then it would indeed be functional despite the fact that the human-placed and 
the accidentally-lodged pieces of dirt will not differ at all in how well they fulfill Cummins’ three 
constraints—the two blocked-pipe systems may be identical except in how and why they have come 
to be. 
																																																								
190 However, to repeat, these are indeed subjective judgments, and so it is not entirely clear. 
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This long and almost indefinitely extensible list of counterexamples shows there may be a 
missing distinction in Cummins’ analysis.  We might, however, be able to mine the examples for 
commonalities that could be used to strengthen the model.  One thing of note is that the 
counterexamples seem to be situations either in which effects of an item contribute to the 
occurrence of some event regardless of whether that event is desirable or not (rainmaking clouds 
and rainbow-making mists), or in which the biological goals of survival and reproduction seem to be 
thwarted by a capacity that an item contributes to (oncogenes, mercury, liver flukes, or the narwhal’s 
tusk).  We could add a third category, similar to the second, in which the intentional goals of an 
actor are thwarted by a capacity that an item contributes to.  For instance, a software bug—a bit of 
delinquent code—which is a part of a system (the program it occurs in or the hardware that that 
program controls) and which regularly causes failures in the behavior of the machine—say, a missile 
guidance system that fails to track its target due to an accumulated floating-point error in its timing 
clock191.  Such a bug seems to fit Cummins’ constraints of being simpler and different in type from 
the tracking failure it contributes to, and the overall system is certainly complex in organization.  
One can imagine any number of other situations in this third category, in which a part of a poorly 
designed or poorly built machine or system does not contribute to what one intends for the machine 
to do when using it.  Together, the three categories (physical processes that just happen whether or 
not agents are involved and things that are counter to either biological goals or psychological agents’ 
goals) are the opposite of another concisely definable (though still not yet precise) category:  things 
that serve agents’ goals.  This is the intuition that leads to the goal contribution (GC) analysis 




191 This example is based on a real bug that existed in 1991 in the Patriot Missile systems manufactured by the Raytheon 




It is important to note that the CR analysis as it is standardly presented is an anti-teleological 
view.  Cummins first offered his version of the analysis as a response to earlier attempts at defining 
functions in terms that could explain a trait or an item’s presence in an organism or other system 
(Hempel 1959; Nagel 1961), and he protested that this tendency of those earlier theorists was a 
“failure to distinguish teleological explanation from functional explanation” (1975).  I think 
Cummins’ distinction here is a false one:  My claim, later, will be that there is no functional 
explanation that is not ultimately also teleological explanation, and the CR analyst’s presumption that 
there might be is a mistake.  Examining the method by which Cummins attempts to excise teleology 
from his account will help us develop the suspicion that this method is somewhat disingenuous. 
At its core, the CR analysis appeals to a higher-level “capacity” of a containing “system”.  
Both of these words, “system” and “capacity”, were chosen carefully because they appear to be 
teleologically innocent terms.  They imply that, as analysts, we are looking at well-defined objective 
categories in the world called systems and the objective processes that they undergo, the results of 
which are called capacities.  Cummins would have us believe that, in functional analysis, we are 
examining what a thing is able to do and how it does it without regard to why.   
While in their most generic forms, the terms “system” and “capacity” do seem to discard any 
subjective element that might invite teleological thinking, it is the specific choice made by an analyst 
of each particular system and of its capacity, during the individual analysis of any function that 
smuggles the teleology back in (much like the choice, made by a dieter who eats only salads, to 
smuggle the calories back in each time with a rich and creamy dressing).  In particular, if we choose 
an inherently teleological system as the reference context when analyzing a function then, despite 
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appearances, the CR analysis is not as teleologically innocuous as advertised192. Let’s have a look at 
our examples again. 
For starters, Cummins (1975) reminds us that the function of chlorophyll is in contributing 
to the photosynthetic production of sugars; the function of nerve tissue in animals is in aiding 
coordinated activity; and the function of a heart in vertebrates is its contribution to the circulation of 
the blood.  In all of these, and any other, biological cases that the CR analysis seems to correctly 
classify as functions, the capacity to which an item contributes is not simply a physical process; it is not 
something that just happens to happen in the world.  Each such capacity—producing sugars, 
coordinating activity and circulating blood—also ultimately if not directly plays a role in assisting an 
organism to survive and reproduce, which I claim is an archetypal teleological capacity.193   
It is clear that this last claim remains partially unsubstantiated without an underlying, 
objective, definition of what a teleological capacity is, and many may be apprehensive about whether 
such a definition can be given (I will make that argument later).  But even if we are skeptical about 
the existence of objective teleology, still we can notice the categorical differences between those 
systems and capacities that are required to make Cummins’ offering work and those systems and 
capacities that, as counterexamples have shown, cause it to clash with our intuitions.  Let’s continue 
to develop those categories.  
On the one hand, if we group the CR analysis’ true positives194 (hearts, chlorophyll, nerve 
tissue, cogs in machinery, and even a clump of dirt intentionally placed in a pipe to slow water flow) 
along with its false negatives (stone paperweights and doorstops), we find that each example has a 
goal or purpose implicit in the “system” in relation to which the function is defined—there is always, 
																																																								
192 Amundson and Lauder, in their (1994) paper “Function without Purpose”, buy it.  They argue for the aptness of the 
causal role analysis in biological practice and, as their title suggests, they see Cummins as having “introduced a novel 
concept of function in which the specification of a real, objective goal simply dropped out.”  I think they’ve had the 
wool pulled over their eyes.  Perhaps, yes, the specification of a goal has dropped out, but the unspecified goals are implicitly 
smuggled back in. 
193 However, this is shorthand for what each ultimately contributes to. 
194 Also called “hits”, in signal detection theory. 
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ultimately, an artifact that serves a user’s goals or an organism whose traits and behaviors contribute 
to its overall goals of survival and reproduction. The systems that happen to allow the CR analysis to 
succeed can all be seen as being somehow goal-directed at the system level. 
On the other hand, consider both the false positives given by the CR analysis (selenium’s 
reaction with mercury, mists that make rainbows, clouds that make rain, a bug in the software, a 
wrench in the gears,195 and a clump of dirt accidentally lodged in a pipe) and its true negatives196 
(none have been mentioned yet but let’s say, for example, a rock or a puddle not being used for 
anything).  All are, simply, physical objects or processes, only a subset of which—the false 
positives—are parts involved in what can be called systems.  And none of these have any necessary 
relation to goal-directed artifact usage or organisms’ biological goals.   
The division is clear.  If, in practice, the CR analysis only ever uses artifacts and organisms to 
provide the relative context to successfully sort functioning items from non-functioning ones, and if 
it also fails to sort them correctly when it does not use these contexts, then CR analysts must admit 
this consistent bias as a tacit, hidden constraint of their theory.  In short, the causal role analysis is 
nearly right when it says that a function is a causal contribution to a capacity.  What it fails to state is 
simply that it is not a contribution to just any capacity of any system that counts, but, in particular, a 






195 One might wonder whether there is goal-directedness in “the software” or “the gears” in these two examples, since 
they are causally involved in artifacts that serve intentional purposes.  However, on the CR analysis, one would then be 
attempting to say: “the function of the bug (or the wrench) is its causal contribution, relative to the capacity of a missile 
guidance system to miss its target.  Missing a target is not in fact a goal, though; it is a failure.  And so no goal of the 
artifact or its creator or user is thereby inherited into the CR analysis. 
196 Also called “correct rejections”, in signal detection theory. 
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Systems and Their Parts  
 
One attempt at accounting for the stone paperweight might consist of including the paper 
and the stone together as a system.  Doing so seems like an arbitrary move, though, since the CR 
analyst doesn’t make the same move for most other artifact functions.  It seems strange to include 
the paper (the thing being held down) as a “part” in the “system” that holds down paper197.  We 
don’t include the road as part of the car when assigning a function to tires.  Still, this consideration 
helps raise the question: If functions are relative to an item’s role as a part in the context of a system, 
then what should we count as a CR “system” or as a “part” of one?198   
Certainly, if the CR analysis is to be an objective theory of function (as its proponents 
usually claim it to be), one cannot merely claim that any arbitrarily defined grouping of parts and 
processes is “a system” in order to justify attributions made by the theory.  There has to be rhyme 
and reason to the selection process.  And yet . . . what natural ways do we have of bounding 
systems?   
Although physicists, especially thermodynamicists, do prolifically use the term “system” 
(thus speaking of “open”, “closed”, and “isolated” systems), so far there are no physically objective 
criteria by which these definitions can be made precise.  There is always bleed-through, at the edges, 
where the idealized boundaries of such systems fail.  All physical systems in the universe are, 
ultimately, open systems199.  Idealizations are often practical expedients that allow the fields of 
physics and thermodynamics to proceed usefully, but the (good) scientists involved in such practices 
																																																								
197 Another possibility would be to include both the stone and the person placing it upon the paper, together, as a 
system.  I’m not opposed to the idea of involving the user of an artifact in fixing the artifact’s function, but to do so 
would directly invite conscious goal-directedness into our analysis of artifacts—a move that the CR analyst would 
probably prefer to avoid. 
198 See also Millikan (1999) for a different yet still critical analysis of the same question. 
199 A perfect thermos is as physically impossible as a perpetual motion machine. 
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are keenly aware of their assumptions and of the fact that all their models have limits to their 
generalizability.   
So without physics to lean on, where do CR analysts draw the bounds for their systems?  As 
I suggested in the previous section, it seems they are drawn arbitrarily or subjectively by the analyst, 
wherever it seems intuitive (or, perhaps worse, convenient) for the purposes of their analysis; it 
seems that goal-directed systems or systems held in a causal-contributory relationship to a goal-
directed system are always chosen.  But it also seems that while the chosen systems appear to have 
this goal-directed nature, they are not in fact defined in any other precise terms whatsoever from 
which a general definition for “system” could be derived. This sounds like a broad claim to 
substantiate, but while I will review a few examples here, generally I leave it up to any CR analysts 
who wish to sustain their view to prove this wrong200. 
Let’s take the example of a common electromagnetic speaker.  Where are the boundaries of 
this device considered as a “system”, if we are to use that system to grant functions to its parts in 
relation to it?  What counts as a “part” of such a device?  To a first approximation, most people 
would probably include the fixed ferromagnetic ring and electromagnetic copper wrappings near it, 
as well as the cone-shaped diaphragm or membrane attached to the electromagnet, and the solid 
frame that holds all the rest of the parts in their places.  A slightly more detailed review might note 
that there are some screws and adhesives involved as well as some connecting wires and so on.  A 
CR analyst very likely would call this entire assembly the analyzed system, and its systemic capacity, 
to which all those parts contribute, would obviously be to produce sound 201 .  But is this 
characterization sufficient?  Should we not include the air both within and surrounding the speaker, 
																																																								
200 Again, CR analysts may not care to sustain their view for the general purposes that I have in mind; they may choose 
to limit their view to a subset of functioning for some other reason.  And that response is just fine as long as such 
theorists explicitly avow the corresponding limits of the scope of their theory. 
201 Let’s ignore the fact that sound itself is a complicated phenomenon involving the sensation and perception of a 
cognitive agent, and instead just make the simplifying assumption that sounds are longitudinal compression waves in a 
gas. 
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without which the system will fail to produce sound waves?  Might we include the speaker-wires that 
carry power and a signal to the magnetic assemblage?  And, if so, mightn’t we also consider the 
signal-production system, whatever it may be . . . and the power production system, whatever that 
may be?  Maybe not.  It seems that including a television or music player and a hydroelectric power 
plant in our definition of a speaker goes too far.  But that is an arbitrary decision.  There is no 
principle by which we can easily generalize such a judgment to all cases of “systems”.  We bound the 
system where we do for other, intuitive reasons that are not explained in the CR analysis.  If such 
unstated intuitions play a role in our analysis then, as was mentioned in the previous section, it is 
disingenuous to state the process of analysis without explicit mention of them. 
Cummins seems to be aware of the system-bounding problem, though, for reasons unclear 
to me, it doesn’t seem to concern him greatly. 
 
Indeed, what makes something part of, e.g., the nervous system is that its capacities 
figure in an analysis of the capacity to respond to external stimuli, coordinate 
movement, etc. Thus, there is no question that the glial cells are part of the brain, but 
there is some question as to whether they are part of the nervous system or merely 
auxiliary to it” (Cummins 1975, footnote 18, p. 761) 
 
If we take this at face value, if we take it that what makes something part of an analyzed system is 
that the part’s capacities “figure in an analysis of ” the system’s capacity, then we should in fact 
include, as parts of the electromagnetic speaker, the power plant, the music player, and the air—all 
of which absolutely “figure in an analysis of the capacity” to make sounds.202 
																																																								
202 Not to mention that if Cummins’ proposal for defining a system is based in choosing the parts that figure in an 
analysis of it, then his analysis of the functions of parts in terms of a system becomes circular:  A function is the role an 
item plays in a system that is made up of parts that play a role. 
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This is not an isolated or unusual case, either.  The same question applies to any artifact.  
Televisions or computers clearly use electric power in the same way the speaker does.  Automobiles 
are fueled by a complex economy of oil drilling and distribution.  Items such as flush toilets and 
showers require pressurized water feed pipes and drains as well as pumps that may be operating 
miles away, in order for their primary capacities to operate.  Do we include the sun as “part of the 
system” when analyzing a solar-powered calculator?  Do we include it when analyzing a solar oven?  
Do we include the river, when analyzing the capacity of a watermill to grind grain?  How much of it?  
And, in this case, should we also include the sun, the energy from which carried the water to the 
clouds that dumped it into the watershed of that river?   
Cummins’ example of glial cells opens the door to biological cases too.  Where shall we 
bound the circulatory system or the pulmonary system or the nervous system in an organism?  Are 
glial cells “part of the nervous system or merely auxiliary to it”?  Do we or don’t we include the 
innervation of the heart in the circulatory system?  If so, how far back do we cut those nerves when 
carving out the circulatory system?  Is the brain stem far enough?  Why?  What principle can we 
possibly use for bounding our system anywhere if we are interested in lower-level capacities “that 
figure in an analysis of ” a systemic capacity? 
The issue here can perhaps be cast in terms of the more general philosophical problem of 
open-ended causation.  Since every event in the world is caused by previous events and those events 
are themselves caused by even further previous events, then when a theory gives an answer in terms 
of causation, it invites an unending series of answers spanning the period from the event in question 
all the way back to the beginning of time.  Likewise, when one asks what future events are caused by 
a particular event, there is an ever widening light-cone of future causal consequences none of which 
is the effect, but each of which is an effect, of the event in question.  Because of this, defining a 
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system in terms of the items whose causal capacities figure in an analysis of the capacity of the 
system fares no better than defining a system in physical terms (or subjective or intuitive terms).   
This may sound like a negative conclusion, but I don’t mean to suggest that it is hopeless to 
try to define a system.  What’s more, as it turns out, I think that, in the absence of physical criteria, 
causality is a good starting point for a definition of system, though it needs to be used in a less 
simplistic way.  I claim that the presence of certain causal organizations can be an antidote to the 
pathological open-endedness of causality.  A certain kind of causal bound can create a form of 
containment that physical bounds never could.  This antidote will be an important piece in making 
the theory I’ll later advocate work.  
 
Functions Are Causal Roles 
 
Though I’ve just expressed concern with the notion of causation, I also think that the focus 
on causation is the most essential kernel of truth in the CR analysis.  A majority of functioning 
items—even the stone paperweight—do in fact appear to causally contribute to something, even if 
that something is not always simply a “capacity of a containing system”.  The pumping of the heart 
plays a causal role that contributes to circulation, the turning of a cog plays a causal role that 
contributes to the operation of the machine it is in, and the stone paperweight plays a causal role 
that contributes to its holding down papers (and our wanting it to hold down papers).  And so, while 
the “system” and “part” portions of the CR analysis seem to need some kind of adjustment, the 
“causation” portion, though still quite thorny, seems nonetheless highly relevant to the notion of 
function.  
In fact, as we go through the remainder of the theories that comprise the debate, we’ll find 
also that each one takes almost for granted that a function is a kind of causal contribution. Three 
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theories (SE, PE, and VE) are given in terms of “effects”—those effects that a trait or an item (of a 
type described by the particular theory) has; of the other two theories, one (GC) is given directly in 
terms of “causal contributions” to goals (Boorse 2002), while the other (RD) is given in terms of the 
disposition of an item to play a particular (causal) role (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987:196).  Everyone 
seems to agree that there is something fundamentally central in the concept of function about 
“playing a causal role”.  It remains to be seen what we can make of this insight, since the notion of 
causation raises its own philosophical problems—problems that have not yet been deeply examined 
in the functions debate.  As I said, I think the worst of them can be evaded, but we’ll have to pick 
that thread up again later. 
Other features of the CR analysis include, first, the fact that it respects a notion of hierarchy203 
(even if it is not clear why or how); second, that it finds functions to be relative to a context, which 
is inconsistent with the idea of a “proper” function (even as the analysis still seems on the surface to 
be about “the function of ”); and, third, it respects our understanding of functional equivalence (the 
idea that replacing a part in a machine—or organism—with another that plays the same causal role 
still allows the machine or organism to operate properly)204.   
In addition, there are two issues that I found unconvincing about the CR analysis but that 
raise important questions that need to be addressed by any proposed amendment of the analysis.  
First, I’ve emphasized my disagreement with the anti-teleological stance of the CR analysis, though I 
admit that an alternative or updated offering would still need to be consistent with the reasons why 
Cummins and other CR proponents provided their anti-teleological offerings—namely, that any 
theory of function needs to be consistent with the modern scientist’s view of materialism. 
																																																								
203 McShea also put his recent theory of (“seeming”) teleology (though not specifically of function) in terms of 
hierarchical organization, though his is a somewhat more physical sense of hierarchy, given in terms of compositional 
containment, rather than a causal sense of hierarchy. 
204 Other theories do this too, but only because they are couched in terms that ultimately refer to a causal contribution. 
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Second, while a saucer or a stone paperweight reminds us that not all items that function 
have a containing system with a superordinate capacity, still a structure of that sort seems to be 
extremely common—so common that the exceptions appear to CR theorists to be systematically 
ignorable.  A new theory that intends to make sense of the phenomena of functions and the causal 
roles played in them should at least make provisions both for those situations in which a functioning 
item does contribute to the larger capacity of a containing system and for those situations in which it 





B. Selected Effects 
 
Items have functions when their being there depends on reproduction from ancestors having similar traits, these traits 
having been causally efficacious in helping to produce these items, and these traits having been selected at some point in 
this history for their capacity to make this kind of contribution. 
 
—Ruth Millikan (1993) 
 
Our second popular view is called the Selected Effects (SE) theory, or the historical or 
etiological205 theory of functions.  Allen and Bekoff (1995a) have given it the moniker “The Standard 
Line”, as there appear to be many more defenders of versions of this view than any other (e.g., 
Adams 1979; Ayala 1970; Brandon 1981; Dennett 2014; Enç 1979; Garson 2012; Godfrey-Smith 
1994; Griffiths 1993; Mace 1935; Millikan 1984, 1989a, 1989b, 2002; Mitchell 1995; Neander 1983, 
1995a, 1995b, 1998; Williams 1966; Wright 1973; not to mention the abundance of plural and so-
called unifying theories that are based largely on the SE theory206).  Allen and Bekoff (1995a) put it 
this way: “A trait’s function or functions causally explain the existence or maintenance of that trait in 
a given population via the mechanism of natural selection”.  A bit more pithily, an item’s functions 
are the effects of the item for which it was selected by natural selection.   
Typically, the SE analysis is expressed first in terms of its original formulation by Larry 
Wright, and then modified by its now more “standard” and, it is sometimes claimed, more robust 
formulation, given by a series of authors beginning with Karen Neander and Ruth Millikan.  I will 
follow in that tradition.   
																																																								
205 The word “etiology” (and its adjectival form, “etiological”) is commonly used in the literature on functions.  It simply 
refers to the historical reasons for a thing coming to be the way it is.  I will try to stick to the terminology of “Selected 
Effects”. 




Wright’s oft-cited and now-classic formula is the following.  
 
The function of X is Z means  
(a) X is there because it does Z,  
(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there. (Wright 1973) 
 
Although Wright leaves it unmentioned, to understand him properly we need to interpret the 
shorthand found in some of his words in two very different ways depending on whether we are 
talking about organisms and their traits, or artifacts and their parts. The ambiguous terms are the 
word “because” from part (a), the word “consequence” from part (b) and the word “there”, which 
appears twice, once in part (a) and once in part (b).  
In the case of organisms, these words bring to mind natural selection as our explanatory 
mechanism:  X exists because it does Z and doing Z is what X’s ancestors did successfully in order to 
replicate, and thus cause X to exist.  In the case of artifacts, these words should be interpreted in terms 
of human intentions:  X either exists or is located where it is or both because it does Z and somebody knows 
X does Z, and wants it to do Z, and so they built X and/or put X in that location in order for it to do Z207.   
So, for example, “the function of the heart is pumping blood” means, (a) “the heart is there 
because it pumps blood”, and (b) “pumping blood is a consequence of the heart’s being there”, 
wherein (a) is to be interpreted to mean hearts as a category are there (partially, but importantly) 
because all members of the class of their ancestors’ hearts pumped blood successfully, thus 
contributing to the existence of current hearts.  This version of Wright’s view is a theory primarily 
																																																								
207 Wright (1976) clarifies the term “is there” from part (a) of his schema, suggesting that it should best be interpreted to 
mean, “came to be there”.  My interpretations in this paragraph are consistent with that. 
	 280	
about types, though one could (and I think Wright intends to) easily extend it to tokens by the 
simple logical move that a token heart, for instance, inherits most of the properties of the heart type.  
For artifacts, however, it is a purely token theory. “The function of the cog is translating 
rotational motion” means (a) “the cog is there because it translates rotational motion” and (b) 
“translating rotational motion is a consequence of the cog being there”, wherein (a) is to be 
interpreted as “the cog is there because a person who knows it will translate rotational motion has 
willingly put it there for just that reason.”  Similarly, we can claim that “the function of the stone 
paperweight is holding down paper” means (a) “the stone is there because it holds down paper” and 
(b) “holding down paper is a consequence of the stone being there,” because we know that a person 
placed the stone paperweight on the paper with the intention of it holding down the paper (though 
of course this is not why the stone exists). 
 
Is Wright Right? 
 
As we just saw, Wright’s view seems to describe functions in both of the main categories of 
organism and artifact successfully, but it does so by relying on an ambiguity in some of its terms that 
disguises an unarticulated difference between the two applications. When the difference is made 
explicit, though, the theory divides in two—one theory for each category208. As was pointed out by 
Boorse (1976), Wright’s failure to make this division explicit also leaves the schema vulnerable to 
two categories of counterexample.  The first consists of artifacts that are there (partly) because of 
selection—because of what they do that contributes to their own existence.  
																																																								
208 Also, if we were to try to explain the functions of behaviors, such as those in FS10 and FS11, we would need to put a 
third, more explicit disjunct into the definition since “is there” does not apply to behaviors.  Wright’s formula would 
then look something like “X is there (or is performed) because it does Z and Z is a consequence of X’s being there (or 
X’s being performed)”.  But this doesn’t have the kind of circular causality in it that “being there because of what it 
does” creates, and it isn’t clear how to remedy that.  Inserting FS10 into the formula, for instance, would produce: 
“Putting a stamp on a letter is performed because it ensures that the letter gets delivered and ensuring that a letter gets 
delivered is a consequence of putting a stamp on the letter” . . . which sounds more tautological than teleological. 
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Suppose that a scientist builds a laser which is connected by a rubber hose to a 
source of gaseous chlorine. After turning on the machine he notices a break in the 
hose, but before he can correct it he inhales the escaping gas and falls unconscious. 
(Boorse 1976) 
 
In this example, Wright’s analysis would have us assign releasing gas as the function of the break in 
the hose:  (a) the break is there because (among other things) it releases gas (thereby preventing 
anyone from repairing it) and (b) releasing gas is a consequence of the break being there.   
Bedau borrows another similar example (but not its analysis, he notes) from Robert van 
Gulick. 
 
Consider a stick floating down a stream that brushes against a rock and comes to be 
pinned there by the backwash it creates.  The stick is creating the backwash because 
of a number of considerations, including the flow of the water, the shape and mass 
of the stick, etc., but part of the explanation of why it creates the backwash is that the 
stick is pinned in a certain way on the rock by the water. (Bedau 1992) 
 
Bedau asks pointedly, “Given that the heart example and the stick example involve a similar sort of 
etiology [meaning that the reason the heart is there is analogous to the reason the stick is there], why 
is only the heart teleological?”  This is a good question. 
Boorse’s second category of counterexample involves organismic traits that are there 
because of human intentions (the way, say, the cog or paperweight is).  He illustrates: 
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A man who is irritated with a barking dog kicks it, breaking one leg, with the 
intention of causing the animal pain. The dog’s pain is a result of the fracture, and 
the fracture is there because its creator intends it to have that result. (Boorse 1976)209 
 
Of course, we wouldn’t be willing to assign to the fracture the biological function of causing 
the dog pain.  Even if we were to distort our concept of function in that way, it would certainly not 
be meant in the same sense as we mean when we say the heart has the function of pumping.  The 
fracture could only be functional in the sense that it is an artifact—it might serve a function for the 
man, but not for the dog. 
Another way Wright’s schema assigns functions where it shouldn’t is in the case of vestiges.  
When the environment changes suddenly in such a way that a previously functional trait no longer 
does anything, Wright would still consider the effects of such traits to be a consequence of the trait 
being there and the trait to be there because ancestral traits of the same kind were selected for that 
effect.  
McLaughlin (2001) points out also that Wright’s schema grants functions to whole 
organisms (and not just their parts), though most of us would not.  For instance, McLaughlin notes, 
elephants are there because they replicate themselves and elephants’ replicating themselves is a 
consequence of their being there.   
So, yes, there is a sense in which Wright has accounted for all three of our base cases—each 
fits his formula, naïvely interpreted.  However, after noticing the ambiguity of his formula and of its 
applicability across the cases, we must admit that he has not in fact given us a singular theory that 
																																																								
209 I have found that some readers misinterpret Boorse’s example.  I will try to explain further:  The (cruel) man in the 
example is meant to have fully intended the broken leg that causes pain.  He is not just meant to have intended to cause 
pain with a kick that also accidentally breaks the leg.  Boorse’s first sentence makes this unclear by being specific (but not 
specific enough) about an intention.  The second sentence clarifies, but it is easy to miss, especially if we, in our hearts, 
want the man not to be quite that cruel.  The claim is: “the fracture is there because its creator intends it . . .” 
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accounts for all the base cases, nor one that correctly distinguishes other functions in the world from 
non-functions, such as in the above counterexamples.  The implicit organismal and artifactual halves 
of his theory have little in common.  Nonetheless, there is something intuitively teleological about an 




Later authors evolved Wright’s formula into its more modern form, described earlier.  To 
repeat, an item’s functions are the effects of the item for which it was selected by natural selection.  
Some of these authors (e.g. Neander 1991, Godfrey-Smith 1994) seem interested only in the 
functions of organismic traits, leaving artifacts and behaviors aside and embracing just the biological 
half of Wright’s formula.  Most intend to account for artifacts in one fashion or another.  For 
instance, Griffiths (1993) attempts to wrap artifacts in the cloth of natural selection by focusing on 
the way many artifact designs are evolved by human selection, with later generations of tools being 
based upon the more successful (i.e., useful) ones from earlier generations.  Kitcher (1993), similarly, 
attempts to unite organisms and artifacts along the lines that both have been subjected to a process 
of design.  Millikan makes a somewhat more sophisticated move in her case for proper functions, 
and since her theory raises many issues that will be important to developing our later theory, we will 
turn our attention to it now. 
As was mentioned earlier, Millikan uses the term “proper function” to emphasize that the 
functions she is interested in are properties that, once established, inhere in or belong to the objects 
that we describe with them.210  And as you may recall, I am not enthusiastic about this idea; let us, 
																																																								
210 Neander (1980, 1983, 1991) gave an earlier, very similar, version of the theory of proper functions; however, because 
she focused only on biological functions, her theory is not quite as complete as Millikan’s.  Here is Neander’s formula 
for the proper functions of biological traits:  “It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that 
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however, set that criticism aside for the moment and look at the form of Millikan’s offering.  
“Proper biofunctions” or “direct proper functions”, Millikan says, get their status by being members 
of “reproductively established families”, which she explains are, more or less, the results of natural 
selection211.  She then introduces the notion of “derived proper functions”212 for items that, on their 
own, are not members of reproductively established families, but that nonetheless derive their 
functional status from being produced by an item that has a direct proper function, and having 
(ancestrally) contributed to the selection of the item that produced them. 
In Millikan’s own words: 
 
Putting things very roughly, for an item A to have a function F as a "proper 
function", it is necessary (and close to sufficient) that one of these two conditions 
should hold. (1) A originated as a “reproduction” (to give one example, as a copy, or 
a copy of a copy) of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of the 
properties reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and A exists because 
(causally historically because) of this or these performances. (2) A originated as the 
product of some prior device that, given its circumstances, had performance of F as 
a proper function and that, under those circumstances, normally causes F to be 
performed by means of producing an item like A. Items that fall under condition (2) 
have “derived proper functions”, functions derived from the functions of the devices 
that produce them. (Millikan 1989, p. 288) 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
which items of X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of 
which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection.” (Neander 1991) 
211 Actually, Millikan’s theory is a fair bit more nuanced. But for our purposes here, we needn’t focus on too many of the 
details. Her work was meant to support a more complicated analysis of biosemantics that goes well beyond the central 
topics of this thesis. 
212 As well as “relational proper functions” and “adapted proper functions”—two notions that address aspects of 
environmental relativity and plastic responsiveness in proper functions; but, once again, not all of Millikan’s details are 
relevant to our analysis. 
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For Millikan, then, an organism’s genes are copies of prior items, and so they have direct proper 
functions according to her condition (1), but the heart is a “product” of those genes, and so it has a 
derived proper function according to her condition (2).  An artifact, such as a cog or a stone 
paperweight, falls under condition (2), thereby allowing her theory to neatly account for all three of 
my base cases.  In fact, for Millikan, artifacts of all sorts have derived proper functions simply by 
being produced by members of reproductively established families, and she cleverly extends the 
notion also to behaviors performed by members of reproductively established families (see also 
Millikan 1999). 
This formulation differs from Wright’s in at least two interesting ways.  First, since Millikan 
requires functional items either to be members of reproductively established families or to be a 
special kind of product of those members, as outlined above, she cleanly avoids the 
counterexamples presented against Wright.  Boorse’s chlorine leak and Bedau’s stick in the stream, 
for instance, are neither.  Second, Millikan grants artifacts their functions not via a wholly distinct 
schema, but via a branch of the same schema that allows her to grant them to organisms and their 
parts: at the root of each there is membership in one or another reproductively established family.  
What is particularly interesting to me about Millikan’s construction is this relationship 
between direct and derived functioning. The notion that an item can somehow be derivatively 
functional is an important one, which accounts for the strange gap in animacy between the two 
major categories of functional items (living organisms and inanimate artifacts) but one that I don’t 








The more modern SE analysis has been subjected to its share of counterexamples also (some 
of which may also apply to Wright’s earlier version).  The three most commonly mentioned are 
those of clay crystals, the immune system, and various types of selfish DNA.  I’ll introduce each one 
here.  In the end, however, I find each of these examples to be largely inconclusive and thus not 
particularly damning for either Millikan or Wright. 
Clay is composed of countless tiny crystals (in a mineral class called phyllosilicates) and it has 
been discovered that these crystals may have random variations—imperfections in their crystalline 
structure—that are subject to heritability through the process by which crystals grow and cleave.  As 
it turns out, some of these imperfections are able to influence the likelihood of their own 
proliferation in a population of reproducing crystals (Cairns-Smith 1982, 1985; see also Bedau 1991; 
Dawkins 1986).  Because of these facts, clay crystals are subject to a standard form of natural 
selection: they have reproduction, heritable variation, and fitness.  Despite this, the intuition that 
most function theorists have is that the imperfections in these crystals have no purpose and no 
function (e.g. Bedau 1991; Boorse 2002; Lewens 2004; Melander 1997).  Thus the behavior of these 
imperfections is often cited as evidence that having a selected effect is not sufficient for, and 
possibly not at all constitutive of, having a function (although, of course, TDHF).   
I am not convinced. I think the SE analysis may be able to slip past this counterexample 
without sustaining significant damage.  I think the logic is sound, but what I question is the intuition 
that the variations in these crystals are necessarily functionless.  This intuition seems based firstly in 
the assumptions that such crystals appear neither to be alive nor to be the kind of thing that could 
be a beneficiary, and secondly, in an unwillingness to label as purposeful something that is 
explainable by physics alone.  Bedau (1991) for instance, states a claim of this sort explicitly, in favor 
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of his intuition that clay crystals do not have a function:  he claims that crystals are simply not 
animated, living beings; they cannot benefit from the service of functional activity.  I must admit 
that I have the very same gut instinct.  But in a world where everything is explainable by physics 
alone (albeit not always usefully or concisely) and yet where purposeful things also exist, there must 
be a boundary, somewhere, where purposive, minimally lifelike behavior begins to appear in 
phenomena still physically explainable—a boundary where both levels of explanation may be useful 
or applicable or, at the very least, comprehensible.  Seeming biological in some ways and yet not in 
others, these crystals lie close to that boundary and, it seems to me, we cannot know whether they 
are on the interesting, minimally purposeful side or the almost-but-not-quite purposeful side unless 
we have a productive and detailed theory of vitality or purposiveness or, for Bedau, of benefit or 
value.  At the moment, no theorist who has cited intuitions about clay crystal variations being 
functionless has given such a theory.  I’ll examine the same case again later, but for now we can say 
at a minimum that the heritable variations in clay crystals are not a clean and clear, central 
counterexample to the SE analysis213.  Millikan makes much the same judgment:  Of the claim that 
the SE theory would be forced to assign a function to these crystals, she says, “that is fine by me”, 
since it similarly allows the SE theory to assign functions to, for instance, “learned behaviors, 
artifacts, words, [and] customs.” (1993:39). 
The immune system (of humans and other vertebrates) is another type of system in which a 
form of natural selection takes place on a non-genetic entity, which has prompted some to argue 
that there is selection without function (Matthen and Levy 1984; Matthen 1997).  Antibodies, which 
are present in the body in vast variation, are selected by their ability to “match” with antigens, an 
event that determines their rate of reproduction, thus contributing to a system of heritable variation, 
reproduction, and fitness that results in differential reproduction within a population of 
																																																								
213 Two similar but less natural counterexamples are the example of ball bearing cloning offered by Schaffner (1993:383-
4) and the example of artificial selection by Naziesque mad scientists devised by Plantinga (1993:203). 
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antibodies214.  Matthen (1997) argues that isolating this system of antibodies and their selection 
process from a mammalian body—say, extracting the components of the immune system from the 
blood and marrow where they normally reside, and installing them in a jar or test tube—would not 
change the antibodies, nor the procedure of selection they might undergo, yet it would render them 
non-functional, because they would no longer serve a body immunologically.  As with clay crystals, 
the immune-system thought experiment is meant to dissociate having been selected for an effect 
from having a function.   
My concern with this proposed counterexample is similar to the one I expressed concerning 
Bedau’s intuition about the clay crystals, and similar also to the concern I hinted at with the 
examples of oncogenes and liver flukes in an earlier passage.215  It seems to me that underlying many 
intuitions about when a thing does or does not have a function there exists a prejudice about whole 
organisms being the only possible recipients of the functional service.  Matthen would not see 
antibodies in vitro as being functional because their behavior does not contribute to an organism.  
But it seems to me that we would need a theory of what types of patterns can be beneficiaries (or, at 
least, recipients of functional contributions) before we can make judgments of this kind.  There is a 
sense—even if a weak one—in which antibodies themselves are patterns that might be seen as 
beneficiaries that could be served by their own (possibly naturally selected) functioning.  It is the 
same sense in which oncogenes and liver flukes can also be beneficiaries served by their own 
functioning despite their injurious effects upon their hosts, and the same sense in which selfish 
DNA (a more convincing example, which we’ll look at shortly) can benefit from its own 
functioning.  Again, the central point here is that while Matthen’s example of the immune system 
																																																								
214 Since the variation seems to be prior to, rather than a result of, reproduction, this form of natural selection is not the 
paradigmatic form in which change accumulates over the course of many generations. But let’s leave that concern aside. 
215 I will leave aside the concern that the segregation of immune components from the rest of the body in Matthen’s 
proposed counterexample may be an impossible task. 
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certainly does raise some doubts, it doesn’t seem to be a clear, central counterexample against the SE 
theory.  
The example of the liver functioning to house flukes brings to light a fact of parasitism 
worth mentioning:  an item such as a liver may function both for an original owner and for a 
parasite although differently so. The beneficiary of an item’s functioning need not be the entity that we 
traditionally describe as the owner of an item.  A hermit crab benefits from the functioning of a 
gastropod’s shell, and every non-photosynthetic creature makes energetic functional use of another 
organism’s tissues or products.  Here’s a fascinating case:  the tongue-eating louse (Cymothoa exigua) 
is a parasitic crustacean that, true to its name, first devours a fish’s tongue before then latching on to 
the remaining stump and serving as a new permanent tongue for the remainder of the fish’s life (see 
Figure 5.1).  Brusca and Gilligan (1983), the biologists who first documented this creature, say it is 
“the first known case (in animals) of functional replacement of a host structure by a parasite.”  In 
this case, we have something further along the symbiosis continuum between parasitism and 
mutualism.  That is to say, after the tongue is removed, the fish and the parasite depend upon one 
another mutually, although had the parasite not destroyed the fish’s natural tongue the fish would 
never have needed the parasite.  (In this sense, the parasite is a bit like a glass-repair company that 
throws rocks through your windows with their business card attached.)  At any rate, in this case as 
well as in more mutualistic symbioses, there are items that simultaneously serve widely differing 
functions for different individuals—the louse’s body serves itself in many regards, and it serves the 
fish as a tongue.  Similarly, although liver flukes and oncogenes don’t serve their hosts, they still 
serve themselves in many ways.  And while clay crystals and the in vitro antibodies of the immune 
system don’t even have hosts to serve, they also may be seen as serving themselves.  In order to 
know for sure, we’ll need to have a theory of what counts as the kind of self that might be served. 
	 290	
 
Figure 5.1:  Cymothoa exigua, the tongue-eating louse (center, colored) serving as a tongue in the mouth 
of a fish. (Image credit: Matthew Gilligan, Savannah State University). 
 
Segments of DNA in an organism’s genome are referred to as “selfish” or even 
“ultraselfish” if the effects they have are, as far as we can tell, either invisible or even mildly 
damaging from the perspective of the organism, yet nonetheless advancing the cause of their own 
proliferation.  Mere hitchhikers that sit on the genome and are passively copied once per 
generation—sometimes called “junk” or noncoding DNA216—are usually not cited as being selfish, 
since they are transcriptionally innocuous and only mildly proliferative, but they do share a similarity 
with what is normally called selfish DNA in that they are nonfunctional for the organism that bears 
																																																								
216 However, this terminology is undergoing refinement as research progresses.  More and more examples of segments 
previously believed to be noncoding have been determined to be functional, even despite not coding for proteins.  At 
the very least, telomeres, centromeres, and segments that signal origins of replication all perform functions that help 
control the processing of genetic material within a cell.  Still, there are plenty of segments that either do not appear to 
ever be transcribed to RNA, or that are transcribed to RNA that then goes on (so far as we currently know) to do 
nothing. 
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them and they are propagated, at least, across generations.  Other more selfish segments have effects 
that further increase their own likelihood; transposons, for example, make multiple copies of 
themselves, even on the same strand—altering the genome typically with no beneficial effect for the 
organism’s phenotype (which, through interaction with the world, determines the reproductive 
fitness of that genome).  According to some calculations, through accumulation over the ages, 
transposons have come to make up as much as 50% of some organisms’ genomes while still having 
no recognized phenotypic effect (see, e.g., San Miguel et al. 1996).  
Segregation distorter genes make up a slightly different class of selfishly behaving DNA.  
These are genes that actively and preferentially distort the ratio of alleles present in a population of 
gametes containing themselves.  Here’s the high-level description:  When gametes (sperms or eggs) 
are created in an organism, the division process, called meiosis, normally results in four genetically 
distinct cells being produced from one of the organism’s genetically “standard”217 germ-line cells.  
One part of the meiosis process, called crossover, allows genes to be mixed and matched, 
introducing a fairly random element to the makeup of the four genetically distinct resultant gametes.  
Ideally, after this process has happened many, many times, the populations of resultant gametes that 
carry the various alleles that exist at any particular locus on the genome will be of roughly equivalent 
size.  If there were two possible alleles at a particular position, then, after meiosis, half the gametes 
typically would carry one of the alleles at that location, and half would carry the other.  Segregation 
distorter genes interfere with this ratio by “murdering” or otherwise disabling the gametes that have 
their competing allele, prior to the gamete-coupling process of sexual reproduction.  In one well-
studied version, these genes commit their attempted microscopic genocide by creating a kind of 
toxin to which they themselves have the antidote.  As many of the gametes with competing alleles 
																																																								
217 It is interesting to note that this view of “standard” is being challenged now, in the age of mass genomics, as there 
appears to be a considerable amount of genomic variation between the cells in the individual bodies of large multicellular 
organisms. 
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die off, the segregation distorter genes’ own numbers see a relative increase, which expresses itself as 
a higher likelihood that offspring of the organism will carry the segregation distorter genes, rather 
than the newly dispatched alternative allele.  In another version, the segregation distorters induce 
adverse mutations in the swimming apparatus of the sperms that carry their competitors, causing 
them simply to be less likely to reach an egg cell, with the same ultimate result (Burt and Trivers 
2006). 
As with the heritable variations in clay crystals and the selected antibodies of an in vitro 
immune system, these selfish-genetic phenomena are often cited as counterexamples to the SE 
analysis, since the case consists of selected effects that most authors seem unwilling to call functional 
(e.g. Manning 1997; Boorse 2002; Lewens 2004).  Manning says “This seems to be a paradigmatic 
case of selection; having the trait of being a segregation distorter increases the chances of a bit of 
genetic material’s being passed on through generations as compared with other genes without the 
trait . . . None the less, biologists do not typically regard [segregation distorters] as having the function 
of disrupting meiosis” (Manning 1997, as also cited in Lewens 2004).   
And again, as with the previous two examples, I don’t find the intuition (that Manning cites 
as coming from biologists) to be particularly persuasive.  The behaviors of segments of selfish DNA, 
such as transposons and segregation distorter genes, certainly are not functional for the organism 
that they reside in, but it doesn’t seem unreasonable to consider them functional for themselves. To 
take that perspective, though, one may need to give up one’s assumptions about what counts as a 
self.  A particular toxin that kills gametes might be functional for the segregation distorter gene, or a 
particular cancerous behavior in a cell may be functional for the oncogenes that cause it (or perhaps 
for the rogue cells that contain those mutant genes), in spite of their impact upon the larger 
organism that hosts these mechanisms, if those entities can benefit.  So the question is one of 
identity—functional for whom?—and that is a question that can only be answered with a theory of 
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identity and value.  Until we understand those topics, all three of these purported counterexamples 
against the SE analysis should be deemed inconclusive, as each is based upon their authors’ intuitive 
assumptions about the relation of functions to certain beneficiaries. 
 
Doubles and Initials 
 
I think there is a very good reason for the preceding difficulty in finding false-positive 
counterexamples to the SE analysis:  the things that have been selected by natural selection—
including entities that are standardly considered to be traits of organisms, as well as naturally-
selected phenomena that are not usually so considered—may in fact all be functional.  If they are, 
however, I don’t take it to be the case that they are functional because they were selected, but rather 
vice versa—I would say that they were selected because, among other things, they are functional.  
Their functioning played a role in their selection by helping themselves or their bearers (and thus, by 
proxy, themselves) succeed in their environment  (see also Bigelow and Pargetter 1987). 
Some things that are functional, however, are not the results of selection (that is, there are 
false negatives given by the SE analysis).  The main category of false negative counterexamples 
aimed at the SE analysis is what is commonly referred to in the functions literature as “doubles”—
organisms that appear magically and instantaneously rather than being produced by natural selection 
but that have the same structure as their natural counterparts (though any kind of a first occurrence 
of an animal or trait—call these “initials”—would also, in principle, fit the mold)218.  Boorse 
introduced the idea of a double with what has come to be referred to as “instant lions”. 
																																																								
218 These kinds of examples may seem to be only boundary cases, but they are not.  While it is difficult to draw out the 
meaningful differences in a process of gradual evolutionary change, some examples of single-mutation beneficial effects 
can occur.  For instance, a member of a lineage of domesticated capsicum might in one generation produce mutant 
seeds that grow into new plants with a different color of their fruit.  Farmers—and the markets that demand their 
products—may appreciate the new color, thus immediately kicking off a process of artificial selection for the new trait.  
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Suppose we discovered, for example, that at some point the lion species simply 
sprang into existence by an unparalleled saltation. One would not regard this 
discovery as invalidating all functional claims about lions; it would show that in at 
least one case an intricate functional organization was created by chance. (Boorse 
1976:74) 
 
In other words, if our intuition aligns with Boorse’s, the parts of instant lions and other “hopeful 
monsters” (Goldschmidt 1940; Gould 1982)219 are functional despite lacking an evolutionary history.  
Their legs are for running, their noses for smelling, and their teeth for gnawing; and that is what 
these parts are used for, just like those of ordinary lions.   
Millikan notes this challenge to her SE analysis and responds, as she admits “rather 
brazenly”, that “such cases are like the case of fool’s gold” (1989; see also Millikan 1996).  She 
considers instant lions to be things that, were they to exist, would convince us of their function-
bearing nature, yet that would not be functional in the slightest.220,221  There is no easy way to argue 
against an opinion like that, but she offers another argument: 
 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Exaptations make for another class of examples:  instead of a change in the organism, we might have a change in the 
environment.  A spandrel, a nonaptation (that is: a trait that has not been selected for), or a trait that had come to be 
vestigial could, with a relatively sudden change in environment, quite quickly come to serve an entirely new function 
(Gould and Lewontin 1979; Gould and Vrba 1982).  This is not uncommon and, in terms of their relationships with the 
new environment, such traits, when they first appear, should be considered “initials”. 
219 See also the literature on another kind of double, the so-called “Swampman” who is fortuitously generated (by, say, 
cosmic coincidence or lightning strike or radiation burst or whatever) as an identical model of an individual person (who 
might be disintegrated nearby at just the same instant).  The thought experiment has been used to argue that Swampman 
would lack intentionality—would have no historically grounded semantic connection to the world either through 
ontogenetic (personal) history (Davidson 1987) or phylogenetic (evolutionary) history (Millikan 1984; 1996); more or less 
the same argument applies equally to historical notions of function (Millikan 1984; 1996). 
220 In other words, she would have us take these apparent-functions to be illusions.  But she offers no perspective-
changing test by which we could recognize their illusory status.  
221 In a personal communication, Douglas Hofstadter has pointed out to me that this suggestion of Millkan’s sounds 
quite analogous to, and equally problematic as, Searle’s (1980) claim that if a machine or mechanism such as his famous 
“Chinese room” passed the Turing Test, it would still have no semantics and no understanding and no intentionality (see 
also Hofstadter 1980). 
	 295	
For example, your randomly created double exhibits no purposive behaviors and has 
no purposive parts because there is no way that any of his/her states or parts could 
be defective or might fail. That creature of accident, wonderful as he or she may be, 
falls under no norms (Millikan 1989). 
 
This strange argument sounds not only theoretically biased—that is, it appears to be based 
only upon the SE analysis’ claims about what constitutes norms (i.e., selection)—but it also appears 
to be false.  I imagine that, were an instant lion to appear and behave in all respects as a normal lion 
does, we could easily diagnose it with liver failure, arteriosclerosis, or ventricular fibrillation as it 
aged, based firstly upon comparative norms that we derive from its striking similarity to normal lions 
(and other homologous mammals; see Amundson and Lauder 1994) and, secondly, upon evaluative 
norms that we derive from the contribution of its liver and heart to its survival up until its declining 
health, and our expectation that a repaired liver, vasculature, or heart—or at least a functionally 
replaced one, in the case of an artificial transplant—would contribute similarly.  There are a number 
of clear norms available to work with; Millikan just chooses to ignore them when she claims the 
creature “falls under no norms” (see Neander, 1991, for a similar argument that also dismisses any 







222 “Some theories which imply that instant lions (and piggyback traits) would have proper functions do not capture the 
distinction between what an item does and what it is supposed to do, and so they do not describe a notion of a “proper 
function” that is capable of generating these biological categories which embrace both interspecies and pathological 




Imaginary doubles are sometimes considered unfair examples because they don’t naturally 
occur in our world.223  But if the comparative norms of historical performances do indeed bestow a 
function upon a current item, as Millikan claims, then another class of real counterexamples, based 
also upon norms of historical performance, may promote a more convincing concern. 
Tim Lewens describes sorting processes where “there is variation across a collection of items, 
[as well as] differential propensities among the items to survive some kind of test, but no 
reproduction” (2004).  This process, representing one version of what Godfrey Smith (2009) calls 
marginal natural-selection, is a close cousin of full-fledged natural selection but, in terms of 
comparison against the SE analysis, differs crucially in its lack of reproduction.  One example of 
Lewens’ sorting processes is the screening, done by drug research companies, of millions of 
randomly generated molecules, testing for some effect.  Another is granular convection—the 
process by which Brazil nuts, for instance, end up in the tops of containers of mixed nuts after 
undergoing the shaking that attends their packaging and lengthy shipment.  A third is the sorting of 
pebbles, by size, performed by the waves on a beachfront.  Lewens suggests that the “successful” 
items that emerge from such a sorting process can be said to have the function of causing that 
effect.  In other words, the feature of pebbles (being light in weight) that allows them to be pushed 
highest onto the beach seems to function in helping those lightweight pebbles get pushed highest up 
onto the beach.  Lewens says, “If selection can give genuine functions to eyes, then sorting 
processes can give genuine functions to stones on the beach” since “both processes support the 
																																																								
223 I happen to think that the notion of doubles makes a fair case.  If, one day, we are able to invent or discover new 
organisms by inserting whole-cloth, engineered strands of DNA into the nucleus of an egg cell from an actual organism, 
much like today’s cloning technologies, then we really will be faced with explaining the functions of traits that appeared 
by what Boorse called an “unparalleled saltation”.  Even randomly generated strands might work, if we try a vast number 
of variations in the hope that just one might be a viable, if strange, new organism. 
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three connotations widely thought to be the marks of genuine teleology . . . [they] explain the 
presence of the functionally characterized item, . . . express normative demands on the item, and . . . 
allow a distinction between function and ‘accidents’” (Lewens 2004; see also Dawkins 1983). 
The types of norms involved here are, to my eyes and Lewens’, very similar to the kind of 
comparative norms that Millikan cites in favor of the SE analysis.  That is, the norm is derived from 
having succeeded at something historically, allowing us to reason that the item may continue doing 
the same thing in the future. 
Using only norms of historical performance leaves us with two problems for the SE analysis, 
then.  First, it raises the problem of dealing with doubles—that is, historical norms do not count the 
traits of instant lions as being functional despite even Millikan’s intuitions that those traits would 
convincingly appear functional—and, second, it raises the difficult question of whether or not the 
survivors in Lewens’ sorting processes deserve to be granted SE functions the same way the 
survivors of selection processes supposedly do—that is, historical norms seem to count Brazil nuts 
as being functional for going to the tops of containers.  I will have more to say about the normative 
aspect of the SE analysis shortly, but first I have a further and perhaps more serious worry to 
express about the constitution of doubles and their initials. 
 
Shadows and Residues 
 
The SE analysis assumes that a function is a property of an item that has a certain historical 
story that can be told about it—not only must the item have been copied (Millikan 1984) but, in 
some versions (e.g., Millikan 1993) it must have been copied at the expense of something else not 
being copied.  The most troubling concern I have with this theory is that the reference to “history” 
amounts to extraphysical or metaphysical claims not too different in kind from old-fashioned, 
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enchanted vitalism or backwards causation (though, as we’ll see, in this case the problem is 
disconnected forwards causation).  An SE analyst who embraces the story that an item is granted some 
feature due to the selective history that produced it, and yet who refuses to accept that a double—a 
physically identical structure—has that same feature, is left to choose one of the following two 
unappealing metaphysical options.  
First, they could assume some extraphysical substance or process or structure—something 
beyond what is measurable by our physical instruments—some magical residue, not made of the 
kinds of particles or energy we know the world to be made of, that is somehow left behind in an 
item with a selective history, but no trace of which is to be found on a physically identical item that 
does not have a selective history.  For the sake of amusement, let’s call such a residue a “functino” 
and imagine it to be a particle that carries the property of functionality.  Option one is that the SE 
analyst needs to believe in functinos.224 
Second, if they refuse the idea of an identifiable residue, then they could assume that 
functions are a causally irrelevant property—an epiphenomenon in the strictest sense, not just a 
shadow but an invisible shadow.  On this option, the analyst would take the view that functional 
items and their doubles have a differing nature—that is, one has a function and the other does 
not—despite the fact that they are truly physically identical.  The problem with this is that since they 
are physically identical, their causal futures (ceteris paribus with respect to the environments they are 
embedded within) are likewise going to be identical.  The only way I see to reconcile identical causal 
behavior with “differing natures” (and without being contradictory with our modern understanding 
																																																								
224 To extend the absurdity, it is worth noting that if one did believe in functinos, one would also have to specify some 
further properties of their behavior.  In particular, one would have to clarify how these particles avoid being 
incorporated into the rocks and the clouds and so on, so that those objects don’t magically spring to life.  Is there a 
reservoir somewhere where the unused functinos reside?  One would also have to clarify the special process by which 
functinos are imparted (presumably from ourselves?) into our designed artifacts.  Would the very act of creating an 
artifact cause us to lose our own functinos, becoming ever more purposeless as we impart functions to these objects?  
Are assembly-line workers at the greatest risk of becoming hollow shells whose own parts eventually will stop 
functioning?  Of course this is all ridiculous.  There are no functinos, no purpose-bits in the world; purposiveness is a 
property not of particles but of relationships, of organization . . . 
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of causation in physics) would be to suggest that the difference is a non-causal one.  Option two is 
that the SE analyst needs to believe that “having a function” is irrelevant—it doesn’t do anything. 
The troubling aspect of this dilemma (and I presume that, if pressed, the modern SE analyst 
would, like most of us, reject both of its horns based on materialist assumptions) is just one more 
reason that I am unwilling to believe in “proper functions”.  If we give up the notion that a function 
is a property that somehow inheres in an item, if we recognize the illusion of function constancy, 
and if we instead see the functioning of an item in terms of some relationship in which the item is 
held, rather than in terms of a historical, non-physical, supposedly property-granting process, then 
the problem of choosing between functinos and causally irrelevant functions simply disappears.  
Along with it go the problems of initials and doubles and vestiges, and also the malfunction fallacy, 
which is the next topic we’re going to look at.   
 
The Malfunction Fallacy 
 
How could an item fail to function if it didn’t have a function?  That’s the major premise of 
the malfunction argument, a cornerstone defense of the SE analysis (Griffiths 1993; Millikan 1989, 
1993; Neander 1991, 1995).  The idea, of course, is that a malfunction is simply the failure to meet 
the normative standard set by an actual function.  A malfunctioning item just doesn’t quite operate 
as it “should” or as it is “supposed to”.  If you recall, Millikan employed a version of the 
malfunction argument to defend her stance on doubles, claiming that the parts of doubles are simply 
unable to be defective because there is no historical norm to compare them to and so, according to her, 
since they can’t malfunction, they cannot have functions.   
It is sometimes said that no other theory is able to account for malfunctions and that this is a 
strong reason to prefer the SE analysis.  Millikan puts it this way: a “fact about function categories is 
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that their members can always be defective—diseased, malformed, injured, broken, dysfunctional, 
etc.,—hence unable to perform the very functions by which they get their names.  [. . .]  The problem 
is, how did the atypical members of the category that cannot perform its defining function get into 
the same function category as the things that actually can perform the function?” (1989).  According 
to her, the answer to this question is that the defective items got into the category by having the 
same selective histories—by being members of the same “reproductively established family”—as the 
functioning items and so, despite the defective items’ current capacities or propensities (or lack 
thereof ), they have functions.225 
Now, I have claimed that even items that are functional don’t have proper functions—that 
the idea of a proper function is itself an illusion—and it follows from that claim that nonfunctional 
items certainly wouldn’t have them either.  In addition, in the previous subsection I cast doubt on 
the idea that historical performance can provide the norms underlying functioning.  But then, on 
such an account as I am giving, what sense can we make of Millikan’s intuition that items might fail 
to fulfill their functions?  How else might atypical, nonperforming members get into function 
categories?   
Well . . . by analogy.  A simple alternative (and one that Millikan acknowledges but 
discounts) is that dysfunctional items are described as such only because of their resemblance to items 
that we know to function in those ways.  If functioning items are taken to have functions because 
they commonly perform those functions (that is, via the illusion of function constancy), and if they 
really are grouped together into functional categories (such as the category of hearts) because of 
various likenesses—gross morphological likenesses as well as functional likenesses226—and not 
because of any shared type of history, then it is no great leap to group other non-functioning items 
																																																								
225 Neander (1991, 1995) and Griffiths (1993) make much the same point.  Neander says, “Items that are dysfunctional 
are dysfunctional precisely because of their incapacity to perform their proper function” (1991). 
226 See Amundson and Lauder (1994). 
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along with them, items that share many of the same gross morphological features and which, we can 
reason, would also share functional capacities if only some small distinguishing (function-breaking) 
feature hadn’t been so.  (Here, we might recall the non-functional designed items on page 245.)  
What I am suggesting is this:  Dysfunctional items are called “dysfunctional” only because (or only 
when) they remind us of functional items.  Neither group actually has a function; there is no norm, 
universal to both and historically established, that one group attains and that the other falls short of.  
Instead, one group—the functional items—by the very functioning of its members, provides a norm 
against which the (similar-looking) dysfunctional items are measured and found to be deficient.227  It 
is not that these dysfunctional items cannot perform a function that is properly “theirs”; it is only 
that they cannot perform a function that they look as if they ought to be able to—a function that we 
imagine them to have.  The groups are subject to being compared in the first place simply because 
of various resemblances. 
If this alternative were to be the case, then we would expect to see a spectrum in our 
function attributions that varies with level of resemblance:  at one end, the more a functionless 
target item looked like a functioning version of an item (e.g. an actual heart), the more likely we 
would be to consider it dysfunctional.  For instance, consider a heart that resembled other hearts in 
most respects including not only most details of its gross and fine morphology, but also its location 
in an organism and various types of connectivity with other organs.  But suppose this heart had a 
hole in its ventricular septum, and suppose we widened that hole to the point at which the heart 
could no longer produce enough of a pressure differential to pump blood.  At this point we would 
surely call this heart dysfunctional; it is a broken heart.  At the other end of the spectrum, the less an 
item resembled a functioning version, the more likely we would be to consider the new item to be a 
member of a different kind all together.  For instance, consider a calf, stillborn with a tumor 
																																																								
227 Aristotle, in his De Anima, put it this way:  “The eye is the matter of sight; if sight is lost, it is no longer an eye, except 
homonymously, in the way that a stone eye or painted eye is.” 
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composed of what appear to be liver cells that grew in the space where a heart should have been228. 
Despite the mild similarity of its location in the calf, and despite the fact that it may have arisen from 
a stem cell that was originally produced on a path towards creating a heart, we would undoubtedly 
consider this item a tumor or a developmental oddity and not any kind of a heart229.  Between these 
extremes we might find another stillborn calf with a solid, chamberless lump of striated cardiac 
muscle that has nothing like the form necessary to pressurize blood flow into the vasculature of a 
body.230  This third item seems more like a heart than the liver-cell tumor, but more unlike a heart 
than the one with the perforated septum; we might find ourselves torn between calling it a 
dysfunctional heart and calling it a non-heart231.   
The question for the SE analysis is this: just where, in the developmental process from 
gamete to embryo to fetus to calf, might an alteration—a mutation, a developmental defect—be 
considered extreme enough for us to say that an item is a non-heart; and where might we consider it 
still merely to be a dysfunctional heart?  Just how much similarity is required to consider an item to 
be a member of a reproductively established family, and what level of differentiation is required for 
an item to no longer be?  The SE analysis has no way to give clear answers to these questions, for 
selective history has no bearing on developmental changes.  While Millikan claims the SE analysis to 
be the best (or only) account of how to differentiate malfunctions from functions, firstly, this is false 
since other norms are indeed available and, secondly the SE analysis fails to differentiate 
malfunctions from some non-functions.  
																																																								
228 This may be a developmental impossibility, since a calf fetus without the rudiments of a heart would likely be unable 
to produce much of any type of tissue, but the imagined scenario is instructive nonetheless. 
229 To exaggerate the case, we can imagine a stillborn calf fetus so badly formed that the entire thing is entirely 
unrecognizable; the SE theory seems to suggest, oddly, that some blob of cells in the mass of undifferentiated flesh still 
“has the function” of pumping blood simply because it has a historical relationship to its parents’ hearts. 
230 These examples are fantastical, since a beating heart is a practical and functional requirement for keeping a fetus 
developing in the womb.  However they are easily understood and, while changing the example to a wing or an eye 
would work as well, it wouldn’t fit with the theme of hearts. 
231 McLaughlin notes that if a spontaneous Porsche (a double) occurs with a broken axle, “we would be hard pressed to 
say whether it is a malfunctioning car or just not a car at all” (2001:49).   I can see how the case may not convince 
everyone; but variations of it may indeed be more convincing. 
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This is one way in which we run into trouble determining membership in a reproductively 




As the SE analysis has developed over the years, one of the central debates among its 
proponents has been about just how much natural selection is required for a function to be granted.  
We already indirectly faced this question when talking about doubles earlier:  when exactly do SE 
analysts grant a function to the traits of a newly created instant lion lineage?  As we’ve been told, it is 
certainly not immediately . . . but is it enough to say they have functions by the time the lion has 
created its own cubs?  Or do the original instant lion’s traits never have functions, but perhaps its 
cubs’ or its grandcubs’ traits do?   
The reason nobody knows how to answer these questions is that “amount of selection” is a 
graded phenomenon, while the possession of a “proper function” is taken to be black-and-white. 
Suggestions for where to make the distinction have included the entire history of the trait, only the 
most recent history of the trait (Godfrey-Smith 1994; Millikan 1989b), or a combination of distant 
history along with present-day “continuing usefulness” of the trait (e.g. Schwartz 2002)232.  Not only 
do these proposed answers disagree with one another, but each one itself also fails to draw a fine 
line, and so having a function, on any such account, is still either a matter of degree, or of some kind 
of unspecified subjective determination (either of which countermands the SE analyst’s black-and-
white notion of having a proper function).    
																																																								
232 An alternative way to draw the line says that a history of selection, while it must have occurred to create a trait, does 
not confer a function; instead the trait’s function owes its status to the trait’s being currently causally disposed toward 
being replicated (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987; Griffiths 2009).  This view is called the dispositional theory, and I will 
address it in detail in the next section. 
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A similar issue of indeterminacy has been critically raised by Allen (2002), who asks us to 
consider the existence of functions to be as blurry as the underlying concept of traits itself (see also 
Gould and Lewontin 1979; Hardcastle 2002; Kauffman 1971).   
For one thing, traits are hard to bracket into a well-defined category across time. A heart and 
its ancestors are never entirely identical—near relatives, only a generation or two apart, may be 
relatively similar, but such is the nature of gradual change; ancestors and descendants separated by 
many more generations may differ more substantially, and at some point the differences will be so 
large that we would no longer consider those individuals at one end of the family tree to be “the 
same” as those at the other end.  It is thus unclear what criteria Millikan and other SE theorists 
might have us use to define a “reproductively established family”.  Are the sometimes widely 
differing traits of a ring species233 all “in the same family”? By what measure? If we were to use the 
members’ function itself to establish traits (and thus the family), then the definition of function in 
terms of a reproductively established family would become circular.    
For another thing, individual traits are hard to pin down even within a generation or an 
instant.  As was discussed earlier (p. 277), it doesn’t seem possible to find distinct joints along which 
to definitively carve an individual heart from its body.  Prior (1985) points this out also, saying 
“Organisms do not come to us divided into parts and with labels on those parts. We (or more strictly 
anatomists and physiologists) analyse them into those parts and attach appropriate labels.” Function 
plays a major role (perhaps second only to morphology) in that reasoning.      
																																																								
233 A ring species is one that has a geographical range that circles or nearly circles the globe, yet in which there is 
variation all along that range such that each set of neighbors may interbreed but those at farther, possibly overlapping, 
ends from one another cannot. 
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Allen suggests that if we can offer no clear answer as to what a trait is or as to what 
constitutes being a member of a reproductively established family, then SE functions, conceived of 
as properties of traits that are features of those families, must inherit this imprecision.234  
 
The Chicken and the Egg 
 
Many authors have pointed out a paradoxical-seeming circularity in the application of the SE 
analysis.  The point is a worthwhile one, but one that needn’t be made anew by me, so I will simply 
borrow from other writers here.  Griffiths makes the case best and I find it worth quoting him at 
length235. 
 
Millikan has correctly pointed out that in order to study the biological functioning of 
an organism, biologists must identify where one organism ends and another begins, 
must distinguish the functioning of that organism from irrelevant causal processes in 
which the organism is caught up, and must identify and exclude pathological features 
of the organism. She suggests that biologists determine whether something is part of 
an organism’s biological functioning, and thus solve these problems, by determining 
that it has a selected function (or has been exapted to support a selected function). 
But this suggestion generates a paradox, because the first step in determining 
whether something has a selected function is to analyse the contribution it made to 
biological functioning in the past. To show that oddly-shaped sperm have the 
selected function of interfering with the sperm of rival males, it is necessary to show 
																																																								
234 However, this problem can be elided if things simply don’t have functions. 
235 It is worth pointing out here that this Griffiths (2009) who is arguing against the selected effects theory is the same 
Griffiths who sixteen years earlier (1993) had offered a selected effects theory.  Something must have changed his mind 
in the meantime. 
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that these sperm increased the fitness of ancestral males that produced them by 
interfering with the sperm of rival males. But either we can establish this without 
knowing the selected function of the sperm of those ancestral males, in which case 
we could do the same for living males, or we have to know their selected function in 
those ancestors, which means looking at still earlier ancestors to discover this and so 
on ad infinitum. (Griffiths 2009, p. 18) 
 
The regressive inquiry that Griffiths is concerned with is problematic not only because of its 
regressive nature236, but also because biological creatures undergo constant gradual change, and so it 
wouldn’t take too many layers of chasing reasons back in time before one found oneself simply 
looking at a different organism than where one started, and thus one would simply be unable to 
answer questions about the original organism of inquiry.   
A focus upon the role of natural selection in one or another analysis of functions is to be 
expected.  There is a clear and strong correlation between things in the biological world that have 
functions and things that have been naturally selected.  And it is convincing to think that the bulk of, 
if not all of, the purposeful items in the world are the results of natural selection.  But this is only to 
say that natural selection makes teleological things, not that it makes things teleological.  
It is clear to anyone familiar with evolutionary theory that the reason a biological item is 
there—why it exists—has to do, in part, with the fact that its ancestral versions functioned properly.  
As Griffiths points out, this is because function logically precedes selection—an item can be selected 
																																																								
236 Prior (1985:321) makes a similar point: Evolutionary biologists depend upon the delineation of traits performed by 
anatomists and physiologists in order to explain relative fitness (see also Allen 2002; Amundson and Lauder 1994).  In 
Griffiths’ terms, she is pointing out that we needn’t follow the evolutionary regression ad infinitum; we can establish 
functioning from present facts. 
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for only if it functions (see also Amundson and Lauder 1994; Bigelow and Pargetter 1987; Cummins 
2002; Davies 2001237).  Later, Griffiths summarizes.  
 
“If biologists needed to know why something evolved before they could describe its 
form and function then they could never get off the ground.” (ibid, p. 26) 
 
Now, we must admit it is not entirely circular to say both that:  
 
C1) An item’s functions are the effects for which it has been selected, and  
 
C2) Selection for an item occurs because of the effects of its functions.   
 
Eggs beget chickens, which then beget eggs . . . But a cyclical analysis of this sort must ground out 
somewhere.  There must be a base case.  Which came first? 
 
Functioning is Normative 
 
The SE and CR analyses take diametrically opposite positions with regard to the normativity 
of functions.  While the CR analysis imagines function to be a completely non-normative notion, 
and its proponents commonly ridicule the idea that nature could be in any way normative or 
subjective, the SE analysis prides itself on its claim that it gives the only possible analysis that can 
account for normativity in nature.   
																																																								
237 “We cannot discover the selected function of any trait without first knowing its systemic function.  If we do not 
know the systemic function of a trait, we have no guide with which to seek historical evidence for the claim that this trait 
was selected for the specified functional task.” (Davies 2001, p. 55) 
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It should be no surprise that I side more with the SE viewpoint in this matter, since I’ve 
already argued that the CR analysis is a closet-teleological view that superficially appears value-free in 
its generic form, yet that surreptitiously smuggles in value-laden teleological terms during individual 
analyses.  However, as it turns out, I agree with the SE analysis in spirit only.  I appreciate the fact 
that it attempts to admit normativity, but it picks out what I think are entirely the wrong norms.  In 
particular, the SE analysis puts function in terms of a comparative, not an evaluative norm; I find it 
to be inappropriately normative.  History can play no role in function without inviting implausible 
metaphysical oddities, such as residual functinos or epiphenomenal functions. 
Now, SE analysts seem satisfied with their comparative norms.  Millikan (2002) points out 
that her term “proper function” was never meant to be an evaluative term.  And, as was discussed 
above, it is comparative norms that buoy her view of malfunction, which she defines as not 
functioning as history would dictate. The way I see it, though, using comparative, historical norms 
leads us into a number of problems.  First, they conscript the results of Lewens’ sorting processes 
into the ranks of function-bearing items while excluding instant lions.  Second, they provide us with 
a way to make sense of the distinction between functions and malfunctions, but only at the cost of 
not being able to distinguish between malfunctions and certain non-functions—a difficulty that also 
highlights the failure of the SE analysis to provide a non-problematic way to define its own central 
term, “reproductively established family”.  Third, and most importantly, they present us with the 
dilemma of either accepting the existence of causally relevant non-physical residues created by a 
history of selection or accepting the idea that functions might themselves be causally irrelevant.   
All in all, I may sound negative about the SE analysis, and in particular about its normative 
claims, but I nonetheless find several insights from the SE analysis to be worth retaining.  First, it is 
difficult to find convincing counterexamples:  things that have been naturally selected do seem to be 
correlated with things that are functional, and if we are to offer a view that natural selection is not 
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the cause of that functionality, then this correlation is a fact that deserves some other careful 
explanation.  Second, as I’ve emphasized, I agree with the centrally normative aspect of the SE 
analysis; I only disagree on the particular source of normativity invoked by it.  Third, I think 
Wright’s basic insight—that functioning occurs in items that, in some way, cause themselves—is 
crucial, though the devil is in the details, and we’ll have to explore those details in later chapters.  
Lastly, I find Millikan’s distinction between direct and derived function(ing) to have some 
resemblance to the view I will advocate.  The relation she describes—in which a derived functional 
item is produced by a direct member of a reproductively established family—is not quite the way I’d 




C. Replication Dispositions 
 
The relevant properties are seen either as those which contribute to an organism’s current needs, purposes and goals . . . 
or those which have evolutionary significance to the organism’s survival and reproduction. 
  
          —Ron Amundson and George Lauder (1994) 
 
[The] decoupling of function from the processes responsible for its origination means that the specific mechanisms 
involved don't matter.  Only the consequence matters, irrespective of how it was achieved . . . [This decoupling] helped 
[Darwin] to recognize that variations of structure and function that arise by accident can nevertheless be functional. 
 
          —Terrence Deacon (2013, p. 423) 
 
The last of our three popular theories is the Replication Dispositions (RD) theory of 
function (also sometimes called the Propensity theory).  The RD analysis is similar to the SE analysis 
in that both consider the capacities of traits that aid in the survival and reproduction of the trait-
bearer to be the functions of those traits, but the two views differ in that the SE analysis confers 
functions upon traits whose ancestral versions had effectively contributed to their own modern 
existence, while the RD analysis confers functions upon traits, now, that will effectively contribute 
to the creation of their own successors.  So for RD theorists, a function is a disposition to contribute to 
replication.  The most commonly cited proponents of this view put it this way.   
 
The [SE] theory describes a character now as serving a function, when it did confer 
propensities that improved the chances of survival. We suggest that it is appropriate, 
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in such a case, to say that the character has been serving that function all along. Even 
before it had contributed (in an appropriate way) to survival, it had conferred a 
survival-enhancing propensity on the creature. And to confer such a propensity, we 
suggest, is what constitutes a function.  Something has a (biological) function just 
when it confers a survival-enhancing propensity on a creature that possesses it. 
(Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, emphasis added) 
 
The RD analysis claims that the function of the heart is pumping blood because pumping 
blood is what the heart does now that will help ensure that the organism whose heart it is will be 
able to reproduce and create another organism (with a similar heart).  It also differs from the SE 
analysis, because it is taken to be a token-, rather than a type-, theory—that is, it makes claims about 
this heart, rather than the heart as a category, a fact that allows the RD analysis to refrain from granting 
functional status to individual malformed hearts that do not confer a survival-enhancing or 
reproductive propensity (despite their possibly being members of a reproductively established 
family).  The RD analysis simply does not fall for the malfunction fallacy.  Another consequence of 
the forward-looking nature of the RD analysis is that it deviates from the SE analysis in cases of 
initials and doubles, such as Boorse’s instant lions.  In these cases, the RD analysis claims that the 
hearts and other parts of these animals do function, as long as the animals are reproductively viable. 
Applied to our other two base cases, the RD analysis claims that the cog and the stone 
paperweight, and in fact most artifacts, have no functions.  Cogs, and the machines they are part of, 
typically have no dispositions toward being replicated.  Similarly, a stone paperweight leads a lonely 
existence and is unlikely to produce progeny of any kind.  While copying from a blueprint or a 
prototype does play a role in generating some mass-produced artifacts, it seems that this type of 
procedure should not count as replication (in the RD sense) since the functional items in question, 
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while they are products of such copying, are not themselves likely to serve as prototypes for further 
copying.  That is, they themselves are not being replicated; they are just siblings—the results of 
replication of a single prototype parent.  Some artifacts do go through a process of technological 
evolution in which later versions are copies based upon, but possibly improved from, earlier 
versions (Darden and Cain 1989; Griffiths, 1993).  However, for one thing, this is not necessary 
(many artifacts don’t play such a role, such as our stone paperweight or Cummins’ (2002) Rube 
Goldberg-style gate-opening device238—they are limited-edition designs that serve possibly unique 
functions).  For another thing, the copies that do come about are generally functional whether or 
not they have any tendency to be further copied.239 
 
A Historical Note on Variants 
 
A few variants of the RD view exist, but they differ from one another only marginally.  
Central offerings include Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) and Griffiths (2009)240 but the survival-and-
reproduction theory of function (call it “SR”) is a close relative, too.  Canfield (1964) and Ruse 
(1971) each offered an SR theory in which a biological trait has a function when it is an adaptation 
that contributes to the reproductive fitness of its bearer.  Here, for example, is Canfield’s version.   
																																																								
238 Cummins (2002) describes a device he has constructed on his farm, from a wind-up alarm clock, a piece of string, and 
a latch which, all together, serve to open the gate in a field at a particular time.  While our world has many, many more 
mass-produced devices, one-off designs such as this are not uncommon either. 
239 Though the bulk of their paper is about biological functions, Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) claim to have accounted 
for artifacts as well.  However, I am sorely unconvinced by the paragraph in which they do so:  They alter their view, 
momentarily, repositioning the theory in terms of a “propensity for selection”, instead of a propensity for survival (as 
they write throughout the rest of the paper) and then suggest that, in the case of artifacts, selection occurs at the 
moment an item is made from a blueprint or prototype, not later.  This claim departs widely from their account of 
biological functions though since, items made from blueprints or prototypes usually do not have a propensity for 
survival or replication at all.  And, as noted in the main text above, some one-off artifacts are neither made from a 
prototype or blueprint nor serve as one.  Additionally, Bigelow and Pargetter don’t seem committed to this altered 
notion, since, as soon as they conclude that paragraph, they cease to ever make mention of a “propensity for selection” 
or even just selection; they revert immediately to discussion of propensities for survival.  Because of the discrepancy 
between their biological theory and their artifact theory, I will treat their extensively laid out biological theory as 
authoritative of their view and largely ignore the artifact paragraph. 
240 See also Mills and Beatty (1979) for a “propensity account” of fitness that underlies these kinds of considerations. 
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A function of I (in S ) is to do C means I does C; and if, ceteris paribus, C were not done 
in an S, then the probability of that S surviving or having descendants would be 
smaller than the probability of an S in which C is done surviving or having 
descendants. (Canfield 1964, p. 292) 
 
Griffiths makes a similar SR-like claim when he works to differentiate his RD view from SE 
analyses241. 
 
Rather than focusing on causal capacities that featured in past episodes of selection, 
we should focus on causal capacities that contribute to survival and reproduction 
(survival value). (Griffiths 2009, p. 24) 
 
While, give or take a detail or two, the SR analysis in some ways approximates the Goal 
Contribution account and the Valuable Effects account that we’ll see shortly—and, in some other 
ways, it appears very similar to Wright’s formula—I nonetheless see it as most closely related to 
Bigelow and Pargetter’s RD analysis, since both are strictly biological theories related to replication 
and, in each, it is the contribution towards creating future progeny, determined by present causal 







241 To clarify:  Griffiths (1993) offered an SE view of function, closely aligned with Millikan’s, but did an about-face with 




As with the previous two theories, an analysis of some counterexamples can help to shed 
light on the rough patches. The central class of counterexamples that bears meaningfully on the RD 
(and SR) analysis is those situations that involve sterility.   
We would like to say that the heart of a mule has the function of pumping blood, even 
though such hearts can have no disposition to replicate.  The example affects not only categorically 
sterile animals, such as mules, but also creatures with acquired sterility that once had the disposition 
to replicate but then lost it.242  In these cases, our intuition (that, for instance, such an organism’s 
heart is still functional) aligns with Cummins’ CR analysis (since the heart plays a causal role in the 
mule’s circulatory system) and with the SE analysis (since we might take the heart to be a member or 
a product of a member of a reproductively established family243) but it clashes with the results of an 




One attempt to account for sterile creatures, without resorting to an SE or a CR analysis, 
would be to amend the RD analysis and put it in terms only of survival, without reproduction.  That 
is, we could take Bigelow and Pargetter’s phrase more literally than they intended it and say that an 
item “has a (biological) function just when it confers a survival-enhancing propensity on a creature that 
																																																								
242 Hardcastle (2002) also gives the example of the eyes (or any traits) of a sterile worker bee that will never reproduce.  
This example, however, suffers from a prejudice of drawing organismal boundaries at physical boundaries.  Social insects 
whose reproductive delegates constitute a minority of the population are better seen as distributed organisms—a single 
animal with many partial bodies—rather than as sterile individuals (see also Dawkins 1982; Wilson 1971, 2009). 
243 There is room for interpretation here, since having both a horse heart and a donkey heart as ancestors doesn’t 
necessarily make a mule heart a “copy” as it will likely differ from both its parents in some ways; but a less extreme 
version of this same concern affects the SE theory more generally since any sexually reproduced organism’s organs will 
differ somewhat from its parents’. 
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possesses it” (1987, emphasis added)244.  A number of authors in recent years have made just such a 
case, suggesting that a function is whatever contributes to “self-reproduction”—the ability of an 
organism (or a trait of one) to protect, preserve, repair, and rebuild the organism over its lifetime 
(see Christensen 1996; Christensen and Bickhard 2002; DeLancey 2006; McLaughlin 2001245; and 
Schlosser 1998).  The ability to self-reproduce—also referred to by Maturana and Varela (1973) as 
autopoiesis, a notion I’ll review in more detail in Part II—shares the intuitively purposeful-seeming, 
active, vitalistic nature that we see also in reproduction.  On its own, though, a self-reproduction 
view is not clearly superior to the original RD analysis.  It suffers from the same inability to classify 
artifact functions (aside from the occasional robot that plugs itself in to recharge its batteries, no 
contemporary artifact self-reproduces in any way) and it has its own counterexamples to contend 
with as well.  For instance, most viruses are not self-rebuilding in the same way that cellular life is, 
yet they are replicators, and it would be strange not to consider their parts and the mechanics of 
their behaviors to be functional towards their reproductive ends.246  Griffiths describes a couple 
more centrally biological cases.   
 
For example, the genetic and developmental mechanisms that underpin the failure of 
the mouthparts of mayflies to develop fully after metamorphosis to the adult 
reproductive stage make no sense when analysed for their contribution to the 
individual’s ability to maintain its form (‘self reproduction’). They make perfect sense 
																																																								
244 Doing so would not work for Bigelow and Pargetter themselves if we were to take their artifact-directed revision 
seriously, since that revision requires a propensity for selection, which itself would require reproduction.  They have a 
choice, I suppose:  either keep the artifact-revision and retain difficulties explaining sterile animals, or abandon artifacts 
and possibly follow McLaughlin to explain functions in sterile animals. 
245 Interestingly, McLaughlin sees more of an affinity between his view and the SE analysis than between his and the RD 
analysis (he sees self-reproduction as simply replacing reproduction, leaving the basic form of Wright’s or Millikan’s 
schema otherwise little changed).  On the other hand, because of his claims that self-reproduction is the basis of an 
intrinsic good (or value), I prefer to classify and further discuss his view under the Valuable Effects analysis that comes 
later in this chapter. 
246 We will review the status of viruses and their behaviors again later. 
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as a contribution to reproduction.  In several small Australian Dasyurid species such 
as Antechnius Stuartii a frenzied mating season is followed by a short period during 
which the male’s sexual organs regress and their immune system collapses. Then all 
the males in the population die. The mechanisms that underpin this ‘big bang mating’ 
behavior (Diamond, 1982) obviously do not contribute to the capacity of individual 
males to maintain their form. But they do contribute to the life-history strategy by 
which these males maximize their contributions to future generations. (Griffiths 
2009, p. 21) 
 
And Peter McLaughlin points out another example. 
 
Parthenogenetically reproducing cecidomyian gall midges don’t hatch their eggs 
outside their bodies but rather inside and are then devoured from within by their 
own growing daughters.  But such lethal traits are said to have a biological function. 
(McLaughlin 2001, p. 79) 
 
As these examples show, some functional behaviors in biology are detrimental to autopoietic self-
reproduction yet beneficial to reproduction.   
Despite counterexamples of this sort, I agree with the self-reproduction authors that their 
concept is in fact intuitively related to being functional.  While neither the standard RD analysis nor 
the autopoietic RD analysis, on their own, seem to describe the full set of function attributions for 
which I am pursuing an explanation, together they suggest a notion that might help us get closer: 
survival or reproduction.  I’ll flesh out a version of this notion later, somewhat following Schlosser 
(1998), Christensen and Bickhard (2002), and DeLancey (2006).  
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On the Irrelevance of Natural Selection 
 
I am not convinced, as Griffiths is, that only an evolutionary forward-looking account can 
explain function because “biological functioning must be understood in terms of reproduction, not 
only self-reproduction” (2009).  I agree that biological functioning must (in some way) be 
understood in terms of reproduction, but, firstly, not necessarily over and above self-reproduction 
and, secondly, not under the conflated view that reproduction is, by default, evolutionary.  It seems 
to me that evolution—conceived of as a set of changes in species due to differential reproduction in a 
population with heritable variation—is in fact irrelevant to functioning because functioning (or even 
“having a function”) occurs in the present (see also Cummins 1975:745).  The claims in Griffiths’ 
paper seem to equate evolution directly with reproduction alone (despite the fact that Griffiths is 
well aware of what paradigmatic evolution by natural selection consists in247). 
Of course if a function were a disposition for an item to survive and reproduce, as has been 
clearly stated by Griffiths as well as Canfield, Bigelow and Pargetter, and Ruse, then neither would 
the item need to succeed at replicating nor would it need to succeed at the expense of any 
competitors, nor would it need to change or have changed in any way, in an evolutionary sense.  All 
it would need to do is be disposed toward not falling apart before it had a chance to at least set off a 
chain of events that will construct a copy of itself.  Variation and heritability might stay entirely out 
of the picture, as would competitors.  As I argued against the SE analysis, what possible physical, 
causal role could a competitor (past or present) play in the nature of an item?  They might play a 
role in eliminating—outcompeting—an item, but they don’t cause a successful item either to exist or 
to have the functional capacities it has.  
																																																								
247 Perhaps this was a tactical error on Griffiths’ part, instead of a logical or lethargic error, in that he may have been 
aiming his criticisms only at McLaughlin-style analyses.  But it is difficult to read him that way, since the claim he makes 
is that his target is all “non-evolutionary accounts of biological functioning”. 
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The survival and reproduction of individuals is certainly one prerequisite for evolution by 
natural selection.  However, in the absence of other features, reproduction alone doesn’t produce 
change or adaptation and doesn’t engender either selection or evolution.  Both can also logically 
exist without natural selection (Godfrey Smith 2009).  At its core, the RD analysis—based only in 
replication—can be agnostic of change. 
 
Replication and Self-Replication are Normative 
 
When Canfield developed his SR view, described a few pages earlier, he first put it in terms 
of “usefulness” and then attempted to translate his way out of that commitment in order to dispense 
with what he saw as an unsustainably normative notion.  He wanted a non-normative and thus non-
teleological version of the same characterization—a characterization of the processes or mechanics 
underlying situations that we deem functional in which those processes could be seen as not being 
for anything.248  According to Canfield, the translation of “usefulness” into the terms “survival and 
reproduction” successfully accomplished that job.  I think his translation served only to obscure, not 
eradicate, the teleological norms implicit in his characterization249.  
Like Canfield, other RD theorists also appear to think that the use of such terms allows 
them to ground their theories in mechanical processes that are normatively innocuous (meaning, as 
per the discussion in Chapter I, that the concepts may be normative but—so the story goes—only in 
a comparative, not in an evaluative sense).  The use of these concepts (replication, self-replication) is 
																																																								
248 For the interested reader, here is Canfield’s preliminary version, with an example:   “A function of I (in S) is to do C 
means I does C and that C is done is useful to S.  For example, (in vertebrates), a function of the liver is to secrete bile, 
and that bile is secreted in vertebrates is useful to them”. (Canfield 1964, p. 290) 
249 This issue of translatability is taken up again in Chapter VII, following Beckner (1969) who argues, “teleological 
statements are not translatable into non-teleological ones.” 
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precisely where I think the RD view implicitly imports an evaluative type of normativity into its 
analysis, while successfully hiding it behind the veneer of another, merely comparative normativity. 
That is to say, terms such as “reproduction” or “self-reproduction” are easily conceived of as 
bringing with them comparative norms (as we saw with the SE analysis).  There is an obvious sense 
in which reproduction and self-reproduction can succeed or fail in the same way as, say, a moon can 
succeed or fail at orbiting a planet; these processes can be compared to other instances (either 
historical or parallel) and either they just happen or they don’t.  If viewed externally by an analyst 
who is biased by the belief that value is not an inherent part of our universe, then nothing much 
appears to ride on the success or failure of that mechanistic operation.  Any normativity that might 
be observed can be passed off as having arisen from the observer’s comparative norm derived from 
other observations. 
Attending only to that comparative pattern can, however, camouflage an underlying 
simultaneous evaluative normativity—that is, the fact that success or failure of reproduction or self-
reproduction is, in actual fact, very important to the agent or entity that strives to reproduce or self-
reproduce.  There is an important sense in which success or failure is very much either good or bad 
for that entity.  At the moment, this may seem to be an arguable intuition; however, one of the 
keystones of the theory advocated in Part II will be a foundation for this type of evaluative 
normativity.   
 
Functioning Contributes to Dispositions to (Self-) Replicate 
 
Of the three popular theories, the RD analysis is closest in form to the view I will take.  I 
agree very much with the forward-looking perspective it takes, including the fact that it nicely 
captures our intuition that, as Bigelow and Pargetter put it, a thing has been serving that function all 
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along, and I find value in the observation that both reproduction and self-reproduction are 
behaviors that appear vitalistic.   
The concerns that I raised were, for one thing, that the RD analysis is incomplete in that it 
borrows an evaluative notion without being explanatory of that notion and, for another thing, that 
individual versions of it (either reproduction versions or self-reproduction versions) have trouble 
making sense of the various counterexamples, such as the functions of artifact parts and sterile 
animals’ organs or those of traits that are antithetical to self-reproduction.  Millikan’s insight—that 
an item may not cause its own direct copying, but might instead cause the copying of the thing that 
produced it—can offer help here.  We might improve upon the RD analysis by suggesting that an 
item is functional whenever it is disposed to contribute to autopoietic maintenance of an item or to 
either replication of itself or replication of something else—loosely, its “user”, in the case of artifacts, 
or its “owner”, in the case of traits.  If the stone paperweight or the machine that contains the cog 
contributes in some way to its user’s disposition to replicate, then they fall under this extended type 
of RD analysis, while the machine or stone is no longer required to be a replicator itself.  The 
amended analysis might seem like a two-part (disjunctive) theory, but I think a certain form of it can 





Philosophical discussions of function have tended to pit different analyses and different intuitions against one another 
without noting the pluralism inherent in biological practice. 
 
—Philip Kitcher (1993) 
 
Hybrid theories of function that are based in some of the popular theories can be classified 
into three subtypes.  Here, I will follow Davies (2001), who calls these three types of theories 
unification, pluralism, and instantiation.  While none of these hybrid schemes fares any better than their 
individual components do, it is important to discuss them because defending one or another of 
them—most often the pluralist version—is the customary approach taken by most philosophers of 
biology these days.  Generally, these philosophers find themselves persuaded that the SE theory 
accounts best for biological function, but they are also willing to allow that it doesn’t account as 
clearly for artifacts, or for all the ways we look at biological functioning (see, e.g., Amundson and 
Lauder 1994). In order to patch up this perceived gap, they adopt an additional provision that the 
remainder of our functional endorsements might, in one way or another, be attributable to 
perception of a structure such as Cummins’ CR functions. 
In what comes below I will describe the hybrid analyses, but I will mostly ignore 
counterexamples and specific criticisms which I find unnecessary, because these analyses are all 
plagued by the more general concern that the constituents from which they are constructed—the 






Unification (or synthesis) is the idea that a suitably generic concept could subsume both the 
CR and SE analyses.  If each were a subclass of a single superstructure of some sort, then perhaps 
that superstructure alone could account for function, while the particulars that differentiate the two 
subclasses could account for some of the nuanced differences in kinds of functions.  Kitcher (1993), 
for instance, takes generalized design, which he portrays as incorporating both human and natural 
design, to be the central idea underpinning a generic concept of function (see also Dennett 1990).  
This notion subsumes the other two firstly because the SE account is based directly on natural 
selection as a source of design, and secondly because Kitcher argues that “when we attribute 
functions to entities that make a causal contribution to complex processes”—that is, when we 
attribute a CR function—“there is . . . always a source of design in the background” (1993: 390).  As 
I stated earlier, in the discussion devoted to the design fallacy, the correlation between design and 
function is strong (and thus requires explanation), but it can be better accounted for by the fact that 
successful functioning guides design, rather than by the act of design granting proper functions.  
Kitcher appears to be not only smitten with the intuitions that underlie the design fallacy but also, 
like many other modern function theorists, captivated by the illusion of function constancy. 
Walsh (1996) and Buller (1998, 1999, 2001) attempt to give a different unification that they 
refer to as “the relational theory”.  Under this analysis, a function gets its status from its contribution 
to fitness under a time-independent “selective regime”.  This formulation is meant to triply unify the 
SE, RD, and CR analyses, in that a function is a contribution to either past fitness (SE) or current 
fitness (RD and CR).  However, it is a biologically focused analysis that (i) doesn’t apply to artifacts; 
(ii) is still vulnerable to counterexamples such as Lewens’ sorting processes, vestiges, doubles, and 
initials; and (iii) fails to explain not only what kind of a residue or structure past selection might 
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physically confer upon an item, but also what kind of structure or metaphysical residue future 
selection might be able to backward-causally confer upon an item in order to ensure that it is 




Pluralism, the most popular form of hybrid analysis, generally aims to bring the CR and SE 
analyses together by exploiting their differences rather than their similarities.  The pluralist analyst 
believes that the SE theory describes one kind of function while the CR theory describes another 
kind of function, and that the two may overlap many times in biological cases, obscuring the fact 
that both concepts apply simultaneously.  On this view, a cog need not have been selected for its 
effects to have its function, as long as it plays a causal role, and a seed (that never grows) need not in 
fact play a causal role to have its function, as long as it is the result of selection (of its ancestors) 
effects.  But the function of a normal heart may both play a causal role and be a result of selection.  
The proponents of such a model are many (Allen and Bekoff 1995a, 1995b; Amundson and 
Lauder 1994; Brandon 2011; Godfrey-Smith 1993, 1994; Hinde 1975; Melander 1997; Millikan 
1989b, 2002; Preston 1998), though there are slight differences in all their analyses.   
Perhaps the most central issue behind the pluralist view is that the SE and CR analyses are 
working towards different explanatory goals.  Godfrey-Smith makes this clear:   
 
If it is claimed, for instance, that the function of the myelin sheaths round some 
brain cells is to make possible efficient long distance conduction of signals, it may 
not be obvious which explanatory project is involved—that of explaining why the 
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sheath is there, or that of explaining how the brain manages to perform certain tasks. 
(Godfrey-Smith 1994) 
 
This is a good point about the explanatory projects of biology, but it still does not require a plural 
view of functions; it just needs an explanation of both of these things, of which, one, both, or 
neither might involve function.  In particular, I find it likely that function plays some role in both 
“why-is-it-there” and “how-does-it-work” types of explanatory project, but that it is not constitutive 
of a full explanation for either.   
As I stated earlier, pluralism is unconvincing to me because both of the underlying analyses 
from which it is constructed are themselves problematic.  For one thing, both analyses tend to take 
functions as things that are had, not things that are served, and conjoining them does not resolve this 
problem.  For another thing, the SE analysis is subject to the malfunction fallacy, the design fallacy, 
and the metaphysical-residue concern, and the CR analysis is subject to its teleological smuggling 
concern, none of which are solved by borrowing either analysis into a plural view.  And, for a third 
thing, borrowing both the CR and the SE analyses into a plural view brings along the unconvincing 
overbreadth that afflicts each individually (cf. their respective counterexamples in the previous 
sections of this chapter).  Pluralism, in all its various treatments (see citations above), is only a 
loosely specified conjunction of its constituents that seems to properly assign its inclusions (such as 
the heart and the cog) but that seldom has attention paid to its exclusions.  For instance, how does 
pluralism deal with Griffiths’ piece of dirt stuck in a pipe, or with Millikan’s rain clouds or with 
oncogenes (Boorse 2002)?  The selected-effects analysis correctly says they are not functions, but in 
pluralism, candidates for functionhood must be rejected by both components of the theory in order 
to be fully rejected, and as we’ve already seen, the causal-role analysis has trouble rejecting these 
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kinds of examples. 250  I am not opposed to a plural view in principle, but firstly, I would like to see 
other options exhausted before resorting to such theoretical inelegance, and secondly, if we must 





Instantiation claims that SE functions constitute a subset of CR functions.  Griffiths (1993) 
and Walsh and Ariew (1996) each point out that if we consider an organism to be a system and if we 
consider survival and reproduction to be a systemic capacity of the organism, then we have a 
straightforward rule by which to consider SE functions to be contributing to that capacity, and thus 
to be a simple subset of CR functions.  On this analysis, all functions are to be identified as causal-
role functions, but the functions of biological traits are a special kind of CR function, which, thanks 
to natural selection’s providing of a particular context for their systemic capacity, happen to owe 
their existence to the selective evolutionary process that produced them.  Of course, the 
instantiation account really casts aside the SE analysis by differently accounting for the functions it 
had previously accounted for.  This makes selection irrelevant to function—it is only the 
contribution to survival and reproduction, and not the selective history, that supposedly grants a 
function to an item. 
It should be clear that the concerns with both the CR analysis and the survival and 
reproduction (SR) subclass of the RD analysis presented earlier still apply to this kind of a claim, 
whether or not SE functions are a subset of CR functions.  For instance, the instantiation view 
																																																								
250 Remember, logical conjunction (the “or” operation) includes things that are A, things that are B, and things that are 
both A and B; it only rejects things that are neither A nor B.  It might seem convenient to say that, where the CR 
analysis fails, SE can step in, and where SE fails, CR can step in.  But this would be an unprincipled alternation that gains 
us no theoretical ground and instead obscures the faults of both theories. 
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cannot account for sterile animals and for whole artifacts that are not, themselves, parts, nor does it 
resolve the innumerable counterexamples to the CR analysis catalogued earlier. 
 
Let’s Fix Theories, Instead of Kluging them Together 
 
While the SE or SE-based plural views are widely touted as “consensus” (Allen and Bekoff 
1995a; Buller 1999; Godfrey-Smith 1993; Neander 1991), the disputes and counter-intuitions 
published in a constant stream of papers and monographs show that very few are satisfied with any 
analysis that has yet been presented and that the keepers of the consensus even find little agreement 
amongst themselves as to the fine details of their variations.  Buller (1999: pp. 19–27) summarizes 
the disagreement carefully, in an effort to highlight the so-called consensus.  He suggests, 
“resolution of these [disagreements] constitutes the major part of the agenda for continued 
philosophical work on the biological concept of function” (1999: pp. 26–27).  I am inclined instead 
to read the same level of disagreement as a possibly irresolvable philosophical confusion, based 
largely in the illusion of function constancy and the metaphysically unsustainable belief that history—
natural selection—could play any role in the current causal circumstances of an item’s functioning 




E. Goal Contributions 
 
To motivate a goal-contribution analysis, one may first observe that the functions of artifacts seem obviously determined 
by human goals. . . . Goal directed behavior also seems ubiquitous among living things, not just human beings. 
 
—Christopher Boorse (2002:68) 
 
The majority of thinkers about function and teleology have offered one variation or another 
of the three popular theories or their hybrids that we’ve just discussed, but their work certainly does 
not exhaust the thinking that has been done on these topics.  It is time now to review the three less 
popular—indeed, I think, maverick—theories that will serve as some of the crucial building blocks 
for the theory presented later.  I’ll begin with Christopher Boorse’s goal-contribution account.  
On this view, if an item in any way causally contributes to the attainment of some goal for 
some agent, then the item is functional for the owner of that goal.  There are a number of things 
that are vague about this presentation, not the least of which are the facts that Boorse does not 
specify any account of causation and that he does not give a theory of what constitutes an agent that 
could have a goal.  However, one of the virtues of the account is Boorse’s attempt at generality, by 
including both what he calls “weak” and “strong” function statements, which align respectively with 
the ideas of “serves a function” and “has a function”.  For Boorse, an item can be functional by 
contributing to a goal, but it can also have a function by being the kind of thing that contributes to a 
goal.   
We can tabulate five general cases of how to apply Boorse’s theory.   
 
	 328	
Case 1:  Biological Traits.  The functions of biological traits are all given by the goal-contribution (GC) 
analysis because of their contributions to the trait-owners’ biological goals of survival and 
reproduction—we are talking here about things such as hearts, eyes, wings, gills, lungs, and 
opposable thumbs, as well as species-typical behaviors such as reflexive blinking or the burying of 
eggs by turtles; but not vestiges, such as the vermiform appendix or cave-dwelling creatures’ 
degenerate eyes, and not spandrels, such as the wrinkle made between your bicep and your forearm 
when you bend your elbow.  Spandrels don’t count because, by definition, they don’t contribute to 
anything; if they did, they would be traits, not spandrels (Gould and Lewontin 1979).  Vestiges 
similarly don’t count because, as vestiges, they no longer contribute to the goals their ancestral 
versions once did.  However, during the interim period in which a species’ changing relationship 
with its environment is transforming a trait to its vestigial form, the intermediary form of the trait 
would nonetheless have had a function, on Boorse’s view, as long as it was still able to contribute 
somewhat to the organism’s survival and reproduction.  Such biological counterexamples as we saw 
before, in which a trait is seen as being somehow deleterious (including the liver’s housing flukes and 
the narwhal’s tusk dragging it down), are correctly counted out by the GC analysis precisely for the 
reason that these are ways in which they fail to contribute to survival and reproduction (though the 
liver’s role in metabolism, bile production, detoxification and so on, and the ability of the narwhal’s 
tusk to do whatever it does251 would still be functions, and, of course, in terms of housing flukes the 
liver may still be functional . . . for the flukes).  Our base case of the heart’s pumping blood is 
correctly counted in since, by pumping, the heart contributes to the survival and reproduction of its 
bearer.  In the case of an instant lion, Boorse’s theory would not differentiate between the imaginary 
creature and a naturally evolved one, and would thus assign the functions that our intuitions would 
																																																								
251 It is still not fully understood what the tusk’s functions are but, as it is primarily a male trait of unusual proportions 
and also very dense with nerve endings the best current hypotheses are that it is a trait used in sexual selection (much 
like the peacock’s tail) or as a sensory organ, or both. (Nweeia et al. 2014). 
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to any traits that helped the lion survive or reproduce.  In the treatment of all these biological 
examples, there is a straightforward similarity between Boorse’s GC analysis and the survival-and-
reproduction (SR) analysis that I considered to be a subcategory of the RD analysis.  Boorse 
remarks: “Since evolution in fact seems to yield organisms with the supreme goals of individual 
survival and reproduction (loosely, ‘fitness’), within biology the [GC] analysis gives the same results 
as one defining biological functions, specifically, as causal contributions to fitness” (2002).  The 
difference between these two analyses, as we’ll see in just a moment, is that the GC analysis is also 
able to account for the functions of acquired behaviors, artifacts, and the traits of sterile animals, 
while, as we noted before, the SR and other RD analyses cannot. 
 
Case 2:  Acquired Behaviors.  The functions of acquired, volitional behaviors, such as cooking, sailing, 
or playing squash are given by the GC analysis on account of their contributions to the intentional, 
psychological goals of their performer.  Someone performs these behaviors because they want to 
engage in these processes or achieve their results.  This interpretation even seems to be effective at 
accounting for biologically counterproductive behaviors such as suicide and celibacy because, as 
long as the performer intends the action, regardless of what might be biologically good for them, their 
psychological goal underpins the function.  It is not yet clear, on an account such as Boorse’s, how we 
should interpret psychological goals, nor why they would have the power to override the biological 
goals of survival and reproduction, but if we can decipher the relationship between psychological 
and biological goals, then Boorse’s account—a contribution to any goal—will be satisfyingly 
inclusive. 
 
Case 3:  Artifacts.  The function of an artifact—a hammer, a pen, or a chair—gets its status by 
contributing to whatever the user intends of it.  The GC analysis can claim the function of a 
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hammer to be setting nails into place just in case someone uses it towards that end.  A hammer 
might also serve the function of being a doorstop, a weapon, or a leverage fulcrum as long as 
someone chooses to use it in any of these manners to fulfill a goal.  Our base case of a cog in a 
machine has the function of transferring mechanical force, on the GC analysis, since that is one 
thing it does and, in doing so, it contributes to a goal required by the machine’s operator (say, the 
proper operation of the machine).  If the cog accidentally falls into a machine and therein comes to 
be turned, although to no useful effect, then it does not function.  But if, as Kitcher (1993) imagines, 
it falls into a machine and there comes to play a vital role in the operation of the machine, then 
despite the accidental nature of its functioning, it is nonetheless functioning.  Our other base case, a 
rock, chosen as a paperweight, serves the function of holding down paper if it actually holds down 
paper, which is an effect that contributes to the goals of someone who prefers not to have to chase 
their sheets of paper around the room.   
 
Case 4:  Non-Functions.  Our intuitions in the previously reviewed non-function counterexamples are 
upheld too.  A cloud usually neither has the function of creating a rainbow nor of creating rain, since 
clouds have no goals; however, in some circumstances, the cloud can contribute to a person’s goals, 
in which case it may function.  For instance, one might suggest that a cloud may function if 
someone has the goal of getting another person to talk about light refraction and the cloud helps 
them accomplish that goal by providing a rainbow upon which to base the discussion252.  As it turns 
out, Boorse’s account already makes provisions for this:  the cloud serves (but does not have) a 
function, for that person253.  Similarly, the hole in the rubber hose that carries gaseous chlorine and 
																																																								
252 This example is thanks to Colin Allen (personal communication). 
253 There is a more rarefied question as to whether the cloud functions if someone has the goal merely of having a 
rainbow appear.  In one sense, the cloud contributes to the appearance of the rainbow and thus the fulfillment of that 
goal, but, at the same time, we might be unwilling to say the cloud functioned in this case, since the rainbow would have 
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Bedau’s stick that is lodged behind a rock in a stream don’t seem to be the kind of things that can or 
do have goals, and so Boorse does not assign them any function, but if they did support a person’s 
goal of any kind, then they would serve a function, or “function as” something or other254.   
 
Case 5:  Accidents.  While accidental contributions count, such as the bible functioning to prevent a 
bullet from entering a soldier’s heart, mere effects do not.  If the bible prevented the bullet from 
entering a pile of sand we would not consider it having functioned to do so; it just would have 
happened to do so.  This case is a possibly divisive one, though it shouldn’t be. A proponent of the 
GC analysis would be satisfied that we have more broadly included more cases of (verb-) 
functioning without admitting any additional non-functioning, and would further point out that the 
popular analyses are unable to make this distinction: each of the CR, SE, and RD views would not 
consider either event to be an instance of the bible functioning255.  In addition, the proponent would 
be satisfied that the GC analysis also includes other “weak” function statement cases, such as a rock 
used as a paperweight or a doorstop (FS7) or a wood box serving as a dog’s sleeping quarters (FS13).  
However, an opponent who is convinced that the function–accident distinction is a central measure 
for theories of function might suggest that inclusion of the bible saving the soldier’s heart is a case 
that shows the GC analysis casts too wide a net.  Earlier I argued that the function–accident 
distinction is flawed for this very reason.  On my view, what Boorse calls “strong” function 
statements—claims about items having functions—are just subjective perceptions based in the 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
appeared whether or not the goal existed.  I think the proper interpretation of such a situation is that the cloud is making 
an accidental contribution, but a contribution nonetheless.   
254 Douglas Hofstadter (personal communication) has pointed out to me that the stick in the stream has served a number 
of philosophers’ goals of finding a good example with which to discuss the notion of function. 
255 The RD and SE analyses would find the bible’s performance in this manner neither to be a result of selection nor to 
have a propensity to contribute to replication.  The CR analysis would rule, as it does with the stone paperweight, that 
there is no containing system nor overall capacity that the bible is contributing to in either the case of the heart or the 
sand pile—the bible is not a “part”, it is just a whole object.   
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A number of criticisms have been raised against the GC analysis.  Boorse (2002) enumerated 
twelve possible concerns and he defended against ten, leaving two unresolved.  I am going to give a 
blend of my defenses and Boorse’s, here; however, a few of the issues will have to be revisited again 
later, in terms of the theory presented in Part II. 
 
Objection 1:  Arbitrary, evaluative, or circular goal-choice.  Melander (1997) and Schaffner (1993) argue 
that making function relative to goals is only a vague, arbitrary theory.  Melander (1997), for 
instance, notes that if one alters an animal’s physiology so that its homeostatic systems approach 
different values than they normally do (say, so that the kidneys of a human maintain blood water 
content at 70 percent rather than 90 percent) there would still be a goal, and the GC analysis would 
have to assign a function.  I think this is an important concern, and I am not completely satisfied 
with Boorse’s response (but there’s no need to repeat it here); Melander’s concern can be resolved, 
however, by providing a different theory of goals—one that is not merely a cybernetic system with 
an arbitrary set-point—to which functioning can be made relative. 
 
Objection 2:  Lack of explanatory power.  Neander (1983:98-100) and Melander (1997:36-8, 56) argue 
that a GC account of function does not allow a function to explain a trait’s presence, which is, they 
claim, what function statements are meant to do (see also Wright 1973, 1976; Price 1995).  I (and 
Boorse) take these thinkers’ premise to be faulty.  We can speak of present functioning without any 
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interest in the history of how an item came to be there (see also Amundson and Lauder 1994).  We 
might also, for instance, be interested in how the trait works (Cummins 2002).  The inference from a 
trait’s functioning to its presence is both compelling and useful, as well as effortless to make once 
one is trained in Darwinian thinking, but that inference begins with a claim about modern 
functioning, proceeds via a number of logical steps that extrapolate that functioning back into 
history, assumes that the ancestral environment did not differ significantly from the modern one, 
and ends with a claim that establishes the trait’s presence due to its ancestral successes.  A function 
statement is part of the chain of reasoning that can explain a trait’s presence but that explanation is 
not a direct corollary of the statement, and it is neither what the statement is necessarily meant to 
do, nor the only thing it can do.  
 
Objection 3:  Artifact functions.  Nissen (1997) argues that Adams’ (1979) account (which resembles 
Boorse’s, 1976, version) cannot neatly deal with artifact functions because it requires outlining a 
system that includes both the artifact and its user, and then assigning a goal to that unusual and 
arbitrary system (such a view goes much more smoothly with organisms and their traits).  This looks 
a lot like the system-bounding problem we faced when reviewing the CR analysis, which, in that 
instance, is a major concern.  But Boorse (2002) sidesteps the concern by pointing out that, for his 
GC analysis, there is no need to look at such joint systems; the premise of the analysis claims that 
functioning exists when there is an agent whose goal the artifact contributes to.  The goal is the 
agent’s alone, not one of some larger system.  I am inclined to agree.   
 
Objection 4:  Environmental relativity.  This criticism was raised against Ruse’s (1972) and Prior’s 
(1985) SR and CR analyses, though not yet against the GC analysis, but Boorse notes that one day it 
could be used against him.  The concern is that we may assign a function to a trait of an organism 
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only to see it disappear into thin air when the environment changes.  For instance, polar bears have 
white fur, which has the function of camouflage, allowing them to hunt more effectively, but that 
function only exists in an environment of snow and ice (Melander 1997; Munson 1972).  The SE 
theorist would like camouflage to be a permanent proper function of the whiteness of the polar 
bear’s fur, until selection in the new environment changes it.  This issue only affects analyses that 
intend to account for proper functions.  Boorse tried to support both weak and strong function 
statements in his work, but my view of his theory is that it need not make (ontological) provisions 
for strong function statements.  If there are no proper functions, if functioning itself is contextually 
relative as I have argued, then Melander’s and Munson’s example simply becomes a typical example 
of any functioning, and the concern simply dissolves. 
 
Objection 5:  Maladaptive functions.  Neander (1983:89) charges that the GC account cannot 
distinguish between malfunctions and species-typical maladaptive functions.  Boorse argues that, we 
shouldn’t accept Neander’s intuitions about the existence of maladaptive functions:  if something is 
maladaptive then it is not a function.  If the polar bear’s environment were to become warm and 
snowless (as is now occurring) the whiteness and heat-retention of its fur would not be maladaptive 
functions, they would simply no longer be functions; they would be vestiges.  I agree, but I would 
phrase it, only slightly differently, that these maladaptive features would no longer be functional 
(since TDHF).  Neander is falling victim to both the malfunction fallacy and the illusion of function 
constancy.  Maladaptive and malfunctioning items are both simply items that don’t function; there is 
no need for a theory of functioning to distinguish between them. 
 
Objection 6:  Functions vs. Accidents.  Neander (1983) argues that the GC analysis cannot make the 
judgments required by the function–accident distinction.  As I’ve argued, the function–accident 
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distinction is a misleading result of the illusion of function constancy and is not a standard that an 
account of functioning needs to be held accountable to.  As a matter of fact, a virtue of the GC 
analysis is that it nicely accounts for the accidental functioning of many items that other views, 
including Neander’s, cannot account for. 
 
Objection 7:  Unperformed functions.  Boorse describes unperformed functions as a generalization over 
malfunctions (things that supposedly have functions but cannot perform them) and unused 
functions (things that supposedly have functions, but in which, for instance, the initiating button is 
simply never pressed).  The worry presented by Millikan (1989), Neander (1991), and Nissen (1997) 
is that the GC account can’t attribute functions to either category of things, since such items never 
contribute to any goals.  I think they are right—the GC account doesn’t attribute functioning in 
these cases—but I also think that judgment is correct.  Neither malfunctioning items nor unused 
items have functions (TDHF), but, more to the point, they don’t even serve functions though, in 
some cases, they could.  As with objection 5, this concern, too, dissolves in light of the malfunction 
fallacy and the illusion of function constancy. 
 
I am going to jump ahead briefly to Objection 10, as listed by Boorse, for reasons that will become 
clear shortly after. 
 
Objection 10:  Batesian mimicry.  Batesian mimicry is usually described using the example of the 
Monarch and Viceroy butterflies both of who have a similarly stark pattern of bright colorations, 
though only Monarchs have a taste that is unpalatable (to the birds that like to eat butterflies).  The 
explanation for their similar appearance is that the Viceroy is an evolutionary mimic—its coloration 
pattern evolved to match that of the Monarch so that birds would avoid eating it, as if it were a 
	 336	
bitter Monarch.  According to Mitchell (1995) the function of the Monarch’s coloration is “to warn 
the predator of its unpalatability”, while the function of the Viceroy’s coloration is “to mimic the 
model and deceive the predator into presuming it is unpalatable.”  These different functions, 
Mitchell argues, can be determined by an SE analysis, which, it is claimed, uses the selective history 
of the traits in order to assign their functions256, but, they supposedly cannot be distinguished by a 
RD analysis, nor (Boorse extrapolates) a GC analysis, which presumes that if the coloration plays a 
role in the goals of survival and reproduction, then both species of butterfly are equally served by 
the function, which can be said to be “to avoid predation”.  Boorse argues that Mitchell’s conclusion 
is a simple mistake of underspecifying the mechanism and the function:  For a GC analysis to say 
that something has a function (or, as I prefer to say, is functional) one need only suggest that it plays 
a role in a high-level goal such as survival and reproduction; but to say further just what that 
function is only requires a specification of the mechanism by which the goal is contributed to.  
Boorse says:  
 
In Monarchs, the function of the coloration does not depend upon traits of another 
species.  In Viceroys, it does, namely, upon the poisonousness of Monarchs.  It is 
this present difference between the two mechanisms, not its presumed evolutionary 
history, that Mitchell is describing when she says that the function of Monarch 
coloration is to warn, the function of Viceroy coloration to deceive. (Boorse 
2002:104, emphasis added). 
 
																																																								
256 This claim is highly suspect however, since one cannot determine the selective history of a trait without some clue as 
to the present (and then, by extrapolation, past) function of the trait (see also Amundson and Lauder 1994; Griffiths 
2009; Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006).   
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The GC analysis can in fact determine the differing functions of Monarch and Viceroy colorations 
the same way biologists did in the first place—not by knowing their evolutionary history (which is 
something the biologists inferred after determining their current functioning) but by observing the 
characteristics of the two species, and the current relationships between the two species and between 
each of them and their predators. 
 
Objections 8, 9 and 11 all relate to Boorse’s statistical definition of normal function.  He 
defines “medical normality as ‘the readiness of each internal part to perform all its normal functions 
on typical occasions with at least typical efficiency’” and the term “typical” here is derived from an 
average over a reference class—the norm of a population “of uniform functional design: specifically, 
an age group of a sex of a species” (Boorse 2002; see also Boorse 1977).  This helps Boorse make 
sense of strong function statements, which doctors need to make use of in practical medical 
contexts (in healthy individuals under rest conditions, the function of the heart is to pump blood 
with a pressure, X, at a rate, Y, where X and Y are distributions measured from a population and 
then used to diagnose whether a given patient’s heart is functioning properly).  These strong 
function statements are also a direct correlate of the proper functions that other theorists are 
interested in, which is why Boorse’s account of them has drawn fire from those quarters.  My 
response to this entire issue is simply that a theory of teleology need not directly account for proper 
functions.  TDHF.  Boorse should have explicitly separated his theory of functioning from his 
theory of function and considered them two different theories accounting for two different subjects.  
While biomedical normality is an important concept in medicine, and Boorse’s statistical definition 
of that concept may be the most practical way to operationalize it, I think it is nonetheless a heuristic 
concept, and not useful as a basis for our philosophical theory of the fundamental nature of biology 
and function.  After all, there are situations wherein the notion of functioning may apply but neither 
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having a function nor biomedical normality would be relevant.  If an individual were to be born with 
a series of mutations such that (i) they have much thinner vasculature than normal (and thus a lower 
vascular volume, lower safe operating pressure for their veins and arteries, but a higher demand for 
flow in order to maintain perfusion of their bodily tissues), and (ii) in compensation, their heart 
pumped far more quickly yet with smaller, lower-pressure beats, such that altogether the individual 
was equally healthy as the rest of us, then biomedical normality would simply not apply to this 
individual.  There would be no disease.  And there would be no reference class to which we could 
compare the functioning of their parts.  Still those parts would be functional (on a GC view as well 
as an SR or a CR view).  Being functional is different from having a function.  The latter is not a real 
part of the world (TDHF) but rather a heuristic that allows categorization of individuals based on 
useful similarities.  I see no need to defend normal function or biomedical normality for my 
purposes; I take it that these concepts are practical extrapolations from the underlying facts of 
functioning, used to make useful comparisons but nothing more, and so I will set these issues aside 
until my new theory is laid out and we are ready to analyze its implications. 
 At this point, however, I must note one facet of Boorse’s philosophy that is not in line with 
my own.  As with the first three major analyses of function that we looked at, Boorse’s version of 
the GC analysis turns out to be a non-normative theory.  Boorse thinks that our analyses of health 
and health-related concepts need to be “value-free” because to be a “normativist about science in 
general, or biology, or biological function” is too “high a price to pay for [ . . . ] normativism about 
health” (Boorse 1997, p. 99).257  In other words, Boorse seems to recognize the evaluative-normative 
nature of health and health-related terms but, motivated by strong materialist convictions, he is 
unwilling to accept that normativity as reflecting anything more than illusion.  I disagree; I think the 
																																																								
257 Boorse says elsewhere, “Clearly, by the biostatistical theory, insofar as biological function statements are normative, 
health is normative too. Once again I leave this issue to nonmedical philosophy of science. I merely note that for anyone 
who seeks to exclude values from scientific knowledge, holding biological function statements normative is a case of the 
high cost of normativism about health” (Boorse 1997, p. 58). 
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normativity we observe in medical science is fundamentally based in the normative nature of biology 
and, in particular, in the evaluative-normative nature of goal-directedness.  We have only to account 
for that normativity. 
 
Objection 12 is the most difficult of the bunch for Boorse to answer, and, presumably for 
this reason, he leaves both it and Objection 11 unanswered.  Boorse describes Objection 12 as 
“attacks on the cybernetic analysis of goal-directedness” (2002), but I’d like to slightly reframe the 
issue as one of vagueness:  The only naturalistic theory of goals given in the past century—the 
cybernetic theory—has been highly criticized and appears to be unsustainable in its current form 
(Bedau 1992b; Nissen 1997; Melander 1997).  Without this underlying theory of goals, the GC 
theory of function is left with two of its major terms poorly defined.  First, we are simply unable to 
identify natural “goals” in the world to which we can relativize GC functions and, second, it is 
unclear what it means for an event or a behavior to be a “contribution”—we are not prepared to 
identify the relationship by which a function may be relativized to a goal.  Both “goals” and 
“contribution” are central terms of Boorse’s theory, and yet both are undefined.  In addition, if we 
were to have definitions for goals and their contributions, we might still ask what makes, say, (i) the 
contribution of an artifact to the goals of a user the same as (ii) the contribution of a trait to the 
goals of its bearer or (iii) the contribution of a behavior to the goals of its performer.  What prevents 
the linking of these three (possibly) diverse types of contribution from being what philosophers call 
a category mistake?258  Can a theory be developed that shows how all three of these are indeed, in 
some relevant sense, the same thing?  If Boorse’s theory (or my more normatively-flavored version 
of it) is to be sustained, all of these questions will need to be answered.  
 
																																																								
258 A category mistake is simply when one co-categorizes things that have only superficial resemblance, and then tries to 




Aside from the GC analysis being so patently undefined, one of its strengths is that it is, 
compared with any of the more popular theories, better able to account for the various examples 
and counterexamples of function attributions that we make.  While Boorse doesn’t have a theory of 
goals, he shows that if we can come up with a theory of goals that is sustainable and that is also 
detailed enough to show how a goal can be contributed to, then we can probably support a clear 
theory of the ways we use the word “function”, given in terms of those goals.  While this conditional 
status of his theory appears to be a weakness because theories of goals are in short supply and there 
is widespread skepticism that one could ever be produced (see Chapter VII), I consider the same 
state of affairs to be a strength perhaps because I have more hope than do others that we can 
develop a theory of goals and also because many things about functions, function statements, and 
the counterexamples that we’ve seen all fall into place nicely if we do.  
Another strength of the GC analysis, as I see it (but perhaps Boorse does not), is that it is 
inherently subjective—if goals are relativized to an agent and functions rest upon goals, then 
function is a subjective notion.  Again, some might be concerned that this is a weakness rather than 
a strength, since they might want function to be an objective fact about items in the world.  I don’t.  
And I think those people might also be less concerned if it turned out we had a subjective view of 
functioning but could show how an objective underlying theory of goal-directedness accounted for 
the very existence both of subjectivity and of functioning. 
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F. Programmed Effects 
 
A teleonomic process or behavior is one which owes its goal-directedness to the operation of a program.  
 
—Ernst Mayr (1974/1988) 
 
The second maverick theory we need to get acquainted with is Mayr’s (1961, 1974/1988, 
1992, 2002) teleonomic theory259.  The word “teleonomy” was coined by Colin Pittendrigh (1958), 
and then adopted and further popularized by Mayr (1965, 1974/1988), Williams (1966) and Monod 
(1970), to describe “seemingly” goal-directed behaviors without admitting the existence of actual 
final causes in the world—it can be considered today to be about equivalent to putting the word 
“teleology” in scare-quotes.  Mayr was interested in describing what he called “seemingly goal-
directed behavior” (1974/1988).   
Anything that is teleonomic, says Mayr, owes that status to its being directed by a program.  
Although Mayr’s theory claims to be about “teleonomic processes in living nature” (1974), still, if we 
take it that functions are teleological (and if we ignore the scare-quotes implied by the term 
“teleonomy”), then application of Mayr’s theory to the notion of function is fairly straightforward260:  
Mayr’s view is that functions are programmed effects (PE).   
																																																								
259 Cummins (1983), perhaps influenced by Mayr, also used the word “program” to elucidate his idea of functional 
analysis: “By a functional analysis, I mean an analysis of a capacity of a system into sub-capacities of that system such 
that exercise of the analyzed capacity is reduced to programmed exercise of the analyzing sub-capacities. By 
‘programmed’ I simply mean organized in a way that could be specified in a program or flow chart. . . .” (Cummins 
1983:29). 
260 Mayr (1992) expressly avoids the term “function” in describing his teleonomic theory.  He borrows a distinction from 
Bock and von Wahlert (1969) between function and biological role.  For these thinkers, the concept of function is more 
like a causal role (see also Amundson and Lauder 1994) while a biological role is more like what many other theorists would 
simply call “function”.  However, most theorists don’t make this distinction, and so what is commonly called “function” 
aligns very much with Mayr’s teleonomic theory of biological roles.  
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In what may be the most refined form given to the theory, Mayr wrote, of a program, 
“tentatively, program might be defined as coded or prearranged information that controls a process (or behavior) 
leading it toward a given end” and that endpoint should be “foreseen in the program that regulates the 
behavior” (1974/1988, emphasis original).  While my review of the PE analysis in this section will 
amount primarily to unflattering criticism, I’d like to request the reader not to discard it from 
memory for its poor performance in its current form.  I think there is a very important and widely 
overlooked core to Mayr’s notion of a program as “controlling a process” that is worth preserving. 
The notion of a “program” worked nicely for Mayr at the time of his writing because he was 
taking the analogy between computer code and genetic code rather seriously, and because the 
disanalogies between the two were perhaps not recognized as clearly as they are today.  The notion 
of a “genetic program” seemed to allow categorization of all traits of biological organisms as 
teleonomic and Mayr’s way of conceiving the design and building of artifacts as “programming” 
allowed the PE analysis to account for artifacts as well (Mayr 1974/1988).  Unfortunately, Mayr later 
disavowed the inclusion of artifacts, saying they do not actually have programs in his sense and are 
only analogous to genetic and computer programs (Mayr 1992). 
As an early example of how to interpret the theory (before his change of heart about 
artifacts), Mayr said, “The simplest program is perhaps the weight inserted into loaded dice or 
attached to a ‘fixed’ number wheel so that they are likely to come to rest at a given number. A clock 
is constructed and programmed in such a way as to strike at the full hour261” (1974/1988).  In the 
case of the loaded dice, we can take it that the function of the weight in them is to shift their centers 
of gravity, causing the dice to more frequently land with the weighted side down and thus a certain 
desired number up—Mayr wants us to consider the foresighted placement of the weight to be the 
authoring of a mechanical program. 
																																																								
261 Mayr was likely speaking of mechanical clocks not digital clocks, the latter of which are more literally programmed. 
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We can apply the view, only hazily, to our base cases.  First, the PE analysis gives the 
function of the heart as pumping blood because, in some sense, the genetic code is the program that 
both built and operates the heart, causing it to pump.  This success should be tempered, though, 
since the program in the genetic code also causes the heart to create heart sounds, and the theory is 
unable to differentiate between the results of pumping and these heart sounds.  The theory is quite 
similarly unable to differentiate between such nonfunctional things as evolutionary vestiges and 
nonaptations or spandrels and actual functional traits, such as hearts, since all are genetically 
programmed in the same sense.   
Second, a cog in a machine can be said to “have” the function of transferring mechanical 
force, on the PE analysis, because the design and construction of the machine, in having located the 
cog precisely where it is, is considered to be the process of programming that ensures the cog’s 
behavior in doing what it does and in thereby contributing to the machine’s overall behavior.  If 
Mayr hadn’t retracted his claim that artifacts have programs, this might have been the most 
convincing of his theory’s applications to our base cases, but apparently he lost his conviction that 
mechanical “programming” had something fundamental in common with genetic and computational 
programming.   
Third, the programmed effects analysis struggles to describe the function of a rock, chosen 
as a paperweight; it seems that we would need to significantly broaden our notion of programming if 
the mere—perhaps even careless—selection of a rock and placement of it upon a stack of papers is 
to count as a program.  In all three base cases, it appears that a clearer definition of what a program 







In his review of the PE analysis, Nagel (1977) gives two counterexamples to Mayr’s view.  
The first is a biological example that seems by all lights to be a Mayrian program: the patellar reflex 
(Nagel calls it the “knee-jerk reflex”), which Nagel claims is not goal-directed and which has no 
obvious function.  The second counterexample is radioactive decay, which, Nagel points out, occurs 
in a manner that seems to mechanistically proceed towards a predetermined end, much like the 
clockwork that Mayr suggests includes human-made clocks as being teleonomic.  No one would 
want to include radioactive decay as being a teleonomic process, of course.  Both examples are 
excessive inclusions of the theory, and so Nagel suggests that maybe Mayr’s idea needs to be 
narrowed to programs “of a special kind ”.   
Nagel’s second counterexample incited a response from Mayr in a postscript to his 1974 
paper added in 1988, but the response is difficult to interpret.  Mayr wrote “radioactive decay is 
controlled by laws and not by any particular program; it obeys the same laws any time anywhere. 
Programs are highly specific and often unique.”  It is not clear what distinction Mayr is making 
here—is he suggesting that radioactive decay fails to count because it lacks conditional branching?  
Is uniqueness or rarity in a process an additional constraint for being teleonomic, and how would we 
determine it, if it were?  Mayr (1992) remarks that “information and instruction” are the key notions 
to what makes a program a program, and this does seem to provide a principle which could exclude 
Nagel’s counterexample, but it also may require a reanalysis of whether—or in what sense—artifacts 
such as weighted dice or a mechanical alarm clock involve information and instruction.   
Allen and Bekoff (1995), channeling a personal communication between themselves and 
Elliott Sober, make this last criticism more explicit.  
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Mayr’s use of the notion of program here is an unexplained metaphor. For example, 
where is the program in a clock? Sober objects that the idea of a clock being 
programmed simply amounts to the claim that someone designed it. We agree that 
Mayr’s use of this notion does not conform to the literal sense in which computers 
may be said to execute programs and that Mayr must therefore explain his use of the 
notion before his account of biological teleology can be accepted. (Allen and Bekoff 
1995a) 
  
Allen and Bekoff (and Sober) want to know what allows us to extend the idea of a computer 
program to organisms and artifacts.  In what sense do these all have programs?  In what sense do 
their performances all correspond to the orderly execution of an instruction set?   
There may not be an answer to satisfy these questions but, despite the counterexamples and 
vagueness, I think there is something important in Mayr’s notion of a program causing functional 
behaviors.  His intuition that everything that is purposeful seems somehow programmed, directed, or 
instructed is insightful and should be added to our list of intuitions and explanatory desiderata.  
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G. Valuable Effects 
 
The biologist who helps himself even to such an obviously safe functional category as eye, leg, or lung is already 
committed to assumptions about what is good. 
 
—Daniel Dennett (1987:278) 
 
Our third maverick theory is what I will call the valuable effects (VE) analysis.  In the title of 
a standout paper responding to the lifelessness of CR, SE, and RD theories, Bedau wonders, 
“Where’s the good in teleology?” (1992b).  The same general sentiment—that good, or value plays a 
role in teleology—has also been called “the welfare view” (Nagel 1977) or the “good consequences” 
view (van Parijs 1981).  It has various precursors in Hempel (1959/1965), Sorabji (1964), Elster 
(1979) and the early SR analyses (e.g. Canfield 1964; Ruse 1971; see also Ayala 1970) all of which 
focused on what is useful or necessary (i.e. valuable) for an organism, under the assumption that 
survival and reproduction are the ultimate operating principles of organisms262.  In recent decades, 
however, only a few writers have supported a theory of function in terms of value (Bedau 1990, 
1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996; McLaughlin 2001; van Parijs 1981) while most other modern writers have 
largely ignored it.  The version that both van Parijs and Bedau support is roughly that functions are the 
consequences produced by a trait, an act, or artifact that are good or valuable for either the bearer of the trait, the 
performer of the act, or the user of the artifact. 
Before we assess the merits and weaknesses of the VE analysis, it is necessary to review 
some of its nuances.  In particular, Bedau’s (1992b) version distinguishes between three grades of 
involvement of value in teleology that help to clarify how to apply it.  The first grade refers only to 
																																																								
262 To be sure, the idea of “the good” being relevant to teleology goes back as far as Aristotle who often referred to his 
final causes using the phrase “the end and the good”. 
	 347	
the production of good consequences.  This grade is very much like Boorse’s GC analysis—it 
accepts the soldier’s bible as being functional since, in stopping a bullet, the book produced a good 
consequence, for the soldier.  However, Bedau differs from Boorse in that he would like his theory 
to exclude this kind of accidental effects, and so he discounts the first grade in favor of the next two, 
both of which can be seen as versions of the SE analysis modified with a value constraint.   
Grade-two teleology, on Bedau’s account, involves something that occurs because of its 
consequence, which happens to be good for someone, though not because that consequence is good.  
Bedau says, “In grade two teleology the consequences cannot be accidental, but the benefit they 
provide can” (1992b:789).  The soldier’s bible is now already excluded—the bible stopped a bullet 
and that happens to be good for the soldier, but its occurrence was accidental.  The heart’s function 
of pumping, on the other hand, fits the second grade straightforwardly:  The behavior of pumping 
happens to be good for someone (the heart’s owner) and also that pumping occurs non-accidentally, 
as in Wright’s SE analysis, because the pumping of hearts contributes to the creation of hearts 
(through reproduction and selection). 
Bedau’s Grade-three teleology can be distinguished from grade two because “good 
consequences and their goodness both figure in the explanation” (1992b:790).  This is what Bedau 
considers to be full-blooded teleology.  To put it in other words, an item exhibits grade-three 
teleology if its consequences, which are good for someone, occur in part because they are good for 
someone.  However, Bedau only considers mentally directed behaviors and artifacts to be 
archetypically grade three.  For instance, we walk to the grocery or sit in a chair because we believe it 
to be good for us and so the goodness of the effect of either the act or the artifact plays a role in an 
explanation of the occurrence of that effect (while no such belief about the future plays a role in 
how the heart comes to be a pump).  The heart and other biological traits are not grade three.  
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Bedau says “Since the goodness of survival does not itself play a role in natural selection, biological 
teleology never surpasses grade two teleology” (1992b:802). 
If we measure Bedau’s VE analysis up against our base cases we find that it performs rather 
well.  The heart’s pumping is good for its owner.  The cog’s performance in the machine has a good 
effect for an operator who gets some value from the machine’s operation.  And the stone 
paperweight is similarly good for the person using it to hold down their papers.263  Of course, as 
noted, on Bedau’s account, the heart is grade two while the cog and the paperweight are grade three, 
meaning that the heart does not have full-blooded teleology, but is only “a cousin of a central family 
member” (1992b:790).   Bolstering this performance with our base cases is a lack of 
counterexamples in the philosophical literature, though it is not clear whether no one has found any 
or whether no one has tried.  For my part, nothing obvious has come to mind.  Boorse, noting that 
Bedau’s second and third grades are descendants of the SE analysis, says “if functions are [in 
particular] etiologically significant contributions to value, then Bedau suffers all the same 
counterexamples of unselected function as a pure SE view” (Boorse 2002:68, emphasis added).  
Boorse is referring to such things as segregation distorter genes and clay crystals; however I am as 
unconvinced about using these examples against the VE analysis as I was when they were used 
against the SE analysis, particularly because I think our intuitions about whether these things are or 
are not functional may be unreliable.  They are not clear cases. 
So, as we’ve done with other theories, we can summarize the cases in terms of some 
categories:  The functional traits of organisms all serve the good of that organism, as long as what 
we take to be the organism’s “good” is hitched to its survival and reproduction.  Vestiges, on the 
other hand, no longer produce any good of that sort and so are no longer considered functional.  
																																																								
263 This all follows straightforwardly from Bedau’s statement of applicability:  “Where [the functional item] is an organ, 
the beneficiary is the organism containing [the organ], and where [the functional item] is an artifact, the beneficiary is the 
person using [the artifact]” (Bedau 1992:792). 
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Nonaptations never produce any good.  The liver may function as an artifact for liver flukes, much 
the way a stone paperweight functions for a person, and while the behaviors of oncogenes may not 
be good for the afflicted organism, they can be seen as good for the cancer cells themselves.  In 
contrast with the RD analysis, the VE analysis is able to account for the traits of sterile organisms, 
because, for Bedau, value is defined in terms of the individual, rather than in terms of the survival 
and reproduction of lineages (1992b:791) and so mules can be beneficiaries just as horses and 
donkeys can.  In terms of artifacts, they are functional if they contribute to the good of an individual 
user, which is what most artifacts do, when used.  There is an open question as to whether the 
artifact has to actually have contributed or whether it is sufficient to just be capable of contributing 
(think of a never-used item that has come off the assembly line and sat in a drawer ever since) 
though a proponent of the VE analysis could likely add a rider that makes sense of either 
perspective.  Bedau, by distinguishing the constraints of his second and third grades of teleology 
from the first grade, has also carved out any item that accidentally contributes to an individual’s 





In some sense, the VE analysis may appear to differ very little from Boorse’s goal 
contribution analysis, if one takes it that things that have value are precisely those things that 
contribute to goals (again, either psychological goals or survival and reproduction as biological 
goals).  However it is not necessary that all conceptions of goals are value laden and, in fact, 
Boorse’s own use of the cybernetic theory of goals can be seen as a value-free notion (cybernetic 
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goals are simply feedback systems). Boorse himself, unmoved by the idea of natural value, finds the 
resemblance unpersuasive. 
 
I am unconvinced by the efforts of Bedau and his sources, Taylor (1986) and 
Callicott (1989), to show that all living organisms have intrinsic value of a kind that 
artifacts such as watches or pianos do not.  Writers who attribute intrinsic interests to 
plants or bacteria, or a good or welfare of their own, are, I would argue, either 
anthropomorphizing, or advocating incomprehensible values, or confusedly referring 
to some descriptively definable property such as life or goal-directedness, in which 
case the [VE analysis] metamorphoses into a [GC analysis]. (Boorse 2002) 
 
My primary concern with the VE analysis is slightly different than Boorse’s.  I agree that the division 
between artifacts and organisms is made too sharp by Bedau’s view but contrary to Boorse, I do 
think there’s something to Bedau’s (and Taylor’s and Callicott’s) notion of an “intrinsic value” in 
living organisms (see also McLaughlin 2001).  The way those four authors have discussed that 
intrinsic value, though, is rather underspecified, and that brings me to my central criticism of the VE 
analysis:  I find the notions of “value” and “good” as they are used in the analysis to be unworkably 
vague.  Bedau does present an analysis of what he considers “X is good for Y” to mean.  He says it 
amounts to: 
 
(i) Y is the kind of thing that has its own interests (a “good of its own”); 
(ii) Y’s good is independent of any value that some third party might place on Y; and 
(iii) X is in the interest of Y, i.e., X promotes Y’s interests or constitutes (at least part of) Y’s 
interests (Bedau 1992a). 
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But this analysis is still nebulous because the underlying notion of “interests” is also not well 
defined.  If a person is interested in committing suicide, is such an act in their interests?  It is hard to 
say, since the act may not be in their biological interests but it may be in their psychological or 
ideological interests.  If interests can conflict like this then it is hard to know how to apply Bedau’s 
analysis.  What exactly does “interest” mean?  Moreover, what criteria are we to use to determine 
whether an item is the type of item that has “a good of its own”?  What kinds of items does it apply 
to, and how do we know? As Boorse pointed out, relying on the term “life” or “living” doesn’t get 
us any closer since it is debated just what fits into that category too.  It is likely that this imprecision 
is what has motivated other theorists to simply ignore Bedau’s account much of the time.  
McLaughlin (2001) attempted to define beneficiaries as self-reproducing systems264.  On this 
view, then, value would be anything that is good for such a system—that helps it in its self-
reproduction.  I think it is a good start, but not quite general enough (McLaughlin arrives at his 




264 By which McLaughlin seems to mean, more or less, autopoietic systems, although he avoids that term and avoids 




Saying “An elephant is like this, an elephant is not like that!” [and] “An elephant is not like this, an elephant is 
like that!” they fought each other with their fists.  And the king was delighted (with the spectacle). 
 
—Udana 6.4 (Trans. John D. Ireland, 1997) 
 
Our tour through the garden of function analyses is now finished.  Along the way we looked 
at six primary theories:  Causal Roles (CR), Selected Effects (SE), Replication Dispositions (RD), 
Goal Contributions (GC), Programmed Effects (PE), and Valuable Effects (VE), as well as a few 
variations of those more central analyses (SR, self-replication dispositions, and various types of 
pluralism).   
We found that the three popular theories each fail to account for all the ways we would like 
to use function statements and for the intuitions about functioning that I developed in chapter IV.  
At the same time, though, all three seem to have some potential concessions that, were they to be 
made, could perhaps allow amendments that would make up the difference in their explanatory 
scope.  On one hand, some of those concessions are large, and it is debatable whether amended 
versions would resemble the originals enough to be called descendants.  For example, the SE and 
RD theories would have to relinquish natural selection, which forms the heart of both analyses and, 
at the same time, the CR theory would have to accept normative, teleological aspects of function, 
the rejection of which has always been a cornerstone of that analysis.  As I said, these seem like 
enormous, insurmountable concessions to make, but that’s what it would take to find a middle 
ground (aside from the pluralist attempt to simply agree to disagree).  On the other hand, I think it is 
still the case that large parts of these theories will remain intact in a complete account.  Among the 
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things I don’t think we would want to discard are:  The CR notion that functional items play causal 
roles in some kind of an organizational structure; Wright’s idea of self-causation; Millikan’s notion of 
direct and derived functioning; the general focus of the SE account upon normativity; and the RD 
analysis’ focus upon contributions to reproduction or self-reproduction.  If a new account can be 
found that comprises all these aspects in some manner, it may well be a happy medium that can 
make sense of the many ways we see function in our world. 
As for the three unpopular theories, they each appear to have a very fundamental kernel of 
truth to them, but also a fundamental vagueness that undermines the theoretical power of that truth.  
If we can develop a meaningful theory of goals and what counts as a causal contribution to one 
(Boorse’s GC analysis), a definition for a general-purpose concept of “programmed effects” (Mayr’s 
PE analysis), or a naturalistic theory of what value or good consequences might be and who could 
be a beneficiary (Bedau’s VE analysis), then it seems likely that one of these theories might also be 
able to explain the teleological notion of function.  As it turns out, I think that the answers to all of 
these quandaries will converge and that when we understand them in their proper contexts, they will 
come to resemble one another.  Moreover, I think that the CR, SE, and RD analyses, as I imagine 
them to be amended, will also converge upon the very same result.  It is this convergent view that I 
intend to outline and advocate in the coming chapters.  In the end, none of the analyses will be quite 
the same as it is at present, but each will have moved closer to the others and we will have held on 




Twenty Questions For a Naturalistic Theory of Teleology 
 
Naturalism is the doctrine that everything real is at least in principle within the scope of a purely scientific account of 
the world. 
 
—Mark Bedau (1991), writing on teleology 
 
We’ve covered a lot of ground so far in our explorations.  At this point, I’d like to give a 
brief recap of where we’ve been, and then to use that retrospective to help map out the rest of 
what’s to come.   
In the first two chapters, I began to make a case that the notion of goal-directedness (and it’s 
subjective nature) is not just a common thread running through the domains of agency, biology, 
cognition, computation, and technology; it is the key pattern that accounts for the very existence of 
those diverse phenomena.  We found that the problems of identity and value—what I called “the 
fundaments of subjectivity”—are perhaps the central unsolved riddles challenging us in bringing 
goal-directedness and other subjective topics under scientific consideration.  In Chapter III, we 
reviewed much of the history of teleological and vitalist thinking, discovering many of the 
observational patterns that motivated early thinkers on these topics, and watching as these two 
streams of thought waxed and waned in varying quarters over the past few millennia.  Then, in 
Chapters IV and V, I attempted to mine the most valuable insights from the recent biophilosophical 
work on the subject of function.  At this point, Part I of my account is nearly complete; I will finish 
it off in the next chapter by making an appeal in favor of pursuing a theory—rather than a 
dismissal—of teleology.   
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While I think we’ve made good progress in reframing many of the questions that surround 
teleology, so far these explorations have left us with far more loose ends than resolutions.  By the 
end of Part II, I intend to show how we can tie up a good number of those loose ends, but there is 
much work to do before we are ready to digest those proposals in full.   
The first thing to do will be to set out the goal posts, and so I’ll turn to that project now.  In 
a previous piece of theoretical work, I used a list of twenty questions to frame the goals for that 
theory and then, later, to test whether those goals had been met265.  I’ll repeat the same strategy here.  
Below, I present a list of questions, in twenty principal categories that map out the explanatory 
ground that we would like a theory of teleology to cover.  The first six are derived from issues raised 
in chapters I through III, the next seven represent the issues raised in Chapter IV, and the last seven 
summarize the issues raised by the theories described in Chapter V.  My claim is that any theory 
worth its salt—whether it is the one I present or one developed from other considerations—should 
eventually lead to convincing answers for all twenty of them.   
 
1. What is  t e l eo logy?   If subjective goals are a real part of our objective material world, then 
just how does that state of affairs come to pass?  What are goals made of, and how are they 
materially realized?  Quite simply:  What does it mean to be goal-directed?  Not all ends are goals, 
so which ones (if any) are, and why should that be so?  Why are perseverance and plasticity 
widely thought to be the hallmarks of goal-directedness?  And what is the relationship 
between biological goal-directedness and the more salient psychological teleology of 
conscious, representational beings such as humans?  
2. What is  ident i ty?   How can we carve an individual from its environment?  Or distinguish it 
from other individuals?  Is there a principle by which we can identify an agent that can be 
																																																								
265 Hurley, Dennett and Adams (2011). 
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said to be the locus of goal-directedness—that is, when we say that something is goal-
directed or purposive or functional, how do we define that “something” so that we know 
just whose goals or purposes we are talking about, or who is benefitting from an item’s 
functioning?  
3. What is  value?   Speaking of benefitting, is there also an objective way to account for the 
subjective notion of value?  What types of items or patterns in the world is the notion of 
value relevant to?  Can value accrue for just any item or object or is it relevant only to certain 
types of things?  How and why?  And what is the relationship between value and goal-
directedness?  Can we account for the evaluative norms by which the achievement of goals 
or the serving of purposes can be benchmarked?   
4. How do we di f f erent iate  t e l eo log i cal  patterns f rom other patterns?   Both teleological 
patterns and spontaneously organizing patterns appear to metabolize free energy to build 
structure.  How do they do that?  How do we solve the material coordination problem:  
what is the source of information—the blueprint—that helps these kinds of open systems 
produce their orderliness?  And what is it about teleological patterns that make their 
metabolic processes different from those of spontaneously organizing patterns? 
5. What is  l i f e?   What makes living things alive?  What are animacy and agency and vitality 
and projectivity?  Can a natural, material theory of teleology help restore older conceptions 
of life that depended on a more vague notion of purposiveness (as opposed to those more 
recent conceptions that cite 19th and 20th century biological concepts such as metabolism, 
reproduction, cell membranes, DNA, and evolution)?  Moreover, can a material theory of 
teleology help revitalize vitalist notions, such as entelechies and élan vital, in an emergent 
and non-enchanted way?  Can it describe the kind of organization that matters in the 
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biologist’s now-common phrase “organization matters”?  In just what way is a biological 
whole more than the sum of its parts? 
6. How can we account for future -direc tedness?   Goal-directedness is most certainly about the 
future, but how can a thing be “about the future”, especially if it is not an intentional, 
psychological system?  Can our account of biological teleology be made consistent with a 
conception of causation in terms of physical forces and Eddington’s arrow of time, and still, 
in some way, be about the future? 
7. What is  funct ion (and how does i t  re late to te l eo logy)?   Is it possible to fill in the blank, in 
the statement “the function of the heart is that particular thing the heart does that 
_________”, in a way that is so general as to allow us to transplant “the heart” with any 
other functional item while maintaining the truth of the statement?  Or if proper functions 
do not exist, then what is functioning?  What particular type of relationship must exist in the 
world for us to say that an item is functioning?  And just how does having a function (even 
if it is an illusion) relate to serving a function?  Is function a necessarily teleological 
phenomenon?  Certainly it isn’t only goal-directed things that can function (a hammer isn’t 
goal-directed), so then what exactly is the relationship between function and goal-
directedness? 
8. Can te l eo logy provide for  the autonomy of  bio logy?  Is function the fundamentally 
irreducible characteristic of biology that Laubichler suggested it is?  Can a law-like regularity 
be used to account for all functioning?  Or, if function is derivative (that is, if it is a relational 
property as I’ve claimed), then what relationships does it derive from and how might that 
phenomenon instead contribute to this apparent irreducibility?  If there is some teleological 
law of biology, how does it relate to other suggestions for biological laws?  What are we to 
make of Rosenberg’s assertion that natural selection is the law that gives biology its 
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autonomy?  Or McShea and Brandon’s assertion that “biology’s first law” is the tendency for 
diversity and complexity to increase? Might there be two or three (or more) laws of biology? 
9. What accounts for  the varie ty  o f  funct ion s tatements?  Can a theory of functioning, 
whatever it is based in, account in some way—whether it is in theoretical, analogical, or 
cultural terms—for all our function statements?  How do we make sense of some of the 
more exceptional cases such as the function of the ozone layer; or of free radicals in the 
ozone layer; or of rhizomes in the forest ecosystem; or of a non-designed rock used as a 
paperweight?  Can our theory of functioning make sense of the intuition that there may be 
more than one function per trait or per part of an artifact?  Can it account for the fact that 
purposiveness appears limited to organisms, their behaviors, and their artifacts? 
10. Can the many senses o f  “for” be uni f i ed?   When we ask the teleological question “what is 
it for?” there are many possible interpretations of what the word “for” means.  I suggested 
that this could cause some confusion, but that each sense of “for” may ultimately be in some 
way derivative from the fact that items with purposes or functions are personally good for 
some agent.  Can our theory of teleology either account for this suggestion, or else replace it 
with another explanation? 
11. What is  des ign?   Why do things that are designed coincide so regularly with things that 
have functions?  Even if not quite all things with functions are designed, why are natural 
design and human design both such prodigious progenitors of functions?  Can our theory of 
teleology clarify the relationship between design and function?  The relationship between 
design and agency?  Just what is design? 
12. Can we account for acc idental  funct ioning?  Can our theory of functioning equally account 
for both intended functioning and accidental functioning?  And if we can account for 
	 359	
accidental functioning, can we thereby avoid using the function-accident distinction to judge 
the theory of function?  Is there another benchmark that we can use? 
13. How can we re form our concept  o f  funct ion?  Even if the concept of a proper function is 
an illusion, thinking of items as having functions can be a useful tool in doing functional-
analysis and reverse-engineering in order to figure out how artifacts or organisms may work.  
If we develop a new theory of function, and if we discard the function-accident distinction, 
discredit the notion of “proper” functions, and discount intuitions based in design, 
malfunction, and items being for something-or-other . . . what remains of our concept of 
function?  How much does the new concept resemble the old one?  Can it still be used to 
perform the same theoretical jobs?  Can it still refer to things the way it currently does in 
everyday usage?   
14. Why does playing a causal  ro le  in a containing system corre late  so wel l  with i t ems that 
funct ion?   Why are functional items commonly found to be parts of systems that are 
hierarchically structured?  Said another way: Why is the process of functional analysis such a 
successful strategy when reasoning about both biological and artifactual items?  Some causal 
roles are not functional—the sun’s gravity tugs ever so slightly on our hairs but it doesn’t 
“have the function” of making our hair just a smidgeon lighter in the day and heavier at 
night—so just what kind of causal capacity or structure is required for functioning?  Does a 
theory of function need to provide a definition of a “system” or a “part” of one and, if so, 
how does our theory specify these things?  Moreover, how does our theory of function make 
sense of an item such as a stone paperweight or a cup or a stick of chalk that plays a 
functional role without having parts or belonging to a system?   
15. Why do the products  o f  natural  se l e c t ion corre late  so wel l  with i t ems that funct ion?   
Why do most functional items seem to be either the products of natural selection 
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(organisms) or the products of the products of natural selection (artifacts and behaviors)?  If 
natural selection doesn’t create function then how else might we account for the regularity 
with which the two are associated?  Can our theory account for Wright’s intuition that the 
function of an item is whatever it does to cause itself to be there?  Can it give a more unified 
account for both artifacts and organisms? 
16. Why does membership in a reproduct ive ly  es tabl i shed family corre late  so wel l  wi th i t ems 
that funct ion?   Is membership in such a family required for functioning?  If so, how shall 
we determine an item’s membership—when is an item that is made by some parent item 
identical enough to be considered a child, and when is it not?  If such membership is not 
required, then what else might account for the fact that the majority of functional things 
appear to be such members?  Also, does our theory provide a principle by which we can not 
only distinguish functions from malfunctions, but also distinguish each of those categories 
from non-functions?  Does the new theory account for Millikan’s ideas about direct and 
derived proper functions?  Does it account for items that are functional without being the 
products of selection?  How does it classify doubles such as instant lions?  And the sorting 
processes that Lewens describes as using the same norms that selection does?  Most 
importantly, does it avoid the SE theorist’s metaphysical dilemma of positing either a vital 
residue such as a function, or a causally irrelevant notion of function?    
17. Why does the disposi t ion to repl i cate  corre late  so wel l  with i t ems that funct ion?   Is there 
something about replication (even without selection) that is important to functioning?  What 
is it about the biological notion of survival and reproduction that correlates well with items 
that function?  Is the altered form of this—survival or reproduction—a useful notion despite 
appearing to be disjunctive?  Can our theory somehow maintain this basis in replication and 
yet still account for the functioning in limited edition designs that don’t have replicative 
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futures, such as artifacts and sterile animals?  Can it also account for Bigelow and Pargetter’s 
intuition that for an item to exist, it must have been serving its function all along? 
18. Why does the contr ibut ion to a goal  corre late  so wel l  with i t ems that funct ion?   If 
functions aren’t contributions to goals, then why else do functional items always seem to 
serve either an agent’s psychological or its biological goals?   And if functions are 
contributions to goals, then in what way is that relationship structured?  What exactly does it 
mean to be a goal?  And what does it mean for something to be a contribution to one?  How 
does our theory compare with the cybernetic theory in buttressing Boorse’s notion?   
19. Why does the not ion o f  programming corre late  wel l  with te l eo log i ca l  i t ems?   What is it 
about organisms and artifacts that make both somehow seem to be programmed?  Are 
information and instruction the central notions that define programs?  If so, what would 
allow us to extend this instructional idea of a computer program also to organisms as well as 
artifacts other than computers?  If not, what other pattern might account for Mayr’s 
intuition?  Is there a phenomenon that equally subsumes computer programs, artifact design 
or use, and the behavior of organismic traits in some way such that all may somehow be seen 
to be the same? 
20. Why does the not ion o f  value corre late  so wel l  with i t ems that funct ion?   Everything that 
functions seems to provide value to an agent; but just what does that mean?  And if 
functioning is not to be equated with having valuable effects, then what else might account 
for the two phenomena being so commonly associated with one another? Bedau talks 
vaguely about “the kind of thing that has its own interests (a ‘good of its own’)”, but just 
what “kind of thing” is that?  Is value somehow intrinsic to organisms, or is some other 
category more precise?  If we know what kinds of things can accrue value, then do we also 
know how value may be conferred upon them?  And, lastly, if value or interests turns out to 
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be a key term in a theory of goal-directedness, what sense can we make of conflicting 
interests, such as the suicide bomber’s biological interest to live and their ideological interest 
to die—can both these things be good? 
 
While this list may not be complete, it is certainly a good start.  If a theory of teleology is 
held accountable to answer all the questions here, that theory will not only provide an explanation 
for the basic teleological notions of goal-directedness, value, and identity, but it will also elucidate 
many of the issues that make function a thorny topic and it may explanatorily subsume all the major 
families of function-theory from the past century.   
Ideally, though, one would like a theory to do more than just that.  No doubt, if teleology is 
as important a subject as I have claimed, then a proper theory of it will bear further upon 
subjectivity, agency, will, and the relationship between agents and technology as well as the search 
for non-biological life, and the development of artificial intelligence.  Furthermore, a proper theory 
should be able to explanatorily replace previous theories in their extended roles, for instance in 
buoying theories of biosemantics, biomedical normality, functional analysis, and ethics.  It should 
either leave existing teleologically based or function-based theories of these topics largely intact yet 
set them on a somewhat modified foundation, or it should expose weaknesses in them and offer 
ways to repair those weaknesses.  Beyond this, we would hope the theory to eventually make new 
and interesting predictions in many or most of the related fields just discussed.  Near the end of the 
dissertation, I’ll very briefly and speculatively address all of these topics, leaving the bulk of those 





Realism about Goals and Purposes 
 
I have stressed the importance of the use of such concepts as biological means and ends because I want it clearly 
understood that I think that such a conceptual framework is the essence of the science of biology. 
 
—George Williams (1966:pp) 
 
Rather than reject this idea (as certain biologists have tried to do) it is indispensable to recognize that [goal-
directedness] is essential to the very definition of living beings. 
 
—Jacques Monod (1971:pp) 
 
Purposefulness, or teleology, does not exist in nonliving nature. It is universal in the living world.  It would make no 
sense to talk of the purpose or adaptation of stars, mountains, or the laws of physics. Adaptedness of living beings is 
too obvious to be overlooked. 
 
—Theodosius Dobzhansky, et al. (1977) 
 
Larry Wright opened his classic paper, “Functions”, by noting the non-centrality of the 
concept.  He wrote, “The notion of function is not all there is to teleology, although it is sometimes 
treated as though it were.  Function is not even the central, or paradigm, teleological concept” 
(Wright 1973).  The paradigm concept he is referring to is of course what we refer to variously as 
goal-directedness, striving, or purposiveness.  Still, over forty years later, the bias that Wright 
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pointed out persists in the literature.  It is exceedingly rare to find a paper that presents or defends a 
theory of goal-directedness while, as we’ve now seen, the debate on function continues to flourish. 
The main reason for this theoretical gap is the challenge that goal-directedness has long 
presented to the materialist.  There is nothing in the material world of particles, forces, and so on, 
that seems even remotely related to values, reasons, intentions, or strivings.  Where would such 
subjective properties come from?  The cybernetic approach—the only serious attempt to make 
objective, scientific sense of goal-directedness during the twentieth century—fell out of favor 
around Wright’s time and, until recently, no new offerings have been made.  The topic of function, 
despite many challenges of its own, has just seemed so much more approachable by comparison. 
Standing in contrast to the indifference of the material world are two everyday experiences.  
The first is our own psychological experience in which every action we take seems to be motivated 
by our psychologically goal-directed nature, by our individual aims and ambitions.  The second is our 
observation of the goal-directed nature of other organisms—of bacteria and sunflowers and 
mosquitoes and squirrels—striving in various ways toward various goals.  And so we are trapped—
caught between, on one hand, this distinct impression of biological and psychological entities and, 
on the other hand, our scientific understanding of the material world.  We find ourselves convinced 
that spirited organisms are composed of spiritually inert matter, and yet unable to make sense of the 
lively former in terms of the lifeless latter (see also Dennett 2017). 
In this chapter I will describe this problem, which I’ll call the teleologist’s dilemma, and I will 
compare it to a similar dilemma faced in the last century by behaviorist psychologists.  I’ll explain 
why I think the modern teleologist’s focus on functions instead of goals stems from the same 
concerns that caused behaviorists to emphasize behavior rather than minds; and I’ll suggest that the 
logical similarity in their motivations is why the teleologist’s focus also, unsurprisingly, suffers from 
some of the same flaws that plagued behaviorists.  Then, I will describe what I’ll call 
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“eliminativism”—the commonly held view that appears to resolve the teleologist’s dilemma by 
claiming that goal-directedness in organisms is only “apparent” or “seeming” (while leaving human 
psychological goal-directedness simply unexplained, though loosely assumed to be a product of how 
the brain produces a mind).  I will cite a broad variety of scientists to show that holding some form 
or another of eliminativism is the fashion of today.  Lastly, I aim to show that eliminativism is an 
unsustainable position and that we should instead believe in the goal-directedness that we all observe 
in the world until an enterprising eliminativist can clearly demonstrate how the illusion that they 
propose to exist is constructed, or under what types of limited conditions it occurs.   
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A. The Perception of Goal-Directedness 
 
You cannot conceive of a living organism, not to speak of behavior and human society, without taking into account 
what variously and rather loosely is called adaptiveness, purposiveness, goal-seeking and the like. 
 
—Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968:45-46) 
 
Nothing could be more obvious.  Organisms have aims and purposes, which their behavior serves; their component 
parts serve to fulfill these purposes and have functions in meeting the needs of cells, tissues, organs, whole biological 
organisms, and systems like ant colonies made up of a large number of individual organisms.  
 
—Alexander Rosenberg (1985:43) 
 
When we look at biological organisms of any type, their goal-directedness is immediately 
apparent to us, from their structure to their behavior, at every level of their organization.  As 
Rosenberg says: “Nothing could be more obvious.”266  For now, let’s call this an observational or 
perceptual fact, rather than a biological fact.  That is to say, I want to draw attention only to the fact 
that biological organisms look goal-directed (particularly in the sense of “goal-directed” that is not 
based in psychological goals).  We can remind ourselves of the breadth of this perceptual fact by 
examining a handful of cases. 
Think, for instance, of a ground squirrel.  It spends its summers and autumns toiling away in 
order to collect calories it can use to survive through the winter.  It does this in two ways:  first, it is 
biochemically inclined to accumulate substantial deposits in its fat cells that will both insulate it and 
																																																								
266 It is interesting to note that, after making this rhetorical claim, Rosenberg goes on to argue that the fact which is so 
obvious is, in actuality, an illusion (Rosenberg 1985, 2013).  I will take his claim more seriously than he himself does.  
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slowly burn off during the colder months, and second, it is behaviorally inclined to sock away 
hundreds of seeds and nuts in carefully chosen (and remembered267) hiding places so that it can later 
eat them in order to replenish both nutrients and energy.  The animal even has specialized parts and 
behaviors used to help achieve these goals.  For instance, it has (non-salivary) pouches in its cheeks 
that it uses to cache more than a meal’s worth of food so that it may free its forelegs for running off 
to “squirrel away” the nuts, as we say.   
 
 
Figure 7.1:  A hungry squirrel busy collecting nuts, in order to prepare for the winter. 
 
In everything they do, from morning to night, squirrels appear to be goal-directed.  Later, 
we’ll run across one author who refused to believe in purposiveness in squirrels (Ducasse 1925). Of 
course that author would not have found squirrel goal-directedness worth even a momentary 
																																																								
267 Jacobs and Liman (1991) observed that squirrels retrieve nuts from their own stashes, but not those from each other’s 
stashes buried in the same area, showing that retrieval depends on more than just the smell of nuts. 
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mention if he had not clearly observed their goal-directedness.  How else should we characterize the 
extensive process of storing and retrieving nuts across the seasons, or the many other clear striving 
behaviors (such as hiding, fleeing, reaching, leaping, nest-building, and so on) that the squirrel 
undertakes every day?  It would be difficult to describe any of these behaviors except in terms that, 
at least implicitly, make reference to what purpose the behavior serves—what it is for.   
If we scale down somewhat in complexity from the comparatively big-brained and complex-
bodied squirrel, we can look at animals such as mosquitoes, whose bodies and behaviors, while 
simpler, are still astonishingly adapted to a particular lifestyle.  
 
 
Figure 7.2: A female mosquito about to have a drink in order to nourish her eggs.  Photo reprinted 
courtesy of James Gathany, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
 
Like most insects, a mosquito is born from an egg that its mother carefully laid in a relatively 
safe place in order to ensure that her hatchlings would flourish.  In the mosquito’s case, this is at the 
surface of a body of standing water.  And, like most winged species of insect, when the larval 
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mosquito awakens into the world, its first actions are to alternately feed (in order to gather nutrients) 
and molt its exoskeleton (in order to make space for new growth) until it is large enough to undergo 
metamorphosis into an adult (in order to prepare for reproductive behaviors).   
When fully formed, the adult mosquito climbs out of its pupal shell and up onto the surface 
tension of the water for the first time.  It stands for a short while in order to let its soft body harden, 
crawls ashore, and then opens its wings in order to let them dry.  Then the female mosquito, as we 
all painfully realize, spends the rest of its nights skulking about, seeking animals and humans whose 
blood she will extract with a syringe-like mouth.  The male has more or less the same mouthparts, 
but it will use them to dine only on plant nectar in order to stay alive long enough to inseminate a 
female.  So why is it only the female that needs to pilfer blood?  Because the nutrient-rich fluid is 
used primarily to nourish its developing eggs in order that the whole story may begin again.   
This description of the mosquito’s lifecycle is intentionally riddled with “in order to” clauses 
in order to emphasize the creature’s goal-directed nature, but those clauses can’t simply be done 
away with.  If we spoke of the series of activities that a mosquito goes through in its life without also 
explaining (or assuming) what each of those acts is for, we would be left with a lingering sense of 
curiosity, fueled by both the functional interdependency and the thermodynamic oddity of each of 
its behaviors:  each part of these creatures clearly serves a role in their reproductive lifecycle, and 
each is used for (or is good for) accomplishing a certain task that contributes to the continuation of 
that lifecycle—each helps to organize the world in a certain manner, working against the statistical 
tendencies toward both energetic and material disorder.  Everything seems to be done for a 
reason268. 
																																																								
268 I’m being rhetorically blunt here at the risk of offending anti-adaptationist sensibilities.  Of course some parts and 
behaviors of creatures are non-functional, evolutionary accidents.  The point here is not whether or not the functional 
parts and behaviors make up the lion’s share; it is that, in terms of contributions to a continuing lifecycle, the functional 
parts and behaviors are the ones that matter, and the non-functional, non-adapted ones—however many there are—are 
largely irrelevant (unless they cost the organism too much).  
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In fact, every organism can be characterized in terms of this functional interconnectedness 
of its parts and behaviors, a state of affairs in which each stage of its lifecycle can be considered to 
do what it does in order that the next may be able to do what it does, and in order that, taken all 
together, the goals of survival and reproduction are achieved.  And, in the case of the minuscule-
brained mosquito—at least more so than in the case of the squirrel—this glaringly apparent goal-
directedness cannot be psychologically attributed to what the organism was thinking or wanting.  To 
emphasize this point, we can turn our attention now to a few examples where similarly discernible 
goal-directed behavior occurs but in creatures that lack brains altogether. 
Photographs of sunflower fields are famously attractive with their rows and rows of large, 
bright canary-colored blooms.  Such images are also remarkably easy to capture on any given sunny 
day.  One might imagine that sunflowers, with vertical faces that inherently must favor one direction 
over any other, would be even more difficult to coordinate for a family portrait than people are 
(“Everybody look at the camera and say ‘cheese’!”).  To the contrary, though, the sunflowers line up 
in readiness for such photos all day long.  They are virtuoso models that can transform any amateur 
into a directorial genius. 
Of course, sunflowers are entirely unaware of and uninterested in the fact that they are being 
photographed. What actually accounts for the photographer’s fortune is a common mechanism in 
many plants that botanists generally call phototropism (light-following) or sometimes, more 
specifically, heliotropism (sun-following).269  The explanation for this behavior is straightforward: the 
plants that follow the sun do so in order to maximize the amount of solar energy they can collect 
and use for photosynthesis. 
																																																								
269 More specifically, fully developed sunflower heads are not phototropic, but their leaves are, and when the plants’ buds 
are young and green they follow the sun too.  However, as the plant ages and the stem hardens and becomes woody 
while the flowers bloom, the mechanism that once moved the head back and forth becomes more limited and the heavy 
flowers tend to hang predominantly with their faces to the east . . . a result probably of the biasing fact that they spent all 
their youthful nights facing that direction, waiting for the sunrise.  Still, that resultant bias can be attributed to the 
heliotropism of their adolescence. 
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Figure 7.3:  A field of sunflowers facing to the east in the mid afternoon.  (Image credit: An amateur 
photographer.) 
	
As with the activities of squirrels and mosquitoes, those of plants are best described in terms 
of what purposes they serve.  Heliotropism is not an outlier in this regard.  Defense against insects 
and herbivores, the production of flowers (in order to attract pollinators), and the production of 
seeds, with a wide variety of mechanisms for endurance and dispersal, all serve various purposes in 
bettering the odds of producing the next generation.  These things are done for a reason.   
But of course we have little chance of chalking up these reasons to psychological intentions.  
Plants are classic non-psychological agents, according to most people’s intuitions.  They have neither 
brains nor ganglia, nor even a few distributed neurons.  And while they have numerous molecular 
signaling systems270, most people would agree that they have no hopes or desires, no beliefs about 
																																																								
270 There is at least one entire journal devoted to the topic: Plant Signaling and Behavior.   
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possible futures, and thus no ability to make plans toward which they might strive.  Plants might be 
minimally cognitive271 in the sense that their behaviors may include simple, conditional, information-
processed reactions to stimuli (if heliotropism is unconvincing, then think of the Venus’s flytrap), 
but the goal-directedness we see in them is not akin to psychology.  They are just too simple, too 
reflexive, for planning.   
To climb down the complexity ladder further still, we can strip away the distractions of 
multicellularity and examine the behavior of single-celled organisms such as bacteria.  When we 
zoom in for a close look we’ll find that these organisms appear no less goal-directed than the plants 
and animals we’ve explored above272.  The basic lifecycles of bacteria consist in feeding (in order to 
procure materials for the next steps), the synthesis of RNA, membrane lipids, and many other 
functional molecules (in order to repair damage and prepare for reproduction), and then the many 
ordered steps of binary fission undergone in order to produce two daughter cells that are then ready 
to begin the cycle once more.  This is mechanically more modest than the lifecycles of multicellular 
creatures, but it is nonetheless vitalistic, and can equally be described as a series of functionally 
interconnected activities, each done in order to prepare for the next. 
 
																																																								
271 The term “minimally cognitive” is borrowed from Randall Beer who uses it to refer to the simplest behaviors that we 
would characterize as being cognitively interesting.  His first example is an artificial agent with a few simple sensors and 
motors (Beer 1996).  In that and later work, Beer used an evolutionary algorithm to pursue minimal neural networks that 
could direct both simulated and real agents in performing simple discriminatory or behavioral activities (see, e.g., Chiel, 
Beer and Gallagher 1999; Beer and Williams 2015). 
272 A testament to this resemblance is the fact that Anton van Leeuwenhoek, the microscopy pioneer and discoverer of 
microorganisms, first called them “animalcules”, from the Latin for “little animals”. 
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Figure 7.4:  A colored scanning electron micrograph of the flagellated bacteria Vibrio cholerae.  Zhu et 
al. (2002) discovered that V. cholerae use quorum sensing (described in the text below) to control gene-
expression for toxicity virulence.  (Photo taken by Juergen Berger, Max Planck Institute for 
Developmental Biology.) 
 
In addition to the functional interconnectedness of their structures and behaviors, bacteria, 
much like animals, give the appearance of striving in many of their individual behaviors too.  
Howard Berg, one of the foremost contributors to our understanding of the biochemical mechanics 
of bacterial locomotion, notes that the mechanisms that contribute to their success in searching for 
food is best described as the pursuit of greener pastures.  In his monograph “E. coli in motion”, Berg 
(2004) describes the molecular mechanisms by which Escherichia coli use their propeller-like flagellum, 
driven by the world’s tiniest mechanical motor, in order to swim upstream (to greener pastures) in a 
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concentration-gradient of nutrients, by using sensory information about their progress to direct 
them273.   
This ability to “sniff out” and dependably move towards nutrients, such as glucose, serine, or 
aspartate, and away from poisons, such as the chemical phenol, is called chemotaxis and it is shared in 
some form by many species of bacteria.  In consisting of a sensorimotor feedback loop mediated by 
information processing, chemotaxis is a paradigmatic minimally cognitive behavior, and it is also an 
undeniably purposive-looking one.  As Berg himself observes, “E. coli swims in a purposeful 
manner” (2004). 
Another apparently goal-directed activity of bacteria is their social coordination through 
molecular communication.  One such method that recently has been investigated in detail is called 
“quorum sensing”.  In this system, individual bacteria signal their presence to one another by 
releasing a special molecule that they can also detect.  When the concentration of that molecular 
signal exceeds a threshold, the members of the colony recognize it as a quorum—a minimum 
number of votes that has been reached.  This signifies that their numbers are great enough to 
effectively accomplish a mutually beneficial, but cooperative task, such as virulence, spore-
production, or biofilm formation, activities that are much less effective or simply wasteful when 
																																																								
273 The details are fascinating.  Like many bacteria, E. coli has helical flagella (tails) that can act much like the propeller on 
a boat.  As it turns out though, there is no rudder on these bacteria, and the environment they swim in is one of constant 
perturbation from Brownian motion (Brown 1828; Einstein 1905; Perrin 1909), making it a bit of a challenge for them to 
set their course in a straight line for very long, not to mention that they have no way to know which direction they are 
facing when standing still.  The brilliant solution that evolution came up with to solve this challenge is a kind of hill-
climbing search algorithm that exploits the simple information in a nutrient gradient.  The flagella (which are attached 
somewhat variably between stern and midship) have two modes of operation.  When they turn counterclockwise, they 
become more or less bundled together, cooperatively propelling the bacterium forward.  When they turn clockwise, they 
disentangle from one another and work uncooperatively, causing the bacterium to tumble about unpredictably.  Thus, 
with a simple switch in polarity in the motor, the bacteria can swap between two different kinds of activities that Berg 
calls “tumbles” and “runs”.  The trick is in the way these tumbles and runs are coordinated by information.  The basic 
architecture of the algorithm is to simply alternate between tumbling and running, thereby making a little distance and 
then reorienting to a new unpredictable direction, but this alone amounts only to a random walk.  The key to making 
useful progress is a one-bit sensory system in the bacteria, which turns these tumble-and-run cycles into something much 
like the game of “warmer/colder” that children play.  The bacteria know only whether the current concentration of 
nutrient outside them is greater or lesser than it was a moment ago, and if it is greater, then a run is allowed to last 
longer, but if it is lesser, then a run will be cut short, and another tumble will take place.  Thus the random walk is 
punctuated with longer runs in the right direction (and shorter ones when going the wrong way).  The result is a fair bit 
of backsliding and sidestepping but, overall, the bacteria make forward progress (Berg 2004). 
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performed individually (Bassler and Losick 2006; Miller and Bassler 2001; Zhu et al. 2002).  
Cooperative social coordination of this sort would be difficult not to call goal-directed, especially 
when it has effects that serve what we see as being the purposes of the members of the population. 
I’m going to review one more example now, because it is a borderline case that will help later 
in mulling over the relationship between being goal-directed, being animated, and being alive.  The 
example is that of viruses, which most biologists consider neither to be organisms nor to be alive 
but which still, when we look at them closely, appear goal-directed, with lifecycles in many ways 
similar to those of organisms.   
Every virus has a structure that is a variation on the following two-part plan: (1) a genome, 
consisting of either DNA or RNA, is packed into (2) a protective shell called a capsid, usually 
icosahedral (twenty-sided) or cylindrical in shape and made of numerous identical protein parts.  
Depending on the species of virus, this capsid may then be enveloped in a membrane similar to that 
of a cell, or it may have a tail (as many bacteriophages do), but some simpler viruses have only a 




Figure 7.5:  A colored scanning electron micrograph of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) virions 
budding through a cell wall.  The new virions are the numerous tiny green spots (Photo taken by 
Thomas Deerinck, National Center for Microscopy and Imaging Research, University of California, 
San Diego).  
 
The reason that biologists typically refuse to call this type of structure alive is that, in the 
absence of a host cell, the virus is entirely inert.  It does nothing.  Unlike the much more complex 
structure of cells, viruses don’t have their own metabolic pathways, nucleotide-replication 
mechanisms, or protein-synthesizing machinery, and so they can neither harvest energy nor even use 
any if they had it, in order to reproduce or further their own survival (by, say, repairing 
environmentally-sustained damage) 274.   
																																																								
274 For an interesting borderline exception, see Häring et al. (2005). 
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In the context of a host cell, however, a virion (as individual virus particles are called) 
becomes another thing altogether.  As soon as it comes into contact with the right kind of host, the 
virion springs into action, first attaching to the cell and then forcing its way in, to gain access to the 
tools inside275.  Once it is inside, there are a number of strategies that it might take, depending on the 
species.  For instance, viruses with latency strategies will inject their genetic material into the host’s 
genome and then more or less hide away for a while, in order to allow themselves to be passively 
replicated and spread as a byproduct of normal cell division of the host.  Other viruses will 
immediately set about building virion-production factories—new, localized cellular machinery of 
their own—which then produce new virions in a highly efficient manner.  But most viruses will 
simply commandeer the cell’s normal operating machinery in order to copy their own genetic code 
and synthesize their own proteins, which eventually assemble into new virions within the cytoplasm.  
The new virions are then borne out into the world beyond the cell either by rupturing the entire cell 
or, in the case of enveloped virions, through a final act of thievery, called budding (see Figure 7.5), in 
which they create their envelope by pushing through the cell’s membrane and pinching off a bubble 
of it as they go276. 
Some scientists (e.g., Bandea 1983; Forterre 2010) have suggested that we should see 
individual virions as spores or seeds, and only whole infected cells as viruses.  What they mean is that, 
although the virion does not build the cell, once it commandeers it, then it effectively owns the 
machinery therein and it can be said that there is a new entity, comprised of the virion fused with its 
cellular home, for which these authors suggest we reserve the word “virus”.  Since these merged 
																																																								
275 On review, it appears that many of a virus’s behaviors would fit a description of minimal cognition.  Despite being 
comprised of just a handful of molecules, the virion seems to use information to make decisions.  For instance, the 
detection of the right kind of host cell by way of a sensor consisting of matching proteins, which then triggers a 
behavior—the entry mechanism the virion uses to get into the cell—seems strongly analogous to other sensorimotor 
feedback mechanisms in more complex organisms.  And this is just one example of the virus knowing just when to 
engage in which activities—in an ordered lifecycle—in order to successfully effect its own replication. 
276 The most insidious thing about this act of stealing the door as they exit is that these virions then use that very same 
stolen door as their entryway to the next host cell by inducing the new host’s membrane to fuse with it, thereby 
accepting the virion right into the factory. 
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entities are cellular and have features such as membrane containment, metabolism, and ribosomal 
protein-synthesis, Bandea and Forterre both consider them—but not their virions—to actually be 
alive by the same standards that other biologists use in describing cellular life.  One obvious concern 
with this view is that the virion is not self-sufficient in that it does not contribute to the construction 
of the membrane of the cell that it comes to inhabit, nor much of the machinery that it comes to 
operate277.  But at any rate, the proposal is an interesting one, not least because it is driven by a 
desire to recognize and make sense of the vitality or goal-directedness that these writers see in the 
many complex intracellular behaviors of virion-cell amalgams. 
We’ve looked now at five examples that span a variety of the domains of life, from animals 
and plants to bacteria and even pseudo-living viruses.  At this point, I think we can conclude that no 
matter where in the biological world we look, the behaviors of creatures that have lifecycles are 
going to give us the impression of being goal-directed.  Partially this is because their vitality and their 
industrious projectivity resemble our own constructive, project-focused strivings; partially it is 
because each activity that organisms undergo seems as if it contributes to something; and partially it 
is because each activity within a lifecycle seems to make sense only in terms of the whole cycle—
each seems as if it is done in order that the next may begin.  Even when things turn out to have been 
done in vain, they still don’t seem to have been done for nothing. 
Well before people understood cells or had any other productive biological theories, we 
labeled organisms as alive and grouped them together as biological objects simply because they 
displayed vitality.  We knew that bacteria and molds had something in common with sunflowers and 
mosquitoes and squirrels and humans because they all appear to have their own interests that their 
behaviors seem to serve; they all behave in a way that appears to us to be vitalistic, agential, and 
																																																								
277 Although in this case too, there are some partial exceptions in which viral genetic material codes for the construction 
of a set of operating mechanisms for virion construction, or even for some photosynthetic components that replace 
those of the cell and produce the energy necessary for virion construction (see e.g. Bragg and Chisholm 2008; Miller and 
Krijnse-Locker 2008; Novoa et al. 2005). 
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goal-directed.  We see the same thing whether we are looking at large multicellular organisms, the 
microscopic organisms that Leeuwenhoek first called “animalcules”, or even the internal workings 
of an individual cell.  It is an observation that is plain to any of us, from the prescientific 




278 Recall the quote from Aristotle, cited earlier:  “It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not 
observe the agent deliberating.” (Physics II.8) 
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B. The Teleologist’s Dilemma  
 
Minds are not bits of clockwork, they are just bits of not-clockwork. As thus represented, minds are not merely ghosts 
harnessed to machines, they are themselves just spectral machines. . . . Now the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine 
does just this. It maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that there occur physical processes and mental 
processes; that there are mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental causes of corporeal movements. I shall 
argue that these and other analogous conjunctions are absurd. 
 
      —Gilbert Ryle (1949) 
 
When what a person does is attributed to what is going on inside him, investigation is brought to an end. Why explain 
the explanation? For twenty five hundred years people have been preoccupied with feelings and mental life, but only 
recently has any interest been shown in a more precise analysis of the role of the environment. Ignorance of that role led 
in the first place to mental fictions, and it has been perpetuated by the explanatory practices to which they gave rise. 
 
—Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1974) 
 
Beginning just over a century ago, a generation or two of psychologists found themselves 
cornered by a dilemma:  The alternatives were to believe in a kind of extra-physical mind-stuff—the 
view called dualism—or to face what seemed like the perverse task of explaining the seemingly 
immaterial, subjective mind in objective, material terms.  The behaviorist’s resolution at the time, 
which today is unsatisfactory to most, was to avoid landing on either horn of the dilemma by 
claiming that the mind simply does not exist—that it is an illusion.  Without something to explain, 
the concerns of both alternatives dissolved.  Behavior could still be explained by material “laws” such 
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as classical and operant conditioning, reinforcement learning, and Thorndike’s “law of effect”, but 
such explanations eschewed any reference to mental states, beliefs, desires, or minds.  Writing off these 
latter concepts as fictions seemed to simplify the psychologists’ theoretical work, and the ensuing 
success of their theories in describing behavior gave them great confidence. 
The modern teleologist faces much the same kind of dilemma.  On the one horn, vitalism, 
which posits a kind of non-physical life-stuff or goal-stuff, is to biology and teleology what dualism 
was to psychology.  And on the other horn, it seems equally perverse to attempt to account for the 
seemingly immaterial and, again, subjective notions of goal-directedness and normativity in objective 
material terms.  How could mere mechanistic physics and biochemistry account for strivings, for 
reasons, and for plans, not to mention a set of norms by which to evaluate the achievement of those 
strivings and plans? 
Not surprisingly, without easy answers to these kinds of questions, the modern philosopher 
and scientist usually escapes the teleologist’s dilemma in the same way the behaviorists escaped 
theirs.  They deny or ignore the existence of non-psychological goals in the world, and give theories 
of much of what they observe in terms of a related concept ( function) which itself seems to them 
explainable in goal-free, objective, material terms—terms such as causal roles, dispositions, etiology 
(selected effects), and natural and human design.   
André Ariew takes himself to speak for the field in endorsing this kind of response to the 
teleologist’s dilemma:  
 
“Functional explanation” is our chosen term because “teleological explanation” is 
thought to imply backwards causation or bizarre ontological categories (for example 
vital forces) attributable to the teleological theories of Plato and Aristotle.  
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Functional explanation is not so imbued and hence, as opposed to teleology, is an 
appropriate topic for naturalistic analysis. (Ariew 2002) 
 
The idea that any topic could be deemed “inappropriate for naturalistic analysis” is a strangely 
unscientific one.  All patterns in the world that we (or any other agent) can in principle perceive are 
ripe subjects for analysis.  By their very nature, as patterns, they are immediately available for making 
and testing predictions.  On one hand, perhaps the pattern will turn out to be an illusion, but if so, 
analysis can only help to expose the source of that illusion.  On the other hand, perhaps what we 
perceive is a real pattern, out there in the world, and we simply have yet to successfully wrap a 
theory around it (Dennett 1991).  In either case we will come to understand the pattern more deeply 
through naturalistic analysis. 
Now behaviorism no doubt provided us with some abidingly interesting and valuable 
notions, but it ultimately failed to explain fully the subjects of psychology and behavior.  By turning 
its back on some of the fundamental patterns of its field of inquiry—thoughts, beliefs and desires—
not only did it leave such patterns themselves completely unexplained, but furthermore it was unable 
to account even for human behavior as successfully as an alternative body of theory (cognitive 
psychology) that does accept the roles played by thoughts and beliefs in the determination of 
behavior. 
Likewise, the recent decades of inquiry into function and design have also provided biology 
and philosophy with many useful notions. However, in largely ignoring goals, all this work leaves 
still unexplained not only the observed goal-directed character of organisms—their striving, their 
perseverance, their directedness, their vitality, and their normative nature—but also, I will soon 
contend, it leaves unexplained the way in which functioning deeply depends on that goal-
directedness and, thus, in which it cannot be fully explained without reference to goals. 
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Now, in laying out this analogy between behaviorist psychology and functionalist teleology, 
I’m not suggesting that any argument based in ontological doubt is systematically wrong.  Some 
patterns in the world do in fact turn out to be illusions, and our doubt is what leads us to eventually 
determine that about them.  What I am trying to suggest is that the reason that such doubt exists, 
both in the case of minds for behaviorists and in the case of goal-directedness for biophilosophers, 
is equally poorly founded.  In both cases, the doubt is not based in good evidence that there may be 
an illusion—there is no investigable pattern of exceptions or blatant context-relativity that seems to 
characterize the doubted pattern.  Rather, these patterns are doubted to exist only because explanation 
of them proves difficult.  The theoretical strategy employed is to assume that if the pattern can’t easily be 
made to fit with our rather well-tested scientific worldview, then it must not exist.   
That strategy might seem to make sense since it appears to work wonderfully for such 
patterns as goblins, ghosts, and gods; but the comparison is not fair.  In cases of that kind, the bulk 
of the prior observational evidence is against the existence of such phenomena.  The patterns are 
insubstantial, fleeting, ethereal . . . not obvious, and hence the burden rests upon the believer’s 
shoulders to prove to us why we should believe.  As the Bayesian scholar would put it:  evidence for 
their existence must be overwhelming, even miraculous, in order to overcome the prior evidence 
that they do not exist.   
For cases like beliefs and goals, though, the bulk of the evidence clearly supports their 
existence.  Nothing could be more obvious than the fact that we have minds and thoughts and 
beliefs that direct our behavior.  It is clear as day to all of us today, and it could only have been clear 
as day to the thinkers of the early 1900s as well.   Our minds are there, “staring us in the face”, every 
moment of every day.  Coming to discover such patterns did not require mental gymnastics and 
explanatory toil, but it was rather the disguising of these patterns, in order to eradicate them, that 
required years of (ultimately unsuccessful) effort by behaviorist thinkers.   
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Similarly, as Rosenberg said of organismic aims and purposes, “Nothing could be more 
obvious” (1985:43)279.  Nothing could be more obvious.  When we look to the natural world, the biological 
world, there are goal-directed behaviors being performed everywhere.  The squirrel, the sunflower, 
the mosquito, the bacterium, and the virus are just a handful of examples, but they aren’t special 
cases.  Every organism on the planet has behaviors that are goal-directed and this brute fact—this 
pattern of regularity—can be clearly observed by every two-year-old child discovering the liveliness 
of insects, birds, animals, and plants in their world and seeing something in their animacy that clearly 
distinguishes them from rocks and puddles and so on (see also Bertenthal 1993; and Rochat et al. 
1997; as well as Piaget 1929).  
Like beliefs and minds, goal-directedness is also staring us in the face all the time.  And since 
the bulk of the evidence clearly supports the existence of these patterns, then contrary to how we 
treat goblins, ghosts and gods, it rests squarely upon the non-believers’ shoulders to prove to the rest 
of us why we should disbelieve in the goal-directedness we see.  If one intends to wipe out a clearly 
observed pattern from their ontology for the sake of theoretical simplicity, then one had better have 
a good reason to believe that the pattern is indeed an illusion. That it is merely difficult to explain 
will not suffice.  
  
																																																								
279 Though, strikingly, Rosenberg himself is a selected-effects theorist and turns out to be a goal eliminativist. 
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C. Goal Eliminativism 
 
Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he is unwilling to be seen with her in public.280 
 
— J.B.S. Haldane   
 
The term “goal eliminativism” (alternatively: “teleological eliminativism”) can be used to 
refer to the common belief that any goal-directed behavior we observe in the world is only apparent.  
This differs importantly from earlier uses of the word “eliminativism” in the functions literature, 
wherein it was used for instance to classify views that “reject the intuition that a real difference exists 
between functions and dispositions” (Enç and Adams 1992).  Put simply, function eliminativists 
would have us disbelieve in functions while goal eliminativists would have us disbelieve in goals281. 
The theory of goals underlying goal eliminativism is typically not that there are none.  We 
could call that thesis out-and-out goal eliminativism and perhaps it was held by some of the 
behaviorists who refused to believe in mental states including psychological goals, but it is rarer 
nowadays.  Instead, most modern versions of goal eliminativism are roughly characterized by the 
belief that the only goals that truly exist are psychological goals, and that it is the non-psychological 
remainder of observed goal-directedness that is illusory.  There are a number of variations on this 
stance, but for all of them the behaviors of the sunflower and the bacterium are not attributable to 
any intrinsic goal-directedness of those organisms (while those of humans are).  Commonly it is taken 
that the behavior of these other organisms is apparently goal-directed, and that this appearance can be 
																																																								
280 I don’t mean to endorse this glaringly sexist comment.  Still, I felt compelled to include it here because the underlying 
theme (of even a gender-neutral translation of it) is exceptionally illustrative of the old but long-running and I think 
particularly problematic eliminativist stance that biologists take. 
281 Some might be tempted to classify me as a function eliminativist.  If they did so, I would find it difficult to argue 
otherwise but I would like to emphasize that, while I hope scientists eradicate the notion of a “proper function” from 
our scientific vocabulary, I find the common notion of an item having a function to be as exceptionally useful as the notion 
of an object having a weight or a color. 
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explained by some superficial analogy between their behaviors and those of psychological agents 
such as us.  We could call this kind of view partial goal eliminativism (as opposed to the out-and-out 
version), since its adherents do believe in some but not all goals; I will call it just plain eliminativism, 
as it is the only form that we really run into nowadays282. 
Let’s look next at a variety of eliminativist claims in order to clearly characterize the view and 
the ways it has come to be dispersed.  Today, eliminativism is the default position held by the vast 
majority of scientists and philosophers. 
  
																																																								
282 Allen and Bekoff (1995) have already branded this mentalistic kind of partial eliminativism “teleomentalism”, in order 
to contrast it with what they call  “teleonaturalism”, the latter being the class of theories that claim to give not a 
psychological, but a natural source for purpose or function.  There are, however, some eliminativist (and thus 
teleomentalist) views, both brazen and closeted, amongst the views that Allen and Bekoff place into each of their 
categories.  For instance, Davies’ (2001) causal-role theory of function (another defense of Cummins’ view) is 
archetypically teleonaturalist but at the same time he offers an avowedly teleomentalist explanation for goals.  Allen and 
Bekoff’s taxonomy works well to classify the functions debate that we looked at earlier; but I’ll stick to the word 
“eliminativist” to describe teleomental views on goals. 
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D. Eliminativism Everywhere 
 
Nearly all biologists and philosophers agree that biology is fundamentally non-teleological. 
 
—Michael Ruse (1971) 
 
David Hanke, a botanist at the University of Cambridge, is one recent writer I’ve run across 
who is absolutely captivated by the teleologist’s dilemma. He finds neither horn acceptable and so 
argues forcefully for eliminativism: 
 
Biology is sick.  Fundamentally unscientific modes of thought are increasingly 
accepted, and dominate the way the subject is explained to the next generation.  The 
heart of the problem is that we persist in making (literally) sense of a world that we 
now know to be senseless by attributing subjective values to the objects in it, values 
that have no basis in reality. (Hanke 2004) 
 
If one reads Hanke (2004) further one finds that the “subjective values” he is referring to are 
the norms of purposiveness that underlie the way we see biological behavior as functional and goal-
directed.  He worries that we are seeing reasons, in biology, where none exist.  More precisely, he 
thinks that there are objective “how come?” reasons for science to explore and discover, but that 
there are no subjective “what for?” reasons in our world, and so to speak in such purposive terms is 
fallacious.  Continuing, he writes, “The purpose of any object is entirely subjective because purpose 
has no real existence outside the mind of the animal thinking of it” (2004, emphasis added).  So, for Hanke, 
there can only be psychological goals and purposes in our world.  In the next few sections of this 
chapter, I think we’ll see that Hanke is not nearly as alone in these beliefs as he thinks he is. 
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André Ariew appears to be more circumspect, but also ultimately prefers an eliminativist 
stance of one sort or another.  In his exposition of classical Greek teleology he concludes “if biology 
has an ineliminable teleology, this is not so bad as long as it is one of the more restrained 
Aristotelian versions of teleology” (2002, emphasis added).  And he clarifies his idea of “the more 
restrained Aristotelian versions” with an assertion that I reviewed earlier: “teleology pertaining to 
natural organisms is . . . non-purposive (though seemingly so)” (2002).  Reading further, we find that 
Ariew would accept an “Aristotelian explanation for the existence of traits in terms of their 
usefulness”—that is, a Darwinian theory of function, but not a theory of goal-directedness (Ariew 
2007).  As with Hanke, there is no real purposiveness in any organisms other than psychological 
human agents—Ariew would have us accept either a goal-free materialism or a weak version of 
Aristotelian teleology in which purposiveness is only “seemingly so”.  
Employing the adverbs “seemingly” or “apparently” to preface “goal-directed” and 
“purposive” is one of the clearest signs of an eliminativist stance.  It is also a nearly universal 
practice today.  Ariew (2002) notes that qualifiers of this kind have been used at least since Aristotle 
distinguished his four causes.  Indeed the trend is so widespread that the term “teleonomic”, 
introduced by Pittendrigh (1958), has come to be embraced and used widely as synonymous with 
“seemingly” or “apparently” goal-directed (though Pittendrigh himself hadn’t intended it this way)283.  
The long list of quotes that follow showcases the diversity of disciplines across which purpose is 
seen to be “seeming” or “apparent”.   
Dan McShea has recently offered a new theory of teleonomy in terms of hierarchical 
structure.  The view is eliminativist, though.   
 
																																																								
283  He simply meant to distinguish a deterministic kind of teleology from cosmic or theologically connoted teleology or 
backwards causation.  Pittendrigh was not an eliminativist; he did in fact believe that biological objects are goal-directed, 
and was somewhat convinced by the cybernetic theory of goals. (See the endnotes of Mayr, 1974/1988, for 
correspondence between Mayr and Pittendrigh detailing this issue). 
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How shall we understand apparently teleological systems? . . . Here I argue that all seemingly 
goal-directed systems—e.g., a food-seeking organism, human-made devices like 
thermostats and torpedoes, biological development, human goal seeking, and the 
evolutionary process itself—share a common organization.  (McShea 2012a, 
emphasis added) 
 
Carl Craver, another philosopher of biology also recently offered his eliminativist view: 
 
I claim that the causal structure of the world is disenchanted and purposeless. Mechanistic and 
functional descriptions, in contrast, presuppose a vantage point on the causal 
structure of the world, a stance taken by intentional creatures when they single out 
certain preferred behaviors as worthy of explanation. Specifically, talk of functions 
and final causes is not legitimized by or reduced to privileged kinds of etiological 
histories (though some functions have such histories) or to certain special effects of 
the item in question. Rather, they are imposed from without by creatures seeking to 
understand how a given phenomenon of interest is situated in the causal structure of 
the world. (Craver 2013, emphasis added) 
 
McShea and Craver may be some of the most recent theorists of teleology, but they also exemplify 
an old trend.  In introducing their anthology of essays on “Nature’s Purposes”, Allen, Bekoff, and 
Lauder hedge their bets too. 
 
Biology is unique among the natural sciences in licensing apparently teleological statements 
about design, purpose, and adaptive function.  Teleological thinking originated from two 
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views, both of which are assumed to have been discredited in physics, chemistry, and 
the other natural sciences. (Allen, Bekoff, and Lauder 1998, emphasis added) 
  
Laubichler, also writing about teleology in terms of function, says: 
 
This ontological distinction between mechanistic processes and “additional laws of 
nature” also sets the stage for the binary opposition between “reductionism” and 
“holism” that has often crippled any constructive dialogue about the interpretation 
of seemingly goal-directed or purposeful biological phenomena. (Laubichler 1999, emphasis 
added) 
 
In approaching the teleologist’s dilemma, Sommerhoff attempts to navigate between the 
horns: “We see therefore that a definite answer can be given and that it is neither the teleological 
answer of the vitalists nor the skeptical answer of the mechanists.” (Sommerhoff 1969).  Ultimately, 
this turns out to be an eliminativist view. 
 
The most distinctive characteristic of the behaviour of higher organisms is its goal-
directedness, its apparent purposiveness. In fact, it is largely through this apparently 
teleological nature of their activities that living organisms betray their exceptional 
organization. (Sommerhoff 1969, emphasis added) 
 
Also in another passage:  
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If we abandon scientific exactitude and provisionally attempt to express these 
fundamental characteristics of living systems in non-scientific and largely 
metaphorical language, we may say that they consist in the apparent purposiveness of 
vital activities and in the manner in which this apparent end-serving or goal-seeking quality 
integrates the part events of living systems into the self-regulating, self-maintaining, 
and self-reproducing organic wholes which we recognize as living individuals. 
(Sommerhoff 1950) 
 
Given these quotes, one might be surprised to find that Sommerhoff does offer a theory of goal-
directedness.  But he is not inconsistent.  His theory is given in the tradition of the cybernetic 
theory, and, like other authors in that stream, he is only prepared to say that the goal-directedness he 
is describing is illusory, the result of an often complicated, but ultimately cybernetic, mechanism that 
amounts to little more than the objective mechanisms in things such as thermostats and homing 
torpedoes.  It is not truly normative, subjective, or value-laden. 
The eliminativist trend is not limited to philosophers of teleology. Other writers in 
biophilosophy display the same commitment. 
 
Memes, like bacteria, create their own apparent goal-directedness because they form a 
selective system with replicators whose permanence transcends individual bodies. 
(Frank 1996, emphasis added) 
 
The most salient feature of organisms is adaptation, the seeming goal-directedness that 
makes organisms different from merely physical entities. (Queller and Strassman 
2009, emphasis added) 
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Medicine is a biological subfield and so it is subject to a somewhat similar culture of beliefs.  
For example, in describing the cause of the coughing reflex caused by stroking the trachea, 
Goldstein writes, 
 
The apparent goal-directedness and coordination of this reflex does not imply either that 
the patient senses the suctioning catheter or coughs voluntarily, just as the apparent 
purposiveness of a thermostat does not imply that the thermostat is either conscious of 
or “wants” to maintain the temperature of a room. (Goldstein 2006, emphasis 
added) 
 
Outside of biology and philosophy, we still find many scientists making similar claims.  
Though, in some of these contexts, the ontological doubt may seem somewhat more justified.  For 
instance, from roboticists, we get the following quotes: 
 
We experimentally examined whether differences in the manner of interacting with a 
moving robot (operating it or only observing its movements) influenced one’s 
perception of the robot’s animacy and, if so, whether the strength of this influence 
depended on the apparent goal-directedness of the robot’s movements. We found that 
people only observing the robot perceived it most animated when its movements 
seemed most goal-directed but that people controlling the robot perceived it more 
animated when 1/f noise made its movements seem less goal-directed. 
(Fukuda and Ueda 2010, emphasis added) 
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A key thing to note with these robots is the ways in which seemingly goal-directed 
behavior emerges from the interactions of simpler non goal-directed behaviors. 
(Brooks 1990, emphasis added) 
 
The implemented architecture is used to control a simulated robot, and a classic 
experimental paradigm in which rats performed apparently goal-directed action selection 
is emulated. (Shanahan 2005, emphasis added) 
 
And from evolutionary psychology, we have: 
 
Motivated responses may occur without the activation of any cognitive 
representation (conscious or nonconscious) of goal constructs. Seemingly goal-directed 
cognitions may simply be triggered automatically in response to the perceptual 
recognition of certain situations. Again, the suggestion is that this automatic 
triggering process occurs as a result of the evolutionary history of the species. 
(Schaller 2003, emphasis added) 
 
Altogether, there appears to be a rather widespread tension among the scientists cited here:  
The pattern of goal-directedness must be as obvious to all of them as it is to Rosenberg—as obvious 
as it has been to any of us since the age of two. It is a pattern that they all see, that they find 
themselves compelled to talk about in scientific discourse and yet, due to a fear of being impaled 
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upon one of the two horns of the teleologist’s dilemma, they cannot refrain from either 
equivocation or blatant disbelief284. 
  
																																																								
284 There are a handful of notable exceptions, including the scientists whom I’ve quoted in the epigraphs at the start of 
this chapter as well as Walsh (2009), who argues at length that biology cannot do without the explanatory power of goal-
directedness; Deacon (2013), whose ideas prefigure my own in some ways; and Nagel (2012), who argues that natural 
teleology is the only acceptable answer to explain consciousness, cognition and value.  Nagel stops short of giving a 
theory—he just suggests that one is necessary—but the argument is certainly iconoclastic, given the atmosphere we have 
been reviewing in this chapter.  I also find his argument that teleology underlies value to be mistaken—as we’ll see in the 
coming chapters, I prefer to frame it in the reverse manner. 
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E. Teleomental Eliminativism 
 
If we say that we “try” to catch a fly, we regard this as a perfectly legitimate use of the verb “to try”.  But if we next 
say that the fly in the hollow of our hand will “try” to escape, our modern scientific training intervenes and warns us 
that in the second case we are committing an illicit anthropomorphism.  The fly, we are warned, is not a conscious 
rational agent, and therefore does not in any literal sense “try” anything.  This rigour of thought is very laudable.  Yet 
in spite of these wise injunctions the incontrovertible fact remains that there is a unique something about the observed 
behaviour of the fly which quite emphatically invites this anthropomorphism and which renders this behaviour far better 
suited to such an analogy and teleological conception than, say, the behaviour of a falling stone.   
 
—Gerd Sommerhoff (1950) 
 
The eliminativist view that psychological goals are the only real goals is implicit in most of 
the uses of “seemingly” or “apparently” to describe goal-directed behavior, but it is also offered 
explicitly, and in detail, by the theorists that Allen and Bekoff (1995) call “teleomentalists” (see 
footnote 282, p. 388).  Theorists of this persuasion illustrate the ways they think that psychological 
goal-directedness can account for the perception of non-psychological goal-directedness. 
Ducasse (1925), for instance, claims “only the acts of entities capable of beliefs and desires, 
are capable of being purposive” and he requires further that “causation by that belief and that desire 
jointly” is essential in order to speak of an act as being purposive.  At the time of his writing, it was 
uncommon to think of animals as possessing beliefs and desires, and Ducasse appears to have 
agreed with this verdict: he suggests “when a squirrel stores away food . . . it is not a purposive act” 
(1925, emphasis original)285. He defends his view by appealing to the threat of backwards causation:   
																																																								
285 Though, with respect to human beliefs, Ducasse apparently diverged from the behaviorist school of thought, popular 
at the time. 
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How, indeed, could a fact that has not yet occurred explain, i.e., be a possible cause 
of, a fact that has already occurred? And it is here that the teleological temptation 
comes in: Obviously, whispers the Devil, only if an intelligence aware of the 
contingency of the second upon the first, and desiring the occurrence of the second, 
is thereby moved to bring about the first!  (ibid, p. 153)  
 
Ducasse undoubtedly would have felt the same way about our sunflower, bacterium, and mosquito 
examples as he does about the squirrel.  For him, non-psychological goals only have an illusory 
appearance of being goal-like.   
Woodfield’s form of teleomentalism holds quite similarly “the [goal-directed systems] that 
do not have minds are included [as being goal-directed] because they are similar to the ones that do 
[have minds]” (1976:163).  Woodfield notices the similarity between biological and psychological 
goal-directed activity, but he means to downplay that similarity in order to consider the mindless 
systems to not really be goal-directed.  His strategy would be workable if we knew just how and why 
the mind-bearing systems came to be goal-directed and if we knew that that same structure—
whatever it is—were not a part of the mindless systems.  We could then conclude that the similarity 
is only superficial.  But the study of cognition and affect is a fledgling field, only now beginning to 
explore how human goals and decision-making arise from the mind, brain, and body, and the picture 
is still out of focus.  Given our relative ignorance, it might be more productive to use the opposite 
strategy from Woodfield’s: to use the similarity between mindless and mind-bearing goal-directed 
systems to guide our inquiry about just what structures might be shared between them, rather than 
assuming those similarities are unimportant.  
Lowell Nissen (1993, 1997) gives the most recent teleomentalist view of this sort.  For him 
there is goal-directedness only if an intentional agent intends the goal.  Nissen claims that when 
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people invoke goal-directedness to explain the behaviors of organisms, they are imagining natural 
design to require a “programmer” (he seems to borrow Mayr’s term) who intends the organisms to 
operate as they do and whose goals we are actually talking about.  Since Nissen rejects the idea of a 
creator, he then concludes that explanations that appeal to goal-directedness in this way amount only 
to false claims; there is no goal-directedness in non-human organisms. 
In contrast to Nissen, there are those teleomentalists who do believe that the functions and 
goals of organisms are quite literally derived from the goals of a supreme psychological agent—a 
creator that designed and built (or programmed) the world to work just so (e.g. Plantinga 1993).  We 
can call these people creationists or, following Allen and Bekoff (1995), “literal teleomentalists”.  
The creationist claim of course will depend crucially on an extensive and sustainable defense of the 
existence of the imagined creator286.   
Some thinkers, of course, take the view that natural design is sufficient to metaphorically 
play the role of a designer (e.g. Dawkins 1986; Kitcher 1993) and that this is good enough to account 
for designedness and thus function.  Allen and Bekoff call this strand of thought “metaphorical 
teleomentalism” since it doesn’t explicitly require any intentional or mental aspect.  In chapters IV 
and V, however, I argued extensively against taking design as a basis for function, and there is no 
need to repeat those arguments now.  
The primary concern I have with any real teleomentalist views (the literal creationist version 
and the version advocated by Nissen, Woodfield and Ducasse, but not Dawkins’ metaphorical 
variety) is that they all rest upon notions of intentionality (including psychological goals) without 
defining those terms.  That is, they require a goal-directed agent from the start (either a human or a 
god) without explaining how that agent came to be goal-directed.  Such a view leaves the original 
																																																								
286 Since it will be a long while before we’ll see such a defense, I think the reasonable course of action here is to continue 
examining other theories of goal-directedness.  And, if, in the meantime, we find a complete natural theory of teleology 
that makes the creationist view superfluous, then we should provisionally accept it until we one day have evidence of a 
creator. 
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problem of what goal-directedness actually is simply unexplained.  The question is not answered, but 
rephrased:  What is it about minds that makes them goal-directed? 
Of course, we have plenty of evidence to accept the idea that minds issue forth somehow from 
the complexity of (embodied) brains, and to presume that perhaps the explicit cognitive goal-
directedness of humans can be explained, somehow, as a result of our emotional system combined 
with reasoning and “executive function” and perhaps culture and experience.  But it remains to be 
seen just what all of those things really consist of and just how they might produce goal-
directedness.  I find it substantially compelling to think that the cognitive capacities that make 
psychological agents goal-directed actually result from those agents being biological organisms in the 
first place.  After all, our central example of a psychological agent—ourselves—is, if anything, a 
biological organism.  This is why I am rather more convinced by a logic reversed from the 
teleomentalist’s—one that accounts first for biological goal-directedness in some kind of natural 
terms, and only then for how the psychological goal-directedness of humans is a special case of that 
more general and fundamental answer. 
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F. Function Theorist Eliminativism 
 
According to neo-teleologists, as I shall call them, we have hearts because of what hearts are for.  
 
—Robert Cummins (2002) 
 
There really aren’t any purposes in nature and no purposive processes either. It’s just one vast network of linked causal 
chains. The notion that Darwinian natural selection naturalized purposes is just a way of sugar coating its bitter pill. 
 
—Alexander Rosenberg (2013) 
 
Many of the theories of functions that we looked at in the previous chapter are also either 
openly eliminativist or closet eliminativist.  It will be worth reviewing them to see how.  Perhaps the 
most brazen eliminativists amongst philosophers of function are the causal-role theorists.  While 
Davies accepts functions and rejects the label of “function eliminativist” (that he anticipates Enç and 
Adams, 1992, might apply to him), he is nonetheless a goal eliminativist: 
 
I thus reject the premise that we must make room for any such teleology [—genuine 
purposes or norms of performance—] in our theories of natural traits. (Davies 2001, 
p. 49) 
 
[Goal-directedness] is important insofar as it accounts for our temptation to see 
some objects as more functional than others; but it is not among the conditions 
necessary for the attribution of a . . . function. (ibid, p. 155) 
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On Davies’ view, functions in natural traits don’t require the existence of purposes or goals or 
reasons in the world.  He offers a teleomentalist thesis that our perception of goal-directedness is an 
illusion: 
 
I want to suggest . . . that certain psychological capacities and limitations incline us to 
see some objects as more functional than others. . . . [I aim] to suggest by way of 
example how to diminish the intuition we have that much of the biological realm is 
purposive. (ibid, p. 75) 
 
Davies doesn’t offer any convincing argument of how (or why) our psychological capacities 
might actually bring about the illusion of presenting false purposiveness to us—he cautiously and 
explicitly defers that task to psychologists—but later in this chapter I will perform a version of the 
exercise for him.  After presenting a likely mechanism for such an illusion, I will suggest that we 
have good reason to believe that its scope of operation is limited and that instances when it does 
operate are typically detectable, so that we need not take the radically skeptical view that the illusion 
might be pervasive. 
Cummins also refuses to allow purpose or goals to play any part in his functional analysis 
view.  He likens the SE analysis, which he calls “neo-teleology”, to teleological mechanics—the 
supposed purposiveness in phenomena such as falling stones and planetary orbits—and then argues 
that, like the animistic purpose that was once seen in these mechanics, the purpose seen in biological 
traits can be considered explanatorily irrelevant if his causal roles are sufficient to explain functions.   
 
Biological traits once explained by a teleology grounded in appeals to the intentions, 
plans, and actions of a creator have, in discerning minds, given way to appeals to 
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evolution generally, and to natural selection in particular.  Neo-teleologists want to 
read this as the discovery of a legitimate grounding process for a teleological 
explanation of these traits.  I am inclined to read the same intellectual development 
as analogous to what happened in mechanics and developmental biology: not a 
vindication but a replacement. (Cummins 2002) 
 
While I agree with Cummins that grounding (basing our theory of ) teleology in natural 
selection fails as does grounding it in creationism, I think he may be too quick to toll the death knell.  
Teleology was properly wiped out of mechanics because scientists discovered laws by which the 
behaviors of physical phenomena could be described without any evaluative norms, but the same is 
not true of biological, psychological or artifactual phenomena—we simply cannot avoid at least 
sometimes speaking of organisms in terms of what is good or bad for them.  Of course, Cummins 
claims that his functional analysis provides a way to look at functional phenomena without invoking 
any concepts of goal-directedness or value but, as I argued in Chapter V, the job only seems to be 
accomplished through a bit of sleight of hand on his part.  The card is still in the deck; he’s only 
made sure it’s no longer on top. 
Causal-role theorists wear their eliminativism on their sleeves, as do some of the other 
function theorists cited earlier (e.g., Allen, Bekoff and Lauder 1998; Ariew 2002; Craver 2013; 
Laubichler 1999; McShea 2012), but some form or another of perhaps less blatant eliminativism is a 
wide trend amongst other philosophers of function too.  Probably the most obvious sign of this is 
the contrast between the immense scale of the literature on function and the relatively little modern 
discussion of goal-directedness.  Additionally, coming from just about all corners, there seems to be 
either animosity or indifference towards the only modern goal-based theory of function, even 
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though this theory (Boorse’s GC analysis) can, taken loosely, be independent of any particular theory 
of goals. 
Selected-effects theorists seem for the most part to be teleologically agnostic, if not 
eliminativist.  Most of their theories are given in terms that simply make no mention of purpose or 
goal-directedness.  Many of them make no mention even of normativity (e.g., Wright 1973; but see 
also Wright 1976).  As I noted in the previous chapter, Millikan’s SE functions are comparatively but 
not evaluatively normative so she might see herself as giving a kind of teleological theory of 
function287, but still, the comparative, historical norms of selection only allow us to say that a trait is 
or is not doing what its ancestors had done.  They don’t answer inquiries that are interested in “for 
the sake of ” or “in order to” or about what purpose something serves. 
Perhaps the most plainly eliminativist SE theorist is Godfrey-Smith, who argues that 
Wright’s (1973) introduction of the function–accident distinction “disposes of the whole range of 
analyses of functions based upon contributions to goals” (1993:197).  Godfrey-Smith continues: “a 
mere contribution to a goal is not a function unless it is not fortuitous, unless this contribution 
explains why the thing is there. But this requirement of explanatory salience is apparently now 
bearing the whole weight of the concept of function, and goals drop out of the picture” (ibid, emphasis 
added).  Of course, on Godfrey-Smith’s argument, goals drop out of the picture only if one takes the 
notions of “proper functions” and the function–accident distinction seriously but, as we’ve seen, 
these are ideas that I seriously doubt. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, some of the theorists whose views fall under the 
“survival and reproduction” (SR) branch of the RD analysis are also eliminativist.  Canfield says, “If, 
then, the word ‘useful’ which appears in [my preliminary sketch] can be replaced by words which are 
clearly non-teleological, there will be strong reason to believe that the teleological notions occurring 
																																																								
287 Indeed, Millikan claims, “The things that have ‘proper functions’ do seem to coincide with things (omitting God) that 
have, in ordinary parlance, ‘purposes’.” (1984). 
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in functional analyses can be dispensed with.”  This ambition to find a schema by which one could 
“translate away” any teleological terms, by trading in terms such as “in order to” for replacements 
such as “and thereby”, was widespread at the time (Canfield 1964; Nagel 1961; Pittendrigh 1958; 
Ruse 1971), but has been convincingly argued against by a few authors who show that translations 
of this sort inevitably lose an important part of the original meaning, particularly with regard to the 
question of what an event or item is for (Ayala 1970; Beckner 1969; Mayr 1974).  Mayr gives the 
following example. 
 
The Wood Thrush migrates in the fall into warmer countries in order to escape the 
inclemency of the weather and the food shortages of the northern climates. (Mayr 
1974) 
 
If we were to replace “in order to” with “and thereby”, Mayr says, “we leave the important 
question unanswered as to why the Wood Thrush migrates” (1974).  Beckner gives a series of 
examples in which the phrase “in order to” does not appear but is still implicit.  When we 
understand these claims, we tacitly bring in our knowledge of goal-directed behavior and make the 
(correct) assumption that the subjects of examples T1–T4, along with other agents implicit in T5 
and T6, are behaving in an agentive, goal-directed manner. 
 
(T1)  “Vultures break open eggs with stones.” 
(T2)  “Myrtle warblers migrate in the spring into regions of abundant food.” 
(T3)  “The missile swerved toward its target.” 
(T4)  “He acted out of avarice.” 
(T5)  “The arms of the Dean’s chair are upholstered.” 
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(T6)  “The sight of a barracuda releases an escape reaction in anchovies.”  
(This list adapted from Beckner, 1969) 
 
Despite lacking an “in order to” clause these are all teleological claims that compel the reader 
to think in terms of goal-directedness.  We immediately wonder or assume what the vultures break 
open the eggs for and why the myrtle warblers migrate and so on.  Beckner’s (and Mayr’s) point is 
that we should not be fooled by these translational-theorists who are avowedly eliminativist but 
whose lexical chicanery only eliminates certain words, not the concepts behind them. 
Even the maverick theorists who defended the three unpopular theories are not all 
unequivocally willing to defend goals.  Boorse is, and Mayr comes close288 but Bedau, who supports 
the VE theory, presented his three grades of teleology in order to separate what he sees as “real” 
(for him, psychologically-based) teleology from what he takes to be biological pseudo-teleology.  He 
says, “Grade three teleology seems to be present in biology, but only its grade two close cousin really 
exists” (Bedau 1992b, p. 284, emphasis added).   
Altogether we find few amongst biologists, psychologists, roboticists, philosophers, and even 
the brand of function-theorizing philosophers that we could almost call “teleologists” who are 
willing to accept that there are real evaluative norms or real goal-directedness in our world.  Today, 
thinking of purpose as being merely “apparent” is quite the norm, but, if I am right, one day it will 




288 While Mayr refers to “seemingly goal-directed behavior” (1974, emphasis added), he also shows that he takes goals to 
be real in some emergent sense when he says, for instance, “Even though there are indeed many organic processes and 
activities that are clearly goal-directed, there is no need to involve supernatural forces, because the goal is already coded 
in the program which directs these activities.” (Mayr 1992). 
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G. Truly Illusory Goals 
 
Attributing intention to behaviour is a primitive move. Children do it with no instruction, as when listening to nursery 
stories and playing. It is done in an instant, without conscious inference. If non-linguistic judgments can be 
countenanced, animals may also be said to make judgments of intentionality, as when prey distinguish pursuit from 
loitering in a predator.  
 
—Lowell Nissen (1993) 
 
Hence, it came about that, as Man awoke to the objective phenomena of directive correlation in nature, he began to 
describe them in terms of concepts introspectively derived from his own experience, and to interpret them in terms of 
anthropomorphic and psychological analogies—in terms of “purposes”, “goals”, “aims”, &c.  The resulting confusions 
in biology were fatal.   
 
—Gerd Sommerhoff (1950) 
 
As we have seen, no one denies that we commonly perceive goal-directedness; they only deny 
that biological goal-directedness is rooted truly in the natural world rather than being constructed 
somehow through the processes of perception.  Before I argue one more time against eliminativism 
in the next section, I’d like to do something that eliminativists generally neglect to do in support of 
their positions:  I’d like to highlight how illusion can convincingly account for the perception (and 
projection) of goal-directedness in certain circumstances where there is none. 
Around a half century ago, Albert Michotte performed an extensive series of experiments on 
“the perception of causality” (1946/1963, 1950, 1968; see also Csibra 2007, 2008; Gao et al. 2009; 
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Heider and Simmel 1944), from which an interesting illusion emerged:  Participants in his 
experiments observed feelings, thoughts, desires and goals in situations where there clearly were 
none.  Here’s how that happened. 
Michotte was interested in the ways that people infer causation from motion, and so he 
arranged a set of experiments in which he could vary a number of parameters of motion and could 
then observe how those variations influenced viewers’ perceptions of causality. One of Michotte’s 
apparatuses displayed colored rectangles that appeared to move across a screen in various, simple, 
coordinated ways.  The design of this apparatus consisted of a painted disc that was made to rotate 
smoothly and silently behind a screen with a slit in it.  Curved stripes on the disc would then be 
seen, through the slit, as nearly rectangular shapes that would appear to move to the left or right, as 
the disc rotated.  One can see that, were we to rotate the disc in Figure 7.6a, the two rectangles 
showing through the slit would at first be stationary, then the orange one would move right to abut 
the blue one for a moment, after which the blue one would move away before they would both 
remain stationary again.  If this happened rather slowly, the description I just gave—in terms of 






    
Figure 7.6:  Schematics of display wheels like those used in Michotte’s experimental apparatus.  In 
both cases, the majority of the wheel would be fully occluded with only a small amount showing 
through the horizontal slit (here the majority of the images are only slightly greyed so that we can see 
what lies behind).  When turned counter-clockwise, the colored stripes on wheel a would appear as 
rectangles that would move to the right, with the orange one moving first until it abutted the blue one, 
and then, after a pause, the blue one would move away.   The stripes on wheel b would appear as the 
same two rectangles, both moving at the same speed and never touching one another.  Of course, 
today, the same effect can be achieved much more simply on a computer screen. 
 
If the period of abutment were reduced significantly (by repainting the disc otherwise) 
participants would observe a kind of billiard-ball causation in which the darker square struck the 
lighter one, knocking it forward.  With subtle differences in the arrangement, the velocities, and the 
relative timing of the rectangles’ movement, Michotte was able to elicit from his participants widely 
varying descriptions of the behavior of these rectangles.  Sometimes people would describe the 
rectangles as moving left or right, or speeding up or down, or getting closer together or further 
apart; but other times they would describe them as “pushing”, “launching”, “fleeing”, and so on.  
Much like the language in Beckner’s examples that we looked at in the previous section, these 
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intentional verbs used by Michotte’s participants all imply a perception of goal-directedness—an 
inference about a psychological or biological nature in the rectangles.   
One particularly relevant and simple example here is the condition in which Michotte 
arranged for two rectangles to move together across the screen at the same velocity, one in front of 
the other.  A disc like the one in Figure 7.6b rotating at a roughly constant rate would produce an 
image showing this kind of behavior.  Michotte found that when this arrangement was presented at 
particular speeds, the rectangles would frequently be described as chasing and fleeing one another.   
Of course they are doing no such thing.  Rectangles don’t chase or flee289.  They move in 
lockstep simply because they were painted as two curves with a fixed gap between them.  What, 
then, accounts for the use of goal-oriented language in describing their behavior?  Or, as Michotte 
asks, “Why this tendency to translate the phenomena into terms of human or animal conduct?” 
(1968)290. 
The answer seems to be that there is a psychological predisposition in humans to perceive 
intentional, goal-oriented behavior.  Psychology and philosophy of mind have given at least two 
names to this tendency.  One is the “theory of mind”, a term coined by Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) when investigating the extent to which chimpanzees have the same ability.  The other is “the 
intentional stance”, a name devised by Dennett (1987) in order to highlight how we approach the 
world from this “stance”, even if unconsciously, in order to make successful predictions in a world 
that, for intelligent social creatures like us, is filled with intentional (thinking), goal-oriented friends 
and foes.  Gergely and Csibra (2003; see also Csibra et al. 1999; Gergely et al. 1995) have amended 
Dennett’s notion by suggesting that, prior to a fully developed intentional stance, human infants 
																																																								
289 And, really, they are not even rectangles!  They are just the illusions of rectangles made by viewing a portion of a 
curved line through a slit. 
290 A similar effect occurs with Braitenberg’s notorious Vehicles (Braitenberg 1984).  These simple robots only perform 
basic single- or double-rule behaviors such as approaching or avoiding light based on a single sensor or other such things.  
Yet most observers seem to think they are best described in terms of liking, wanting, fearing and other such intentional 
terms.  Despite their simplicity, the “vehicles” seem lifelike. 
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show a “teleological stance” from which they are able to predict goal-directed, but not intentional 
(thought-based) behavior.  
Another way of interpreting this is that the human mind has a tendency to project an image 
of intentionality or goal-directedness out onto objects in the world that resemble agents in some 
way, just as we have the tendency to complete any partial pattern we observe with the most likely 
candidate in our minds (see Figure 7.7)291.  I have previously called this kind of tendency by the 
name “the projection error”; but of course it is an error only when performed zealously, since the 
projection of completed patterns is a normal tendency of perception, and a correct assumption 
when the partial pattern we perceived is a fragment of a real complete pattern (Hurley, Dennett and 
Adams 2011).  In the case of the intentional stance or teleological stance, the patterns that are 
completed by the mind’s automatic analogy mechanisms and then projected out onto objects in the 
world are the patterns of beliefs, desires, or goal-directedness, despite whether the object truly has 




291 When viewing optical illusions such as those in Figure 7.7, our minds have a tendency to complete parts of the 
picture that are only fragmentary.  This phenomenon of pattern completion is sometimes called “reification”, a term that 
comes from the psychology of Gestalt perception and that means “making real”.  In terms of these illusions, certain 
patterns that are not completely present in the image, such as the triangle in 7.7A, are made “real” by the mind.  A 
related concept is the Gestalt Law of Closure, which states that we have a tendency to perceive things as whole, closed 
forms—a notion that also explains, for instance, the reification of the triangle in 7.7A and the sphere in 7.7C as wholes, 
despite our only seeing fragmentary edges of them (Wertheimer 1923/1938; Koffka 1935).  Elsewhere in perceptual 
psychology the term “filling-in” is used to refer to the way the perceptual machinery or the mind fills in the information 
that is not presented in the world, when building a representation of it (e.g., Ramachandran and Gregory 1991). 
292 It is worth noting that while the terms “the intentional stance” and “the theory of mind” may sound as if they 
designate a special-purpose cognitive tool, if they are seen instead in the way I’ve described, then they are just one aspect 
of the normal pattern-recognition and analogical processes of cognition as applied to a particular type of content in the 
world (intentional content).  
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Figure 7.7:  Gestalt perception illusions.  When viewing images such as these we feel as if we “see” 
objects that are not truly present in the image.  We see the triangle and sphere in A and C, and we 
complete the worms in B and D, coming to believe that there’s a pole or a lake obscuring the rest of 
the serpent.  Projecting such perceptions out into the world is a common task for our brains and 
usually it is correct.  When we see forms that look like D in the real world, it is usually because there is 
a continuous body of, say, a Loch Ness monster half-submerged in the lake, and so imagining the rest 
of the creature is the right thing to do.  But in some less common cases, that projection will turn out 
to be false.  And in drawings such as these ones, meant to be ambiguous, there may not be a truth to 
the matter since there is neither a lake nor a Loch Ness monster on the page—there are only some 
black marks against a white field. 
 
So the teleological stance or intentional stance, working in the minds of observers, is how we come 
to see Michotte’s rectangles as wanting to do certain things, and how we come to see them not only 
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to be moving, but to be “chasing” or “fleeing”.  As long as the motion of the rectangles is sufficiently 
similar to actual cases of chasing or fleeing that we’ve experienced in our lives and sufficiently 
different from most of the movements of bodies normally influenced only by mechanics—as long as 
the motion occurs at certain rates, directions, and relative timing and distance—we can draw the 
analogy effortlessly and see the rectangles as being lifelike and as having goals. 
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H. Limits to the Illusion 
 
The main question . . . is not whether the processes of life can properly be called purposive: it is rather the question if 
the purposiveness in those processes is the result of a special constellation of factors known already to the sciences of the 
inorganic, or if it is the result of an autonomy peculiar to the processes themselves. For that there is, as a matter of fact, 
much that is purposive in vital phenomena is merely an immediate deduction from the definition of the concept of 
purpose itself, and from the application of this definition to living beings.  
 
—Hans Driesch (1914) 
 
As we saw earlier, the goal eliminativist wants to extend the scope of the illusion just 
discussed.  The eliminativist would suggest that perhaps the sunflower or squirrel or bacterium is 
very much the same as one of Michotte’s rectangles.  Perhaps when a sunflower moves towards the 
sun it is only moving towards the sun, not following or tracking.  Perhaps the sense we get that the 
bloom might be in pursuit of the sun is due to the illusory outward projection of goal-directedness, 
caused by the tendency of our minds to take the teleological stance.  
To add a little more fuel to the eliminativist fire, we might note that the psychological 
projection of goal-directedness is hardly limited to rectangles on screens in laboratory situations.  
When we reviewed animism, we saw a number of other versions of this illusion.  People often 
conjure spirits, ghosts, and gods or other willful, goal-directed activity to explain the behaviors of 
such things as volcanoes, storms, tsunamis, earthquakes, obstinate nuts and bolts, statically charged 
hairs, doors shut by breezes, and so on.  The illusion is widespread.  So why shouldn’t we expect 
similarly overzealous attributions of goals to be responsible also for our perceptions that bacteria, 
plants, and animals are purposive?   
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The difference is simple.  Any time we are dealing with an illusion, if we search long enough 
and carefully enough, we can determine that what we see is an illusion either by varying the 
conditions of our perceptual interaction with the phenomenon until it disappears (in which case we 
know the phenomenon is an illusion but don’t necessarily know what causes it to manifest) or by 
finding an alternative explanation that perhaps forestalls the illusion from occurring or at least makes 
sense of the illusion in terms of our perceptual machinery or viewing perspective.   
In the case of Michotte’s rectangles, a participant in the study needs only to get out of their 
chair and investigate the apparatus to discover that they are not really viewing rectangular objects at 
all (much less goal-directed rectangles).  As soon as they probe the device, their illusory impressions 
of those rectangles “chasing” and “fleeing” will evaporate entirely. 
If we believe that stubborn statically-charged hairs are willful, we only have to observe them 
in a broader array of circumstances to eventually discover that they usually do nothing of the willful 
sort, and that they only stand up seemingly obstinately when they’ve been treated in a certain way—
say, when a wool sweater has just been dragged across them on a dry day.  As soon as we find our 
perception of the hair’s obstinacy to be regularly associated only with certain circumstances, then we 
will suspect that it is an illusion and that something other than goal-directedness might account for 
the hair’s behavior.  By further investigating those circumstances, we eventually may find an 
alternative explanation for the hair’s behavior (say, in terms of electrical charge) causing the illusion 
of goal-directedness to be unconvincing, even if we still seem to perceive it. 
Similarly, the reason we no longer believe goal-directedness to play a role in geological and 
meteorological events is that, over time, science has found alternative explanations for most such 
phenomena.  Because those alternatives are convincing, they have made the illusion of goal-
directedness disappear.  This is how, bit by bit, materialism came to dominate in physics, while ideas 
of cosmic and theological teleology had their credibility gradually eroded.   
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Now the fact that no one yet has found an alternative explanation for organismic goal-
directedness is certainly not proof that such an alternative doesn’t exist.  We may not have searched 
long enough or broadly enough or carefully enough.  There may still be some way to make the 
observed pattern of goal-directedness in organisms flicker in and out of existence by changing our 
perceptual point of view . . . there may be some context into which we can drag organisms thereby 
rendering their behavior suddenly objective rather than projective, such that nothing appears to be 
good or bad for them, such that their activities no longer look like strivings, and such that our 
intuitive sense when viewing their behaviors is that those behaviors are not for anything.  But the 
challenge, in order for the goal-eliminativist to support their thesis, is to find that context and to show 
us that they can reliably erase our perception of goal-directedness from the organismic world (and 
reintroduce it again) at will, by changing the relationship of organisms to the perceptual system (and 
of course without changing the organisms themselves).  Until that can be done, the logical 
assumption to make is that the pattern of goal-directedness that we all observe in every living 
organism, from bacteria to humans, is real. 
In the next two chapters I will describe a hypothesis about the nature of goal-directedness, 
synthesized from the ideas of many modern theoretical biologists.  Rather than trying to avoid the 
horns of the teleologist’s dilemma, this synthesis follows the lead of post-behaviorist psychologists 
and philosophers and instead embraces a version of the second horn—accounting for subjectivity in 








What is the characteristic feature of life? When is a piece of matter said to be alive? When it goes on ‘doing something’, 
moving, exchanging material with its environment, and so forth, and that for a much longer period than we would 
expect of an inanimate piece of matter to ‘keep going’ under similar circumstances.   
 
—Erwin Schrödinger (1944) 
 
At this point, I am going to try to develop an account of what it means for a pattern to 
display vitalistic, projective, teleological tendencies—for an animate piece of matter to go on “doing 
something . . . for a much longer period than we would expect of an inanimate piece of matter”.  
The account I will present is a new twist on an older account, the larger fragments of which began 
to appear during the 1970s.  The account is still far from complete, even with the amendments I 
offer here, but the ways in which it neatly ties together so many of the otherwise philosophically 
elusive concepts that we have been discussing has given me the confidence to believe it is on the 
right track.   
Aside from Immanuel Kant, who provided the most central contribution over two centuries 
ago, the major contributors thus far are Manfred Eigen, Tibor Gánti, Stuart Kauffman, and 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (all of whom have further developed the Kantian notion of 
reflexive self-organization); Kurt Gödel, W.V.O Quine, and Douglas Hofstadter (the latter of who has 
picturesquely discussed and made clear the work of the former two, highlighting the dual roles a self-
replicating structure can play both as functional mechanism and as informational payload ); and Richard Dawkins 
	 416	
(who has recast our conception of organisms from being individuals to being collectives of economically 
cooperative and competitive beneficiaries). 
The modern theory of teleology is an attempt to weave the themes above into a single 
cohesive story.  That story claims that basic teleological agents are patterns of matter whose 
structures, in serving as both mechanism and payload (Hofstadter), are able to reflexively maintain 
their own organization (Kant, Eigen, Gánti, Kauffman, Maturana and Varela).  The story gets to be 
even more interesting when we see that these structures may become organizationally coupled by 
way of economic relations to form larger, materially overlapping collectives that share parts and 
processes in service of both their individual and common good (Dawkins). 
My contribution to telling that story will be twofold.  First, I will work to show how these 
thinkers’ ideas may be fitted together into this unified account.  And second, I will attempt to use, as 
an adhesive in fitting those pieces together, the beginnings of a new quantifiable model of the 
fundaments of subjectivity.  That model will be incomplete, but, as I said, I think it will have a 
variety of interesting consequences, and I think it will represent a significant step away from a 
number of philosophical impasses, including Theseus’ ship, many historical debates over normativity 
and, especially, teleological eliminativism and proper functions, and, at the same time, a step towards 
a new era of teleological realism and a science that may one day encompass subjective phenomena 
within its objective topics of study.   
I will also take the time to explore the ways in which the pieces above seem to naturally 
produce a tripartite classification of the kinds of material orderliness that can exist.  This comes with 
the territory that we’ll be exploring because one of those three categories of orderliness will 
constitute the modern theory of naturally teleological patterns. 
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A. A Preview of the Theory 
 
Pregnant in the birth of the universe was the birth of life.  Agency may be coextensive with life.  Life certainly burgeons 
nowhere without agency.  We all act on our own behalf.  In the Kantian form:  What must something be such that it 
can act on its own behalf? 
 
—Stuart Kauffman (2000) 
 
I am first going to make a rough sketch of the way I see the pieces of the modern theory of 
teleology fitting together, and then, in the next few chapters, I will enrich the picture with bolder 
lines and colors that will help bring it to life.  We can assess the theoretical value of the offering, 
both descriptively and predictively, as a later exercise. 
The theory of teleology is not about the kinds of goals we typically think of.  It is not about 
reaching the sales targets for the quarter or growing enough rice to feed the village, and it is not 
about squirreling away nuts for the winter or swimming upstream in search of greener pastures, 
although at the end of the day, in one manner or another, it should figure prominently in an 
explanation of all these things.  The situations just described can all be considered to be subordinate 
goals—some kind of partial contributions to an ultimate goal in a hierarchy of ends.  But there can 
be no subordinate goals without the ultimate goals they contribute to.   
At its root, the modern theory of teleology is about those ultimate goals, which, the theory 
claims, come in only one kind:  the goal of continued existence, for some organizational pattern, in 
the face of a relentless swarm of attacks led by the material decay of ratcheted braising.  To apply a 
more concise term, the ultimate goal in this world is nothing other than the persistence of a pattern.  
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Something that is goal-directed is something that has a set of behaviors, which, taken together, give 
rise to its own existential persistence.   
We can differentiate the teleological brand of existential persistence from other kinds of 
stable persistence, such as the long-term viability of stable atomic isotopes or the spontaneously 
reoccurring stability of structures such as lipid micelles or Bénard cells.  In particular, the stability 
found in the teleological version is driven in part by the activities or motions of the persisting 
pattern itself, and because of this, we can term it “active stability” or “active persistence”.  A goal-
directed pattern persists through a combination of external factors and, importantly, its own actions 
(see also Juarrero 1999, who analyzes action and agency in similar terms; and Pross 2005, 2008, 
2009, who labels a similarly active notion of persistence at the level of chemical replicators “kinetic 
stability”).   
But already we seem to have made a bit of a magical leap here when we transition from 
talking about an item’s motions, to talking about its actions; the former is a relative but nonetheless 
objective notion while the latter is an agentive and thus fundamentally subjective one.  The best way 
I’ve found to describe why active persistence underlies this magical transition from the objective to 
the subjective is that, when a mere, objective, physical pattern of forces undergoes a group of mere, 
objective, physical motions that just happen to have the reflexive property of facilitating the 
persistence of that very same pattern, it thereby comes to be doing what can best be described as 
helping itself (see Kauffman 2000).  And in the two parts of that short phrase—“help” and “itself”—
we can find the roots both of benefit and of identity, the fundaments of subjectivity, the germs from 
which the rest of the projective and agentive features in the universe emerge, grow, and thrive.   
The modern theory of teleology is of course a theory of goal-directedness but, really, the 
terms it is given in comprise a theory of what it means to have a self and of what it means to be able 
to benefit, to evaluate, and to act on one’s own behalf.  When a thing comes to be able to actively 
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persist, the great leap is made from a prior world in which “Why is it doing that?” could be answered 
only with a process narrative, to a new world in which that question can in some cases be answered 
with a reason—a world in which the “it” that “is doing that” becomes sharply defined rather than 
observer-dependent, and in which the “why” begins to refer to “what for” rather than “how come”.  
The closing of the autocausal circle (in which a thing is able to help itself) creates a distinctive 
situation in which each behavior in the circle is not only the cause of the other behaviors but also, 
transitively through those other behaviors, the cause of itself, and so the previously unanswerable, 
future-directed question “What is it doing that for?” suddenly comes to have a meaning that is rich 
enough to replace the purely historical “How has it come to be doing that?”  The answer, which can 
for the first time be given in teleological terms (using phrases such as “for” or “in order to”), is 




The way the theory explains identity is perhaps the most complicated piece but it is not too 
difficult to understand, taken a step at a time.  Most fundamentally, it claims that an individual 
teleological identity is only the persisting pattern itself—the set of capacities that are, by their actions 
and their mutual interactions, able to create themselves (Maturana and Varela 1973).  
This is an identity for the simplest of reasons: since this set of capacities comprises precisely 
the pieces required to create those same capacities, it therefore remains identical across time and thus 
persists for longer than its disconnected parts otherwise would.  But this short formulation requires 
quite a bit of interpretation.  For one thing, what it means to be “identical across time” needs to be 
made precise.  We will need to know how to interpret different versions of an ever-changing pattern 
as being the very same thing.  For another thing, we also need some way to provide precision to the 
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concept of “longer than . . . otherwise”—just how long would “otherwise” have been?  For a third 
thing, we need to specify what the term “create” means, and what the background context is with 
respect to which that type of creation must be understood.  What are the physical requirements and 
constraints for this notion of “creation”?  Just what is being created?  Obviously it cannot be the 
atoms from which the pattern is made (they are, more or less, enduring); instead, it must be 
something about their organization.  And for a fourth thing, we should recognize that the ways in 
which we think about these previous three concerns will ultimately shape a new concept of identity 
that will no longer be rooted in intuitively concrete notions such as objects or items or bodies.  We 
need to be prepared to accept the fact that this new type of identity will integrate differently with 
many other concepts that compose our current scientific and philosophical understandings of the 
world.  I’ll try to address each of these pieces throughout this second part of the dissertation; for 
now, let’s continue our preview with an introduction to how the persistence of identities can 




A cyanobacteria colony in a sun-warmed patch of the ocean may persist for months, and its 
clonal progeny may ultimately persist for billions of years.  In contrast, an influenza virion or, for 
that matter, silver halides or even diatomic oxygen, in the same direct summer sunshine may last 
only moments before decomposing into smaller pieces.  Success or failure at persistence is the 
archetypal standard that patterns that may come to exist must live up to; merely by being there (in a 
particular environment), a pattern either is the kind of thing that persists (thus it passes the test and 
succeeds) or it is the kind of thing that does not (thus it fails).  Every pattern in the world is implicitly held 
to this natural, objectively normative standard.  And because of this, the possibility of persistence, the 
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potential to persist, by being something that is allowable by the physics (or the mathematics) of our 
world, ushers in a naturally emergent transition from a universe of objects to a universe of subjects . . . a 
universe in which evaluatively normative patterns—those that succeed at persistence—may 
potentially come to exist.   
This brand of normativity is evaluative rather than comparative because the “ought” (when we 
say that a candidate pattern “ought to persist”) is measured in terms of success or failure, and not in 
terms of any comparison against a distribution of other patterns in the world (see Chapter I).  We 
are saying “this thing ought to persist” not because it measures up to a comparison class, nor 
because it is like other things that persist (although that might also be the case), but only because its 
behaviors, if it works properly, encourage its own persistence.  If a thing has properties that 
engender its own persistence in a certain environment, then it ought to persist in that environment; 
and if it does not have such properties, then it ought not to persist.   
And since persistence gives birth to an evaluative normativity, it also becomes the underlying 
standard against which any other items and events in the world may come to be evaluable.  Objects 
and events can be evaluated in terms of their relative contributions to the persistence of identities.  
A thing is “good” (for any particular persisting pattern) if it helps that pattern achieve its goal (of 
persistence) and it is “bad” (for that pattern) if it thwarts the pattern’s efforts towards achieving that 
goal.  Of course, if a thing neither helps nor hinders the pattern’s efforts, then it is evaluatively 
neutral.  Evaluation, then, straightforwardly gives rise to value and thus, in the presence of other 
evaluating identities, economy:  If a thing is good for me, then I consider it to be good.  And if I 
consider it to be good and you consider it to be good, then, depending on various factors (such as 
whether it is sharable or limited), we may cooperate or compete with respect to it . . .  And so, hand 
in hand with the emergence of persistence in our world comes the emergence of evaluative (and 
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subjective) notions such as being useful, working properly, having value, being good for, being mutually 
beneficial, and also, ultimately, being ethical.293 
I have made mention of the concept of economy, aware of the fact that it sounds as if my 
cart is now getting ahead of my horse.  In this piece of work, I don’t intend to analyze the 
implications of the theory of teleology for higher-level economic theory, though I think the bases of 
that extrapolation will become clear in short order294.  Rather, I mean only to set the foundations for 
understanding the economic principles that are able to link smaller teleological identities into larger 
teleological identities, by way of a blend of competitive and cooperative relationships.  In short, 
these are the very same already-well-studied principles that underlie not just biological parasitism, 
mutualism, and commensalism, but also the social and commercial versions of the same phenomena. 
 
Adding it All Up 
 
To recapitulate this brief introduction, then:  The short form of the modern theory of 
teleology holds that patterns that have methods by which they might actively persist, despite 
experiencing the inexorable material decay caused by ratcheted braising, thereby gain identities and 
thus bring into existence the relative, subjective evaluation of objects and events with respect to the 
goals of maintaining those identities.  A pattern that is able to help itself persist is a pattern whose 
actions are jointly goal-directed towards that persistence295, and whose parts serve the purpose of 
aiding in those actions.  This is how the subjective phenomena of identity, value, purpose, and goal-
																																																								
293 For the philosopher:  I suggest that the description in the previous two paragraphs shows precisely how we can “get 
an ought from an is”, thus patching back together the positive and normative worlds that “Hume’s Guillotine” once 
carved from one another (Hume 1738).  This then provides a basis for naturalistic treatment of moral philosophy and 
secular ethics.  What one then ought to do is whatever is good for one’s own identity (since one’s fundamental duty is 
persistence); however, what is good for one’s identity is a proposition that can only be clearly understood in terms of 
what constitutes one’s identity, and, especially in the case of humans, that turns out to be a very, very complex thing. 
294 For one thing, much of modern economic theory depends on the assumption that agents—often, rational agents—
exist.  The current work provides a theory of agency that can underpin those assumptions. 
295 And thus it is also a pattern whose behaviors can rightly be called actions (see also Juarrero 1999). 
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directedness all get their footing in our objective world, and provide a basis upon which further 
subjective phenomena may be built.  Compositions of these teleological identities, in both time and 
space, form the basis for the kinds of agencies we normally call organisms and species and, eventually, 
societies and governments and so on.  When we’ve got a natural theory of goal-directedness under our 
belts, the biophilosopher’s notion of functioning can easily be understood in relation to it, in more or 
less the way that Christopher Boorse (1976, 2002) has advocated:  Anything that (verb-) functions 
does so because it plays a causal role in the persistence of some teleological identity.  In order to be 
seen as having a noun-function (even if that vision is illusory), a thing simply needs to verb-function 
in a particular way with some regularity, or to have been constructed solely in order to potentially 
(but not necessarily) verb-function in a particular way at some point in time. 
Coming up next, we’ll spend some time analyzing the notion of persistence itself in order to 
differentiate the most general methods by which a thing might persist.  The key notion to keep our 
eye out for will be informational redundancy; we are looking, here, for nature’s blueprints—the sources 
of information that make the creation and maintenance of orderliness possible.  After that, in the 
section on “autocausality”, we’ll look at the provocative yet presently vague method of being-both-
cause-and-effect-of-oneself as a means of realizing persistence.  There have been a number of 
specific models of autocausality offered by theorists, and we’ll briefly review the most prominent of 
them, because the more generic offering we are developing will maintain some relationship with 
each of them.  In the next two chapters, we’ll sharpen the notion of autocausal persistence by 
presenting a theory of identity based on informational redundancy and given also in terms 
compatible with the materialist view of causation.  Once we’ve got a handle on how certain things 
may remain retain an identity in the world, we’ll then differentiate between those that retain their 
identity by helping themselves, and those that retain their identity under the protection of other 
processes.  Both may have identities, and both may potentially benefit, but only the former benefit 
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in part through their own activities, and thus only they can be said to have agentive actions that are 









The question of life or death seems to be the most crucial concern for any biological entity, 
but roughly the same idea arises even pre-biologically:  Along with any physicochemical structure 
that, by whatever method, comes to exist in the world, also comes the potential question of whether or 
not that structure will continue to exist.  The theory we are going to look at is not so much a theory of 
the origins of various organizational patterns as it is a theory of the existential destiny of those 
patterns.  
The central suggestion I will make is that teleological patterns, because of an information-
theoretic feature of their architecture, form a class with a qualitatively different existential destiny 
from that of other major categories of patterns.  Teleological patterns are neither guaranteed to 
persist, nor guaranteed to fall to pieces.  Quite literally, there is a sense in which their destiny is in 
their own (figurative) hands. 
 
The Struggle for Existence / A Recipe for Persistence 
 
The importance of persistence as a hallmark of the living has been noticed by any one of us 
who has woken up and killed a beast before breakfast; but the topic really gained theoretical 
prominence when Darwin (1859) borrowed a term he found in Thomas Malthus’ (1826) Essay on the 
Principle of Population.  The key idea was what both writers referred to as the “struggle for 
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existence”—the fact that an individual organism must struggle constantly against the causes of 
mortality in order to continue existing (see also, e.g., Wallace 1858; Huxley 1863; Weismann 1909). 
Darwin made use of Malthus’ idea primarily to describe the competitions that take place 
between an organism and two classes of resource-hungry competitors: its peers and its predators.  In 
Darwin’s sense, it is the winners of both these competitions that tend to persist, surviving not only 
until tomorrow but also, one hopes, long enough to be represented in the next generation.   
Following on the heels of Darwin’s theory, the biologist Herbert Spencer coined the now-
famous term “survival of the fittest”, underscoring the Darwinian characterization of organisms as 
kinds of persistors (Spencer 1864; see also Darwin 1868, 1869).296  Nearly a century later the 
psychologist and AI pioneer Herbert Simon riffed on Spencer’s expression, noting that it isolates a 
special case of a more general existential bias in the universe:  the relatively greater persistence of the 
relatively more effective persistors, or, perhaps more succinctly, the persistence of the “stablest” (Simon 
1962; see also Bouchard 2004; Dawkins 1976; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Keller 2007; Rosenberg & 
Kaplan 2005; Rosenberg 2006).297   
From Simon’s perspective, the struggle for existence should really be seen not as a struggle 
against other individuals or other species, and not even as a struggle fought only by organisms, but 
merely as the struggle of any potential pattern in the world against changes to its material organization.  
Predation and peer competition are just some of the more salient cases of what organisms may 
																																																								
296 Framing natural selection in terms of persistors sounds a great deal like framing it in terms of replicators (Dawkins 1976, 
1982; Dennett 1995; Haig 1997; and Hull 1980, 1988), and the reader attuned to that terminology will likely be reminded 
now of the complicated debate over the validity and usefulness of the replicator framework, including, especially, the 
definition of what exactly comprise the fundamental units of replication, and thus of selection.  Whatever the case may 
be, even the classical framework for thinking about natural selection takes, as an unquestioned assumption, that there is a 
population of reproducing agents, and that this reproduction means that something—whether or not that something is 
well defined—is persisting in some way over time.   
297 This is an idea that is easier to see as being clearly true in its abstract form than it is when applied to real-world 
biological structures.  Although we will try to address this issue with more clarity later, in biology it is not always clear 
just what persists across a reproductive cycle.  Since most organisms are sexual reproducers rather than clonal organisms, 
their progeny share genes and traits that come from each of two parents, and neither parent has persisted alone.  For 
now, I’ll continue to pursue the abstract notion.  
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struggle against; one also struggles for existence against famine, against drought, against solar 
radiation, against falling rocks, against storms and high seas, against cancer,298 against stroke, against 
neurodegeneracy, against dehydration, against environmental toxins, and quite generally against the 
depredations of time, none of which are necessarily caused by competition with other organisms. 
This formulation lacks detail (about the causes and modes of stability and persistence), but 
we shouldn’t underestimate its importance.  What Simon’s idea suggests is that the grandest ontological 
categories of our world—the kinds of things that we can expect to find existing in any universe where braising takes 
place—are those that have reliable methods of persistence.  This is an idea that paves the way for framing our 
ontological inquiries about what philosophers call the furnishings of our world.  So the main 
waypoint, then, on the way to “What kinds of patterns could possibly exist?” is the following 
question:  “What modes of persistence might there be?”   
 
Resilience vs. Redundancy 
 
In looking for modes of stability against the inevitably accumulative damage of braising, one 
might imagine three abstract possibilities.  First, we know from biological examples that a thing 
might have some method by which it could alter its own fate by protecting or repairing itself.  
Second, we understand that a thing might fall under the protection of some benefactor processes 
that are disposed to intervene on its behalf, shielding it or patching it up as necessary, the way, for 
																																																								
298 Perhaps it is debatable whether cancer can be thought of as another organism.  After all, cancers are by definition 
genetically distinct from the normal cells of the host, and so one might consider them to be different from the host.  
While that may seem like a blurry distinction to make, certain cases can be even more pronounced.  For instance, there is 
the case of facial tumor disease in Tasmanian devils—a contagious parasitic cancer that developed originally in one 
individual, but has become highly transmissible between hosts, and now threatens the species with extinction.  In this 
case, the disease is an infectious rather than developmental disease; it has its own genome that differs from that of its 
hosts, and it conducts its own reproductive lifecycle quite analogously to any other distinct obligate parasite (Pearse and 
Swift 2006).  
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instance, we humans repair and maintain many of our artifacts.  And third, a thing might simply be 
tough as nails.   
The first two manners are worth our consideration, but let’s take a few moments to dismiss 
the third possibility.  Any sort of resilience—the hardness of diamond, the durability of stainless 
steel, the tensile strength of spider’s webbing—can only be measured relative to the distribution of 
braising energy that a pattern might encounter.  If I build a stronger shield, you can always build a 
stronger weapon.  And, as physicists have determined, everything is eventually susceptible to 
dissociation under extreme enough conditions.  
A pair of examples can help in directing our attention further away from resilience and 
instead toward the role that redundancy plays in the first two manners of persistence.  The examples 
we’ll use are an expanded-polystyrene foam model of a shark and a real adult Greenland shark.  The 
grounds on which the two of these sharks are comparable is that, unlike most other relatively soft 
structures we know of, both of these usually can retain the bulk of their relatively soft shape and 
structure for hundreds of years.  The comparison becomes interesting because the equally 
substantial longevity in each of the two cases must be accounted for and understood quite 
differently. 
In the case of the polystyrene foam, while the shark’s structure changes only very slowly299, it 
is nonetheless on a one-way trajectory along which it transforms, bit by bit, into various alternative 
structures.  The slings and arrows that it suffers will result in a slow, but irreversible accumulation of 
bruises and scratches, much as we found to be the case with the washing machine that we flung 
through an asteroid field in Chapter II.   
The Greenland shark’s flesh is also heir to a thousand natural shocks, but there are two 
differences in its constitution.  First, it is much more fragile and thus susceptible to more rapid 
																																																								
299 For a long time, polystyrene foam was thought to be entirely resistant to biodegradation.  However, recent research 
has found an exception to this rule in a bacterium that lives in the guts of mealworms (see e.g. Yang et al. 2015). 
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changes.300  But second, changes to the living shark are not uniformly destructive of its organization; 
for most of its life there is as much constructive change as there is destructive change. 
We can look more closely at these differences in terms of the informational content of each 
shark.  The polystyrene shark has no informational redundancy—its structure is specified precisely 
once, by its very existence.  As its body gets banged about by the vagaries of existence, material 
disorder in it increases—pieces get increasingly bent out of shape, and some may fall off entirely.  
Because there was only ever one copy of the informational specification of that body, any damage 
represents the irretrievable loss of information about its material organization.  One could only 
reconstruct a bruised polystyrene model by making use of external information—by using a 
manufacturer’s blueprint of some sort or by making educated guesses the same way a restoration 
artist might repair renaissance paintings or ancient frescoes.  One could assume that a damaged 
patch had once been smoother or that a lost fin had once had a particular shape, but without any 
detailed documentation (beyond the shark’s own now-damaged form) one could never be sure, and 
there is always a risk that one might unknowingly botch the job.   
In the Greenland shark, any structural information that is lost to braising is also gone.  
However, there is redundant information about the shark’s material organization preserved 
elsewhere in the functional structures and processes of the shark’s undamaged parts (especially but 
not solely in the DNA).  There is a blueprint of a sort, inside the shark, and it is that redundant 
informational content that lies at the heart of the reconstructive processes that prevent the 
accumulation of decomposition in the shark.  Those vital processes “know” how to repair and 
rebuild the degraded parts of the shark because they are informed by the redundant information 
contained in the blueprint. 
																																																								
300 At present, the Greenland Shark is known to be the longest-living vertebrate; one study’s authors have estimated a 
recent specimen to have had a lifespan of nearly four hundred (plus or minus a broad error margin of one hundred and 
twenty) years (Nielsen et al. 2016). 
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As we continue our explorations, we are going to find that, at the heart of the process of 
active persistence by which a pattern’s own activities contribute to its persistence, there always lies 
the notion of redundant information.  This partly explains why the Greenland shark—laced with 
redundant information throughout its body—is able to recover from damage and disease, and why 
the polystyrene shark—comparatively devoid of redundant information—may be highly resilient but 





It must be thought of as an organ that produces the other parts (consequently each produces the others reciprocally), 
which cannot be the case in any instrument of art, but only of nature, which provides all the matter for instruments 
(even those of art): only then and on that account can such a product, as an organized and self-organizing being, be 
called a natural end. 
 
—Immanuel Kant (1790) 
 
If braising is unavoidable and resilience is not a realistic option, then would-be persistors 
seem to be left only with the first two strategies mentioned—a pattern can either help itself rebuild 
lost structure (like the Greenland shark and other organisms), or it can be the lucky beneficiary of 
external reconstructive help (like crystals and micelles or like a polystyrene shark under the care of a 
preservation league armed with a detailed blueprint).  We’ll explore both strategies, as each can 
produce a persistent identity.  However our focus eventually will be on differentiating between these 
manners of persistence in order to isolate the particular organizational features that contribute to the 
teleological capacity by which an identity is not only able to be helped, but able to help itself.  
 
To Be Cause and Effect of Oneself 
 
Kant’s contribution was the notion, quoted first in Chapter III and again in the epigraph 
above, that organisms are teleological because they are “self-organizing”—because they are both 
cause and effect of themselves.  However, Kant’s use of the term “self-organizing” differs somewhat 
from contemporary uses, and it will be worthwhile for us to notice the difference.   
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In modern scientific contexts, beginning with Ashby (1947), “self-organizing” has come to 
mean something more akin to spontaneously organizing.  If we take, for instance, the cases of 
crystallization or the formation of micelles or Bénard cells, we have processes that, given the proper 
contextual conditions, are able to spontaneously produce materially organized structures (the 
crystals, the micelles, and the Bénard cells).  However, it is important to note that, in each of these 
cases, the structures themselves need not play a role in their own creation.  There is no need for a 
“self”—a prior version of the pattern—to exist before the organization comes to be created.  Before 
the proper temperature gradient is reached in a fluid system (and without the proper viscosity and 
fluid layer thickness), Bénard cells simply do not exist.  They organize spontaneously, they become 
organized, but they do not organize themselves.  They—their own dynamical effects upon the world—
play no necessary role in their coming into being.  The same goes for crystals and micelles that 
spontaneously emerge from solutions when conditions are right, but which do not necessarily 
require prior selves as either blueprints or machinery used in the formation of later ones.301 
In contrast, we can tell from Kant’s discussion and from his phrase, “both cause and effect 
of itself,” that he was using the term “self” in a stricter sense.  Kant intended his “self-organizing” to 
refer to a process that is also reflexive rather than merely spontaneous, a process in which the contextual 
conditions required for the formation of a pattern notably include the pattern itself.  Unlike crystals 
and Bénard cells, new bacteria, for instance, form only in conditions that include “old” bacteria; 
there are roles played by the internal machinery (and blueprints) of a bacterium that are necessary to 
the formation of new bacteria.  As Pasteur showed decisively, while the notion of spontaneous 
generation can be used to describe the formation of crystals and micelles, the generation of 
																																																								
301 These structures may also, at times, be perceived as “self-healing”, a term that seems to imply an act in which the self 
plays some role.  However, the term is a misnomer—the healing in these processes consists of the very same process as 
the initial formation, and it has no necessary dependency on the existence of a self—a prior complete version of the 
object that is being “healed”.  The same external conditions are all that is critical to both the ability for these structures 
to form and also for their damage to be repaired. 
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(organizationally-) complex living forms simply doesn’t occur spontaneously.  As Raspail and 
Virchow put it:  Omnis cellula e cellula.  All cells come from cells.  Kant’s self-organization is a 
qualitatively different (and as we will soon see, also quantitatively different) mode of behavior than 
Ashby’s.  
 
Early Models of Persistence 
 
For whatever historical reasons, during the early 1970s the time apparently was ripe for 
theoretical biologists to expand upon Kant’s notion and so, nearly simultaneously, a number of 
descriptions were offered of what it might mean for a thing to persist by being both cause and effect 
of itself.  As we’ll see, Tibor Gánti, Manfred Eigen, Stuart Kauffman, and Umberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela each attempted in their own way to define a biological or pre-biological identity in 
terms of autocausality.  In all cases, the autocausal systems suggested by these theorists are ones in 
which the structures involved have redundant causal potential that increases their own chances at 
persistence.  Unfortunately, as they stand, the schemas that are precise are too specific, and 
autopoiesis—the one that is more general—is too vague.  
Gánti’s version was what he called a chemoton—a chemical automaton.  A chemoton is 
essentially a stripped-down model of a cell that enumerates a minimal set of interconnected cell-
biological capacities that appear to be cause and effect of one another.  The original chemoton 
consists of 1) an autocatalytic metabolism that mobilizes free energy and material from the 
environment, 2) an information-replicating mechanism that uses the byproducts of the metabolic 
system to reproduce itself as well as to produce components used in the membrane production 
subsystem, and 3) a membrane production subsystem that manufactures molecules that self-
assemble into an enclosing membrane.  This membrane not only allows the ingress of the energy 
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sources that fuel the metabolic subsystem and the expulsion of wastes, but also keeps the machinery 
in the metabolic and synthetic subsystems all near enough to one another to operate and 
interoperate properly.  The main idea is that these three high-level capacities all support one another 
in such a way that none of them can exist without the others.  The three capacities are cause and 
effect of one another, and so, taken together as a whole, the chemoton is cause and effect of itself 




Figure 8.1:  A diagram of a chemoton that elaborates upon Gánti’s original (1971) model.  The technical 
complexities of this diagram will be explored a bit later; what is important to the current discussion is 
only the general outline of its form.  The metabolic subsystem (the circle in the upper left, made of 
arrows connecting various “A” labels) consumes nutrients X and produces wastes Y and, in the 
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process produces its own parts, as well as necessary precursors (V' and T') for the other two 
subsystems.  The other small cycle, just right of center and composed of arrows connecting various 
“pV” labels, represents the “information” subsystem, which not only produces itself through a 
process of template replication but also results in a precursor component (R) that contributes to the 
membrane system.  In order to do this, the information subsystem borrows energy and materials 
(symbolized by V') secured by the metabolic subsystem.  The large enclosing circle composed of 
“Tm” labels represents the membrane production subsystem, which, using resources R and T'', results 
in the membrane that allows the ingress of X and the expulsion of Y and helps maintain the 
functional proximity between the other parts.  Most importantly, it is the interconnections between 
these three cycles that constitute the causal, catalytic coupling that Gánti suggests joins the three 
subsystems into a singular, living unity.  Not only is this system meant to be self-sustaining, but, since 
each of the subsystems potentially duplicates its own members (i.e., A1 becomes 2A1; Tm becomes 
2Tm; and pVn becomes 2pVn) it may also grow to contain redundant parts, providing the chance to 
replicate by binary fission.  Reprinted from Gánti (1997). 
 
Another version of “cause and effect of itself” is what Kauffman calls collectively autocatalytic 
sets—groups of chemical species, each member of which plays a role as a catalyst in the spontaneous 
generation of some other member or members of the set such that, all together, through these 
catalyzed synthesis reactions, the set produces a future version of itself that contains all the same 
members (Kauffman 1971b, 2000).  So, for instance, if chemical species A catalyzes the synthesis of 
chemical species B, and if B similarly catalyzes the synthesis of C, and C does the same for A . . . and 
if there are enough raw materials floating around for all these processes to proceed . . . then A, B, 
and C, which are unable to spontaneously form in the absence of one another, may all come to be 
abundant in the presence of one another.  Kauffman’s work suggests that a biological organism, 




Figure 8.2:  The relationships that comprise a collectively autocatalytic set.  Small black circles 
represent ligation reactions whereby two smaller molecules are joined to form a larger third one.  
Dotted arrows represent the catalytic roles played by particular molecular species; each such dotted 
arrow connects a catalyst to the reaction it catalyzes.  Each reaction is catalyzed by one member of the 
set while synthesizing another, such that the set as a whole is collectively autocatalytic even though the 
individual reactions may not be.  Reprinted from Kauffman (2000). 
 
Eigen’s notion of a hypercycle (Eigen 1971; Eigen and Schuster 1977, 1979) describes another 
structure, more or less the same as Kauffman’s sets in terms of their reflexively autocatalytic internal 
relationships.  However, in contrast with an autocatalytic set, a hypercycle is both topologically more 
specific—consisting of an ordered cycle, rather than a network—and molecularly more specific, in 
that the components in Eigen’s model are solely enzymatically-catalyzed RNA strands and the 
enzymes that they code for (see also the RNA-world hypothesis hinted at in Crick 1968; Orgel 1968; 
and Woese 1967; and stated most boldly in Gilbert 1986).  Still, what is most important about the 




Figure 8.3:  Two representations of the concept of a hypercycle.  In both diagrams, the various 
encircled In signify autocatalysts—molecules that individually play a role in their own construction.  
The entirely circular arrows signify this level of catalysis.  The remaining arrows also signify catalytic 
relationships, although these ones are not individually reflexive, but instead collude with one another 
to form larger collectively reflexive cycles.  In the diagram on the left, the autocatalysts (I1 . . . In) 
catalyze the synthesis of one another in a cycle; in the version on the right, the various In catalyze the 
construction of intermediary enzymes (shown as E1 to E4) which each then go on to catalyze the next 
autocatalytic process in the cycle.  There is of course no reason why the enzyme-free and 
enzymatically-mediated modes could not also be mixed in a hybrid kind of hypercycle as well.  Figure 
adapted from Eigen and Schuster (1977). 
 
The most generic concept coming out of this faction of early-1970s theorists was Maturana 
and Varela’s notion of autopoiesis—a coinage borrowing from the Greek roots for “self” and 
“production” (Maturana and Varela 1973/1980; Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1974; see also 
Thompson 2007).  Autopoiesis is described as:  
 
A network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
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components, that produces the components which: (i) through their interactions and 
transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes 
(relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it [the autopoietic system] as a 
concrete unity in the space in which they (the components) exist  (Maturana and 
Varela 1973/1980). 
 
In short, what this means is that an autopoietic system is a set of processes that are self-producing.  
By using the term “processes of production”, Maturana and Varela avoid committing to any 
particularly limiting type of causal behavior.  Catalysis counts, but so do other cellular processes and 
even high-level organismic behaviors such as, say, making friends and sewing clothes, as long as the 
sum results of a group of connected processes are the continuous rebuilding of those processes 
themselves and the continued existence of the relationships between them.  In archetypically 
Kantian fashion, an autopoietic structure is one that, through its various behaviors, attempts to 
ensure its own existence.  
 
Autopoiesis and Identity 
 
The central trouble with the theory of autopoiesis, as I see it, is that, even though Maturana 
and Varela recognize the importance of defining a notion of a self (or identity), the theory has yet to 
make that definition more than impressionistically.  The problem of identity, recall, is that physical 
items may have countless minor variations, and there is no easy way to determine which variations 
count as being the same thing and which ones are sufficiently different as to be called something 
else.  In the messy world of cells that are composed of many millions of atoms, nothing is ever quite 
the same; things can only ever be very similar at best.  How could we ever know which processes that 
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have been created are the ones that did the creating?  Furthermore, is that notion even coherent 
when charged with the responsibility of accounting for developmental change, such as that which 
occurs when a caterpillar metamorphoses into a butterfly?  Certainly relatively few of the processes 
that make up the caterpillar are the same as those that compose the butterfly.  And Lepidopterans 
aren’t the only organisms with morphologically distinct life stages either; all organisms go through 
ontogenetic change in their life cycles, from infancy to adulthood.  Even the individual cell—the 
paradigm autopoietic structure, the unit from which all other organisms are built—goes through vast 
changes during the routine course of binary fission wherein both its form and its processes vary 
widely from one moment to the next (see Figure 8.4).  
 
 
Figure 8.4:  A schematic of the process of binary fission by which a prokaryotic bacterial cell grows 
and divides into two.  The pink ring represents the bacterial DNA, the purple rings represent 
plasmids, and the small blue-green elements represent ribosomes.  Many details have been left out for 
clarity. 
 
Saying that a self is exactly the set of things that create themselves seems, at least at first, to 
be a superficially precise answer that does more to highlight the problem than to solve it.  It makes a 
roughly outlined claim that the variations that we should count as being the same are whichever 
ones happen to work.  The fundamental shortcoming of the theory of autopoiesis is that it depends 
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crucially on a notion of identity, which (so far) it doesn’t offer.  There is, however, a virtue in 
Maturana and Varela’s theoretical generality, which gives many of their readers a keen sense that, 
somehow, they must be right:  even if we don’t know quite which things in an autopoietic system are 
the same over time, we do know, from observations of organisms and their life cycles, that something 
appears to be.  I think that autopoiesis and the other models of autocausal persistence that we’ve just 
looked at can lead us to a theory of identity that may be able to account for, among other things, 
individual cellular continuity, binary fission, and the changing of a caterpillar into a butterfly.302  
We’re going to follow that lead shortly now, but before we do, I want to point out the organizational 
features shared by the processes of autopoiesis and of replication. 
 
Autopoiesis or Replication (Survival or Reproduction) 
 
Autopoiesis is sometimes called “self-reproduction”, and self-reproduction is typically 
contrasted with ordinary reproduction (also known as replication) in order to emphasize the two 
processes as distinct contributors to biological behavior.   
To make the differences clear: autopoietic self-reproduction is the continuous renovation and 
remodeling of a structure to prevent it from falling apart, while replicative reproduction is the copying 
of a structure such that there may then be more than one simultaneous identical structure.  The 
reparation of cellular damage is autopoiesis.  Binary fission to produce two daughter cells is 
replication (see Figure 8.4 above). 
While it is often more fruitful to focus on the differences between the two processes, there is 
also an important similarity.  At the heart of things, each is an autocausal strategy of persistence, 
																																																								
302 It is curious that, in the preface to Maturana and Varela’s book (1973/1980), Stafford Beer was able to conclude, 
“The second reason why the concept of autopoiesis excites me so much is that it involves the destruction of teleology.”  
That is exactly the opposite of the conclusion I would like to draw.  I would say that autopoiesis is involved in the 
creation of teleology. 
	 441	
capable of preserving organizational information across time.  In autopoiesis, a pattern that faces a 
background of braising follows an internal blueprint of a sort in order to repair damage, so that its 
identity (still not a precise term, here) continues to exist in the future.  In replication, a pattern 
strives instead to make copies of its self, so that, statistically, even while some of those copies may 
suffer destruction at the hands of braising, others might continue to exist in the future.  Physically the 
processes seem very different; but informationally both serve the same purpose of ensuring future 
existence by providing a level of informational redundancy.  In both cases, the material in a structure 
may change but the information remains.  Both processes start from a structure that houses 
redundant information, and both result in a structure that retains that redundant information, each 
using the only principle possible—the very redundancy within those structures—to protect its own 
organizational information against materially disorganizing damages.  And because of this, structures 
that undergo either autopoiesis or replication or both all display the aspect of vitality, giving us the 
impression that these things are alive. 
At this point, one might object that I seem to be overlooking an important difference 
between these cases:  In autopoiesis the result is really “the same thing”—a persisting cell—while in 
replication the result is “just a copy”.  I see this concern as being rooted in unjustifiable prejudices 
about what constitutes an identity.  If one were to observe both processes carefully, one would 
recognize that neither one turns out to be the persistence of a physical object.  At some point in 
each process there is a complete turnover of physical material, and all that remains in the future is 
the same structure, the same organizational or informational content, the same pattern.303  At any 
rate, this objection should dissolve when we have a coherent theory of identity.  
																																																								
303 Over the course of an autopoietic cell’s life, its every molecule is replaced thousands of times through continuous 
cycles of metabolic activity.  In the process of replication by binary fission, autopoietic turnover continues unabated, and 
each copied daughter cell can only be made of roughly half the material of the original mother cell, with the other half 
being newly constructed parts . . . a process of change that accumulates geometrically with the passing of generations.  In 





One string functions in two ways: first as program, and second as data.  This is the secret of self-reproducing programs, 
and, as we shall see, of self-reproducing molecules. 
 
—Douglas Hofstadter (1979, p. 499) 
 
At least one generic model of identity can be found to support both autopoiesis and 
replication as forms of Kantian autocausal persistence.  The proposal is based in part on the discrete 
mathematics of graph theory, in part on the dynamical-systems notion of a basin boundary, and in 
part on the notion alluded to in the epigraph above.  Hofstadter’s secret, “of self-reproducing 
programs, and . . . self-reproducing molecules”, actually contains two of the secrets to any 
teleological reproduction or self-reproduction.  The first secret is that one structure may serve two 
entirely different roles, once as “program” and once as “data”.  That is to say, in order to create 
anything—whether that is a copy of one’s self or anything else—the creator needs to contain or 
have access to both a complete informational blueprint (the data) for what it is to create and the 
complete machinery (the program) that can follow that blueprint and do the creating.  
The second secret, hinted at by the first, is that a set of patterns, arranged in the right way, is 
able to contain itself redundantly.  Having two (or more) copies of the same organizational content 
simultaneously present allows one the luxury to lose any bit of information from one copy and to 
then potentially recover and reproduce the lost bit from the redundant information still available.304  
																																																								
304 Computer scientists have, for some time now, understood the strategy for securing information by way of redundant 
storage.  Not only do we have numerous procedures for backing up our data, but data-storage engineers have also 
embodied the notion of redundancy in a technology called Redundant Arrays of Independent Disks (RAID) used to 
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And so, by encoding the same content in two different ways, a set of interrelated structures can 
maintain, ensconced within their organization, the informational redundancy that is necessary to 
survive an environment of braising. 
  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
protect critical data systems.  The general idea of RAID is that if our data is distributed across more than one physical 
disk, and if at least one of these disks is not additional data, but instead redundant data that is derived or calculated from 
the other disks in some reversible manner (commonly using a parity calculation), then whenever any single disk fails—
either an original or the parity disk—the lost data can correctly be rebuilt from what remains on the other disks.  In 
short, we can only rebuild lost information when we have informational redundancy somewhere in the system; 
otherwise, like a restoration artist, we would be left to guess. 
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A. The Subtlety of Sameness 
 
If only by definition, it is impossible for two things, any two things, to be exactly the same. 
 
—Robert French (1995, p. xv) 
 
It should be obvious, I think, that the only possible way to account for the persistence of an 
identity over time is through some measure of equivalence that can group together a set of partially 
similar structures, allowing them to count as different versions of the same thing.   
As we noticed in Chapter II, the majority of such equivalence classes that our human minds 
deal in are subjective; they are sets of structures that we can call “identifiable” because their 
equivalence exists in relation to some purpose for which the mind is making the identification 
(Hofstadter and Sander 2013; Lakoff 1987; Wittgenstein 1953).  Examples are boundless, but 
include the numerous, largely similar (but certainly not identical) versions of Theseus’ ship, or the 
many similar versions of a wedding ring as it weathers and accumulates years of scratches.305 
Sameness is indeed subtle, and Wittgenstein’s (1953) concern over the lack of essential 
categories in our world is of course concerning.  But if every category were based only on 
Wittgensteinian family resemblance, then there simply would be no objective way for something to 
maintain its existence—nothing could ever remain the same, and there would be no true identities.   
The seemingly pathological subjectivity of family resemblances is, however, not as dire as it 
seems.  In certain cases there can be objective criteria by which to group the members of an 
																																																								
305 The notion of subjective similarity is a deep topic that lies at the heart of cognition.  It underlies the processes of 
perception, classification, and analogy-making that occur in our brains and, to some extent, also in artificial neural 
networks.  For more detailed analyses of sameness and analogy, I refer the reader to Hofstadter and FARG (1995) and 
Hofstadter and Sander (2013), as well as to French’s (1995) The Subtlety of Sameness, from which the current subsection 
takes its title. 
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equivalence class, in order to account for absolute identicality (and thus true identity).  Although the 
epigraph above, from French, is true in part—there are no physical criteria according to which two 
things might be exactly the same—we may find two or more versions of a thing to be identical using 
organizational criteria.  If each of the structures within an equivalence class is not required to be 
similar to the others but instead is required, in one manner or another, to have the capacity to 
produce or transform into one of the other members of the set, then they each have the transitive 
capacity to produce or transform into each other.  There can thus be an objective measure of 
sameness across time.  What remains the same amongst the members of such a set is not necessarily 
anything physical at any particular moment, but only the specification of what each member of the 
set has the causal disposition to produce—the identity is the entire set of potential future states, all 
of which can create one another. 
    
Hofstadter’s Secret 
 
In developing his theory of personal identity306, Hofstadter (1979, 2007) explored some 
apparently autocausal, self-referential patterns, a couple of which will be helpful to look at now to 
glean some intuitions about the types of things that are, in part, both cause and effect of themselves.  
Hofstadter’s examples are not fully autocausal but, as we’ll come to see, there is a useful analogy to 
be found between them and phenomena such as Kauffman’s autocatalytic sets, along with the more 
general biological activities of autopoiesis and replication. 
																																																								
306 Readers familiar with Hofstadter’s work may discover some striking similarities between his notion and the one that I 
am developing, both of which are given similarly in terms of loops and cycles, self-reference, emergence, causation, and 
so on.  It is far from accidental that these two theories, of topics that also share a central term in their titles, should 
converge upon such abstractly similar characterizations.  Nonetheless, the two topics are quite distinct.  Hofstadter’s 
“strange loops” (2007) are phenomena that arise from a certain kind of self-referential structure within perceptual 
systems and so, in Hofstadter’s sense, a tomato plant has no identity, a mosquito has nearly none, but a dog may have 
some, a two-year-old a bit more, and a healthy adult human will have something of the full-fledged sort.  By contrast, the 
kind of identity I am working towards explaining is aligned less with awareness and perception and more with life and 
vitality; it inhabits mosquitoes and tomato plants equally as well as it does dogs, toddlers, and adult humans. 
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Hofstadter’s first example draws upon Willard Van Orman Quine’s The Ways of Paradox 
(1962/1976), an essay wherein Quine, explicating Gödel’s (1931) proof of incompleteness, using an 
ingenious novel way of achieving self-reference, developed a crafty emendation to the ancient “liar’s 
paradox” (also sometimes known as the Epimenides paradox).   
The original paradox consists of a sentence such as “This sentence is false.”  Quine noticed 
that that seemingly self-referential statement might actually be found to be non-paradoxical, 
depending on what one takes to be the referent of the term “This sentence”.307  In order to remedy 
this, Quine devised a new sentence to do the same job better.  I’ll follow Hofstadter (2007), who 
labeled the new version of the paradox “Quine’s Quip”: 
 
“Yields a falsehood when appended to its own quotation” yields a falsehood when 
appended to its own quotation.  (Quine 1962/1976) 
 
If one were to attempt to check the truth-value of the assertion in Quine’s Quip, one would 
take the quoted phrase and append it to its own quotation (as the quip suggests) and then check to 
see if that process yields a falsehood (as the quip also suggests).  If this operation is successful—if 
the result that that process yields is indeed false—then the quip is true.  But since performing the 
operation actually produces the quip itself, we run into paradox.  As Quine himself puts it, the 
sentence “is true if and only if it is false” (Quine 1962/1976). 
Hofstadter notes that the surprising and really powerful thing that Quine has done is 
something more than just to produce an interesting paradox:  He has in fact done so by way of 
																																																								
307 Quine (1962/1976) clarifies:  “In an effort to clear up this antinomy it has been protested that the phrase ‘This 
sentence’, so used, refers to nothing. This is claimed on the ground that you cannot get rid of the phrase by supplying a 
sentence that is referred to.  For what sentence does the phrase refer to? The sentence ‘This sentence is false’. If, 
accordingly, we supplant the phrase ‘This sentence’ by a quotation of the sentence referred to, we get: ‘ “This sentence is 
false” is false’. But the whole outside sentence here attributes falsity no longer to itself but merely to something other 
than itself, thereby engendering no paradox.”  
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producing a thing that, in some sense, is able to produce itself.308   Of course, without a person to follow 
its “instructions”, Quine’s Quip is not truly an independent replicator (and that fact will be 
important to us later), but it can be thought of, in a way, as a machine that is itself while 
simultaneously being the instructions to produce itself (Hofstadter 2007; see also Hofstadter 1979). 
The other similar example that Hofstadter analyzed is also a thing that is able to produce 
itself, by way of the same special trick.  In this case, the tricky type of thing is a bit of code—a string 
of characters—that, when run as a program on a computer, outputs the very same string of 




Figure 9.1:  A quine written in the nonce computer-language qPHP.  The first line of the code tells the 
computer to create in its memory a string variable (called $s) and assign it the value of the entire 
literal string of characters between the two “’”s.  The second line of code tells the computer to echo 
(that is, to output) the value of that variable, essentially appended to its own quotation.  What it 
echoes is a series of concatenated strings, beginning with a literal “$s=”, followed by a single-quote 
mark [chr(39) means the 39th character in ASCII, which is just “’”], followed by the entire value 
of the string variable, $s, followed by another single-quote mark, followed by a semicolon 
[chr(59)], and ending once again with the value of $s.  (The eagle-eyed reader who is familiar 
with computer code may have noticed that there is a line-break character after the first semicolon; that 




308 This trick was first discovered and exploited by Kurt Gödel in his (1931) proof of the incompleteness of formal 
systems.  But it is Hofstadter’s analysis and expansion of Quine’s version of Gödel’s idea that will be useful to our 
current project.  The interested reader should explore Gödel (1931), Hofstadter (1979, 2007), and Quine (1962) as well 
as von Neumann (1966) and Smullyan (1961). 
$s=’echo “$s=”.chr(39).$s.chr(39).chr(59).$s;’;  
echo “$s=”.chr(39).$s.chr(39).chr(59).$s; 
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The listing in Figure 9.1 is a sample quine, written in a language we can call qPHP, a 
purpose-built derivative of the recently popular scripting language PHP.309  I chose this particular 
quine as an example, because it visibly operates in quite the same way as Quine’s Quip.  It has two 
halves that look almost exactly the same, despite their playing different roles in the act of replication 
(see also Hofstadter 1979).310  One can follow the figure caption above to see in detail how the quine 
works, but in sum, the entirety of the program pretty much says: 
 
‘Yields a quine when appended to its own quotation’ yields a quine when appended 
to its own quotation. 
 
As Hofstadter explains it, the secret—the special trick that allows both Quine’s Quip and 
these software quines to do what they do—is the fact that both kinds of structures play dual roles, 
serving at the same time as both data and program, both blueprint and machine.  Quine’s Quip and 
																																																								
309 A few notes on syntax, for programmers:  qPHP is like PHP in that it uses the convention of naming and declaring 
variables by prefixing their names with a dollar sign, so $s serves as a string variable here.  Also, the “.” is used as the 
concatenation operator, meaning to join the strings before and after it, end to end, into a single string.  The two main 
differences between PHP and qPHP are the following:  (i) in qPHP, variable interpolation has been turned off.  This 
means that a variable name found inside a string literal will only be interpreted literally, instead of being converted to the 
value of that variable as it is in PHP.  And (ii) in PHP, a programmer needs to tell the interpreter that there is code to 
interpret by enclosing the code in a block that begins with “<?php ” and ends with “ ?>”; in qPHP everything in a file is 
expected to be code and so no enclosure is necessary.  The “same” quine written in PHP is the following relatively 
longer block of code; curious readers who would like to work out for themselves how it operates would be well-served 
to consult an ASCII character-set encoding table.   
<?php $str=’echo chr(60).chr(63).chr(112).chr(104).chr(112).chr(32).chr(36). 
”str=”.chr(39).$str.chr(39).chr(59).$str.chr(32).chr(63).chr(62);’; 
echo chr(60).chr(63).chr(112).chr(104).chr(112).chr(32).chr(36). 
”str=”.chr(39).$str.chr(39).chr(59).$str.chr(32).chr(63).chr(62); ?>  
310 Hofstadter’s own example quine (1979), written in a language he called BlooP, is also aesthetically constructed of an 
obviously reduplicated block of code wrapped in minimal syntactical punctuation: 
DEFINE PROCEDURE "ENIUQ" [TEMPLATE]: PRINT [TEMPLATE, LEFT-BRACKET,  
QUOTE-MARK, TEMPLATE, QUOTE-MARK, RIGHT-BRACKET, PERIOD].  
ENIUQ  
['DEFINE PROCEDURE "ENIUQ" [TEMPLATE]: PRINT [TEMPLATE, LEFT-BRACKET,  
QUOTE-MARK, TEMPLATE, QUOTE-MARK, RIGHT-BRACKET, PERIOD]. 
ENIUQ']. 
An English translation of this quine that respects the syntactical order of Hofstadter’s example might look like the 
following:  A quine is produced when one prepends to its own quotation the phrase “a quine is produced when one 
prepends to its own quotation the phrase”.  
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our qPHP quine both contain within themselves the thing that needs to be written twice and, right 
next door, the instructions for how to write it twice, in order that, together, they might be able to 




In the cases we’ve been considering, the blueprint and machinery for replication stand side-
by-side in a neatly reduplicated form.  Their information is explicitly present twice, once in each half.  
But not all replicators require this explicit reduplication, and as we explore more, we’ll find that, in 
most replicators, things are not so neatly divided.  Nonetheless, the reduplication in the Hofstadter–
Quine examples is curious, and it hints at the idea that some form of redundant information may be 
a requirement for replicators. 
We can take a different perspective on the role that redundant information plays in 
replicators by looking at cases in which a thing does not directly create itself.  Consider what are 
now typically called multiquines—code for computer programs that write code for other computer 
programs (potentially, but not necessarily, in other languages), one of which eventually will write the 
code for the original program again.311  Figure 9.2 contains listings of programs P and Q that are able 
to write one another, both in the javascript language.  Each program certainly contains an 
informational specification for itself, just by being there; it is itself.  And it should be intuitively 
obvious that each program also, in some fashion, contains the organizational information—both 
blueprint and machinery—required to produce the other.  But what that fact implies is that, in some 
																																																								
311 An engineer named Yusuke Endoh produced the most virtuosic multiquine that I have yet run across.  Endoh 
included ninety-nine programs as embedded data in each functioning program, for a total of one hundred programs 
altogether, each of which writes the next program in a circular series.  Every version of Endoh’s multiquine is a different 
structure—a physically and logically different string of bytes, in a different language—with the capacity to produce each 
of the other programs and thereby to, eventually, produce itself (Endoh 2014, 2015). 
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Figure 9.2:  A two-part multiquine.  Programs P and Q, both written in javascript, are designed such 
that they write one another’s source code.  While both programs use string manipulations to write 
code out to the console, their particular methods of building one another differ slightly.  As one can 
see, a large part of these two programs is the same, indicating that they share much of the same 
organizational information.  In each of the two programs, the portions in bold typeface indicate the 
verbatim contents of Program P.  The red, blue, green, and purple characters in each program 
represent the corresponding, encoded contents of Program Q. 
 
PROGRAM P 
function p() { console.log("function q() { var b = " + 
String.fromCharCode(39) + p.toString() + 
p.toString().substr(8,4) + ";" + String.fromCharCode(39) 
+ "; console.log(b); } q();");} p(); 
 
PROGRAM Q 
function q() { var b = 'function p() { 
console.log("function q() { var b = " + 
String.fromCharCode(39) + p.toString() + 
p.toString().substr(8,4) + ";" + String.fromCharCode(39) 




If we look at the programs in Figure 9.2, we can easily see that the entirety of P is located 
inside Q, as a literal string.  We can call this the P that’s in Q.  I’ve highlighted the P that’s in Q by 
putting the verbatim segment of each program in bold type.   
But in order for each program to be able to write the other, the entirety of Q must also 
reside, in some fashion, within P.  In fact it does, and it is not too difficult to see how.  The 
blueprint for Q can be found in P not literally, but as a set of encoded string operations that can 
construct Q.  Observe:  The beginning of Q is there in P, literally:  “function q() { var b 
= ”.  And so is the ending: “; console.log(b); } q();”.  I’ve made these corresponding 
sections within each program red so that they can be easily compared.  Then, the two single-quote 
marks of Q are encoded in P as “String.fromCharCode(39)”, (which is javascript code for 
printing ASCII character number thirty-nine) and there is one functional syntactical semicolon, “;”, 
in Q that is encoded as a string literal in P.  All of these items have been colored blue in each 
program.  The remainder of Q just is P, as we’ve already noted, but the way that that part of Q is 
encoded as a blueprint within P is a bit trickier than the literal way that P is encoded in Q.  In this 
case, the bulk of that part of Q is encoded as “p.toString()”, which is a shorthand in 
javascript that asks the interpreter to get the string that corresponds to the code for function p.  I’ve 
made the corresponding parts in each of the two programs green.  And the small remainder of Q 
not yet accounted for is encoded as “p.toString().substr(8,4)”.  That part of P and the 
small piece of Q that it encodes—a four-character substring of the code for the function p, 
beginning from the eighth character—are both in purple.  Altogether, just as the bold section of P is 
the P that’s in Q, the colorful section of P represents the Q that’s in P. 
Now that we’ve seen how P is inside Q and how, at the same time, Q is inside P, it might 
strike us that this means there should, in some fashion, be a Q deeper within the P that’s in Q as 
well as a P deeper within the Q that’s in P.  Indeed, this is the case.  For instance, if we look within 
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the P that’s in Q—that is, if we look at the literal string in bold type inside Q—we can find a 
representation of the code that corresponds to Q, just as we described above for the Q that is inside 
P itself.  I’ve underlined the relevant piece.  This is the Q that’s in P that’s in Q.  And if we look again 
at the Q that’s in P—the series of colored string-manipulating code statements within P—we find 
within them also a further version of P, encoded as the following subset of the commands: 
p.toString() + p.toString().substr(8,4) + ";".  That is the P that’s in Q that’s 
in P. 
Altogether, each program not only (i) is itself, but also (ii) encodes the immediate or 
proximal potential for its partner or successor, and (iii) is also self-redundant, by encoding the distal 
potential to make a structurally identical copy of itself again.  Both programs indirectly contain 
versions of themselves.  They have informational redundancy (even without containing the obvious 
reduplication found in quines and Quine’s Quip).  They have the power to cause their own existence 
by way of causing one another’s existence.312 
 
Multiquines, Replication, and Autopoiesis 
 
Multiquines make for a rich example within which we can find versions of both replication 
and autopoiesis.  Consider a few different possibilities.  First, imagine we begin with a single copy of 
a single version of a multiquine (say, program P), and when that program is run, it produces the next 
version (Q), after which the first program is cleared from the computer’s memory.  Under this 
constraint, no matter how many versions there are in the multiquine, we have a system that is just as 
																																																								
312 A multiquine is a good example for beginning to explore the concepts of actual and potential organization but, 
ultimately, these examples suffer from one of the problems that also afflict quines and Quine’s Quip.  None of these 
things are perfect examples of the idea we are using them to represent because they aren’t truly standalone machines that 
can follow their own blueprints to produce themselves.  They are all instruction sets that require rather complex auxiliary 
machinery—people and possibly computers—in order to operate.  They are like prions or virions without hosts, or 
cellular DNA in the absence of ribosomes and mitochondria.  They are simply not autocausal sets of their own. 
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susceptible to braising as any other program because, no matter which version exists at the moment, 
if it becomes corrupted—if almost any character within it were to become displaced within the 
computer’s memory—it will no longer be able to write the next version (and so our only copy of all 
potential versions will be lost at once).  All these individual versions of a multiquine contain the 
organizational potential for all the other versions but, arranged and allowed to operate in this way, 
they are still fragile, because their redundancy is not distributed.  The organizational potential for all 
versions is located in one place—in engineer’s terms, a single point of failure. We can represent this 
state of affairs as in Figure 9.3. 
 
 
Figure 9.3:  A representation of programs P and Q, which are able to sacrificially write one another’s 
code.  The arrow from Q to P represents the process by which Q writes P and is then, itself, 
destroyed.  The arrow from P to Q represents the same process in the other direction.  And the 
arrows from each of P and Q to Ø represent the possibility of either of these two programs decaying 
due to random outside events (we can think of Ø as being the “null state” where neither program 
exists).   We will develop the notation that you see here (which I call an “organizational graph”) in 
detail as the chapter continues.  
 
Alternatively, we can imagine a possibility wherein each version of the multiquine is allowed 
to run and to write its own output as a new file, but only one copy of each version is allowed to 
reside on the disk at any time.  What we get is something akin to an autocatalytic (or autopoietic) set.  
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Although there is only one copy of the entire set of programs, that one copy contains a lot of 
redundant data, since each version within it contains the blueprints for all the others.  To be precise, 
there are as many copies of the information for each version as there are versions.  This distributed 
redundancy protects all the versions against random and irreversibly destructive events, because any 
one of those versions contains the potential to recreate all the others.  
Say, for instance, that program P is able to write program Q, while Q is able to write P.  If 
for whatever reason, the version of P in storage becomes corrupted, it can be reproduced by the 
future operation of Q . . . or vice versa.  The various programs that make up the multiquine can be 
thought of as various parts that have the ability to repair or replace one another. 
 
 
Figure 9.4:  A representation of the same two programs, but now arranged in a scenario in which they 
both may coexist in the computer’s memory.  When P creates Q it can also stick around, resulting in a 
state with both programs (PQ), and vice versa.   
 
Lastly now, we can imagine a scenario in which each version of the multiquine is retained 
after running and is also allowed to write its output as a new copy.  Now we have an autopoietic 
replicator.  In this case, as long as the rate of externally produced damage is slower than the rate at 
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which the programs run, the set of all versions is not only able to maintain itself (despite occasional 
damage to some versions) but it is also able to fill up the disk with endless copies of itself, providing 
a further level of protection against braising—if the new versions are written to new sectors of the 
disk or to new disks altogether, then a sector failure or a disk failure (instead of a bit failure) can be 
tolerated, and the autopoietic replicator will continue to exist, or may even proliferate. 
As we continue, the proposal I’ll be making is that autocatalytic sets, hypercycles, 
chemotons, and other autopoietic entities share these informational properties of the multiquine—
their multiple parts contain the blueprints for one another (via their capacities to construct one 
another) and thereby contain the blueprints for themselves.  The difference that makes physical 
autopoietic entities even more interesting than multiquines is that they are not just instruction sets—
they themselves also contain the machinery necessary to follow those instructions.  The various 
versions of any of these structures have the power to cause their own existence by way of causing 
one another’s existence.  To make that claim more meaningful, we can talk a bit more now about 




From the example of the multiquine, we begin to get the sense that what it means to have an 
identity is not necessarily to remain physically identical as time passes, but to remain organizationally 
identical . . . to possess, in every possible version of a changing thing, the deep, distal blueprints—
the organizational capacity—necessary to eventually create any of the other versions.   
It will help us to understand organizational identicality if we make a distinction between 
what I’ll call actual and potential organization.  The actual organization in a state is the physical, 
structural organization of the patterns that actually exist at that moment.  It is some kind of 
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specification of what is really there, and it is what differs from state to state.313  The potential 
organization in a state refers to the ability of that state’s actual organization to causally contribute to 
the organizational content of future states.  In an identity, it is this organizational potential that 
remains the same between states. 
The set of programs that constitute a multiquine are quite distinct if you compare them side-
by-side, byte-by-byte.  They are conceivably written in different languages, translated by different 
interpreters or compilers, and they result in differing series of operations to be performed by the 
same processor.  But, as we know from their performance, they are all inter-convertible.  Each 
version directly specifies its own actual organization, directly encodes the potential organization for 
the next program in the sequence, and thus indirectly encodes the distal potential organization for 
the rest of the programs in the sequence including, ultimately, itself.  What this means is that each 
one of them contains the potential for creating all of them, and so the sum of the potential organization in 
each one is precisely equivalent.  The versions of a multiquine are not physically, but organizationally 
identical. 
 
Blueprints and Machinery 
 
We are soon going to apply the notion of organizational identicality to examples that, while 
naturally abstract, will also be able to map onto chemical systems.  It will be useful to preface that 
discussion by looking at how actual and potential organization might arise in physical and chemical 
systems.   
																																																								
313 One day someone may discover an information-theoretic (i.e. bit-string) formula for encoding organizational patterns 
as bit-strings.  If so, I would conjecture that what it means for different states to be organizationally identical is for each 
of the states to be equivalently compressible to the same minimal bit-string.  At present, I haven’t the faintest idea how 
that would be done. 
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By now, physicists have well documented the nature of matter as stuff that can interact—as 
patterns that can cause changes (to one another).  Matter itself is at the same time both object and 
motion, both noun and verb, both data and program; it is a thing unto itself and simultaneously a 
capacity to change other things; a thing that can move and a thing that can be moved.  And so here 
we can reframe the dynamical account of patterns from Chapter II in terms of actual and potential 
organization:  Each pattern of physical matter in the world—whether it is a particle, a small 
molecule, or a highly complicated aggregate—embodies both its own actual organizational structure 
and, at the same time, some specific causal capacities—some potential organization.  Just by being a 
pattern of matter, a thing is inherently endowed with the dynamical, causal blueprints that are able to 
create a certain set of other patterns (given an environment with the right material and energetic 
components). 
We can make this more specific with an example from chemistry:  A volume that contains a 
polycrystalline lump of platinum (Pt) along with some molecules of gaseous ethene (C2H4), and 
some molecules of gaseous hydrogen (H2) has an actual organization that can be described in just 
those terms.  But latent in that mixture also lies the potential organization for ethane (C2H6), a 
compound formed by the catalytic action of the metal upon the two gases.  There is no ethane in the 
mixture at first, but nonetheless there are both the blueprint and the machinery necessary to create 
it—the mixture might be said to be “pregnant” with the organizational potential for ethane.  And 
sure enough, in a range of energetic environments, the starting state described above will usually 
evolve into a new state that contains ethane (along with the platinum catalyst, which itself goes 
unchanged during the hydrogenation of ethene that it encourages).   
This example is not autocausal in the way a multiquine might be, because the later state 
(ethane plus catalyst) is not likely to produce the former (hydrogen, ethene, catalyst); however, the 
example does demonstrate the difference between the actual and the potential organization of states.  
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In addition, it allows us to imagine arranging chemical systems into Kauffman-style autocatalytic sets 
that are like multiquines, in which the potential of each chemical state contains the distal blueprints 
for the remainder of the states, including itself.   
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B. A Mathematical Form of Identicality 
 
Now there are selves. There was a time, thousands (or millions, or billions) of years ago, when there were none—at 
least none on this planet.  So there has to be—as a matter of logic—a true story to be told about how there came to be 
creatures with selves.  
 
—Daniel Dennett (1989) 
 
But to think [of an item, such as a glass, as having a permanent nature] is to fall into the trap of Plato’s “objectivist” 
vision, according to which objects have one and only one true identity. 
 
—Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander (2013) 
 
Although the notion of organizational identicality that we are about to develop is 
mathematical, it is better thought of as a kind of logic than as a formula or model for a particular 
structure.  It is an exploratory version of a tool for reasoning about the causal interactions that allow 
various kinds of patterns to create one another, and for categorizing the sources of orderliness in 
those patterns.  The design of the tool can probably be improved upon; but this first version seems 
to be worth improving upon because it does us the service of bringing together the conceptual pieces 
that can help us understand identity and value (and all that comes with them).  Since my notion of 
identicality follows from the discrete mathematics of graph theory, I will begin with a brief 
introduction to those abstractions.   
A graph is a mathematical representation of items and their relationships.  The items in the 
graphs we’ll analyze will be symbolic representations of the actual organizations of patterns; the 
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relationships will be the capacities of those items to transform into one another by way of physical 
causation.  But embedded in those representations, in a way that I’ll soon describe, will be a further 
representation of the potential organization of those patterns.  Typically, a graph will consist of nodes (or 
vertices; drawn as circles) that represent the items, and connections (or edges; drawn as lines or arrows) 
that represent the relationships, but alternative representations (for instance, matrices) are 
sometimes used to denote the same information.   
A graph can be as simple as a single node—a symbol on a page, usually circled—that 
represents whatever the person who drew the graph has decided for it to represent.  Two circles  
connected by a line represent different items that are somehow related to one another.  For instance, 
one circle might represent Madrid and another Paris, and the line between them might have been 
chosen to represent the idea “has a direct flight route”.  Another node, perhaps representing 
Honolulu, may have no edges connected to it, thus representing the idea that there are no direct 
flights between it and either Paris or Madrid. 
 
 
Figure 9.5:  A graph representing the existence of a direct flight route between Madrid and Paris, as 
well as the lack of direct flights between either of these cities and Honolulu.   
 
A directed graph is one in which the connections are arrows, rather than lines, symbolizing the 
potentially one-way nature of a relationship.  Thus, however likely or unlikely it might be for airlines 
to do so, there could, for instance, be direct flights from Madrid to Tripoli, from Tripoli to Paris, 
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and from Paris to Madrid, but no flights going in the other directions, and we can symbolize this 
state of affairs by drawing a set of nodes connected by arrows.  The relationships represented by the 
arrows in a directed graph no longer represent “has a direct flight route”, but instead represent the 
more specific idea “has a direct one-way flight” (in the direction of the arrow). 
 
 
Figure 9.6:  An example of a directed graph, representing the flights available from Madrid to Tripoli, 
Tripoli to Paris, and Paris to Madrid.  Obviously, given this schema, if a Madrilenian would like to 
visit a Tripolitan friend, they will have to stop over in Paris on their way home. 
 
A full description of the world’s major cities and the available air-travel routes between them would 
of course have many hundreds of nodes and many thousands of connections.  In general, a graph 
may have as many nodes and connections as are necessary to represent the structure one is 
attempting to describe.   
One feature of directed graphs that is important to the notion of identity we’re going to 
develop here is that there is the possibility of a cycle of directed edges that allows one to pass through 
some number of nodes within the cycle, eventually returning to a previous state.  The most minimal 
cycle consists of a single node with a self-connection (look ahead to Figure 9.8, for an example).  
Another example appears in Figure 9.6, where the three nodes together form a cycle.   
Cycles are of course interesting because, in going round and round, one may come back to 
where one started, thus offering a mildly tantalizing notion of sameness; but cycles get to be even 
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more interesting when taken to the next level:  Graph theorists have chosen the name strongly 
connected component (SCC) to refer to a group of nodes within a graph having the property that every 
node can be reached from every other node through various interconnected and partially 
overlapping cycles.  One feature of SCCs that differentiates them from individual cycles is that, 
while the nodes within an SCC are all mutually reachable, none of them have a reciprocal 
connection—direct or indirect—with any node in any other SCC of the same graph.  That is to say, 
an SCC is an isolated set of connected cycles; both entrance into and exit from an SCC are always 
irreversible (one-way) transitions.  This feature of directed graphs produces a kind of natural, 
mathematical boundary around members of the SCC that marks those members as somehow being the 
same.  At the same time, the boundary also marks the rest of the nodes in the graph as somehow 
being different.   
 
 
Figure 9.7:  A directed graph with four strongly connected components (SCCs) highlighted.  As is 
apparent in the example, one can find a path from any node within a particular SCC to any other node 
of the same SCC (and back), yet only one-way paths exist between nodes in separate SCCs. 
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A further result of the boundaries of strongly connected components is the fact that any 
directed graph can be partitioned into a set of mutually exclusive strongly connected components.  
That mutually exclusive set of SCCs, and the one-way connections that remain between them, serves 
as a directed graph of its own—called the condensation of the original graph.  Of course the 
condensation of a graph is always acyclic (otherwise the SCCs in it would be joined, not distinct).  In 
figure 9.7, the condensation of the graph has four nodes (the four SCCs of the full graph) that can 
be arranged in a serial fashion along the lines of their connectivity.  The source node, I, of the 
condensation transitions to node B–G–L–R–W, which then transitions to node M–P, which at last 
transitions to the sink node T (this kind of serial pattern is not typical; it just happens to hold in this 
case). 
In the current work, our analysis of identity will be given in terms of the SCCs that occur 
within a special kind of directed graph whose nodes and connections represent both organization 
and time.  These graphs fit into a class of models called Markov processes, which are generally meant to 
model time.  The Markov processes we’ll look at can be used to represent the changes that might 
occur to a set of organizational structures over time, and the dividend paid for taking that point of 
view is that we can also look within these models for SCCs that represent patterns of potential 
organization that don’t change over time.  That is to say, in graphs where the nodes represent actual 
organization, an SCC represents a set of nodes all of which have the same organizational potential to 
create one another—they are like the multiple versions of a multiquine, each P containing some 
proximal potential (the Q that is in P) as well as some distal potential that includes itself (the P that is 
in Q that is in P).  It is that persistence of organizational potential that we’ll consider to be the 






So let’s look now at how these Markov-process graphs can help introduce time into our 
analyses.  In a Markov process, each of the nodes stands for a description of a state of the system at 
a particular moment.  The directed connections from node to node signify the potential transitions 
between organizational states as time passes.  
 
 
Figure 9.8:  A directed graph representing the Markov process in which state A transitions to state Ø 
with probability p, and also transitions to itself with probability 1 – p.  Whenever the sum of the 
probabilities for all the transitions outbound from a node is less than 1, we assume that the node has a 
self-connection with a probability that brings the total to 1.  In the case in which there are no 
outbound transitions from a node (such as node Ø in this model), the node is called an absorbing 
state and the implicit self-connection has a transition probability of 1. 
 
I’ve drawn the very basic Markov model shown in Figure 9.8 as an example to help us 
understand this way of representing time.  In such a model, we begin in one of the nodes at time t0 
(we assume whichever node we begin in represents some initial conditions of our world) and, with 
each discrete tick of a clock (t1, t2, t3, . . .), a probabilistic decision is made as to which of the 
transitions to follow in order to reach the next state of the system.  In other words, as time goes by, 
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the world either remains in the same state (at the same node) or it changes to an allowable new state 
by following an arrow. 
For instance, one could consider the state A to represent the fact that a coconut tree remains 
upright and rooted during a typhoon.  The model in the figure claims that, at any moment in time, 
there is some small probability p that the tree may get blown over into state Ø.  The remainder of 
the time (probability 1 – p) the tree will remain standing, and so a self-connection (a curved arrow 
going from state A to itself) represents this maintenance of the status quo.  There is no arrow from 
state Ø to state A, and this represents the fact that the effects of the wind (which is the causal factor 
lying behind our transitions) cannot re-root a fallen tree (i.e., the probability of such a transition is 0). 
The transitions taken are stochastically chosen, according to the transition probabilities of all 
the outbound transitions from the current node.  For now, we will look at discrete-time Markov 
models that are time-homogeneous—that is to say, there is a finite, fixed set of states, and as time 
ticks by in discrete fixed units (called “ticks”), the models transition from one state to another.314 
 
A Discrete Representation of our World 
 
Throughout much of the rest of the chapter, we will be attempting to determine whether 
various combinations of physical patterns can be considered to be organizationally identical.  In 
order to do so, we will use a system of symbols, just like the letters in the graphs we’ve been looking 
at so far, to represent each of those patterns and the causal relationships that may exist between 
them.  Before settling into our use of that symbolic system, however, we should convince ourselves 
																																																								
314 These assumptions certainly oversimplify most real-world systems; however, our topic already has many pieces to be 
understood and, while Markov processes can also be described in terms of continuous-time dynamics, the discrete-time 
simplification will be enough to jumpstart our explorations and to help us forge many of the intuitions we need 
regarding identity, value, and goal-directedness. 
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that it might be reasonable to make the leap from the messy, continuous dynamics of our world to 
the use of those discrete symbols. 
I’m going to try to make one plausible suggestion as to how to make this mapping.  
However, I don’t want the remainder of the work to stand or fall based on this one suggestion, so 
first of all, I would like to point out that there may be other mappings of the continuous onto the 
discrete that could do the job just as well or better, and if a more convincing mapping can be found 
by scientists more well-versed in physics than I, then so be it.  The major notions of identity and 
value that result from the discrete mathematical analyses that follow can be judged independently 
from whatever mapping is used to connect those abstractions to the real world.  With that said, let’s 
look now at the mapping I propose. 
We commonly talk about molecules as if they are rigid, individual patterns, the way we 
envision them, for instance, when using the ball-and-stick models of introductory chemistry classes.  
In reality, however, those ball-and-stick models are simplified representations that stand in as 
prototypes for large categories of very similar structures.  Every molecule is a constantly vibrating, 
twisting combination of atoms.  And each atom has an ever-changing, vibrating nucleus, surrounded 
by an endlessly swirling “cloud” of its electrons.315  The thing that justifies the use of those ball-and-
stick models, as well as the symbolic chemistry that we often do on paper, is that generally those 
many variations all tend to behave in the same way.  For whatever reason, a hydrogen atom reliably 
behaves as a hydrogen atom, and a carbon atom as a carbon atom, and so on.  The point I will try to 
make here is much the same as that commonplace observation, but I will try to spell it out in a little 
more detail, and also tie it in a little more closely to our graph-theoretic analyses. 
																																																								
315 Despite how tempting it may be to try to involve quantum mechanics in this analysis I am going to leave aside such 
quantum issues as the discrete energy levels of electrons as they orbit a nucleus.  There may be something of value there 
but personally, I don’t yet see how one might generalize those concepts to all states of organization. 
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If each of our symbols stands for some prototypical atom or molecule, and if every such 
structure is really an uncountable collection of continuously varying microstates made of that 
structure’s parts, then, when we consider, say, two of our symbols to combine into a third, we would 
like that capacity to be independent of the particular microstates of those patterns that existed at the 
moment of combination.  We would like it if any version would do as well as any other.  The 
chemist’s success with naming atoms and molecules—and predicting their behaviors categorically—
already makes this view highly appealing, but we can put together a few pieces that may help us 
better understand it at a lower level.   
The first piece is that the nature of physics itself naturally discretizes the world into two 
categories of states—those that are bound and those that are unbound.  Whether we are talking about 
nuclear (say, proton-to-proton) attraction, electromagnetic (electron-to-proton; atom-to-atom) 
attraction, or gravitational (massive body) attraction, any two patterns have what is called a potential 
energy well into which their state of relation might fall.  Each of the infinite possible states of 
relation between two patterns (in terms of, say, their masses, charges, distance, and relative 
velocities), either falls into that potential energy well or remains outside of it, thereby collapsing the 
continuous state space into our two discrete categories: bound and unbound.  And so, in the 
absence of outside forces, two atoms, for instance, are either certain to ultimately move apart (they 




Figure 9.9:  A (coordinate) graph of a potential energy well, showing the way potential energy between 
two particles varies with distance.  Ideally—in the absence of outside forces—the particles will be 
drawn toward the bottom of the well, to that particular distance that corresponds to the minimal 
potential energy.  Whether or not the particles are actually bound to come together there is 
determined also by whether the kinetic energy—the current motion—of the particles drives them 
towards or away from one another more weakly or more powerfully than the forces that define the 
shape of this well.  If the kinetic energy is great enough, the particles are unbound, and if it is weak 
enough, they are bound. 
 
When the state of relation between two particles does fall into that potential energy well, the 
particles become quickly constrained to a small subset of their total possible states of relation.  
Without additional energy, they won’t be able to get over the walls of the well, and so the distance 
between them becomes limited to the tight range specified by the width of the well.  Because of this, 
the combined shape they produce, while still vibrating somewhat, does not vary too significantly. 
We might be able to see this in another way by putting the same idea into the language of 
dynamical systems theory.  In terms of dynamics, we can say that the potential energy well produces 
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an attractor (in some coordinate space, perhaps that of distance and velocity between the particles or 
the atomic nuclei).  Around any attractor is what’s called a basin of attraction—the region of that 
coordinate space wherein all flow heads towards the attractor.  And around any basin of attraction is 
what’s called a basin boundary—a line of demarcation within which lies the basin and beyond which 
flow is exempted from reaching the attractor.  This basin boundary serves as the sharp line that 
distinguishes a bound state from an unbound state.  In terms of the kinetic energy, the potential 
energy (in the forces of attraction and repulsion), and the distance between our particles, the entire 
physical relation between the particles either lies at a point within the basin boundary, where the 
particles can be considered bound, or it lies beyond the basin boundary where the particles can be 
considered to be unbound.  I suggest that the reason that particles, atoms, and most small molecules 
appear to be natural kinds—or at least, to be much closer to being natural kinds than larger 
aggregations of matter—lies in the way the dynamics that hold them together draws these sharp 
lines, determining which states of relation count as being the same and which count as being 
different.  Existence as a particular pattern of particles can be thought of as a discrete, binary affair.  
A pattern of this sort either exists or it does not. 
The idea of discrete causal relations that we are going to depend on for our upcoming 
analyses is that some patterns, perhaps X and Y, may have some likelihood, p, of creating some 
other pattern, say Z.  Based on the foregoing, one thing we can account for in this picture is the idea 
that in order for Z to form, creating any state in the basin of attraction for Z seems to be as good as 
creating any other state in the same basin, because the many states will quickly converge to the same 
attractor.  However, we still need to account for the opposite idea—the notion that any versions of 
X and of Y will serve as well as any other in being able to form Z.  The many vibrational variations 
of a lump of platinum, for instance, can all catalyze the hydrogenation of ethene into ethane, and the 
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many vibrational variations of a hydrogen atom can equivalently bind with any of the variations of a 
fluorine atom to form hydrogen fluoride.   
We can augment the notions so far with a probabilistic argument.  As we’ve determined, 
because of the forces that bind their parts together, the various states we are considering to be 
equivalent are all fairly similar in shape and able to perform the same causal jobs in intermolecular 
interactions.  However, if for some reason some of those variations are not able to perform those 
jobs, they nonetheless transform from one to another so quickly that any one of the variants that 
fails to perform a job will soon be replaced by one of the variants that can perform the job.  One 
might be reminded, here, of the way the lock-picking technique called “raking” is able to quickly 
shuffle through many variations of pin heights within the tumbler and, sometimes in mere moments, 
find and effectively imitate the shape of the key.  The rake doesn’t need to be shaped just like the 
key; it just has to cause quick enough random change (centered on the average shape of a key) such 
that the shape of the actual key will soon come to exist, for at least a moment, and push the system 






Figure 9.10:  A lock-raking pick.  A locksmith may open a lock by moving one of these tools quickly 
over all the pins inside the cylinder, while using another tool to simultaneously try turning the lock.  
The bumps on the rake will jiggle the pins up and down randomly, in search of the configuration that 
the proper key would create. 
 
This analogy can take us a little further.  Sometimes, when a locksmith rakes a lock, the right 
combination is not stumbled upon, but in those cases, the locksmith needs only to try again.  The 
causal effects of one pattern upon another are similar, in that we need not expect the first pattern to 
be guaranteed to have its effect.  Rather, we assume it can try over and over again.  As long as there 
is some likelihood of its effect, the effect can eventually occur.  Eventually, as we develop our discrete 
analyses, we will give each symbolic structure a probability of having its causal effect of producing 
other patterns in the same environment (like the p mentioned above, in the case of X and Y 
producing Z; see also Figure 9.8).  Those probabilities will be meant to reflect such things as 
whether or not the causal pattern comes into contact with the patterns it tends to interact with, and 
whether or not those patterns are oriented in the right direction in order to interact properly when 
they do come into contact, and so on.  And so we can add to this list of probabilistic factors the 
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ratio—however big or small it is—between the vibrational variations of the pattern that do in fact 
have the effect we consider the pattern to have and those that don’t.316 
For these reasons, I think it is fair to consider a good many of the states of an atom or a 
molecule as being organizationally identical to one another (in the sense of containing the same 
organizational potential—offering dynamics that may reliably interact with other patterns to produce 
still other patterns).  Perhaps not all of a pattern’s states are able to have the same organizational 
effects.  But most of them are able to transform into one another, converging to a smaller set, many 
of whose members have the same organizational effects.  I see this as naturally discretizing the world 




316 For now, none of the probabilities we use will need to be realistic.  Those kinds of details can be left for later studies.  
But it is notable that they can be very small.  All that will matter for now is the relative scale of these causal probabilities 




As the wind of time blows into the sails of space, the unfolding of the universe nurtures the evolution of matter under 
the pressure of information. From divided to condensed and on to organized, living, and thinking matter, the path is 
toward an increase in complexity through self-organization. . . . Molecular chemistry has created a wide range of ever 
more sophisticated molecules and materials and has developed a very powerful arsenal of procedures for constructing 
them from atoms linked by covalent bonds. 
 
—Jean-Marie Lehn (2002) 
 
We have seen that the formation and maintenance of self-organizing systems are compatible with the laws of physical 
chemistry.  We must now confront this idea with the major problem of biology:  How did biological systems arise? 
 
—Ilya Prigogine, et al. (1972) 
 
The word “spontaneous” means something along the lines of “on its own” or “without 
external cause”.  Throughout the remainder of our explorations of identity, I will be referring to the 
ways that interactions between patterns occur in terms of whether or not those interactions occur 
spontaneously.  I will tend to use examples of chemical reactions; however, the ideas we will be 
exploring are more general and abstract notions about the construction and destruction of patterns.  
Chemical systems just make for an excellent domain in which to find examples that are simple, clear, 
and relevant.  Speaking of spontaneity in chemical systems, however, could cause some confusion 
among scientists, because there is a sense of the term “spontaneous” that chemists have already 
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appropriated into their technical lexicon in order to describe and categorize chemical reactions, and 
their use of the word has a very different meaning from mine.   
The chemist’s usual sense of the term can be thought of as denoting energetic spontaneity.  
A reaction is energetically spontaneous if it does not require an external source of energy for it to occur.  
A reaction is not energetically spontaneous if it requires some kind of energetic push (over the 
energy-of-activation “hill”) to force the reactants to combine or to decompose. 
The sense of the term we will be primarily focused on can instead be called organizational 
spontaneity, and it obviously is more closely linked with the notion of spontaneous organization.  A 
process is organizationally spontaneous if it does not require an external source of organization for it to 
occur.  That is to say, if the blueprints for the products of the process lie entirely within the reactants 
and the environment, then that process, and the production of its products, are organizationally 
spontaneous.  If, however, some part of the organizational potential for creating those products lies 
in a structure other than the reactants, then the process is not organizationally spontaneous.  Those 
other information-bearing structures are required in order to get the system to produce the products.   
The most interesting systems turn out to involve non-organizationally spontaneous 
(catalyzed) processes, but before we can analyze those more interesting kinds of systems, we first 




Molecules—like other patterns—are constructed by a combination of two general processes, 
which can be called synthesis (the binding-together of two or more patterns into one) and decomposition 
(the splitting of a physical pattern into two or more parts). Studying these processes, and sequences 
of them, can give us a foundation from which to understand some potential mappings between 
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patterns and the kinds of organizational graphs that can account for identity.  There is a significant 
difference between the spontaneous versions of synthesis and decomposition and the catalyzed versions, 
and we’ll find that it is the catalyzed versions that ultimately fuel teleological systems; but let’s begin 
by looking at the simpler, spontaneous varieties since, for starters, the phenomenon of identity still 
occurs within them and, in any case, they are the underlying processes that give rise to the catalyzed 
varieties. 
Consider first the case of spontaneous synthesis.  The process of a proton and an electron 
coming together to form a hydrogen atom is one example.  We can characterize any basic synthesis 
in terms of two initial organizational structures, A and B, simply binding together to become a new 
organizational structure, C.  That is to say, under some environmental conditions:  A + B " C.    
The context within which I would like us to consider these patterns is a logical space in 
which, at any moment, each of A, B, and C may or may not actually be present.  The assumption 
that any pattern might disappear may seem excessive in cases when our symbols stand for individual 
atoms, or even subatomic particles, which generally are highly stable.  However, the assumption 
turns out to be harmless in those cases, and yet it becomes necessary when those symbols stand for 




Figure 9.11:  A graph representing the potential organization of A, B, and C, in an environment where 
A and B are known to spontaneously occur (that is, they are freely available via ingress from beyond 
the bounds of the system, or they are spontaneously produced by other unspecified processes within 
the system) and where all three of the patterns are subject to potential decay or destruction.  Two 
strongly connected components result from the transitions in this graph.  The separation of those 
SCCs represents the fact that decay in the C dimension will form a one-way transition between two 
subspaces whose internal structure is specified only in the A and B dimensions.  One might think of 
this graph as being the Cartesian product of three smaller graphs: Ø#"A,  Ø#"B, and C"Ø. 
 
The graph in Figure 9.11 represents the potential organizational states of any three patterns, 
A, B, and C, assuming only that A and B (but not C) are in abundant supply flowing in from beyond 
the environmental boundary or, perhaps, spontaneously produced from other unnamed processes 
within the local environment.  (Note that we are not yet assuming that C is spontaneously 
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synthesized from A and B; we will add that assumption to our system shortly.)  One can see that 
each permutation of the set of patterns of interest {A, B, C} is represented as a distinct node in this 
graph. That is to say that there are nodes representing each of the possible combinations of the 
three letters: {}, {A}, {B}, {C}, {A, B}, {A, C}, {B, C}, and {A, B, C}.  There is also a tangle of 
transitions between the nodes in the graph, but those transitions fall into two simple categories (up-
bound and down-bound) that allow us to easily understand their roles.   
First, in order to represent the assumptions that both A and B are freely or spontaneously 
available in the environment, we allow any state to transition to another state that appends A or B to 
whatever the original state already had.  This can be taken to mean that if actual A or B disappears 
from this environment, more will soon be produced or introduced (by unspecified but assumed 
environmental processes).  There are eight up-bound transitions that correspond to this notion, and 
they make up two parallel faces of a cuboid:  The Ø state may transition with some likelihood to A, 
and also to B, and each of A and B may transition with some likelihood to AB.  Similarly, C may 
transition to AC and also to BC, while each of AC and BC may transition to ABC. 
Second, the transitions in this graph also represent the fact that the organizational structures 
of A, B, and C are all potentially subject to braising.  The result of the braising of C, for instance, is 
that any state that contains a C, namely {C, AC, BC, ABC}, has a transition to a state that is nearly 
identical, but without the C, namely {Ø, A, B, AB}.  Likewise, there are four such transitions in the 
A dimension, and four more in the B dimension.  Altogether, these twelve transitions make up a full 
set of down-bound edges outlining the entire cuboid.   
Once the transitions are drawn, analysis shows that this graph consists of two SCCs, each 
one of which contains four nodes.  One of those SCCs represents the existence of C (all of its nodes 
contain a C), while the other one represents the absence of C (none of its nodes contain a C).  The 
set of one-way, down-bound transitions represents the fact that while some possible states contain 
	 478	
the actual organization of C, no state contains the potential organization of C.  While the potential 
organization for both A and B exists in the environment (as per our assumptions), C will never be 
constructed in the system represented here; if some C does unexpectedly come to enter the system, 
it can only fall apart. 
We can augment the model now by adding new transitions that correspond to the 
spontaneous rule for synthesis: A + B " C.  This can be done by drawing an arrow from any node 
in which A and B simultaneously exist to a new node where both the A and B have “disappeared” 
and C stands in their stead.  This represents the relationship between A and B being knocked across 
the basin boundary such that they fall into a potential energy well, bind together, and become C.  
There are only two states where A and B coexist, and so only two arrows need to be added: one 
from the AB state and one from the ABC state, each terminating on the C state.  The modified 





Figure 9.12: A graph that represents the potential existence, within an environment, of patterns A, B, 
and C, modeling the case of spontaneous synthesis in which A and B are assumed to spontaneously 
occur, and there is also some chance that A + B " C. 
 
In this new graph, all eight nodes together form a single SCC.  In other words, every node in 
the graph is now organizationally identical.  That means that each of the states within the graph 
contains the same organizational potential (in this environment).  Regardless of what actually exists 
at any particular moment, the potential for A, B, and C all to exist is embedded in the assumptions 
about the organizational contents of any of the nodes.  So for instance, when only C exists, our 
environment has the potential to produce more A and B (that was an assumption of this 
environment that was true also in the previous graph); when only A and B exist, C can be produced 
from them, and we can assume the A and B will soon be replaced by more A and B; and even when 
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none of the three patterns are actually present, there is always the potential for A and B to come 
about and then to produce C.  Each state of the graph has differing actual organization; but for every 
one of those states, the total potential organization is equivalent: the potential for all three patterns 
always exists. 
This of course makes sense.  Since A and B are spontaneously arising reactants, and since 
they spontaneously combine to form C, we should also expect C to be spontaneously organizing in 




If we look back at the two SCCs in Figure 9.11, we can see that the graph represents a 
situation in which any state with a C can transition—directly or indirectly—to any state without one, 
but not vice versa.  When we add the A + B " C transition, the graph (Figure 9.12) then morphs 
into one in which any state without a C can also (even if indirectly) transition to any state with one.  
In both cases—with and without the rule for the spontaneous synthesis of C—the SCCs produced 
reflect the fact that A and B are really irrelevant here.  That is to say, changes in the presence of 
actual A or B have no effect on the presence of potential A or B.  And the reason they are irrelevant 
is that A and B are present as potential organization in every state of the system.  There is no doubt 
about their organizational presence.  They are always there.   
In fact, we might even notice that the roles of A and B are much like the roles of their own 
precursors (let’s call them a1, a2, b1, and b2 for now), which we have already implicitly taken to be 
environmental assumptions.  We have accepted the idea that any time A or B is destroyed, more will 
																																																								
317 Even if A and B are not subject to braising in our environment—imagine they are fundamental particles, for 
instance—the graph without those eight down-bound arrows still produces a single SCC wherein all states are 
organizationally identical. 
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come about precisely because A and B themselves are spontaneously organizing or introduced in 
this environment, which entails the fact that their constituents (a1, a2, b1, and b2) are spontaneously 
organizing or introduced in this environment.  But if we don’t need to include a1, a2, b1, and b2 in our 
diagram, then, for the same reason, we can also leave out A and B themselves from the diagram.  We 
can logically truncate or reduce both the graphs above in both the A and B dimensions, leaving C as 
the only element whose existential fate is under consideration.  
Another way to think of this is to count A and B as assumptions in the smaller 
organizational space of just C.  Assuming the spontaneous presence of A and B, the organizational 
rule A + B " C in ABC space represents the same thing as does Ø " C in C space.  Working only 
in C space produces a graph whose general topology is equivalent to the condensation of the graph 
in ABC space, with one node containing A and B by assumption, but no C, and another node 
containing A and B by assumption, and also including C.  The connection between the two nodes is 
bidirectional, representing the facts that (i) C is susceptible to braising, and (ii) when A and B 
coexist, C can be produced. 
 
Figure 9.13a:  A graph representing the fact that, in this environment, C forms spontaneously.  The A 
and B from which C forms are listed in the parentheses of every node in the graph as a way to make 
explicit the assumption that those two patterns are always organizationally present, whether or not 
they are physically present.  In other words, this graph represents the same system as Figure 9.12.  The 
two nodes here still form only a single SCC, since C is subject to braising and is also spontaneously 
reoccurring from the given A and B. 
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9.13b. A simplified notation for organizational graphs.  This is the same graph as in 9.13a.  The 
difference here is that the parenthesized A and B have been removed from the specification of each 
state, and instead stand in the space around the graph, in order to represent their organizational 
presence in the environment within which all the possible states of the graph exist.  Again, this graph 
represents the very same system as Figure 9.12.  To further simplify our notation, the parenthesized 
components whose presence is assumed may sometimes be left out. 
 
In general, we can reduce any space we are analyzing with respect to the organizational 
contents that are available in every state of the space.  And we can call those patterns that are 
ubiquitous in the system “organizational assumptions”, and list them as parenthesized organizational 
contents.  Reduction of this sort will be important not only to understanding the organizational roles 




Decomposition is the opposite of synthesis and so it looks different, but the end result is 
similar, in that a spontaneous process always results in complete organizational identicality between 
states containing the precursors and those containing the products of the process.  One real-world 
example of spontaneous decomposition is the reaction that occurs when hydrogen peroxide 
dissociates into water and gaseous oxygen.  The chemical formula for that reaction is 2H2O2 → 
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2H2O + O2. The more general form of this organizational process can be stated as:  P " Q + R (in 
the context of some environmental conditions).   
We can again build up to a graph representing this scenario by first constructing a graph 
framing its background assumptions within a logical environment in which, at any moment, each of 
P, Q, and R may or may not actually be present.  As before, using such a framework will help us 
determine which states hold the potential organization for which patterns. 
 
 
Figure 9.14:  A graph representing the potential organization of P, Q, and R, in an environment where 
P can spontaneously occur, but Q and R cannot.  The reader comparing this graph to Figure 9.11 will 
note that the two graphs similarly contain eight nodes (here labeled in P-Q-R space rather than A-B-C 
space) but, in order to show more clearly the SCCs that have been formed, the P-Q-R version has 
been rotated so that the P dimension is upright.  Four SCCs are produced by the transitions in this 
graph.  The separation of those SCCs represents the fact that Q and R decay irreversibly.  The internal 
structure of each SCC displays the fact that while P may decay, it may also be spontaneously produced 
or introduced at any point in time. 
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The graph in Figure 9.14 represents the potential organizational states of any three patterns, 
P, Q, and R, analogous to what we saw with patterns A, B, and C in Figure 9.11.  In this case, 
however, we only assume the existence of P (but not Q and R) to be either flowing into the 
environment or spontaneously produced within the local environment.   
We can again walk through the up-bound and down-bound transitions in this graph to 
understand their roles.  The four up-bound transitions—from Ø to P, from Q to PQ, from R to PR, 
and from QR to PQR—all represent the dependable production or introduction of P within any 
state where it is not yet actually present.  P is potentially present in every state.  And just as before, 
the twelve down-bound transitions represent the fact that any of the organizational structures (P, Q, 
and R in this case) are potentially subject to braising.  There are four SCCs produced by this set of 
transitions, representing one-way paths of decay from the top SCC (where Q and R both exist) to 
either of the middle-level ones (where only one of those two patterns exist), and finally to the 
bottom one (where neither Q nor R exist).  In this graph, no state contains the potential 
organization for either Q or R. 
As before, we can now augment our model by adding the transitions that correspond to the 
spontaneous causal rule P " Q + R.  In this case, the arrows to be added travel from each of P, PQ, 





318 We could also add an arrow from PQR to QR, since the idea here is to follow our decomposition rule and add an 
arrow from any state with a P to one that removes the P and leaves in its stead a Q and an R; however, that transition 
already exists, so we can leave it alone for now. 
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Figure 9.15:  A graph that represents the potential existence, within an environment, of parts P, Q, 
and R, modeling the case of spontaneous decomposition in which P " Q + R.  Every node in this 
graph belongs to the same singular SCC, thus implying that all the nodes are organizationally identical.  
This makes sense of course:  Since we are assuming that P is freely available, and we are assuming P 
spontaneously forms Q and R, it follows that P, Q, and R are all bound to eventually exist.  No matter 
what the current state of the environment, even if those patterns don’t yet exist, the potential for 
them all does.   
 
Just as we saw in the case of spontaneous synthesis, when we add in the last few transitions 
that represent the causal rule we are modeling (P " Q + R), all eight nodes of the graph come to 
form a single, organizationally identical SCC.  The organizational potential of every state (in this 




319 And, as we saw previously with spontaneous synthesis, even if a freely available precursor, such as P, is not subject to 
braising in our environment—imagine it is a fundamental particle, for instance—the graph without those four down-
bound arrows still produces a single SCC wherein all states are organizationally identical. 
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Other Reaction Types 
 
While our topic is really about the interactions of patterns in general, it can still help to 
follow chemists in categorizing broad categories of interactions.  Chemical reactions are typically 
grouped into four basic kinds—synthesis, decomposition, single-replacement, and double-
replacement—along with a handful of more specialized kinds, including combustion, redox, and 
some reactions that occur with larger organic molecules (such as rearrangements and pericyclic 
reactions). We won’t take the time to look at all these varieties of interaction in detail because, 
ultimately, the spontaneous version of each results in the same general picture, but it is worth 
noticing the fundamental logic surrounding each of the basic forms.   
In both single- and double-replacement reactions, two reactants swap parts to produce two 
products.  For instance, in the single-replacement reaction Cl2 + 2KBr → Br2 + 2KCl, the chlorine 
atoms (Cl) from the first reactant replace the bromine atoms (Br) from the second reactant, leaving 
two organizationally distinct products.  Similarly, in the double-replacement reaction Na2S + 2HCl 
→ 2NaCl + H2S, the sodium atoms (Na) from the first reactant and the hydrogen atoms (H) from 
the second reactant swap places, again producing two organizationally distinct products.  Some such 
replacement reactions occur by a singular process wherein the two molecules collide, with a kinetic 
energy above the activation energy for the reaction, and the new atoms slide smoothly into place just 
as the old atoms slide out.  In other cases, reactant molecules may be broken apart (ionized or 
radicalized) by some prior decomposition, and the new products are then assembled from the parts.  
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In this case, the organizational processes may be chained together, but in the end they can be 
organizationally reduced to the same form as the smooth, singular process.320 
Organizationally speaking, both types of replacement reaction can be characterized by the 
rule A + B " C + D.  And in an environment where A and B are assumed to exist, the 
organizational graph for reactions that follow this rule results, as with our spontaneous synthesis and 
decomposition reactions, in a complete SCC that encompasses all nodes.  As before, all states of the 
system contain the same organizational potential and thus are organizationally identical (see Figure 
9.16).   
 
 
Figure 9.16:  The organizational graph that corresponds to single- and double-replacement reactions, 
following the rule A + B " C + D in an environment where A and B are assumed. 
 
																																																								
320 For example, one could combine A " E + F; B " G + H; E + G " C; and F + H " D and wind up with A + B 
" C + D.  The organizational contents of the quasi-stable intermediates (E, F, G, and H) would simply be irrelevant, 
since whatever is produced would soon be consumed. 
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Combustion reactions are typically of the form A + B " C (for instance, C + O2 → CO2 
describes the combustion of carbon, as in coal) or A + B " C + D (for instance, 2C2H6 + 7O2 → 
4CO2 + 6H2O describes the combustion of ethane).  In either case, we have already reviewed the 
organizational results of these formal rules above—the first is synthesis, and the second is 




The spontaneous kinds of organizational processes we have so far been looking at may 
combine transitively to produce compound spontaneous processes, as one might expect.  And also as 
one might expect, when they combine procedurally, their organizational identicality combines as 
well. 
The combustion of ethane mentioned just a few moments ago is an example of this.  
Although we simplify the reaction to the form A+ B " C + D, in actuality to get seven oxygen 
molecules to combine with two ethane molecules in the formation of four carbon dioxide and six 
water molecules, it requires a series of steps with a number of intermediate structures, not always 
occurring in the same order.  If it didn’t require this complexity, we would have to imagine the very 
unlikely coincidence of all seven oxygen molecules colliding with both ethane molecules at just the 
right angles and velocities all at the very same moment.  That of course just doesn’t happen. 
Another example comes in the form of redox reactions, which chemists often more 
explicitly separate into individual reduction and oxidation parts, in order to keep track of the 
electron transfers that occur in the process.  For instance, the combustion of magnesium, which is 
summarized as 2Mg + O2 + 4e
- " 2MgO + 4e- may be separated into its oxidation half, wherein 
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each magnesium atom donates two electrons, and its reduction half, wherein each oxygen atom 
gains two electrons: 
 
1) 2Mg "  2Mg2+ + 4e-     (Oxidation) 
2) O2 + 4e- " 2O2-   (Reduction) 
 
The third step, after the electrons have been donated from the magnesium to the oxygen, is 
for the 2Mg2+ and the 2O2- to spontaneously combine into 2MgO.  We can encode this reaction with 
a chain of three spontaneous organizational rules that map onto the above reaction equations: (1) A 
" B + C; (2) D + C " E; and (3) B + E " F, along with the assumptions that Ø " A and Ø " D 
(that is to say, the magnesium and oxygen are provided).  The result, which is too tangled an 
organizational diagram to meaningfully show, is a single SCC that encompasses all the nodes in the 
space of A–B–C–D–E–F.  (If we analyze this a bit further, we might notice that the electrons freed 
in the first step and consumed in the second, and the magnesium and oxygen ions produced in the 
first two steps and consumed in the third, are all intermediates, and so, for the purposes of 
organizational analyses, we can ignore these parts and simplify the reaction to 2Mg + O2 " 2MgO.) 
Here is a simpler example of how two synthetic reactions might be chained together:  A and 
B might form some intermediate I, which might then combine with C to form D  (A + B " I; I + C 
" D).  If both these processes are spontaneous in this environment, then, in the spontaneously 
occurring presence of A, B and C, we will find the organizational potential for I and ultimately also 
for D.  This can be shown by producing the full five-dimensional graph of A-B-C-D-I space, with 
32 nodes that are all organizationally identical; but it is easier to look at a reduction across the 
environmentally assumed A, B, and C dimensions, which results in a simple graph representing Ø " 
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I and I " D.  While Figure 9.17 helps us to visualize the intermediate in this case, ultimately that 
graph also reduces to the merely spontaneous Ø " D. 
 
 
Figure 9.17:  An organizational graph representing chained spontaneous synthesis wherein A + B " I  
and  I + C " D, in an environment where A, B, and C are all assumed to exist. 
 
The same can be shown for any combination of chained decomposition and synthesis 
interactions.  As long as the initial reactants are assumed to exist in the environment, and the partial 
reactions are spontaneous, then the organizational potential of the resultant patterns will tend to be 




We will continue to look at other types of reaction mechanisms just a little further.  But the 
conclusion we are going to reach is that, in some sense, the results of all spontaneous reactions are 
the same: space-covering SCCs in which every state of the system contains the same potential for all 
the organizational products.   
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The spontaneous formation of a product from three or more pieces or the spontaneous 
decomposition of a pattern into three or more pieces might only ever occur as chained processes of 
syntheses and decompositions from two parts.  Still, to satisfy some curiosity, we can look instead at 
the idea of direct three-part synthesis and decomposition, and then generalize what we find to 
multipart synthesis and decomposition (whether or not those activities ever strictly occur).  In all 
such cases, the processes continue to have fully organizationally identical graphs that may reduce 
across their environmentally available reactants. 
For instance, Figure 9.18 shows the four-dimensional graphs for both A + B + C " D and 
P " Q + R + S.  Each of those graphs results in a single SCC encompassing all the possible states 






Figure 9.18a: An organizational graph representing synthesis from three parts.  The organizationally 
causal rule represented here is A + B + C " D.  I’ve simplified the graph by including only one of 
the red-arrow transitions that signifies the causal rule.  The remaining transitions in the graph 
represent the effects of braising and the spontaneous introduction of environmental assumptions A, 
B, and C.  The entire graph forms a single SCC, meaning that all the nodes here are organizationally 
identical states, the spontaneous organizational potential for D is available in any state of the system, 
and so the whole graph is reducible to just Ø " D. 
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Figure 9.18b: An organizational graph representing decomposition to three parts.  The organizational 
rule represented here is P " Q + R + S.  Again, I’ve simplified the graphs by including only one of 
the red-arrow transitions that signifies this rule.  The rest of the transitions are braising transitions or 
correspond to the introduction of environmental assumption P.  As with the previous graph, all the 
nodes here form a single SCC together, and so Q, R, and S are spontaneously organizing, and the 
graph is reducible to Ø " Q + R + S. 
 
In general, any multipart synthesis or decomposition will produce a graph with a single SCC 
encompassing all states because, in any such spontaneous system, the reactants are assumed to exist, 
and the products spontaneously arise from those reactants, meaning that the organizational potential 




The Real World 
 
In the foregoing analyses, I have tried to show how we might account for a broad range of 
idealized spontaneous interactions between patterns.  The real world, however, is a far, far messier 
place than I have so far admitted.  For just one example of the kinds of complications that regularly 
arise, we might notice that sometimes a pattern may be formed by some process that occurs in one 
environment, then the pattern is moved to another environment, after which it may serve as a 
precursor to a secondary process that would not occur in the first environment.  The former process 
might even be prevented from happening in the latter environment (by chemical “poisoning” of the 
reaction, for instance) so that the entire set of processes not only does not but also could not happen 
under identical environmental circumstances.  In such cases, a model of the potential states of the 
system would have to be extended in some way to account for the changing of environmental 
assumptions within the changing of the states.  Certainly, in the case of organisms that are able to 
move themselves in search of greener pastures, it seems almost overwhelmingly complex to try to 
apply the simple kinds of analyses we have been looking at. 
I feel confident, however, that future work could overcome these kinds of complications, 
but I am not prepared to work through any significant portion of those analyses at the moment.  
And I think that trying to make those extensions, while eventually necessary, would at present only 
distract us from the core issues.  The points that I would like to stay focused on now are that there 
potentially exist, in a system, a set of states that are all organizationally identical because of their 
mutual accessibility from one another, over time; and furthermore that any model of identity that 
accounts for sameness over time can provide, first, an account of the existence of the kinds of 
patterns that might exist and, second, the basis, as we’ll see, for an account of the subject in 




It is then shown that several simple and compound bodies, soluble and insoluble, have the property of exercising on 
other bodies an action very different from chemical affinity. The body effecting the changes does not take part in the 
reaction and remains unaltered through the reaction.  This unknown body acts by means of an internal force, whose 
nature is unknown to us. 
 
—Jöns Jacob Berzelius (1835)321 
 
Spontaneous reactions give rise to spontaneously organizing products.  Although we took 
the time above to spell all that out in lengthy detail, the basic logic is straightforward:  Any time a 
particular environment contains spontaneously arising reactants that also spontaneously combine or 
decompose, we can expect the products of those reactions to eventually exist.  Because of the 
organizational potential of the assumed reactants, the products are organizationally present even 
when they are not physically present.  We get space-covering SCCs in the organizational graphs of 
these processes because all the states of a system with spontaneous reactions contain the same 
organizational potential.   
There are, however, forms of synthesis and decomposition that involve additional 
organizational precursors—catalysts—and that are thus not what we will call organizationally 
spontaneous, even if they are energetically spontaneous.  That is to say, although such reaction 
sequences may, as a whole, be thermodynamically favorable and will thus proceed forward in an 
energetically spontaneous manner, that inclination comes about largely thanks to the presence of the 
organizational potential in the catalyst, the role of which is to give the overall reaction a bit of a 
																																																								
321 As cited in Lindström and Pettersson (2003). 
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causal shove in the right direction.  In the absence of the catalyst, the foodstuffs that eventually go 
on to form the products may not contain sufficient organizational potential for those products.  In 
short, catalysts are able to change the total organizational potential of a system, simply by bringing in 
some of their own. 
The role that catalysis plays in affecting organizational potential may not seem too 
noteworthy at first, but it ends up being rather profound, and the details of why that is the case will 
become clearer as we continue analyzing the phenomenon.  To motivate that analysis, however, it is 
worth recalling that catalysis—both in its literal, chemical sense and also in its more figurative, causal 
sense—plays key roles in the majority of the internal behaviors of every living organism we know.  
In fact, the majority of biochemical pathways, in every known cell type, all follow a series of chains 
and cycles of catalyzed reactions.  And, although the boundary between physical and chemical 
causation is certainly blurry, many organismal structures—cell membranes, flagella, arteries, bones, 
feathers, scales, shells, and so on—play less chemically and more physically causal roles that 
ultimately enable (i.e. metaphorically catalyze) various biochemical processes.  Organizationally 
speaking, any physical pattern that produces dynamics involved in the creation of another pattern, 
but at the same time, does not itself undergo change during that process, can broadly be construed 
as a catalyst (or, to coin a term, one might say a “causalyst”—a dynamical causalytic factor in the 
formation of a pattern).   
The most general fact about catalysts is that they are patterns that, on one hand, play 
organizational roles in transforming other patterns and yet, on the other hand, are organizationally 
unchanged by the end of the process.  Chemists define catalysts as chemicals that are involved in 
altering the rates of reactions but that are neither consumed nor ultimately transformed in those 
reactions.  The importance of catalysts remaining organizationally unchanged is that organizational 
content—information—can be preserved:  if a catalyst contains some of the potential organization 
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for other patterns, but that potential (along with the catalyst’s own actual organization) is not spent 
in the process of producing those patterns, then the overall result is an increase in organizational 
redundancy (for some products) within the system.   
For instance, when reactants (say b1 and b2) spontaneously combine, they sacrifice their own 
organization in order to produce that of B.  The reactants’ potential is transformed—it is spent—in 
order to create the actual B.  In contrast, when A catalyzes the formation of B, the b1 and b2 
foodstuffs may still be sacrificed, but the catalyst is retained within the system.  It is not that more of 
A may be produced or introduced (as in the case of environmentally assumed patterns); it is just that 
the very same A is still there in actual form.  It is unspent.  And since the contribution of that A to 
the organizational potential of the system also remains, it can go on to catalyze the same reaction 
again (as long as the organizational potential for b1 and b2 are continually produced or otherwise 
introduced, or if the resultant B is broken back up into its constituent parts by braising).   
The ability of a catalyst to increase organizational redundancy may seem merely to be a 
mildly interesting thing: a small amount can be used, again and again, to produce a large amount of 
some desired product, which can be very useful in many industrial processes.  But catalysis gets to be 
even more interesting when taken to the next level.  As Kauffman has shown us, when arranged in 
just the right ways, this kind of information-preserving productivity can be exploited so that the 
patterns that become protected by redundancy are the very catalysts that help to create redundancy.  
Like self-running multiquines, autocatalytic sets are able to endlessly produce the means to produce 






From Spontaneity to Catalysis 
 
There are a variety of reaction mechanisms that correspond to catalysis.  Sometimes, a 
catalyst is merely an adsorbent (sticky) surface upon which other reactants are able to encounter one 
another.  Other times, a catalyst may form a covalent bond—and thus merge, in a chemical sense—
with another reactant, only to be released sometime later by breakage of that bond.  Still other times, 
a catalyst may be broken apart entirely and, after each of its pieces has served some distinct causal 
role in the reaction, the catalyst may then be reconstructed later in the reaction sequence. In more 
physical (causalytic) cases—such as that of a pair of scissors that helps a paper become divided or 
that of a magnetic-confinement fusion reactor that helps two lighter atoms fuse together into a 
heavier one—the causalyst may not bond with the substrate at all, but only provide dynamics—
particularly shaped fields of force—that compel precursor patterns to become composed or 
decomposed into products. 
Despite this diversity, we can develop some standard organizational formulae to represent 
the phenomenon.  Ultimately, catalysis is any chained series of spontaneous reactions that happen to 
result in the eventual production or release of one of the initial reactants (the catalyst) along with 
some other products or byproducts.  We can look at some standard examples first, and then, more 
interestingly, at an example in which one of the additional byproducts is also the same catalyst, 
resulting in what we can call either autocatalysis or just chemical replication. 
Consider first a classic example of catalysis in which a platinum-group metal is able to 
catalyze a hydrocarbon reaction.  For instance, we can think of the reaction we looked at earlier 
wherein gaseous ethene (C2H4) combines with gaseous hydrogen (H2) to form gaseous ethane (C2H6) 
in the presence of solid platinum.  The primary role of the platinum in this kind of reaction is to 
stretch the bonds within the reactants by adsorbing them onto its surface, a process that damages 
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those bonds, and thereby reduces the energy of activation necessary for the reactants to bond to one 
another.  This kind of stretching mechanism is a very common feature in certain kinds of chemical 
catalysis.   
Here is one way we can model the sequence of events that occur in the platinum-catalyzed 
reaction:  We can begin by labeling the ethene A, the diatomic hydrogen B, and the platinum surface 
C.  When the ethene adsorbs to the platinum, it forms a complex (a quasi-stable combination of the 
atoms in both those reactants) that we can call E.  In particular, as the two carbon atoms of the 
ethene are attracted to two nearby platinum atoms, the double bond between the carbon atoms is 
stretched to its breaking point, whereupon it becomes a single bond, and the newly freed electrons 
play a role first in the adsorption that binds the ethene to the platinum, and then later in binding it 
with the hydrogen atoms to form the new ethane molecule.   
If our lump of platinum has a large surface, and if there are a lot of ethene molecules 
around, then various kinds of Es come and go regularly.  That is to say, structurally different Es may 
come to exist depending on the locations of adsorption onto the platinum, but those Es often have 
the same causal capacity, with respect to hydrogen molecules, making them equivalently Es for the 
catalytic process.   
Then, when a diatomic hydrogen molecule also happens to adsorb onto the platinum, right 
beside the site of adsorption of the ethene, we can call the entire structure, which typically lasts only 
a very brief amount of time but is nonetheless organizationally distinct, F.  Lastly, multiple events 
might ensue from this F, depending how near the new hydrogen atoms are to the adsorbed carbon 
atoms from the ethene:  If they are too distant (call the structure F' instead of F), perhaps the whole 
complex just sits there doing nothing for a while, until some other moving molecule bumps into the 
structure, providing some kinetic energy that might release one of the pieces from the surface 
without their interacting together; in that case, the reversibility of the adsorption typically results in 
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the original reactants forming once again.  If, however, the hydrogen atoms are near enough to the 
ethene carbons (so we have an actual F), the more likely result is that the hydrogen then bonds to 
the ethene, and the electrons that were active in the state of adsorption come to be involved instead 
in the new carbon–hydrogen bonds, thus releasing the new larger hydrocarbon from the platinum 
catalyst.  We can call the resultant ethane molecule product D.  By this point, the catalyst, C, has 
been discharged from its duty and has been released unchanged.  The summary of this series of 
potential events can be given by the following organizational rules:322 
 
A + C " E    Ethene + Catalyst " Complex-E 
E + B " F   Complex-E + Hydrogen " Complex-F 
F " C + D   Complex-F " Catalyst + Ethane 
 
As we can see, our catalytic story is a series of transformational changes that results in one of the 
initial reactants, C, being reproduced or released in a later stage.  In the process, E and F are short-
lived intermediate structures while, ultimately, the total change represented here is only that A and B 
may be combined to produce D.  A string of spontaneously occurring events that necessarily 
involves the catalyst is able to produce some product from some reactants, but also releases the 
catalyst in its original form.  It is of note that this sequence of partial reactions can in fact be reduced 




322 We might add another couple of rules to the system, signifying those cases described above where adsorption is 
followed by desorption and no new product is produced.  Those rules would be E + B " F ' and F ' " E + B.  In these 
cases, the hydrogen B adsorbs to the catalyst complex E, but is not near enough to bond with the ethene in that 
complex.  F ' is formed but does not decompose into D and C the way that F does.  F ' instead may only decompose 
back into E and B (or even A, B, and C).  The catalyst may be released, but no D is produced.   
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Enzymes are the commonest types of catalyst in the biological world, and so they make for an 
important illustration.  The modern understanding of enzymatic catalysis is what is called the lock-
and-key theory, whereby each enzyme has a specific shape that is suited to stretching a particular 
substrate reactant in such a way that those substrates preferentially react in a way that typically would 
not have occurred in the absence of the enzyme (Michaelis and Menten 1913).  Since our previous 
example was a case of catalytic synthesis, we can look now at an example of enzymatic 
decomposition.  The standard form for enzymatic decomposition is for the enzyme E first to bind 
to a series of points on the substrate molecule S (for instance, a sugar or an alcohol or some other 
organic molecule) to form an activated complex A.  This substrate binding is usually made up of 
some combination of hydrogen bonds and covalent bonds.  In the case of decomposition, the 
combined adhesion of those bonds strains one of the bonds of the substrate molecule until it 
breaks.  We can call the new short-lived intermediate structure that consists of the enzyme 
combined with the two separated halves of the substrate B.  In the end, the bonds holding B 
together are relatively weak and so a moderate amount of kinetic energy will release the parts of 
what was once the substrate (we can call these parts C and D), leaving the enzyme E intact and 
ready to work again.  Altogether, the organizational rules for this sequence of events are: 
 
E + S " A    Enzyme + Substrate " Complex-A 
A " B    Complex-A " Complex-B 
B " C + D + E  Complex-B " Products C and D + Enzyme 
 
Once again, however, the result of catalysis is the same.  A series of transformational changes result 
in one of the initial reactants—this time the enzyme E—being reproduced or released in a later stage 
while, in the process, a new product (or, in this case, two) is produced from the remaining reactants. 
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Compressing Over Intermediates 
 
Both of these examples—the platinum-catalyzed synthesis and enzymatic decomposition—
involve explicit intermediates in the sequence of steps that compose those reactions.  Intermediates are 
structures that constitute a kind of organizational opposite to catalysts.  While catalysts serve as a 
consistent source of potential organization both by introducing organization into the system (as a 
kind of reactant) and by carrying it onward (by remaining unchanged as a product), intermediates are 
organizationally trivial—they serve as short-lived carriers of organizational content during 
transformations, but they neither introduce organization into a system nor carry it on later. 
If we look carefully, we find that intermediates are everywhere in organizational processes.  
Not only are they sometimes explicitly present as products that become reactants in sequences of 
organizational events, but they also are implicitly present within individual organizational events.  In 
any step of synthesis or decomposition, the change of states from reactants to products occurs not 
as a discrete leap from start state to end, but as a transition through a continuous series of 
intermediate states, all of which we tend to ignore as irrelevant because they generally tend to be 




323 An exception to this occurs at the quantum level, where discrete state changes do occur, as far as we can tell.  
However, let’s stay focused on the pattern interactions that occur at the atomic level and above. 
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Figure 9.19:  A grid highlighting the major classes of structures involved in organizational interactions, 
organized in terms of whether the organizational potential of those structures is input into the system, 
output from the system, neither, or both. 
 
Now because of their organizationally irrelevant role, intermediates may be removed from a 
set of organizational formulae by a process we might call compression.  We have already seen a case 
of potential compression, when we looked at the two chained organizational rules A + B " I and I 
+ C " D.  If we postpone reduction of the foodstuffs in this case, we can still simplify the two 
formula by compressing them together to produce A + B + C " D, leaving the intermediate I out 
of the picture . . .  In short, any time a series of transformations involves an intermediate product 
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that then becomes a reactant, but that doesn’t serve either as an initial reactant or as a final product, 
the transformations can be combined and, in the process, that intermediate product can be struck 
from both sides of the new organizational rule.  In contrast, any catalyst in the system serves both as 
an initial reactant and as a final product, and so, although it may also appear on both sides of a 
combined organizational rule, it cannot be struck from the transformation. 
Chemists perform the compression of intermediates intuitively in their work, and we can do 
the same with our two examples of catalysis from above.  In the case of our catalyzed synthesis 
example, our original rules were: 
 
 
A + C " E  
E + B " F 
F " C + D 
 
It is easy to see that both E and F serve as intermediates in this set of processes—each of those 
patterns is a product of one transformation that is later consumed in another transformation.  And 
so one can compress the set of rules across those two intermediate patterns by striking them from 
each side, and combining the remainders of the rules.  The result of that process is a single 
organizational rule that notably contains neither E nor F, but still contains the catalyst on both sides.   
 
 A + B + C "  C + D 
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We can call this organizational formula the expanded standard form for catalyzed synthesis.   And we 
will soon use it to develop the reduced standard form for catalyzed synthesis and its graphical 
equivalent. 
In the case of our enzymatically-catalyzed decomposition, we had the following series of 
organizational rules: 
 
E + S " A  
A " B  
B " C + D + E 
 
If we combine these formulae in the same way as we’ve just done, striking the intermediates A and B 
from both sides and then combining the rest, the result is a single rule that shows substrate S 
decomposing into products C and D, in the presence of enzyme E (which is retained on both sides 
of the formula). 
 
E + S "  C + D + E 
 
Mirroring the names we created above, we can call this organizational formula the expanded 
standard form for catalyzed decomposition.  And we will use it also to develop a reduced standard 








It will be easier to graph catalyzed synthesis if we first reduce the standard form the same 
way we did earlier in our analysis of spontaneous transformations.  This just means removing any 
reactants that we take to be organizational assumptions in the system.  So A + B + C " C + D can 
be reduced across A and B, becoming C " C + D.  Graphs representing both formulae are shown 
in Figure 9.20.   
What is important to notice in the case of catalysis is that the system produces an up-bound 
transition that is not rooted in the Ø node.  This reflects the fact that catalysis irreducibly requires 
one organizational pattern (the catalyst) to produce another (the catalyzed products). 
In an organizationally spontaneous system, if there is an arrow from C to CD, it is typically 
because Ø " D in that environment, and so every state without a D (e.g., C) transitions to a similar 
state plus the D (e.g., CD).  The blueprint for D exists entirely within the reactants that we assume to 
exist, and that is what makes the product D a spontaneously organizing pattern.  But in the catalytic 
system, part of the blueprint—part of the potential organization—for D lies in the catalyst, and so D 
is not able to form spontaneously from just any state in the system that lacks it, but only from states 







Figure 9.20:  Two representations of simple catalyzed synthesis.  (a) The full graphical specification of 
A + B + C " C + D, wherein C is the catalyst for the formation of product D from reactants A and 
B, which are taken to be environmentally available.  (b) A graphical specification of the same process, 
reduced over the A and B dimensions.  We can reduce over A and B because they are taken to be 
organizational assumptions—widely available foodstuffs—in this environment.  As one can see, the 
condensations of both graphs here are have the same general form. 
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Decoupling a single pattern from the Ø node does not, in and of itself, allow a pattern to 
persist longer than it otherwise would.  The organizational potential of such patterns is still 
susceptible to braising, in the same way that a program Q that is written by program P is susceptible 
to the braising of P (after which no more Q will be made and then it, too, will suffer from random 
destruction).  But this capacity for decoupling that arises from catalysis is the first step toward 
potentially decoupling the organizational potential for an entire system from the Ø node.  If that 
complete decoupling is possible—and it turns out that it is—then there can potentially exist systems 
whose organizational identities cannot be constructed from null.  Such systems are thus not 
spontaneous, and yet they may be able to persist for some time by evolving from state to state 




The case of catalyzed decomposition can also be modeled straightforwardly.  The expanded 
standard form for catalyzed decomposition that we found above, E + S " C + D + E, signifies the 
way enzyme E helps substrate S decompose into two products without itself being affected.  We can 
use a lettering scheme akin to the one we used for catalyzed synthesis to say the same thing—
catalyst C helps reactant A decompose into two products B and D without itself being affected:  A + 
C " C + B + D.  And in the usual way, we can reduce this formula over foodstuff A to produce the 




Figure 9.21:  An organizational graph depicting catalyzed decomposition.  The system represents the 
rule C ! C + B + D whereby C catalyzes the decomposition of environmentally assumed foodstuff A 
into patterns B and D. 
 
We can read the graph in Figure 9.21 as saying that, assuming the provision of foodstuff A, the 
organizational presence of catalyst C is identical (forms an SCC) with any state that contains both 
the catalyst and any combination of the two products.  That is to say, as long as C exists, B and D 
are also organizationally present, but the absence of any C implies the absence of the organizational 
potential for B and D, which then tend only to be susceptible to braising.  Again, as with catalyzed 
synthesis, the production of B and D irreducibly requires the catalyst, and it yields an SCC that 
rooted in the C node, rather than the Ø node, or in other words an SCC that depends upon C for 





A Proviso about Time 
 
As I mentioned, chemists normally think of catalysts as molecules that change the rates of 
chemical reactions that are, in any case, bound to occur.  In general, this is true, and it is easy to find 
examples—for instance, the synthesis of rust from iron and oxygen, catalyzed by water and various 
salts or acids, or the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide, catalyzed by manganese dioxide.  Without 
those catalysts, both processes proceed, but they typically proceed slowly, sometimes taking years to 
run their course.  A mixture of nitrogen and hydrogen gases at room temperature may seem to be 
entirely stable.  Those reactants come to form ammonia so slowly, in the absence of high 
temperature and a catalyst, that it is as if they don’t react at all. 
One way to understand this is in terms of the energy of activation required for a reaction to 
occur.  If a certain threshold amount of energy is required for two reactant molecules to break their 
existing bonds and for their parts to combine into a new product, then, in any given environmental 
distribution of molecular kinetic energies, once in a (possibly rare) while, a collision that exceeds that 
threshold will occur, allowing one molecule of product to be created.  The question of how slowly 
or quickly a reaction takes place is the question of how often such energetic collisions occur, which 
depends on the shape of the distribution of kinetic energies among the molecules.  A catalyst 
provides an alternative source of energy—the potential in the structure of the catalyst itself can do 
work on the reactants, pulling them apart (partially or wholly) or forcing them together, and thereby 
making it unnecessary to wait for the kinetic energy of heat to create high-energy collisions.  This 
can substantially speed up a reaction. 
For our purposes, however, I don’t think a mere quantitative change in rate is the most 
productive way to think of catalysis, even though that is exactly what is going on.  For one thing, 
when a catalyst changes the rate of a reaction significantly, even if the products of the reaction are 
	 511	
the same as in the non-catalyzed version, the result can still be qualitatively likened to a discrete 
change of states.  It is as if something that was not able to happen is suddenly now able to happen.  
For instance, if an energetically spontaneous reaction forms some product, but environmental 
braising destroys that product (or that product migrates out of the system) at a rate that far exceeds 
the production rate (or if the production rate is just glacially slow), then, in this system, it is as if the 
product were not being produced at all.  The product does not accumulate or come to exist in any 
manner that can have ongoing causal effects of its own in the system.  If, however, a catalyst is then 
introduced and the same reaction takes off at a much greater clip, now exceeding the braising or 
emigration rate, then the product not only will be produced, but also will accumulate, and will be 
able to have its own effects felt elsewhere in the system.  The result is that the presence or absence 
of the catalyst effectively produces—or approximates—a more black-and-white situation in terms of 
the existence of the products. 
For another thing, larger, more complicated molecules may not react in a particular manner 
at all, without the presence of a catalyst.  The activity of enzymes and the substrates they operate 
upon in biological systems are the most prevalent examples of this.  For instance, think of the 
decomposition of a lengthy molecule.  Imagine our molecule is made of six parts, bonded in a fairly 
linear fashion:  A-B-C-D-E-F.  And imagine the weakest link in this molecule—the bond most likely 
to break upon a random energetic impact—is the one between B and C.  In general, whether this 
molecule decomposes quickly or slowly, its decomposition results in A-B and C-D-E-F.  
Alternatively, if there is an enzyme that binds to the substrate strongly at C and at E, causing some 
strain between them (and if, say, the C-D bond is weaker than the D-E bond), then the catalyst will 
tend to help this molecule decompose instead into A-B-C and D-E-F.  That now easy and common 
decomposition reaction would not have happened at all in the absence of the catalyst, and so D-E-F, 
for instance, would not have been a product of the system. 
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The same thing occurs quite obviously in the physical, causalytic interactions between 
macro-level patterns.  Many of the effects these patterns have on one another are vastly unlikely to 
occur except in the presence of the precise causalytic pattern, or some equivalent (but also rare in 
the scheme of things) pattern.  Random events simply cannot cause coins to be minted, knives to be 
sharpened, or paper cranes to be folded.   It seems as if, with an increase in scale—perhaps of size 
or perhaps of complexity—there is a shift away from events being determined to occur by the 
statistics of heat energy, and toward their being determined more discretely and conditionally by the 
very specific dynamic, energetic patterns that either are or are not able to have those effects. 
In light of this, as we go forward, I will at first continue analyzing catalytic processes as if 
they were simply necessary causes of the reactions they catalyze, ignoring for a while the view of them 
as merely rate-changers in processes that would proceed nonetheless.  That will be sufficient for 
understanding the cases of larger more complex patterns—probably from the scale of enzymes and 
DNA on up to the entire macroscopic world.  Later, however, after we’ve developed a rough 
working understanding of autocatalytic systems (and when time becomes more important to us, as 
we begin to analyze the notion of value), we can adjust our models and reintroduce a low probability 
of spontaneous formation in parallel with a high probability of catalyzed formation.  We’ll discover 




In certain cases, the product of a catalyzed reaction may turn out to be the catalyst itself.  
The organizational rule that corresponds to this autocatalysis is much like that for any other catalysis:  
When catalyzed by C, some foodstuffs (say, A and B) might combine to form . . . more C. 
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A + B + C " C + C 
 
The basic idea is fairly straightforward.  One of the Cs on the product side of the rule corresponds 
to the catalyst (which is why it also showed up on the reactant side of the rule); the other C on the 
product side is the new product, which just happens to be the same pattern as the catalyst.  When 
reduced over foodstuffs A and B, we obtain what we might call the standard form for autocatalysis. 
 
C " C + C 
 
This formula looks curious in that there is only one symbol involved in the entire thing, but 
that is no mistake.  Autocatalysis occurs when a thing helps to make more of itself, and so, really, 
another way of thinking about the phenomenon is in terms of replication—an autocatalyst is a 
replicator.  We’ll look more at the notion of replication in a moment, but first we should take the 






Figure 9.22:  An organizational graph corresponding to the autocatalytic formula C " C + C.  Here, 
C1 and C2 both represent the same C, but it is easier to indicate the replication (the formation of two 
distinct C) by using multiple symbols.  The individual nodes for C1 and C2 are unified as just a C node, 
from which there is an up-bound arrow to the C1C2 node indicating that any C can produce another.  
The graph is also characterized by a full set of down-bound arrows that correspond to potential 
braising effects.  Here, C1 and C2 form the simplest version of an autocatalytic set, a notion that we will 
analyze in more detail shortly.  The result of that set is a phenomenon we’ll see more of soon:  all the 
upper nodes form a single SCC, together; the only node excluded from that SCC is the Ø node.  In 
this environment, any C carries the blueprints for the endless production of more C, while Ø (the 
absence of C) carries none of the organizational potential for the patterns whose production we are 
interested in. 
 
This autocatalysis marks an important waypoint as we move forward with our analysis.  It gives us 
the first instance of an SCC, the blueprints of which are contained within the SCC itself, thereby 
divorcing it from dependence upon the Ø node.  It is thus the first semblance of a thing both 






Earlier we looked at reducing and compressing systems to single rules to make their analysis 
simpler.  Now, I’d like to do the opposite, in order to make it clear that a very wide—possibly 
infinite—class of extended reaction mechanisms may all be equivalent to the autocatalysis we just 
looked at.  This is important, because these kinds of reaction mechanisms are widely characteristic of 
biological systems. 
We need just one abstract example to understand the potential diversity.  We can take the 
following set of rules and think about their reduction across foodstuffs and compression across 
intermediates.  The result will be the same C " C + C that we already looked at, but the processes 
involved in the full set of rules afford a glimpse into more complex processes such as those of 
membrane growth and division, template replication, maintenance of the core components of 
metabolic systems, and even binary fission of an entire cell.  In short, a given molecule or polymer 
may grow, via a series of steps, to eventually consist in a doubled version of itself, at which point it 
may also divide into two.  The entire cell, one might notice, seems to be a coordinated and 
interleaved set of such processes.  
 
C + A " I   Autocatalyst + Foodstuff-A " Intermediate-I 
I + B " J   Intermediate-I + Foodstuff-B " Intermediate-J 
J + D " K   Intermediate-J + Foodstuff-D " Intermediate-K 
K " C + C   Intermediate-K " Two Identical Autocatalysts 
 
We can think of C, here, as the autocatalyst, since it plays a role in initiating the cycle and also is 
doubly present at the end.  As the set of rules progresses, that initial C grows and becomes 
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intermediates I, J, and K, through the sequential addition of foodstuffs A, B, and D.  When, at last, 
all the ingredients have been combined, it turns out that K is a molecule that really consists of two 
Cs that are joined in some easily dissociable way.  K may then decompose by splitting down the 
middle and turning into those two Cs, resulting in the autocatalysis (i.e., replication) of C. 
This basic kind of autocatalytic growth and division underlies all biological growth and 
division.  In the next main section, we’ll see at least three distinct variations on this theme: each of 
the subsystems of Gánti’s chemoton is composed of a series of reactions that results in the 




Before settling into our upcoming analysis of autocatalysis and its variations, we might try to 
imagine a parallel space of potentially persistent patterns that we could call “autoproductive sets”.  
The idea would be to find a set of patterns (say, A, B, and C again) that spontaneously change into 
one another in some sort of cycle, without involving catalysis.  For instance, molecule C might join 
with a1 to form A, and A might join with b1 to form B, and B might join with c1 to form C.   
 
C + a1 " A 
A + b1 " B 
B + c1 " C 
 
This kind of autoproductive set is, however, strictly impossible, because each formula in the set 
describes an additive process, and so there is no way that C, for example, could turn out to be the 
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small kind of thing that could serve as a part of A (since, after all, A has already served as a part of 
C).  
We might instead try to amend this by imagining a scenario in which one of the reactions is a 
decomposition; perhaps B loses some part, to become C again, with a byproduct of c1. 
 
C + a1 " A  
A + b1 " B  
B " C + c1    (where c1 and C differ from b1 and A)  
 
But in this case, we again find ourselves stymied.  The C that goes into the system in the first step 
comes out eventually, in the third step, and thus really turns out to be a catalyst.  Patterns a1 and b1 
are consumed as foodstuffs (they are not produced here), c1 is the sole product (it is produced but 
not introduced), and both A and B serve as intermediate structures that are re-consumed within the 
set of processes.  Again, what we are imagining here turns out not to be the autoproductive set we’d 
intended to develop, but just a case of basic catalysis as we’ve already analyzed it.324 
 
Oscillating and Reversible Reactions 
 
Next, we might try to draw some inspiration from empirical discoveries.  Chemists have 
discovered what they call oscillating reactions, which are also sometimes called “chemical clocks” 
because they appear to change states periodically (see, e.g., Belousov 1959; Briggs and Rauscher 1973; 
Zhabotinsky 1964).  Some of these reactions are visually quite striking, as they display different 
																																																								
324 One might go a step further, and try to suggest a new product D (instead of c1) is produced from B, in the hopes that 
D could then convert to A, B, or C.  But if one works out the details, it turns out that this plan results only in a system in 
which that final A, B, or C turns out to be an autocatalyst. 
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colors in their different phases.  And they often have been cited as examples of spontaneously 
organizing (but not necessarily teleological) systems in which a kind of order emerges from a simple 
chemical system (Deacon 2013; Juarrero 1999; Prigogine and Stengers 1984). 
 
 
Figure 9.23:  The Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction—a kind of “chemical clock”—proceeding in a petri 
dish.  As time goes by, the rings of color emanate, as the blue turns red, and the red turns back to 
blue.  This occurs because the first stage of the reaction sequence produces (differently colored) 
products that are then consumed in the next stage, and vice versa.  In stirred versions of these 
chemical clocks, the entire solution may alternate abruptly from one color to another.  Photo taken by 
Ted Kinsman.   
  
As it turns out, however, in such reactions, the oscillation that occurs is not an alternation 
between the existence of some reactant and that of some product, but instead an alternation 
between relative concentrations of intermediates.  The reaction is still ultimately directional in its 
search for chemical equilibrium, and so it eventually comes to an end, resulting in the final assembly 
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of a set of new products from the original reactants, rather than some kind of potentially infinite 
alternation between a series of patterns.   
Another example of how the foodstuffs of a set of reactions may transform into one another 
in a kind of circular fashion, without involving catalysis, is in reversible reactions (Berthollet 1803).  
While every reaction is in principle reversible, many reactions turn out to be irreversible in 
practice.325  Still, there are some reactions that are reversible in practice, and these reactions tend to 
flow simultaneously in both directions, homing in on an equilibrium point where the rates of the 
two reactions are balanced.  In such a system, two reactants may come together to form a product 
(or two) that might later decompose (or react) again, and thereby reproduce the original reactants.   
Viewed this way, reversible reactions appear to be autoproductive sets.  But let’s look a bit 
more closely.  We can choose two ways to graph such a system.  In the first, we can include (that is, 
not reduce over) the assumed reactants.  That is to say, we can include Ø " A and Ø " B, for 
instance, along with:  
 
A + B " C + D 
C + D " A + B 
 
In that case we get the graph in Figure 9.24.  The result is a full space-covering SCC.  It is nothing 
more than a spontaneous system in which A, B, C, and D are expected to come to exist.  We have 
some guaranteed A and B, and the causal rules ensure that this system also guarantees the existence 
of some C and some D.  This is just what we imagined an autoproductive set to be, in the sense that 
the reactants have the capacity to produce one another without catalysis.  But it is not what we had 
																																																								
325 This happens because the energy of activation for the reactions in each direction may intersect at different points with 
the distribution of kinetic energies in the environment, leaving the two reaction-directions with probabilities of 
occurrence that can be several orders of magnitude apart. 
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hoped an autoproductive set to be, in the sense that we saw above with autocatalysis, in which a set 
of patterns support one another’s existence independently of the Ø node.  
 
 
Figure 9.24:  An organizational graph of a system in which A and B are assumed (any state without 
one or the other of these may transition up to a state with the missing pattern) and in which AB and 
CD are interconvertible states—each potentially producing the other (albeit with possibly differing 
transition probabilities, leading to the possibility that each of the states is occupied for differing 
periods of time).  There is just one SCC in this graph, encompassing all the states and indicating that 
the organizational potential of the system is always identical. 
 
The second way of graphing this system might lend a bit more insight into the system.  Let’s 
treat A and B the way we did with the autocatalyst C, above, to see what the fate of these patterns is 
if they are not guaranteed to exist, but if some may just happen to potentially exist.  In that case, we 




Figure 9.25:  An organizational graph representing a reversible reaction system in which A + B and C 
+ D are able to result in one another.  The node names here look different from those in Figure 9.24 
only because the nodes in the graph have been rearranged so that the AB and CD nodes are next to 
one another.  Some transitions have been left out, for clarity, but they do not affect the SCCs that are 
produced.  There is no guarantee here that any of the reactants come to exist.  Nonetheless, if we 
assume that either some A and B or C and D exist from the start, then our system begins in one of 
the two states in the marked SCC in the middle of the graph, and it might, for a while, bounce back 
and forth between those states along the red arrows.  What is of note, however, is that this alternation 
is not bound to continue for any longer than if the reversible reactions had not existed in the first 
place—once any of the patterns involved decays along any organizational lines, the state of the system 
moves irrecoverably toward Ø. 
 
In this graph, the nodes AB and CD are organizationally identical with one another, but 
neither one is identical with any other state.  As one can see, the system does not produce a graph 
that in any way resembles autocatalysis.  There are no upbound transitions that might help to 
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produce either a wider or deeper SCC; the system is equally vulnerable to the braising effects that 
threaten each individual pattern. 
In the end, it seems that autoproductive sets that act like autocatalytic systems are neither 
theoretically predicted nor found to exist empirically.  As far as I am aware, there is no such thing as 
an autoproductive set.  In producing some kind of organizational persistence beyond that of 
spontaneous systems, it is catalysis and autocatalysis that really matter. 
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E. Little Miracles of Self-Reference 
 
In the end, we [ . . . ] self-inventing [ . . . ] mirages are little miracles of self-reference.326 
 
—Douglas Hofstadter (2007, p. 363) 
 
We can try to put the ideas and tools we developed above into action in a more interesting 
way now by using the graphical system I’ve been developing to represent the various kinds of 
autocausal structures for which I set out to develop it.   
At this point, we will work only on representing the identities involved in autocausal systems, 
with our sights set on noticing the qualitative differences between the shapes of the SCCs formed in 
these systems and those formed in our previous analyses.  In our upcoming theory of value, we can 
begin to more interestingly quantify those differences as we begin to more deeply analyze time. 
We’ll begin here with what is perhaps the most straightforward kind of autocausal set, and 
one that follows immediately from where we just left off with our analysis of catalysis: Kauffman’s 




We can use the same example of autocatalysis that I described on pages xx-yy, in which 
chemical species A catalyzes the production of chemical species B, and B catalyzes C, which in turn 
																																																								
326 I’ve abused this quote from Hofstadter, to some degree.  What he was talking about was personal, psychological, 
perceptual identity—a sense of self—while what I am talking about is biological, teleological, existential identity.  
However, the analogy between these two concepts is so compelling to me that I couldn’t resist borrowing the relevant 
parts of his phrase.  Both are claims about a kind of identity, and both are based in a self-referential, self-constructing 
pattern. Hofstadter’s complete, original sentence goes like this:  “In the end, we self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in 
mirages are little miracles of self-reference.” 
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catalyzes A.  To keep the example organized, we’ll assume a system or environment wherein six 
precursor chemicals (a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, and c2) are freely available, and we’ll assume that a1 and a2 
combine by some straightforward type of catalyzed synthesis to form A, and likewise for the 
combination of b1 and b2 to form B, as well as that of c1 and c2 to form C.  In Kauffman’s own 
notation, this arrangement of chemical and catalytic roles can be drawn as in Figure 9.26. 
 
 
Figure 9.26:  An autocatalytic set wherein A catalyzes the synthesis of B from b1 and b2, B catalyzes 
the synthesis of C from c1 and c2, and C catalyzes the synthesis of A from a1 and a2.  The set is drawn 
using Kauffman’s notation, as seen also in Figure 8.2.  In that notation, reactions are small black 
circles, and dotted arrows represent catalytic influences on those reactions.  (Note: the notation is 




Here are three rules for catalytic synthesis that, together, correspond to the autocatalytic system we 
are discussing. 
 
a1 + a2 + C "  C + A  
b1 + b2 + A "  A + B  
c1 + c2 + B "  B + C   
 
As before, we can sideline the reactants that are assumed to exist in every state of the system here, in 
order to focus more on the causalytic roles of the patterns produced within the system.  If we do 
this, then the organizational rules we are really interested in are just the bold-faced portions of the 
list of rules above.   
The interesting thing about the graph that represents these rules (Figure 9.27) is that its 
condensation (the graph formed by its SCCs instead of its nodes) differs from the condensation of 
the purely spontaneous system wherein A, B, and C form, uncatalyzed, from their constituent parts.  
In the spontaneous case, there is only one SCC, encompassing all the nodes.  Here, there are two: 
the top one, consisting of seven nodes, in which A, B, and C are all organizationally present, and the 





Figure 9.27:  A graph representing the autocatalytic set wherein A catalyzes the formation of B, B 
catalyzes the formation of C, and C catalyzes the formation of A.  The top seven nodes are 
organizationally identical to one another, each containing the organizational content for all nine 
chemical species {a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, A, B, and C}, in the sum of its actual and potential 
organization.  The bottom node is organizationally distinct from the rest, as it contains the 
organizational potential for all six of the assumed species, but neither the actual nor the potential 
organization of A, B, or C. 
 
Although this case has been simplified from reality (because, for the moment, catalysis is 
being taken as all-or-nothing causality, rather than a change of reaction rate), what emerges from the 
comparison of this graph with its spontaneous analogue is a qualitative difference between systems.  
In the spontaneous system, A, B, and C are guaranteed to exist; in the autocatalytic set, as 
Kauffman’s definition makes explicit, if the three components exist, it is only because of their 





We can use our organizational graphs to describe a minimal version of Eigen’s hypercycles, 
in a manner similar to what we’ve just done with Kauffman’s autocatalytic sets.  If you recall, in the 
abstract, a hypercycle is just a cyclical autocatalytic superset of individual autocatalysts.  And since an 
autocatalyst is just an autocatalytic set of one, a hypercycle is, really, an autocatalytic set of 
autocatalytic sets.  It seems obvious, then, that the coupling within a hypercycle will only result in 
another higher-level autocatalytic set.  If all the members of each individual autocatalytic set support 
one another, and if the sets somehow support one another also, then it seems as if the totality of the 
two (or more) coupled sets should support the existence of all the members of all the individual sets.  
This is mostly true, but there is some nuance to how it works, depending on the mechanisms by 
which the couplings are made.  We can explore two possibilities for now; however, there are further 
possible types of coupling, exploration of which will have to be left for later work. 
Imagine that A spontaneously converts to a (say, by the sequential addition of some 
environmentally available atoms or molecules), which then spontaneously converts to two A (by 
cleavage).  And imagine that, in much the same way, B also spontaneously converts to b, which also 
tends to spontaneously cleave and become two B.  In this system so far, both A and B are 
proliferative autocatalysts by way of some short-lived intermediates.  
Now, for our first example, imagine that these two autocatalytic structures are coupled by 
way of A being a necessary co-catalyst for a process in the production of B, and vice versa.  In this 
case, we have actually imagined that A and B are no longer independent autocatalysts, because each 
depends on the other to catalyze its production.  Together, they do form a kind of autocatalytic set, 
but neither one is self-sufficient any longer.  The organizational rules that correspond to this system 
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would look like the following (wherein each A may stand for each of A1 and A2 and each B may 
stand for each of B1 and B2): 
 
A + B " A + A + B 
B + A " B + B + A 
 
As we noted in the caption to Figure 9.22, autocatalysts are also replicators, which may serve to 
cause the endless production of themselves.  If A helps to produce AA, then (assuming a healthy 
and wealthy environment) there is nothing stopping each A from helping to produce even more, and 
thus eventually to yield AAA, AAAA, and so on.  Consequently, if A and B are an autocatalytic set, 
with each pattern catalyzing the production of the other, then when we begin in state AB, where 
both patterns exist, the potential clearly exists also to move to states such as AAB or ABB . . . and, 
as with the individual autocatalysts, this proliferation of the two patterns can go on and on and on, 
leading to a graph with infinitely many nodes containing vast permutations of A and B, all of which 
are organizationally identical.327  
In order to graph the two rules corresponding to this kind of coupling, we need to 
potentially have two As and two Bs in each node.  One way to graph that is in the 4-space of {A1, 
A2, B1, B2} (where A1 and A2 are really the same thing, as are B1 and B2), and to graph it with the 
identical nodes unified.  Doing things this way produces the graph in Figure 9.28. 
 
																																																								
327 One early reader of this manuscript has suggested that the image that this discussion brings to mind resembles the 
autocatalytic set in Figure 8.2.  Let’s not let the fact that both are constructed of series of As and Bs confuse us here.  In 
Kauffman’s diagram the series of as and bs represent long polymers made up of monomers a and b.  Each circle in his 
diagram represents a single chemical species.  In the current discussion, each node that contains multiple As and Bs is 
meant to represent the simultaneous, side by side existence of patterns A and B, in duplication as many times as 
specified (i.e. AAB means there are two As and one B). 
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Figure 9.28:  An organizational graph of a hypercycle formed by couplings that represent necessary 
co-catalysis.  In this system, B catalyzes some process in the formation of two As from a single A and, 
likewise, A catalyzes some process in the formation of two Bs from a single B.   In the graph, nodes 
whose edges overlap represent identical nodes; they are meant to be unified, since A1 and A2 are really 
the same pattern, as are B1 and B2.  What emerges from this form of hypercycle is a single SCC at the 
top, containing four nodes {ABAB, AAB, ABB, AB}, each of which contains the organizational 
potential for ABAB, and thus is a potentially proliferative state.  The states at the bottom, outside that 
SCC, all contain either just As or just Bs or Ø.   Another way to think about a case like this is that the 
patterns involved are able to replicate in one another’s presence, but unable to do so in one another’s 
absence. 
 
In a hypercycle with this kind of coupling, as long as there is both some A and some B, the 
system will have the non-spontaneous potential to maintain itself for a while, without either one 
being spontaneously produced in the system.  Although the SCC does not encompass all the nodes 
above the Ø node, it nonetheless forms a kind of autocatalytic set of its own—one that does 
encompass all the nodes above the left and right trailing edges of the graph (i.e. Ø and {A, AA, AAA, 
	 530	
AAAA . . .} and {B, BB, BBB, BBBB . . .}).  It is a case in which A and B together form a replicator 
that can resist braising. 
Alternatively, we can imagine coupling our two autocatalysts in a way that leaves them 
independently capable of catalyzing themselves.  One way to do that is to have each pattern serve as 
an alternative catalyst (instead of a necessary co-catalyst) for the other.  In this case, the organizational 
rules that correspond to our system would look like the following: 
 
A " A + A      A is an autocatalyst. 
B " B + B    B is an autocatalyst. 
 A " A + B     A also catalyzes the production of B. 
 B " B + A     B also catalyzes the production of A. 
 
The first two rules here correspond to each of A and B each being autocatalytic; the latter two rules 
correspond to their independently being catalytic of one another.  When graphed, the four rules 




Figure 9.29:  An organizational graph of a hypercycle formed by couplings representing disjoint 
reflexive catalysis of A and B. One could unify identical nodes in this graph, as we did above, but 
either way, the SCCs formed will be the same.  The graph resembles standard autocatalysis, wherein 
all the nodes except the Ø node are organizationally identical with one another. 
 
What we find in the graph of a hypercycle with this latter type of coupling is that a single SCC 
encompasses all the nodes of the space except the Ø node, meaning that any amount of either A or 
B is enough to give the system a shot at producing plenty of A and B, but in the absence of both A 
and B, the system is unable to produce any.   
In summary, any kind of hypercycle is really a complex autocatalytic set.  Depending on the 
couplings used, we get slightly different forms of autocatalysis, but nevertheless each of these 
systems consists of a set of patterns that are able to maintain one another’s existence despite the 
system’s being unable to spontaneously generate the patterns.   
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While I am summarizing, I’d like to emphasize one more point:  We have learned that 
autocatalysis just is replication—each process is the production of two copies of a thing from one, 
which is distinct from multiple copies of a thing being spontaneously produced from just the 
environment.  Spontaneous generation and autocatalysis are both ways of potentially producing 




At this point we may also re-characterize the schema in Gánti’s chemoton in terms of 
organizational potential.  Looking at this example in detail will show that a complex model of 
vitality—albeit one still far simpler than real biological cells—can be clearly outlined as an identity, 
just as autocatalytic sets and hypercycles can.   
Like the systems we have already looked at, the chemoton is a set of organizational contents 
that, by way of mutual causal dynamics, are able to maintain one another’s existence in spite of the 
braising effects of the environment.  As one explores the chemoton model, one may notice that it is 
arbitrarily extensible, and thus it really represents a broad class of potential models that may be used 
to approximate various types of cell-biological activities (real or imagined) and their organizational 
identicality. 
We can follow Gánti’s schematic for a minimal chemoton, roughly as it was shown earlier.  
As we noted then, the chemoton has three main subsystems that are coupled to one another.  Each 
subsystem is itself meant to be an autocatalytic system, but none of them is entirely self-sustaining, 
as each requires causalytic assistance of various sorts from the others. 
Our analysis of the chemoton won’t be given in terms of the organizational graphs that we 
have been using so far.  Although in principle we could sketch out such a graph, doing so becomes 
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quite unwieldy in practice because, as the number of components in a model grows linearly, the 
number of nodes in its graph grows exponentially.  But luckily, since we now understand the general 
principles by which such graphs operate, we no longer need to explicitly draw the graphs out in full 
in order to understand the shapes and behaviors of the relevant SCCs within them. 
We can look first at the metabolic subsystem of the chemoton, which secures materials (and 
energy) from the environment, and then releases wastes back into it.  We can mirror Gánti’s 
metabolic system by using the five organizational formulae found after the diagram below. Together, 
these rules track a process loosely analogous to metabolic pathways such as the citric-acid cycle in 
real biological cells.  (Please note: this version of the model extends Gánti’s by assuming that the 
conversion between various A patterns is mediated by enzymes rather than spontaneous.  We will 








Figure 9.30:  The metabolic subsystem of Gánti’s chemoton, excerpted from the remainder of his 
diagram.  This system requires the availability of X, discharges Y as waste, and T' and V' as 
byproducts.328  It also has a series of molecules that we might call a “backbone” for its semi-stable 
central role in the process.  That backbone goes through transitions from A1 through A5, at which 
point it will have grown large enough (and become properly organized) such that it may split into two 
identical A1s, amounting to one form of autocatalysis.  Figure adapted from Gánti (1997). 
 
Tm + E1 + A1 + X " A2 + E1 + Tm 
Tm + E2 + A2 " Y + A3 + E2 + Tm  
Tm + E3 + A3 " A4 + V' + E3 + Tm 
Tm + E4 + A4 " A5 + T' + E4 + Tm 
Tm + E5 + A5 " A1 + A1 + E5 + Tm 
 
																																																								
328  Note: the terms “waste” and “byproducts” here are arbitrary assignments when the subsystem is viewed 
independently; but the distinction between them makes sense once one has coupled the subsystem with other systems 
that happen to use the “byproducts” but not the “waste”. 
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In the first rule in this set of transformations, enzyme E1 and the membrane Tm together 
catalyze the formation of A2 from A1 and food sources X = {x1, . . . xn}.  Then, also catalyzed by a 
membrane structure along with enzyme E2, that A2 is converted to A3, releasing wastes Y = {y1, . . . 
yn}.  Gánti seems to be using some shorthand in his modeling when he combines all of the food 
sources into one symbol as if they are provided in just one step, and all the wastes as if they were 
produced and released in another single step.  Whether or not this is realistic with respect to 
biological cells is not important to us because, as we saw earlier in our organizational graphs, foods 
and the elimination of wastes can be taken to be environmental assumptions, and thus they can be 
sidelined in our analysis; our graphs will always reduce across those dimensions.  
Next, A3 converts to A4 and, in the process, releases a byproduct called V', which (just as we 
saw with X and Y) could as well stand for a series of products {v'1, . . . v'n}, each similarly produced 
at different stages within the same or a larger cycle or, even, by a series of organizationally analogous 
cycles. 
We can also imagine expanding Gánti’s model by adding one or more steps very similar to 
this one in which, as one version of A converts to another, some additional product, N, is 
manufactured.  What I am imagining here should be thought of as analogous to the steps from the 
citric-acid cycle whereby D-isocitrate is dehydrogenated to α-ketoglutarate, which is then further 
dehydrogenated to Succinyl-CoA, producing two NADH molecules (from NAD+).  In the real 
biological case, those NADH—analogous to the N that I am imagining—will then typically go on to 
help phosphorylate ADP to form the coenzyme ATP, which is the readily consumable transporter 




Figure 9.31:  A schematic of the citric-acid cycle, showing how a backbone molecule that begins at the 
top as citrate goes through a series of changes, ultimately returning to its citrate form through the final 
addition of an acetyl group that can replace atoms previously shed from the backbone during the rest 
of the cycle.  In the process, wastes (e.g., CO2) and byproducts (e.g., CoA-SH) are produced, along with 
products GTP, NADH, and FADH2.  (Image courtesy of Wikipedia user: Narayanese.  Reprinted 
under the Creative Commons ShareAlike 3.0 Unported license.  Downloaded from: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Citric_acid_cycle_with_aconitate_2.svg.) 
 
Either way, the production of N could be analogous in its organizational process to the 
production of V', and so we can follow Gánti in leaving it out, but we can understand its biological 
role as being organizationally mirrored by that which we are already analyzing with V'.  In short, 
something more may be produced by our metabolic subsystem and consumed elsewhere in the 
supersystem (the entire chemoton), and this is a sustainable process, thanks to the ingress of some 
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energetic molecules or photons from the food source X, and to the autocatalytic cycle in which A1 
progresses through a number of stages and ultimately becomes two A1s, burning free energy from 
the food sources along the way to produce the organization of that cycle’s products. 
In the following step of the metabolic subsystem, A4 is converted to A5 producing a 
byproduct, T', in much the same way that V' (and N) were produced.  And by the time we reach the 
last step, Gánti seems to imagine, the sequential addition of various members of X has caused A to 
grow into a molecule—A5—that may now be cleaved in two, resulting in an identical pair of A1 
molecules.329  Through this process, we not only have a factory that produces T', V', and N but we 
also have a consistent source for the autocatalytic backbone molecules of the metabolic subsystem, 
as long as X is in supply and the rate of decay of {A1, . . . A5} is slower than the turnover rate by 
which A1 is duplicated.  
Overall, in order to operate, this schematic metabolism requires:  
 
(i) the catalytic capacity of the membrane structure;  
(ii) an environment that is able to freely provide the food sources X (which represent 
both material and energy), and that is also able to absorb or discharge any 
accumulation of the waste products Y; and 
(iii) (potentially) the local provision of a set of enzymes E = {E1, . . . En}, which includes 
those enzymes we were explicit about above, and any that might play other roles. 
 
In Gánti’s original form, requirement (iii) is omitted and the system forms an almost independently 
autocatalytic set.  The only catalytic factor not accounted for there is the membrane.  In fact, if one 
																																																								
329 This differs from the citric-acid cycle, which only returns a single citrate by the time the cycle completes.  However, 
our primary focus here is the chemoton.  We are only using the citric-acid cycle as an analogy to show that it is 
energetically possible in the real world to have a cyclical arrangement of anabolic and catabolic steps that produce 
energetically and organizationally useful byproducts. 
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imagines the cyclic backbone materials, A1, . . . A5, to have come to exist within an artificial 
membrane near a source of the right spontaneous sources of foodstuffs [say, in mineral micropores 
near organically-productive alkaline hydrothermal vents under the sea (see Lane 2009; Sojo et al. 
2016; as well as Goldschmidt 1952; Miller 1953)] then we have an autocatalytic set already. 
Alternatively, if the processes of our chemoton’s metabolic subsystem are enzyme-mediated, 
as I’ve been imagining, then in order to fulfill the definition of an autocatalytic set, the metabolism 
will need to be coupled with other subsystems that produce both the membrane and that set of 
enzymes.  And aside from trading those gifts for this subsystem’s products (V' and T', and possibly 
N), those other subsystems should be otherwise organizationally self-sufficient within the same 
environment.  Let’s continue to look at Gánti’s model to see how that commerce plays out. 
Gánti intended the information subsystem of the chemoton to be analogous to, but far 
simpler than, the system in biological cells by which DNA is able to duplicate itself as well as to 
catalyze the production of other molecules used elsewhere in the cell.  We can again try to more-or-
less follow Gánti’s notation here. 
The organizationally causal rules we can derive from his diagram are the following: 
 
Tm + pVn + V' " pVnV1 + Tm 
Tm + pVnV… + V' " pVnV… + Tm 
Tm + pVnVn–1 + V' " pVnVn + Tm 
Tm + pVnVn " pVn + pVn + Tm 
Tm + pVn + E6 + X + N " pVn + E6 + R + Tm 
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Figure 9.32:  An excerpt of the information subsystem of the chemoton taken from Gánti’s (1997) 
diagram.  This system requires the availability of V', and produces R.  It may also be tasked with the 
production of E = {E1, . . . En} (please see the main text).  The main operation of this information 
subsystem differs only slightly from that of the metabolic subsystem.  In the metabolic case, there was 
growth and division of a backbone molecule, but the method of growth was not specific; in the 
information subsystem we have a case of template reproduction, whereby a polymer made of n sub-
molecules grows a parallel copy of itself through a coordinated process of pairing of the sub-
molecules (much as RNA and DNA do in their replication by sequential nucleotide addition). V', here, 
stands for some small set of usable submolecules {v1, . . . vm}, which may be combined in some linear 
fashion to form polymer pVn.  As the cycle proceeds, pVn grows to pVnV1 and so on, until it becomes 
pVnVn, after which the doubled polymer unzips to form two distinct pVn molecules.  Figure adapted 
from Gánti (1997). 
 
The way Gánti intends the symbols in this cycle to be understood is that any symbol starting 
with a “p” stands for a polymer, made of somewhere between 1 and 2n monomers V, in much the 
way that RNA or DNA is made of a string of nucleotides.  As with RNA and DNA, Gánti’s 
polymer templates are able to pair up according to an organizational schema that allows the content 
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of the template strand to be duplicated in the copy (however, unlike RNA and DNA, which use 
conjugate pairs, Gánti’s system assumes like-pairings that produce a direct copy, rather than a 
complementary copy).  This process of piecewise pairing is represented by the first, second, and 
third organizational rules above (although the second rule—the one with polymers subscripted with 
ellipses—stands in for an unspecified number of analogous steps, depending on the number of 
monomers in the polymer).   
To make this process clear: if Gánti’s pVn stands for a template molecule such as LMNOP, 
then some of the various pVnVi would look like the following. 
 
pVnV1  pVnV2 . . .  pVnVn-1  pVnVn 
L LM    LMNO  LMNOP 
| | |  | | | | | | | | | 
LMNOP LMNOP . . . LMNOP LMNOP 
 
By the end of the third organizational rule, the template has become fully duplicated (pVnVn) and, 
when the transformation denoted by the second-to-last rule occurs, the doubled template simply 
unzips its two halves to produce two identical pVn (each of which is an individual LMNOP). 
In addition to the process of template replication, Gánti suggests that each pVn in the 
information subsystem plays another role, in the production of a molecule R, which itself serves as a 
precursor to, or enzyme in, the membrane-production subsystem.  (Note: even though Gánti’s 
diagram (Figure 9.32) seems to combine this process with the first step of the polymeric replication, 
I’ve separated the production of R from the replicative process, as one can see in the last rule in the 
list above.)  The process of R production in the chemoton can be thought of as analogous to the 
complex processes of transcription and translation in biological cells (together known as the central 
dogma of molecular biology).  To keep our analysis more simplified, however, we can imagine that 
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this R production corresponds to some stretch of polymer pVn simply serving as a catalytic surface 
(acting as an enzymatic binding site) that helps two widely available foodstuffs (from the set X) to be 
synthesized into R (if we need to, we might even imagine that general process being helped along by 
another enzyme—call it E6—which we could take to be analogous to a ribosome).
330 
We can also imagine that various other stretches of pVn serve in the same way, along with 
the same E6 perhaps, as catalysts for the production of the various enzymes, E, whose organizational 
sources we have so far left unspecified.331  The additional rule for this, given below, mirrors that for 
the production of R above.  If the polymer is long enough, many and varied enzymes, each of whose 
organizational potential is carried by the replicating polymer, can be produced by such a process.   
 
Tm + pVn + E6 + X + N ! pVn + E6 + E + Tm 
 
The commerce that couples the information subsystem to the metabolic subsystem consists in the 
provision of intermediate foodstuffs V' and N in turn for E.  Both subsystems still require a 
membrane to indirectly catalyze all of the reactions that occur in the cycle by keeping the various 
parts of the system near enough to one another to work, and so on, but the two subsystems are 
otherwise cooperatively self-sufficient, in terms of the maintenance and provision of their core 
components (A and pVn; and perhaps E and N, if we assume these additions to Gánti’s model). 
Lastly now, we can turn our attention to the subsystem for membrane formation, 
maintenance, and replication.  Gánti has envisioned this system also to be a nearly self-sufficient 
autocatalytic process—in fact, the membrane can continue existing (and even replicate) just as long 
																																																								
330 Real ribosomes are made of a combination of RNA strands and proteins—both encoded for by DNA, but we can 
leave those details aside for our chemoton model. 
331 What is more, because of the extensible nature of the polymer that bears organizational information (with each 
segment potentially serving as a different catalyst), this subsystem can, at no further cost, produce any number of further 
necessary catalysts (even those required for its own more complex construction and maintenance, if we were to draw 
those requirements out in more detail).  
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as it is provided with inputs R, from the information subsystem, and T', from the metabolic 
subsystem.  As we’ll explore more below, if R and T' come instead from the environment then such 
membranes will form spontaneously and instead will more or less be what scientists call micelles (see 
pp. 92–94).  Following Gánti, the model for this subsystem consists of two processes that are easier 
to analyze individually.  The first of the two processes is the formation of T monomers from R and 
T', and the second is the spontaneous organization, and potential division, of a set of causally 








Figure 9.33:  The production of T monomers from R and T', in Gánti’s chemoton.  R is produced by 
the information subsystem.  T' is produced by the metabolic subsystem and spontaneously reacts with 
something else (perhaps some member of X, or perhaps another T') to form T''.  Then, R and T'' 





Figure 9.34:  The membrane-production subsystem of the chemoton.  The membrane polymer, Tm, is 
composed by the spontaneous assembly of m monomers of T.  This process is analogous to biological 
membrane formation, which occurs in much the same way; in the biological case, the monomers are 
amphiphilic lipid molecules that prefer to align with one another in aqueous environments 
interspersed with protein-based ion channels (which allow foodstuffs to come in and wastes to go 
out).  The chemoton model assumes that a membrane can be composed of anywhere between m and 
2m monomers but, by the time its size reaches 2m, the membrane will divide into two similar 
membranes (and theoretically, each would contain inside it a complete set of the required members 
for the other two subsystems).  Figure adapted from Gánti (1997). 
 
We can separate the organizational rules for the membrane-production subsystem along the same 
lines as we just did with the diagrams of these processes.  The first two rules, for the synthesis of T 
monomers, are just the following: 
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T' + T' ! T''  (or T' + X ! T'' )    
R + T'' ! T     (or R + T'' + X ! T + R) 
 
The first rule might correspond to the spontaneous combination of two T', or else the spontaneous 
combination of one T' with one additional molecule (from the set X).  In a system where T' and X 
are freely available, T'' is then spontaneously organizing, meaning it is organizationally present in 
every state of the system.  The second rule might correspond to the spontaneous combination of T'' 
with R, or it might instead correspond to the combination of T'' with some member of X, catalyzed 
by R.  Again, in an environment where T'' and R (and possibly X) are available as organizational 
assumptions, the organizational potential of T exists in every state of the system. 
The rest of the rules required for membrane synthesis correspond to the serial growth and 
then division of the membrane as a polymer: 
  
Tm + T ! Tm+1 
Tm+… + T ! Tm+… 
Tm+m–1 + T ! Tm+m 
Tm+m ! Tm + Tm 
 
This series of organizational transformations bears some similarity to the set of rules that 
represented template replication in the information subsystem.  Here we have another classic case of 
autocatalysis, wherein the Tm from the beginning of the series is the catalyst that comes out 
unscathed at the end, and yet, in that time, it also helps to produce another Tm.  The first three rules 
represent the growth of the membrane to twice its size (from size m to size m+m), by way of 
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sequential addition of T monomers.  The last rule represents the division of the enlarged membrane 
during binary fission (see Figure 8.4).  And the only thing that is required to fuel this otherwise 
spontaneous process is the provision of T monomers, which, as we saw a moment ago, are built 
spontaneously from fragments earned through the trade with the other subsystems that, themselves, 




To say that a membrane Tm catalyzes the formation of another Tm may, on the surface, 
appear a bit deceitful because neither of the daughter membranes is likely to have its constituent 
monomers arranged in precisely the same way as those of the parent membrane.  The latter Tm 
polymers are most likely not the same macromolecules as the former ones; they are just other 
polymers made of roughly the same number (and type) of monomers.   
Similarly, in the case of template replication, different versions of the long polymeric strand 
(pVn) will bend and twist in slightly different ways, despite containing the same set of monomers 
strung end-to-end.  And so, not only do autocatalytic processes such as membrane fission and 
template replication seem to stretch what we mean when we say that a catalyst remains unchanged 
throughout a reaction sequence, but they also seem to stretch what we mean when we say that a 
pattern is replicating. 
The solution to this conundrum is rather simple, however, and it is analogous to the answer 
we gave earlier when discussing the vibrational variations of smaller molecules and atoms.  The 
many subtle variants of a pattern don’t threaten the organizational identicality of systems they are 
involved in simply because the variants themselves are organizationally identical with one another.  
That is to say, when coupled with the other subsystems, each variant of the membrane contains the 
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same organizational potential as the others.  And so they form a natural family of variations that are 
able to cause one another (through their causally equivalent interactions with the other coupled 
subsystems). 
I will use the term “causal equivalence” rather than “functional equivalence” to describe this 
concept, because what is important to us here is that each of the variations that we will take to be 
equivalent can cause the same things, although not all of them are necessarily functional.  As we 
have seen, I take the term “functioning” to mean that something serves a goal-directed system, but 
causal equivalence might sometimes occur in spontaneously organizing systems, not just teleological 
systems.  Two slightly different versions of a bowl, for instance, might be causally equivalent in 
providing the dynamics for a marble to come to rest at their bottoms, without either of them 
necessarily being functional; two lumps of platinum might be causally equivalent in catalyzing ethane 
production without either necessarily being functional (I refer the reader back to Chapters IV and V 
for an analysis of when I suggest it is and is not appropriate to use the teleologically loaded term 
“function”).   
Let’s look a little more closely at the case of the membrane to try to understand how we 
might graph the causal equivalence of various family members.  We can specify a series of possible 
membrane structures that might participate in a chemoton, based on the number of monomers in 
each version {Tm, Tm+1, Tm+2 . . . Tm+m}, and we can consider all of these structures to be equivalent in 
their ability to catalyze other reactions in the coupled subsystems, as long as each of them does so.   
There is also some other substantial set of similar structures {Tm–1, Tm–2, . . ., T2m+1, . . .} that are 
either too small or too large or otherwise incapable of being causally equivalent in this regard.  We 
can call these sets J and K; J is the possible membranes that work, and K is the possible membranes 
that don’t. 
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Furthermore, we can consider each of the members of set J to stand in for a more detailed 
set of variations based on the microstructure of each variant.  What I mean by this is that there are 
many ways that a certain number of monomers might be bonded together, and so the symbol Tm 
really refers to a number of similar isomers, as do Tm+1, Tm+2, and so on.  And each of those 
geometries is itself really shorthand for many vibrational, rotational, or stretched variants, as the 
monomers that make up the polymer—and even the atoms that make up the monomers—
constantly wiggle and jiggle.  Altogether, there is vast variation.  Sets J and K are both really very 
large. 
Focusing now just on set J, let’s look at a few of the ways that the many items in the set can 
be said to be organizationally identical with one another.  For one thing, there may be vast subsets 
of J that, through their wiggling and jiggling, transform into one another and back again.  We already 
looked at this idea with the lock-raking analogy earlier.  All of the members of those subsets are, 
within each subset, organizationally identical.  Although they are not catalytic transformations, the 
differing forms of pattern transform from one to another freely. 
For another thing, in the case of the membrane for instance, we understand the spontaneous 
chemistry of membrane formation to allow the addition and removal of monomers from the 
polymer, as well as side-slipping of the inter-monomeric bonds within the polymer.  All of this 
results in free interchange between another vast subset of potential membrane states, and if—as we 
know the case to be—most or all of the members of that subset are causally equivalent in what they 
do to serve the other parts of the chemoton or cell, then we can consider them to be 
organizationally identical.  Perhaps some members of J are not causally equivalent with the others in 
this way.  So, for those cases, we can just move them to set K. 
Lastly, for some kinds of structures, subsets of J that are not necessarily able to inter-
transform in the preceding ways, but which possibly form separate not organizationally identical 
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islands within J, may still have the chance to inter-transform by another method.  If some members 
of two (or more) distinct subsets of J are able to play a causal role in bringing about other structures 
(say, J.1 " A and J.2 " B), and if those other structures are also able to create members of either 
(or any) of the distinct subsets of J (so, A + B " J.1 and A + B " J.2), then the subsets of J are able 
to inter-transform not by transforming into one another directly, but by carrying the potential 
organization for one another and passing that information into the other structures (A and B) which 
then may construct a different subset of J.  In this case, J.1 and J.2 are organizationally identical and 
capable of causally and functionally replacing one another, even though they are unable to transform 
into one another. 
There is much more work to be done to formally prove the validity of this system.  But for 
now, I hope it seems reasonable to think that causal equivalences of the sort being described here 
account for the functional equivalences we see in functional systems, and very likely pose no danger 
to the notion of organizational identicality. 
 
Putting the Chemoton Together 
 
We can take a closer look at how the chemoton comes to form an autocausal identity by 
putting together all of its pieces and looking at the entire set of organizational rules that make it up.  
When we do so, we will find that the system creates all of its own catalytic factors and even some of 
the foodstuffs that feed individual reactions within it.  In order to make that analysis tractable, we 
can reduce the set of organizational rules over environmentally provided food sources and discarded 
wastes (X and Y), and then combine piecewise reactions into single steps (by compressing the 
intermediates).  When we have done so, we are left with the following stripped-down set of rules:  
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Tm + E + A1 " A1 + A1 + V' + T' + N + E + Tm Metabolism 
Tm + pVn + E6 + N " pVn + E6 + R + E + Tm  Informed Production 
Tm + pVn + V' " pVn + pVn + Tm   Template Replication 
T' + T' + R " T     Membrane Monomer 
Tm + T " Tm + Tm     Membrane Assembly 
 
Analysis of this set of rules shows that each major catalyst in the set {Tm, A1, pVn, and E, 
including E6} (all showing up in yellow on both sides of one equation or another) and each of the 
non-environmentally-assumed foodstuffs (V', T', N, R, T) (in blue, on the food side of an equation) 
is produced within the set (in green, on the product side of an equation), and is not provided by the 
environment.332  What that means is that, as a whole, the bundle of three subsystems forms a 
complex autocatalytic set or hypercycle, the states of which all contain the same organizational 
potential.  The chemoton is a (chemical) system that is able to go on “doing something” (“moving, 
exchanging material with its environment, and so forth . . .”) in the environmental presence only of 
the members of X.  Because of this, we know the organizational graph of the set to be composed of 
at least one major organizationally identical SCC that encompasses a great majority of the nodes of 
the organizational graph, and one disjoint minor SCC that encompasses the Ø node of the graph. 
The system is organizationally dependent not just on the environment, but upon itself.  The 
set X of various environmental foodstuffs consumed by the chemoton is a necessary set of 
organizational components, but it is not sufficient, because that set alone does not contain the 
																																																								
332 E.g. A1 is a catalyst that is produced in the system (eq. 1) and that is involved in producing V', T', N, and itself (eq. 1); 
E is a set of catalysts that are produced in the system (eq. 2) and that is involved in producing R, A1, V', T', N and itself 
(eqs. 1 and 2); Tm is a catalyst that is produced in the system (eq. 5) and that is involved in producing V', T', N, pVn, R, 
E, and itself (eqs. 1, 2, 3, and 5); pVn is a catalyst that is produced in the system (eq. 3) and that is involved in producing 
R, E, and itself (eqs. 2 and 3); E6 is a catalyst that is produced in the system (eq. 2) and that is involved in producing R 
and E, including itself (eq. 2); and V', T', T, R, and N are foodstuffs that are produced in the system (eqs. 1, 2, and 4) and 
that are involved in producing Tm, pVn, E, and R (eqs. 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
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organizational potential that specifies the chemoton.  A chemoton is exceedingly unlikely to 
spontaneously form from an environment of X alone; the bulk of its potential organization is 




In the chemoton model, we saw a process in which a membrane, by way of commerce with 
two other subsystems, serves as a part in an overall autocatalytic set.  It will be useful to compare 
membranes, which play that integrated functional role in a vitalistic system, with micelles, which are 
chemically very similar, yet are generally viewed as neither functional nor vitalistic. 
One way to think about this issue is in terms of the causes of growth, repair, and replication 
in the two types of structures. As I noted when introducing micelles, their growth and their 
“healing”, as well as their relatively rare replication333, occurs only in the same environmental 
conditions as those in which they begin to form—the spontaneous chemistry of their environment 
fully accounts for their existence.  On the contrary, in the case of cell or chemoton membranes, we 
must account for their existence not only in terms of environmental conditions but also in terms of 
the cyclical relationship between the various parts of the cell or chemoton that create some of the 
conditions conducive to their membrane formation.  The blueprints for the micelle reside entirely 
within the environment and not at all within the micelle; if the right parts are available, then micelles 
will form and if not, then they will not.  But the blueprints both for the living cell and for the 
chemoton reside partly within the environment and partly within that cell or chemoton; there is 
organizational potential that is requisite to membrane formation hidden within the coupled 
subsystems of the cell.  Omnis cellula e cellula.  
																																																								
333 For example, if a micelle becomes broken in half, the two parts may continue to grow into distinct individual micelles 
by subsequent addition of further phospholipid monomers. 
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We can now also describe this contrast in terms of our organizational graphs and rules.  In 
the case of the chemoton membrane, the rules of production require co-catalysis, whereby the 
membrane enables and ensures the operation of the chemical cycles that produce the monomers 
that construct the membrane.  There is an autocausal loop that forms an SCC that is exclusive of the 
Ø node of the system.  In the case of the micelle, the monomers that spontaneously assemble into 
the micelle are all provided as environmental assumptions, and so the SCC that would form in that 
system would be singular, indicating that all states of the system (inclusive of the Ø node) contain 
the same organizational potential. 
This distinction begins to give a hint at why we should not consider patterns such as micelles 
(or crystals or Bénard cells or storms) to be teleological, alive, vitalistic, subjective, projective, or 
what-have-you.  Each of those patterns may have an identity—a series of states that contain the 
same organizational potential—but unlike chemotons and other autocatalytic sets, those identities 
are not self-constructing in the Kantian sense, and, as we’ll see when we look next at the concept of 
value, their resistance to braising (their growth, healing, and replication) is of a qualitatively and 




By now we’ve cast all of the more specific theories of Kantian autocausality that we looked 
at earlier in terms of our organizational graphs.  The only one that we haven’t yet looked at is 
autopoiesis, but that is only because autopoiesis is a more general concept, which subsumes the rest.  
Autopoiesis, as Maturana and Varela put it, is the self-maintenance of a set of processes, and although 
the systems we have looked at have been specified in terms of the self-maintenance of a set of 
structures, these two formulations can be thought of as being more or less the same, since a structure 
	 553	
or pattern just is a set of potential causal proclivities that contribute to processes.  Each of the sets 
of structures (or processes) that we have looked at is more or less an autopoietic or autocausal 
system that works to retain its own identity (its potential organization) through various processes of 
self-construction. 
I propose that this just is the notion that Maturana and Varela were working to describe in 
their work.  Now, however, we have a way to say more precisely what defines an identity in an 
autopoietic system, allowing it to truly be the same across time.  The notion is generic in the way 
that I think Maturana and Varela would have liked it to be, but it can also be used to examine 
specific patterns and the structures and relationships that compose them. 
 
The Draft of the Iceberg 
 
As it turns out, the phenomenon I’ve just identified as autopoiesis, wherein the members of 
a set of structures serve as the blueprints for one another, also happens to describe replication.  
Typically thought of as independent, these phenomena are really two sides of the same coin—both 
are manifestations of organizational redundancy that actively produces itself.  We can try to see this 
in a couple ways. 
Perhaps we can best see the equivalence between autopoiesis and replication in the minimal 
case of an individually autocatalytic pattern, where the two phenomena are largely convergent.  The 
individual autocatalytic pattern plays a catalytic role in producing more of itself, providing a clear 
case of replication (as long as the rate of production is higher than the rate of braising; see Lotka 
1910).334  However, if we look carefully, the behavior can also be seen to be identical with that of a 
																																																								
334 One might imagine some kind of replication in which a replicating molecule is not an autocatalyst, but if we look 
closely we find that, in those cases where something is produced without being involved in its own production, the 
product is merely a result of a spontaneous process. 
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Kauffman-style set of autocatalysts, where the individual parts work to produce more of one 
another.  The only difference is that, in the case of the individual autocatalyst, the term “one 
another” just refers to the individual itself.  As we saw when we first introduced autocatalysis, a basic 
replicator just is an autocatalytic set of one.   
If we look at larger autocatalytic sets now, we find that the picture remains largely the same.  
When a set of patterns catalyze one another, they are autopoietic (as A may rebuild any lost or 
damaged B, while B may also rebuild any lost or damaged A) but, when the rate of production 
exceeds the rate of braising, those parts will be able to produce one another, sufficiently that they 
will then come to be seen as a replicating set (that is, A and B together create more of A and B).   
I will have to leave for future work a deeper analysis of binary fission, but we can see that 
the general notion of that more complicated type of replication flows out from autopoiesis too: If an 
autopoietic cell produces its own parts faster than the replacement rate, it will eventually grow too 
big for its britches, at which point the doubly large cell could split at the seams and become two 
copies of “the same” cell.   
The other way we can see the link between autopoiesis and replication is to look again at our 
graphs.  The graphs that we have been examining up until now can be considered the tip of the 
iceberg, in terms of the actual organizational possibilities that might describe a system (although our 
icebergs are upside down because, in this case, the tips are at the bottoms of the graphs).  What I 
mean by this is that a graph in A-B space need not result only in a top node that contains one copy 
of each pattern (such as node AB).  As long as the foodstuffs from which A and B are produced still 
exist in the system, that top node is also able to produce more A or B, resulting for instance in 
nodes ABA or ABB.  Full graphs of replicating systems would go on and on in an infinite space, 
expanding beyond AABB, to AAABBB, AAAABBBB, and so on . . . We saw a hint of this already 
in Figure 9.22, when we first analyzed autocatalysis and the top state of the graph was CC, for a 
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system that only contained the autocatalyst C (and its parenthesized foodstuffs).  But we can have 
another look now at a system with more parts, in Figure 9.35.  As one can see, any graph of 
autopoiesis specified simply in a space such as A-B-C can be a shorthand representation for a 






Figure 9.35:  An autocatalytic set with two parts, A and B, allowing multiple (for the moment just two) 
possible copies of each pattern.  In this system we see not only how the two parts support one 
another’s existence as an autocatalytic set, but also how they may go on to produce more of one 
another, potentially resulting in replication of the set of both patterns.  This graph could of course be 
expanded further, to have arbitrarily many copies of both A and B in the top node. 
 
Exploring both autopoiesis and replication in the abstract gives some hints at the generality 
of our graph-theoretical system . . . but there is a lot more work to be done to show—and prove—
just how general this system of classifying patterns might be, and what features of biological 
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behavior and development might be explainable in its terms.  Most of those explorations will have 
to be put off for future work but, at this early stage of theoretical exploration, one important feature 
that still needs to be explored is how our mathematics of identity is also able to give us a measure of 
value.  As we’ll see, the graph-theoretic structures we have been working with can be used to measure  
just how an autopoietic identity can, through its coordinated internal machinations, persist longer 






The day that the universe contained entities that could take rudimentary steps toward defending their own interests was 
the day that interests were born. 
 
—Daniel Dennett (1984, p. 22) 
 
All sciences now must do the preparatory work for the future task of the philosopher: understanding this task to be, 
that the philosopher has to solve the problem of value. 
 
—Friedrich Nietzsche (1887) 
 
One of the most striking facets of Richard Dawkins’ gene’s-eye-view account of natural 
selection is that it is given—and can only be understood—in terms of benefit; it is based on the idea 
that genes may have a personal, evaluative perspective on the world. Genes and their behaviors are 
seen as being selfish and it is their good that the activities of their bodies-as-vehicles are said to serve 
(cf. Dawkins 1976, 1982).  As we saw in Chapter II, this benefit-based view of biology faces a serious 
challenge when confronted with materialist sensibilities whereby molecules such as DNA are 
objective patterns, forbidden from having subjective properties. 
And yet it is unavoidable.  While the champions of the gene’s-eye-view have tended to back 
off from literal claims of individual agentive molecules that actually benefit, they have been unable 
to relinquish the value-laden rhetoric of selfishness, and the prosecutor’s legalese that Dennett 
(1995) has appropriated into biophilosophical inquiry: cui bono?  Who stands to benefit? 
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Furthermore, while these gene’s-eye-view theorists openly acknowledge the notion of 
benefit, judgments of value are by no means unique to their perspective.  Competing accounts of the 
units of selection are all framed in terms of some kind of persisting unit (cells, organisms, species, 
kinship groups, developmental systems).  And no matter which of these persistors we embrace, we 
understand a great many of their attributes and performances as contributing to—that is, as being good 
for—their persistence.  That might sound controversial to some anti-adaptationist thinkers, but it 
shouldn’t:  the “for” in this “good for” does not need to imply “meant for”, “designed for”, 
“intended for”, “adapted for”, or anything of that ilk.  We can leave competition, adaptation, 
evolution, and design aside entirely and still say, merely by definition, that the things that contribute 
to persistence are “good for” persistence . . . and thus good for the persisting pattern’s very 
existence in the world. 
The notion of benefit crops up independently in another realm of biology, too.  The 
phenomenon of autopoietic survival is an alternate kind of persistence that is just as difficult to 
characterize without notions and rhetoric that are, at heart, evaluative.  We are unable to speak of 
food, water, or other resources used by autopoietic agents without implicitly conceding that these 
things are beneficial to those agents; likewise, there is no discussion of disease, predators, or other 
dangers that doesn’t at least tacitly admit that these things are damaging to the agent or organism.  It 
is both tautological and hackneyed to repeat at this point, but I feel I must:  in a universe where any 
particular pattern’s existence is far from guaranteed, the pattern’s continuing to exist is good for the 
pattern’s existence, and its not doing so is bad.  At least one kind of value—at least one very central 
sense of the terms “good” and “bad”—derives directly from the existential notion of persistence.335 
So here is my theoretical offering:  I suggest that the objective property of the natural, 
material world that underlies the subjective properties of value and benefit is simply time.  An 
																																																								
335 I am convinced that this is the only sense of value or benefit that matters, and all other senses of those terms derive 
from this.  But for now any argument for that position will have to be postponed. 
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identity benefits when it is granted more time.  A thing is valuable (to a persisting identity) when it is 
able to grant that identity more time.   
Using the notion of organizational identicality that we’ve just developed, I’m going to argue 
that the foundation upon which value is built is the amount of time the potential organization within 
an identity might be expected to continue existing.  The context for persistence is of course that of 
ratcheted environmental braising.  And in that context, we will find that there are some 
organizational identities that, if they do come to exist, are not long for this world, but there are also 
some organizational identities that have methods by which to actively resist the otherwise statistically 
assured decay.  Despite the shortcoming that our measurements of time here are given in ticks rather 
than physical units such as seconds, we can nonetheless abstractly quantify the differences in how 




336 Perhaps one day a more physical model could be built from these abstractions if we were to make some adjustments 
that probably would include, at the least, altering the Markov chain to a continuous-time version by specifying a 
transition-time matrix specified in units proportional to seconds. 
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A. Measuring Persistence 
 
Differential persistence takes a variety of forms.  Some patterns persist only as long as they do not encounter other 
patterns.  Others persist through some interactions, while undergoing dissolution or transformation in others.  Still 
other persistent patterns interact with only a few other patterns, simply maintaining their form in all other contexts. 
 
—John Holland (1998, p. 227) 
 
I am going to offer what I think to be the most straightforward ways of measuring the 
amount of time that an identity might persist.  There are a couple of ways that those measures will 
be imprecise, but the lack of precision is no reason for concern.  First, the measures turn out to be 
probabilistic (because of the probabilistic nature of our Markov processes).  This is good news, since 
probabilistic measures reflect the uncertainty of the real world much better than precise measures.  
Second, because an identity is made up of many different possible states, the amount of time such 
an identity may persist must be calculated independently for each of those states as a possible 
starting state.  Every node in an identity is of course organizationally identical, but still, an unhealthy 
identity—where the current state contains less redundancy--cannot be expected to last as long as a 
healthier one. 
As our foregoing analysis suggests, the organizational potential in an identity continues to 
exist as long as the current state of the system contains the potential organization for all of the states 
in the identity.  And that remains true as long as the state of the system is a member of the SCC that 
outlines the identity.  Our metric for persistence, then, needs only measure how long it will take 
before the state of the system exits the SCC. 
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Actually, I have so far found two metrics to be of interest in this regard, although there may 
be other possibilities.  The two are what I will call the expected lifetime and the relative expected lifetime for 
each node within an organizational identity.  The expected lifetime is just a standard statistical 
expectation of the number of time steps from a particular node within the Markov process to any 
node outside the SCC, and calculation of that expected lifetime for any node results in a number of 
ticks.  The relative expected lifetime is the ratio of that expected lifetime to the baseline lifetime of 
that node, where baseline lifetime is, as we’ll come to see, related to how long the patterns in that 
node would resist braising by their resilience alone.  The relative expected lifetime is a unit-free 
number that tells how many times longer the potential organization of the structures in the node is 
likely to persist when the node is a member of this SCC than when the patterns in that node are not 




The notion of persistence would be of no interest if patterns were either so resilient that 
everything lasted forever or so fragile that nothing lasted more than a moment.  It is of interest, 
however, because there is a baseline amount of time—less than forever and more than 
momentarily—that a set of patterns might naturally last and, more particularly, because that amount 
of time can potentially be changed.   
One way to think about the baseline lifetime for a set of patterns is in terms of how long the 
actual organization in those patterns would continue to exist, given only the braising effects of the 
current environment and ignoring any constructive activity that might rebuild the patterns.337  In 
order to calculate this value for each of the nodes in a graph, we first need to simplify the graph so 
																																																								
337 In other words, how long it would last if the state’s potential organization were limited to only its actual organization. 
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that it reflects only the down-bound transitions of braising, and none of the up-bound transitions 
that correspond to organizational efforts.  Once that is done, the baseline lifetime for each node is 
just the expected number of time steps before the process exits that individual node. 
The simplest diagram displaying unchecked braising of this sort would consist of a node for 
one pattern, and then one downward transition from there to a Ø node (representing the absence of 
the pattern).  Such a graph denotes a pattern left to fall apart in an environment where there exists 
no potential to rebuild it.  We saw an example of this earlier in Figure 9.8, which, at the time, I said 
might represent a coconut tree that had some risk of being knocked over, but no chance of 
returning to a standing position once it is downed.  We could also think of it as a biological 
macromolecule such as a strand of DNA outside of a cell, which will eventually decay by radiation 
or chemical attack, and will not get rebuilt.  Because there is no up-bound return transition, the two 
nodes in this kind of graph are not organizationally identical to one another; each one forms an SCC 
of its own.  The expected lifetime and the baseline lifetime for node A in this case are the same—
each is the reciprocal of the probability p that node A would transition to the Ø node.  So if p is 0.01 
(1%), then the baseline lifetime here—the expected amount of time before the transition would be 
taken—is 100 time steps. 
I think that image is clear enough, but we can gain a bit more insight into the calculation by 
looking at a graph of a scenario with a few more parts.  In Figure 10.1, the patterns S, T, and U will 
all tend to disintegrate over time.  Nothing in this environment plays a role in the formation of any 
of these patterns.338  As we can see in the figure, each node of the graph is an individual identity; 
none is mutually reachable from any of the others.  Therefore, every change of state in this graph is 
an irreversibly destructive transition to a different organizational identity.   
																																																								
338 We might imagine that S, T, and U actually form an autocatalytic set in which case their expected lifetimes will be 




Figure 10.1:  An organizational graph of patterns S, T, and U.  In an environment in which we have 
introduced some S, T, and U, but none of these patterns has any tendency to form (either 
spontaneously or catalytically), we will see unfettered braising of all three patterns.  This will 
eventually drive the system by one of six possible paths to the null state, where none of the three 
patterns exist.  Every transition in this graph is irreversible, and so no state is organizationally identical 
to any of the others.  
 
In graphs like this, which have no cycles and in which every node is its own SCC, the 
lifetime of any particular node turns out to just be the reciprocal of the sum of the node’s outbound 
transition probabilities.   
For instance, in the Ø node, there are no outbound connections and so, once the system 
arrives there it will stay indefinitely—the lifetime is the reciprocal of zero, which is infinity.  To 
calculate the baseline lifetime for any of the other nodes, we’ll need to specify transition 
probabilities.  To keep things simple, let’s just assume that all the connections in this graph have a 
transition probability of 0.01.  That is to say, there is a one percent chance that, with any tick of the 
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clock, energetic events in the environment might damage any of S, T, or U, causing a transition to 
another state.  In any of the single-letter states (the row above Ø), there is precisely one outbound 
connection, and so the amount of time we can expect the system to remain in that state will be a 
hundred time steps (one divided by 0.01).  Each of the identities in the next level up (ST, SU, and 
TU) has two outbound connections with transition probabilities of 0.01, and so any of those nodes 
can be expected to decay in roughly fifty time steps (the reciprocal of 2 × 0.01).  And the topmost 
node, STU, has three outbound paths.  The reciprocal of 3 × 0.01 tells us that that node has a 




Some systems, or some patterns within those systems, may actually have no constructive 
causal powers within them, and so the expected lifetimes of the nodes in those systems won’t differ 
from their baseline lifetimes.  As with the example above, they will just be subject to a slow but 
inevitable decay due to the distribution of braising energy around them. 
But when a graph contains SCCs that are richer than just one node, there exist cycles in 
those SCCs that allow the state of a system to potentially circulate, for a while, before eventually 
decaying downward.  The expected lifetimes of nodes in these SCCs are thus potentially greater than 
the reciprocal of the sum of their down-bound transitions.  We still can determine those expected 
lifetimes by extending our calculations using a bit of linear algebra.  For those readers familiar with 
Markov processes and matrix math, the calculation we’re going to derive now will be fairly 
straightforward.  For those not inclined to follow along with the upcoming formulae, it will be 
sufficient to attend only to the conceptual-level description of what those equations mean, and to 
pick the thread up again about six pages later. 
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In order to simplify our task, the first thing we can do is to separate the strongly connected 
component that interests us from the remainder of the graph.  This requires the fabrication of what 
we can call a “sink” or an absorbing state—a node to which any outbound connection from any of 
the nodes in the strongly connected component can be redirected, maintaining those connections’ 
original transition probabilities.339   
So, for instance, if we are looking at the diagram in Figure 10.2.a, in the space of patterns A, 
B, and C, and if our interest is in the strongly connected component highlighted in beige wherein A 
catalyzes the formation of B and B catalyzes the formation of C, then we would prune that graph to 








339 If a node has multiple outbound connections to different states outside the SCC, the transition probability of the new 





Figure 10.2:  The process of extracting an SCC from a more detailed graph in order to facilitate the 
calculation of expected lifetimes.  a) A graph wherein A " A + B and B " B + C.  The relevant SCC 
in A-B-C space is highlighted in beige.  b) The same strongly connected component has been 
divorced from the remainder of the graph, with a single sink node added to absorb the SCC’s 
outbound transitions.  Another way to think of producing the diagram in (b) from the one in (a) is to 
simply consolidate the nodes in the remainder of the diagram until they become one.  The transitions 
out of the SCC into that consolidated node retain both their source nodes and their transition 
probabilities.  The key here is simply that these transitions represent the ways that the current state of 
the Markov process might exit the SCC, and thus they represent the moments in which the state of a 
system loses its organizational identicality. 
 
	 567	
Once we have this simplified graph, we can derive the expected time to exit to the sink state 
from any state in the SCC, by setting up a recursive sum for each node and then solving the set of 
these sums as a system of linear equations (see Grinstead and Snell 2006, pp. 419–420). In short, the 
expected lifetime for an SCC, beginning at any particular node, is equal to one (the number of steps 
it takes to transition out from the current node) plus the sum of the expected lifetimes beginning at 
each of the other nodes, individually weighted by the probability that the system will wind up in any 
of those nodes during the transition out from the current node. 
We can look at a couple of simple examples of this to get an intuition for what it means.  
For instance, if, in a very simple graph, there is a 100% chance of transitioning from node i to the 
sink state, and if the expected lifetime of the sink state is zero (that is to say, once you’re in the sink 
state, you are already out of the SCC and so there is no lifetime for that SCC), then we end up with:  
 
𝐸[𝐿!] = 1+ (1×0) = 1 
 
In this example, I am using the probability theorist’s notation E[Li] to denote the expected 
value, E[ ], of the lifetime, L, of the SCC, beginning at the particular node, i, in the graph.  The 
expected lifetime in this case is a total of one time step, because our first time step (our next 
transition) is guaranteed to be a departure from the SCC.   
If our system instead has a 50% chance of self-transitioning to (i.e., remaining in) the current 
node and a 50% chance of transitioning from the current node to the sink node, then we have:  
 
𝐸 𝐿! = 1+ 0.5×𝐸 𝐿! + 0.5×0 = 2 
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The expected lifetime is now two time steps.  Sometimes the lifetime will be less and 
sometimes it will be more, but on average, it will take two time steps before the system transitions to 
the sink node, and from there it will never return to the SCC that contains node i. 
In the general case, we can assume that there are n nodes in the graph (excepting the 
fabricated sink state, for reasons that will become clear shortly), and we can denote the probability p 
of transitioning from node i to node j by pi,j.  The verbose formula for the lifetime of the SCC, 
beginning from node i, can then be written as: 
 
𝐸 𝐿! = 1+  𝑝!,!  × 𝐸 𝐿!  
!
!!!
+ 𝑝!,!"#$  × 𝐸 𝐿!"#$  
 
The first term here—the “1”—represents the cost of the first transition from node i.  The next 
term—the sum—represents all of the n potential future lifetimes that might result from the current 
transition landing in any of the n nodes of the SCC.  The final term similarly represents the potential 
future lifetime, given the pi,sink chance of arrival instead at the sink node (any node of the original 
graph outside the SCC).  This last term is of the same form as the summed terms and so it could 
easily have been included as an n+1st iteration of the summation; however, since it will always 
evaluate to zero (because E[Lsink] is zero), it is better left out of the sum, and can be struck from the 
overall equation entirely, leaving us with the following simpler formula for the lifetimes of any of the 
n nodes in an SCC: 
 






Since each E[Li] depends on the answers to all the other E[Lj], in all but the simplest cases we must 
turn to linear algebra in order to solve the set of them, all together, as a system of equations. 
One way to do this is to move all the unknown variables to one side of the equation, 
 





and then to duplicate the equation n times to account for the n nodes whose expected lifetimes we 
would like to determine, and then recast the set of equations in matrix form and simplify.  The result 
of those operations is: 
 
𝐼 − 𝑃  𝐸𝐿 = 1 
 
where I is an n x n identity matrix; P is an n x n matrix of the various transition probabilities, pi,j, in 
the excerpted graph; EL is a length-n vector of the various E[Li] values that we want to find; and 1 
represents a length-n column vector of ones.340 
So, since I and 1 are constants, in order to find the expected lifetimes of all the nodes in an 
SCC, we only need to plug into this formula the matrix P (which is the Markov transition matrix for 
the truncated graph, with the row and column corresponding to the sink state trimmed out), and 
																																																								
340 It helps, in understanding this derivation, if one notes two simplifications.  First, we can see that the first term in each 
of the individual equations, E[Li], is equivalent to the product of the column vector EL and the i th row of the identity 
matrix (a product that simply isolates the i th value in vector EL).  Second, we can note that the weighted sum in each 
copy of the equation is equivalent to the same column vector EL times the i th row of the Markov transition matrix.  
Once we see these two equivalences, it makes sense that the entire left-hand side of the equation is simply the product of 
EL and the difference of the respective i th rows of the identity matrix and the Markov transition matrix. 
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then to solve the linear system.  The result will be the vector EL, which then contains the various 
E[Li] that we are interested in.
 341 
For those readers who were not inclined to follow along with the math, this solution tells us 
the expected length of time before any particular state of an organizationally-identical set of states 
decays to a state that is no longer organizationally identical with what once existed.   
Those expected lifetimes vary across the different starting states of the system.  However, 
we’ll find that the variation is often qualitatively constrained to certain quantitative categories, and so 
our expected lifetime calculations turn out to be useful in making generalizations about which 
identities in which systems might be expected to last longer than the patterns in them would last in 
the absence of any reconstructive activities.   
 
Longer than Otherwise 
 
It is difficult to argue with a child who claims that their act of jumping off the sofa and 
falling for a moment before hitting the ground is flying.  And the argument isn’t difficult just because 
you don’t want to spoil the child’s fun; it’s also philosophically problematic because . . . after all, how 
do you define flying?  Is it not just passing through the air for a while, as the child seems to think?  
Wouldn’t we say that an intercontinental ballistic missile is flying halfway around the Earth even 
after its launch thrusters have spent their fuel, or that a baseball is flying through the air on its way 
out of the ballpark? 
Blurry cases such as the suborbital ICBM and a fly ball at a baseball game may make it 
difficult for us to reach universal agreement about what the word “flying” should mean. But the 
candidate distinction that most people’s minds latch onto to help distinguish between ballistic 
																																																								
341 Thanks to Eric Nichols for helping me find this analytical solution. 
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children and airplanes is the difference between powered and unpowered flight.  We might tell the 
child that to really be flying, the way birds, planes and superheroes do, they would have to remain in 
the air longer than they otherwise would and, in this case, we tell the child that we can quantify 
“otherwise” by saying they would have to be doing more than just falling.  Powered flight is not just 
being up in the air, but involves additional work to exceed the baseline behavior of simply falling, as 
dictated by gravitation and one’s existing momentum.  There is a clearly measurable amount of time 
that one would stay aloft if one had no special properties.  To be flying means one can, in theory, 
beat that benchmark.342 
The theoretical definition of relative expected lifetime that I am proposing is much like this 
definition of flying.  When a system’s organizational content has a lifetime that exceeds the baseline 
dictated by braising—when, through some kind of activity, the potential organization in a set of 
structures is able to persist longer than it otherwise would—then, I claim, we are justified in saying that 
that identity is benefiting.  It is doing more than just the organizational analogue of falling.  It is 
persisting. 
We’ve seen that a baseline lifetime for organizational patterns can be defined in terms of the 
expected lifetimes of those same patterns in the absence of their organizationally creative capacities.  
And we’ve seen that, because of the cycles within SCCs, expected lifetimes for nodes involved in 
SCCS can exceed baseline lifetimes.  One way to quantify the idea of “longer than otherwise”, then, 
is to use a ratio to compare a node’s expected lifetime against its baseline expected lifetime.  In other 
words, we can set up a quotient with the numerator equal to the expected lifetime of the node when 
it participates in the SCC, and the denominator equal to the expected lifetime of the node when it 
																																																								
342 Of course there is the exception case of powered flight directed towards the ground, in which case impact may be 
even sooner than otherwise dictated by gravitational influence.  In the case of teleological systems, this correlates with 
the idea of a thing that destroys itself faster than its individual parts naturally would be destroyed.  That might be 
possible, in theory, but just as with flying, accelerating under the baseline rather than over it is, on one hand, still 
distinguishable as qualitatively different but, on the other hand, far less interesting. 
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stands alone as an SCC of its own.  The formula below expresses this simple relative expected 







We can take as an example the graph we looked at earlier in Figure 10.1.  As we already 
determined, if we assume all the transitions to have a 0.01 probability, the baseline lifetimes of the 
nodes are 33.33 for the top node, 50 for each of the three nodes below the top node, 100 for each 
of the three nodes above the bottom node, and infinity for the bottom node.  These values can be 
used as the denominators for determining the relative expected lifetimes, when these nodes 
participate in various kinds of other SCCs.   
So, for instance, if there are no constructive transitions in this system, then the system is as it 
appears in Figure 10.1, and the expected lifetime of every node is the same as the baseline lifetime, 
and the relative expected lifetime of almost every node in the graph is 1.343  What this means is that, 
starting from any of these nodes, the organizational content of the SCC is bound to decay at 
precisely the rate dictated by braising.   
In general, if the relative expected lifetime of a node in an SCC is less than or equal to 1, 
then the pattern represented there is a transient part of our world; it is some kind of ontological 
nonce with no power to persist.  If, on the other hand, the relative expected lifetime is greater than 
1, then the organizational pattern can be considered to be some kind of persistor.  There is 
something about the pattern or its relationship to its environment that ensures that the potential 
organization of this identity will stick around at least a little longer than it otherwise would.  And 
																																																								
343 There is an exception for the null node, the relative expected lifetime of which, strictly speaking, is mathematically 
undefined (it is infinity divided by infinity).  That seems just fine, since the question of how long no pattern at all might 
continue to exist is itself best thought of as being undefined. 
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that is certainly good for that identity.  In the next chapter, we can begin to use our expected lifetimes 




Patterns in Time 
 
Like the standing wave in front of a rock in a fast-moving stream, a city is a pattern in time.  No single constituent 
remains in place but the city persists. 
 
—John Holland (1995) 
 
Schrödinger (1944) recognized that in order for the organizing processes of life to get off the 
ground they must somehow resist the second law of thermodynamics.  In his work that began 
roughly two decades later, Prigogine showed how to do this.  It is only within so-called dissipative, 
far-from-equilibrium, open thermodynamic systems that there exists a reliable flux of energetic order 
that is able to provide the free energy required to do the work to shuffle around any material that is 
to become materially ordered.  This showed how we can, in principle, get order out of chaos. 
While Prigogine’s paradigm gives us the thermodynamic answers we need, it has not yet 
addressed the material coordination problem.  It still doesn’t tell us what kinds of order we can get 
out of chaos, or where in the natural world the information that guides the construction of that 
orderliness might reside.  But the analytical technique we have just developed can help with this.  
Let’s review the details again to see how.   
We can begin with the central concern, which is the following:  In a world where all that 
exists is physical patterns, the blueprints and the machinery required to construct any physical 
patterns must also be physical patterns.  And because every physical pattern is subject to the 
statistically assured decay of ratcheted braising, there is a constant risk of organizational erasure—
not just of patterns but also of the patterns that generate those patterns (and the patterns that generate 
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those patterns, and so on). 
In order to begin solving this problem, we based our system of graphs around the distinction 
between actual and potential organization.  Since an actual pattern may contain the potential 
organization for other patterns, each overall graph (of the possible transformations among a set of 
causally related patterns) reflects the distribution of organization within a system.  With that in mind, 
we can analyze a variety of graphs, in conjunction with the lifetime calculations that emerge from 
them, to discover the modes of organization that are able to contribute to the persistence of 
identities.  That is, we can look at various organizational identities within graphs to attempt to 
discover the kinds of organizational relationships between a system’s parts that result in various 
types of lifetimes. 
Doing such an analysis will put us in a position to outline more clearly what I would like to 
call the tripartite ontology of our world—a short, high-level catalogue of the kinds of organization 
that might exist.  There are two points of interest here.  Firstly, it is interesting that there exists such 
a concise catalogue that can be used to categorize our world, as Herbert Simon intended, in terms of 
“the persistence of the stablest”.  Secondly, it is interesting that one of the categories in that 
catalogue serves to outline patterns that are able to help themselves, and thereby to differentiate 
those patterns from any others.  These are the teleological patterns that show just what kind of 
organization matters for vitality to emerge in a purely material world. 
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A. Ontological Nonce 
 
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world . . . 
 
—William Butler Yeats (1921) 
 
Some organizational identities just don’t persist.  There are no dependable, complete 
blueprints for them anywhere in their environment.  If and when these sets of patterns come to 
exist, they generally tend to decay at a predictable rate and, because they lack complete blueprints, 
there don’t exist any processes that could fully rebuild them.  Identities of this kind are what I 




We have already looked at organizational graphs that represent systems like this.  The 
clearest examples so far may be the graphs we saw in Figures 9.8 and 10.1, both of which represent 
systems of unfettered braising.  If, by random chance, patterns S, T, and U all come to be together 
in some environment, but none of them has any causal effect in the production of the others, and if 
none of them is produced by any spontaneous processes in the same environment, then the current 
state of that system exists as an identity (an SCC) consisting of just a single node—specifically, in the 
case of S, T, and U, we have the top node of the graph in Figure 10.1.   
The behavior of an isolated identity of this sort is only temporary resilience, and then, 
eventually, decay by means of one of the one-way transitions to a node at a level beneath the 
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singleton SCC.  That initial set of patterns will have lost some actual organizational content while 
not gaining any potential organization.  The loss is irrecoverable. 
In ontological nonce of this sort, there is no state elsewhere in the system that has a 
transition up to a node such as STU.  There are no blueprints for S, T, and U anywhere in the 
system. 
The fact that none of the patterns in such a node carries the organizational potential for any 
of the others means that none of them will persist any longer than braising will allow.  This is easily 
quantified.  As we already saw when we were discussing baseline lifetimes, any single-node SCC will 
have an expected lifetime equal to the reciprocal of the sum of its outbound transition probabilities, 
and a relative lifetime equal to one (except for the Ø node, which has a relative lifetime that is 
undefined; see footnote 343, p. 573).  What this means is that the expected lifetime of standard 
ontological nonce is just the baseline lifetime, and that the sets of patterns that make up such states 
are able to accrue only random and unreliable existential benefit in this environment.  They are not 




Standard ontological nonce, as we’ve just looked at it, occurs when no pattern in the system 
is able to help any other pattern.  In a short while, we will compare this with Kantian systems where 
all the patterns in the system are able to help one another; however, there are various middle 
grounds between these extremes.  Consider first a system in which we have some catalytic causal 
capacity (e.g., A"AB), but there is no Kantian causal circularity (e.g., there is no B"BA).  In such a 
case, some of the patterns are able to help some of the others.  Figure 11.1 shows a sample graph for a 
system of this sort. 
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Again, in a case like this, there is no state of the system that produces all the organizational 
potential in the identity.  For example, in the large SCC in the figure, we find that A produces B, 
which produces C, but nothing here produces A, either spontaneously or catalytically. 
 
Figure 11.1:  An organizational graph of a system in an A-B-C space, where A catalyzes the formation 
of B and B catalyzes the formation of C.  In this system, four SCCs arise:  The topmost SCC shows 
that the existence of A alone is organizationally identical with any state that contains A along with any 
combination of B and C.  Since the potential for both B and C exists within A, braising in the B and C 
dimensions is nondestructive in this SCC, and so the expected lifetimes of any of these nodes are tied 
only to the braising rate of A.  In the absence of A and in the presence of B, the next SCC down has 
two organizationally identical nodes whose decay, according to the same logic, is tied only to the 
braising rate of B.  And in the absence of both A and B, the C node tends to decay at its own baseline 
rate.  Overall, the system seems to decay in all directions, but, in the presence of B there can be some 
temporary but not very significant preservation of the organizational potential for C, and in the 
presence of A there can be some temporary but not very significant preservation of the organizational 
potential for B and C. 
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We can look at the expected and relative lifetimes of the nodes in the catalytic system in the 
figure.  When we do so, we find that all the nodes in the largest SCC have an expected lifetime equal 
to the reciprocal of the downward transition probability for A-decay, all of the nodes in the second 
largest SCC have an expected lifetime equal to the reciprocal of the downward transition probability 
for B-decay, and the C node (in an SCC of its own) has an expected lifetime equal to the reciprocal 
of its own downward transition probability.  And the Ø node, in which neither A, B, nor C exists, 
has an infinite expected lifetime.   
The relative lifetimes of all these nodes are all different, but the bottommost node in each 
non-null SCC (the A, the B, and the C nodes), has a relative lifetime of 1, signifying that the 
potential organization in these nodes cannot be expected to survive any longer than it would if the 
system of these patterns didn’t have its catalytic capacities.  Higher nodes (AB, AC, BC, ABC) all 
have higher relative lifetimes because, in the absence of catalytic capacities, these would have been 
susceptible to braising in multiple dimensions—that is to say, the Bs and Cs in those nodes would 
be more vulnerable because they are not reparable; however, in this system, the lifetimes of those 
nodes are somewhat extended thanks to the catalytic capacities of A to help form B, and of B to 
help form C.  One way we might think of this is to say that, for instance, in the largest SCC here, B 
and C last longer than they otherwise would, given A.  But since A is not necessarily given (because it 
has its own vulnerabilities), the entire identity—the sum of the potential information for A, B, and 
C—has an expected lifetime that is dependent solely on the braising rate of A.  Because of this, a 
mere catalytic system of this sort is still unable to persist any longer than the catalyst alone would 
otherwise persist, and so we must categorize the system as another kind of ontological nonce that 




Flat Cyclical Nonce 
 
For the sake of inclusiveness, we can analyze one more subcategory of nonce (there may be 
still others, but for now we will limit our explorations here).  In the case of what we might call flat 
cyclical systems, the patterns in a certain set are able to transform into one another in a cycle, but are 
not able to help one another except at the cost of losing their own organization.  This is what 
happens in ordinary reversible chemical reactions, such as those in Figures 9.24 and 9.25, but we can 
look at a more abstract version of the phenomenon now.  For instance, pattern A may become B, and 
B may similarly become C, which then may become A, all without catalyzing one another’s formation.  
Again, however, in SCCs of this sort, there is nothing either spontaneous or catalytic that produces 








Figure 11.2:  An organizational graph representing a system in which A transforms into B, B 
transforms into C, and C transforms into A, but none of them catalyzes the formation of the others.  
As we saw earlier, this may be chemically very unlikely, but the case of reversible reactions, in which, 
for instance, A + B converts to C + D and C + D also converts back to A + B, is extremely common.  
In any case, all of the nodes in a single-level SCC are organizationally identical with all of the others.  
But precisely because the SCCs formed by these kinds of causal relationships do not span levels, no 
redundancy is ever gained through transitions in systems such as this.   
 
When we look at the expected lifetimes for all the nodes in any single-level SCC, we find that 
they are all equal to the reciprocal of the sum of the probabilities of the node’s down-bound 
transitions—a number that is always equal to the baseline lifetime for that node.  And because of 
this, the relative lifetimes of all such nodes are—just as we saw with standard ontological nonce—
equal to 1 (again, except in the case of the Ø node).  Again, these limitations constitute a form of 
ontological nonce in which the combined organizational potential of any set of these patterns is 





There is another potential case in which a set of patterns is unable to persist any longer than 
braising would allow, but in this form of nonce—call it causalytic poisoning—the lifetimes may be even 
shorter than those of the same patterns left to decay by random environmental braising effects.  
These are the cases in which a pattern within the system actively plays a causal role in the destruction 
of another pattern.  So if, for instance, pattern C acts as an enzyme in the catalytic decomposition of 
B, then there will be an additional likelihood of B decomposing at any time, beyond the braising 
effects of the environment.  In that case, while the baseline lifetime for any node containing both a 
B and a C will be the reciprocal of the down-bound braising transitions, the expected lifetime for 
any such node will be less, because it will be the reciprocal of the braising transitions plus the down-
bound enzymatic decomposition transition (it will be easier to model with two distinct arrows going 
between the nodes, representing the different causes of decomposition).  With an expected lifetime 
lower than the braising lifetime, the relative lifetime of such nodes will then be less than 1. 
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B. Spontaneously Organizing Systems 
 
That crystalline structures and the structures of living beings could be related by applying [the] criterion [of apparent 
self-construction] . . . might well give [an investigator] food for thought.  Even if unversed in modern biology, [the 
investigator] would wonder whether the internal forces which give living beings their macroscopic structure might be of 
the same nature as the microscopic interactions responsible for crystalline morphologies . . .  
 
—Jacques Monod (1971, p. 22) 
 
The model of value that we have developed shows that there are some sets of patterns that, 
because of the causal relationships among them, are regularly rebuilt and thus are able to persist 
longer than they otherwise would.  There is, however, a further distinction to be made between 
different manners of persistence.  Some sets of patterns benefit from external processes that give them 
more time and they are, therefore, spontaneously organizing in the presence of those external 
sources of information.  Others have their own internal processes by which they buy themselves 
more time, and it is these internally informed, organizing processes that can be said to be goal-directed.  
We have already become familiar with graphs of both of these categories of system.  In 
Chapter IX, we saw some sets of patterns that have blueprints that seem to be (metaphorically) 
written in the stars, and others, analogous to a multiquine, that have blueprints that appear to be 
(literally) written in themselves.  What we can do now is to take a look at the expected and relative 
lifetimes for the nodes in the SCCs that emerge from those graphs.  We will begin here with 




Standard Spontaneous Systems 
 
As we have seen, in a fully spontaneous system, everything is created from Ø, and there is 
one SCC that encompasses all the nodes of the graph. 
 
 
Figure 11.3:  An organizational graph of a non-reduced, fully spontaneous system wherein A, B, and C 
all form from their constituent parts in the absence of catalysis.  The organizational formulae 
represented here are Ø " A, Ø " B, and Ø " C.  
 
Because the Ø node is included in the SCC and all the nodes in an SCC are reachable from 
one another, there is no sink state in a graph of such a system.  The state of the system will cycle 
within the SCC forever.  The expected lifetime for every node in the graph is therefore infinity, and 







We could also explore a system in which there are some patterns that are spontaneously 
organizing and some that are not.  For instance, in A-B-C space, we might have Ø " A and Ø " B, 
but nothing that causes C. 
 
 
Figure 11.4:  An organizational graph representing the spontaneous formation of A and B (from 
environmentally available foodstuffs, a1, a2, b1, and b2) and where there are no processes contributing 
to the production of C. 
 
In this case, there will be multiple SCCs, one of which will represent the space of all the 
spontaneously organizing patterns in the system in the absence of any non-spontaneously organizing 
pattern, and then some of which will represent the same set of those spontaneously organizing 
patterns in the presence of one or some of the other patterns.  For instance, in Figure 11.4 there is one 
SCC representing all the possibilities of A and B without C, and one representing the same with C.  
If we look at the SCC of just the spontaneously organizing patterns without any of the other 
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patterns, the lifetimes of the nodes in the SCC are like those in any standard spontaneous system—
both expected and relative lifetimes are infinite for every node (except for the undefined relative 
lifetime of the Ø node).  But if we look at any of the other SCCs, we will find that the lifetimes of 
the nodes in them will be much like those of nonce—no greater than the reciprocal of one of the 
patterns within the set that is susceptible to braising.   
These kinds of systems are really just spontaneous systems analyzed in the presence of 
irrelevant dimensions.  Despite the patterns in the irrelevant dimensions being susceptible to braising, 
ultimately the overall system will settle into the lowest fully spontaneous SCC where the lifetimes are 
infinite for that spontaneous subset of patterns.   
 
Other Mixed Spontaneous Systems 
 
Other systems might include some spontaneously organizing patterns along with some 
catalytic activity.  It appears that these cases are generally similar to cases we have already seen.  For 
instance, we might imagine a system in which A and B are spontaneously organizing, and B catalyzes 
C.  In this case, the system turns out to have a single SCC encompassing all the nodes, and thus it 
behaves just like a standard spontaneous system, with infinite expected and relative lifetimes for all 
combinations of A, B, and C.   
We might also imagine a system in which A is spontaneously organizing and A catalyzes B, 
but C is neither spontaneous nor catalyzed.  This case is a hybrid of the case we just imagined and of 
the case of partial spontaneity that we looked at in Figure 11.4.  The overall graph—and thus the 
behavior of the system—is isomorphic with that of the system in Figure 11.4. 
In general, the behavior of spontaneous systems is that, in terms of those patterns that are 
neither spontaneously forming nor catalyzed by spontaneously forming patterns, braising will 
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eventually dominate . . . until what is left is just those patterns that either are spontaneously forming 
or are catalyzed by spontaneously forming patterns, at which point the system will retain its 
spontaneously organizing identity indefinitely.  To be sure, this doesn’t at all guarantee that any 
particular physical structure will last indefinitely—the physical state of the system might change over 
and over again, within the SCC.  What is guaranteed is that, given an environment that contains 
certain assumed features, the total (actual plus potential) organizational content of the identity in that 
SCC will last as long as those environmental assumptions still hold.  The blueprints for the patterns 
produced in the system live entirely in the assumed foodstuffs of the system and so, in the absence 
of those products, the blueprints remain, giving the products the chance to be produced again.  
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C. Teleological Systems 
 
You see, proteins, as I probably needn’t tell you, are immensely complicated groupings of amino acids and certain other 
specialized compounds, arranged in intricate three-dimensional patterns that are as unstable as sunbeams on a cloudy 
day. It is this instability that is life, since it is forever changing its position in an effort to maintain its identity—in the 
manner of a long rod balanced on an acrobat’s nose. 
  
—Isaac Asimov (1950) 
 
Asimov was prescient.  His recognition that life consists of a series of constantly changing 
states of a milieu of biochemical components, in order to maintain a living thing’s identity is Kantian 
in nature and prefigures Maturana and Varela’s work by about twenty years.  It also looks just like 
our third category: the teleological systems.  And so, last but not least, we can look at those types of 
identities that have some Kantian circularity in their catalytic capacities.  The various autocatalytic 
sets—the little “miracles of self-reference” that we examined near the end of Chapter IX—all 
redundantly contain their own potential organization, and it is this organizational structure of 
mutually causal relationships that allows these identities to last longer than ontological nonce, but 
not as long as spontaneously organizing systems.  We’ll look at the details of how to quantify this in 
a few moments but, in short, the major SCCs in these systems always have finite expected lifetimes 






Standard Teleological Systems 
 
A standard teleological system in A-B-C space is the version of Kauffman’s autocatalytic sets 
that we analyzed in Figure 9.27, in which A catalyzes the formation of B, B catalyzes the formation 
of C, and C in turn catalyzes the formation of A.  The graph of that system resulted in two SCCs—
one containing just the Ø node, and the other containing the remainder of the nodes in the system.  
We can have another look at the same graph now in Figure 11.5.   
 
 
Figure 11.5:  The autocatalytic set in which each of A, B, and C is able to catalyze the production of 
one of the other members.   
 
In this system, the expected lifetime for the Ø-node SCC is infinite (and its relative lifetime 
is undefined), reflecting the fact that when all three of the catalysts disappear entirely, they are 
irrecoverable.  However, for the larger SCC in this sort of graph, the expected lifetime of every node 
is higher, sometimes significantly higher, than the baseline lifetime.  And for all of those nodes, the 
relative lifetime turns out to be finite yet greater than 1, revealing the fact that, in contrast with 
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nonce and spontaneous systems, these kinds of organizational identities are able to persist longer 
than a set of patterns would otherwise be expected to, although not forever. 
 
Ço-Catalyzed Teleological Systems 
 
In the above autocatalytic set, we have a case in which A alone contains the organizational 
potential for both B and C, and in which B contains the potential for A and C, and C contains the 
potential for A and B.  If the state of the system falls down to the node that contains just A, for 
instance, it is still within the identity, and so the other parts of the system can still be rebuilt.  We 
should not, however, draw the conclusion from this example (and from that of multiquines) that any 
one part of a teleological system generally contains the full organizational potential for the rest of the 
system.  That turns out to almost never be the case in real biological systems, and we can easily see 
that it is does not need to be the case in our graphs either.   
As an example of a teleological system in which no one pattern ever contains the full 
organizational potential for the entire system, we can look at an autocatalytic set that requires co-
catalysis (even if it is not chemically realistic).  For instance, we can define a system in which A and 
B together are required to catalyze the reconstruction of any lost C, and B and C together are 
providers of the information for A, and so on.  In such a case, nodes that contain single patterns 
(nodes A or B or C) are evicted from the uppermost SCC.   
Figure 11.6 is a graph of such an example.  The causal rules of the system are AB " ABC, 
BC " ABC, and AC " ABC, meaning that any two of the structures together are able to reproduce 




Figure 11.6:  An organizational graph of a system wherein any two patterns are able to co-catalyze the 
production of a third. 
 
In this system, as we might imagine, the expected lifetime of the Ø node is infinite, and the 
expected lifetimes of the other three singleton SCCs are the reciprocal of their respective decay rates 
(i.e. equal to baseline), while their relative lifetimes are all equal to 1.  However, as with our previous 
example of a teleological system, all the nodes in the upper SCC here have expected lifetimes greater 
than their baseline and thus, also, relative lifetimes greater than 1.  Again, the system will tend to 
cycle within the SCC, thereby maintaining the organizational potential for the set of patterns 
represented therein for longer than if the patterns did not have their mutually reinforcing catalytic 
capacities, but not necessarily forever.   
 
Asymmetrical Teleological Systems 
 
Lastly, we can look at a slightly differently-shaped system that is nonetheless autocausal.  If 
we have a set of causal rules such as A " AB, A " AC, and BC " ABC, then the potential for B 
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and the potential for C both exist independently in A, and at the same time the potential for A exists 




Figure 11.7:  An organizational graph of a system wherein A catalyzes the production of each of B 
and C, while B and C jointly catalyze the production of A.  The system is teleological. 
 
The system in Figure 11.7 has four SCCs.  The largest of them reflects the full set of catalytic 
relationships that exist in the system, and every node in it has an expected lifetime that is greater 
than baseline, and a relative lifetime that is greater than 1.  The Ø node and the other singleton 
nodes all behave just as we would expect from our earlier analyses.  This is a third kind of 
teleological system, in which the large SCC represents an identity that maintains its organizational 
potential for longer than would be the case if the relevant patterns had not had their mutually 




Helping Oneself:  The Magical Transition 
 
In Chapter IX we developed a theory of organizational identicality that provides a simple 
notion of a self.  Now, with our lifetime calculations, we are able to see how certain identities—
those that have internal organizational relationships that allow their parts to be both cause and effect 
of one another—are able to help themselves continue to exist longer than they otherwise would.  It 
is the things that the interlinked causalytic parts of these systems do that cause the systems as a 
whole to persist.  Unlike spontaneous systems, in which the persistence of the identity is driven 
solely by the organizational potential in the foodstuffs of the environment, in these teleological 
systems the persistence of the identity depends upon the causal relationships amongst those 
products of the system that also play a role in producing the system.  Each pattern that is produced 
contains some of the redundant potential organization for producing some of the others.  And so 
the system as a whole engages in a continuous series of acts, the upshot of which is the creation, 
maintenance, and reproduction of an organizational self. 
Teleological systems are those systems that are neither guaranteed to exist nor guaranteed 
not to, but whose fate lies in their own hands.  They are neither bound to last forever nor to 
assuredly fall apart (within a particular environment).  Instead, they are little eddies in the universal 
flow of material organization.  They are patterns in time.  And they are able to benefit through the 
activities—now rightfully called actions—of their internal constituent parts, thereby contributing to 
their own good, meaning they are not just persistors, but also in fact agents, actors, subjects. 
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D. Nature’s Blueprints  
 
Concepts like those of organization, wholeness, directiveness, teleology, control, self-regulation, differentiation and the 
like are alien to conventional physics. However, they pop up everywhere in the biological, behavioural and social 
sciences, and are, in fact, indispensable for dealing with living organisms or social groups. Thus, a basic problem posed 
to modern science is a general theory of organization. 
  
      —Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1956) 
 
We may not yet have explored all the possible kinds of organizational identity, but the 
categories we’ve come across so far provide an important foundation to any further exploration.  We 
started with four different kinds of ontological nonce, all of which had different types of potential 
causal interactions among the patterns in their graphs, but which also shared a property:  the full 
information necessary to build or rebuild those identities doesn’t exist within the system (i.e., within 
the identity together with its environment).  Then we reviewed spontaneously organizing systems, 
where we also found some variation, along with another shared property.  Specifically, we found that 
the blueprints necessary to build or rebuild these identities always exist entirely in the available 
environmental foodstuffs.  Lastly, we looked at a few variations of teleological organization.  In each 
of these variations, we found that the information necessary to build or rebuild these identities 
always exists in the system, but not just in the environmentally available foodstuffs—part of the 
information is located in some of the products of the system that turn out to be involved, directly or 
indirectly, in their own production.  In these cases, the identity is partially responsible for containing 
its own blueprints. 
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It is my contention that these three major categories provide us with a full account of 
nature’s blueprints.  As a system of classification, the three categories show us what kinds of things 
can come to exist in a universe made of causally interacting patterns, and they also show us where 
the information that guides the production of each type of organization lives. 
 
Insensitivity to Transition Probabilities 
 
The reason I have been able to make generalizing claims about the resulting lifetimes of the 
nodes in SCCs without discussing the transition probabilities that generate the graphs that contain 
those SCCs is that those results are generally insensitive to changes in the transition probabilities.  
Formal proof of this insensitivity will have to wait until such time as I can put more work into this 
project.  Suffice it to say that for this occasion, it can be shown that no matter what the likelihoods 
of the transitions are, the categorical lifetimes that emerge with our three organizational types go 
unchanged.  
I think this is easy to see in the case of spontaneous organization.  When the graph is a single 
SCC, one recognizes that the expected lifetime of that SCC is always infinite, owing to the fact that 
the state of the system can never leave the SCC.  Changing the transition probabilities will affect 
which states of that SCC the system tends to spend most of its time in, but it will not change the 
facts that every state of the system contains the same organizational potential and thus that the 
expected lifetime of that organizational potential is infinite.  In the case of ontological nonce—at 
least in the case of standard nonce—the expected lifetimes are equal to baseline lifetimes, and so 
they vary with transition probabilities, but still those expected lifetimes are always equal to the 
baseline (which also varies with the down-bound transition probabilities).  The teleological case is 
more complicated, but the same sort of insensitivity holds. One can arbitrarily lower the probability 
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of up-bound connections, making them far lower than the down-bound connections of braising, 
and yet the expected lifetimes for the nodes in the autocausal set will always remain at least a tiny bit 
greater than the baseline lifetimes. 
This insensitivity to the ratio between the transition probabilities of up-bound and down-
bound connections shows that the feature that matters most to our categorical expected lifetimes is 
the organizational relationships within the system. 
 
Tabulating the Cases 
 
To make it easy to compare the behaviors of our three categories and their lifetimes, I here 
will tabulate the variations that we’ve explored so far.   
 
Type Expected Lifetime Relative Lifetime 
Standard Nonce  = Baseline =1 
Catalytic Nonce  = Baseline*   =1+ 
Flat Cyclical Nonce = Baseline =1 
Causalytic Poisoning ≤ Baseline ≤1 
Standard Spontaneous Infinity Undefined 
Partial Spontaneous Infinity Undefined 
Catalytic Spontaneous Infinity Undefined 
Standard Teleological > Baseline >1 
Co-Catalyzed Teleological > Baseline >1 
Asymm. Teleological > Baseline >1 
 
Figure 11.8.  The major categories of material organization, including a few subdivisions within each 
type, and their expected and relative lifetimes.  For detailed explanations of each of these cases, see 
the text in the earlier parts of the chapter.  The unusual case of catalytic nonce is examined further 
below.  The asterisk indicates the fact that the expected lifetimes of the nodes in these SCCs are equal 
to the baseline lifetime of the underlying catalyst, rather than their own baseline lifetimes.  The plus-sign 
refers to the fact that the relative lifetime is 1 for one of the nodes in these SCCs, but it is greater than 1 
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for the other nodes (this contrasts with teleological organizations in which the relative lifetime is 
greater than 1 for all of the nodes in the SCC). 
 
For most types of nonce, the expected lifetime of each of the nodes in any SCC in the 
system is less than or equal to the baseline lifetime for that node as a singleton; the exception is the 
case of catalytic nonce, where the expected lifetimes of all the nodes in the SCC tend to be equal to 
the expected lifetime of the catalyst that produces the other patterns in the SCC.  The relative 
lifetime is then less than or equal to 1 for most nodes in most nonce SCCs, with the exception again 
being catalytic nonce, in which some patterns have their relative lifetimes mildly extended, thanks to 
a benefactor catalyst that produces those patterns but is itself vulnerable to braising. 
We should take particular notice of this case.  The “1+” listed in the table in Figure 11.8 
refers to the fact that, in a purely catalytic (but not autocatalytic) identity, the relative lifetimes of the 
nodes vary; the relative lifetime of the underlying catalyst alone is equal to 1, but that of the other 
nodes will be higher.  This is because catalysis extends the expected lifetimes of nodes with catalytic 
products, making them equal to the expected lifetime of the underlying catalyst. 
Catalytic nonce thus turns out to be interesting, because those expected lifetimes are 
extended but, ultimately, they can never exceed the expected lifetime of the underlying catalyst.  The 
set of patterns created by or rooted in the catalyst cannot be expected to exist any longer than the 
catalyst itself.  This limit means that the identity is neither spontaneously organizing nor 
teleologically organized, but has a fixed, finite amount of time that it can be expected to exist.   
Still, for the catalyzed product, this finite amount of time gives it a little longer than it would 
have had on its own.  And this catalytic step upwards forms the building block from which 
teleological, autocatalytic sets and cycles are made.  If a catalyst can hold its products’ heads above 
water just a little bit, and if we can turn those products around and let them in turn act as catalysts, 
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holding the original catalyst’s head above water just a little bit also, then the (now teleological) 
system can stay afloat for quite a bit longer. 
If we return to the table, we can see that the remaining cases are all simpler to examine:  In 
any type of spontaneously forming pattern, expected lifetimes are always infinite, and relative 
lifetimes are always undefined (the divisor of the quotient—the baseline lifetime—is infinite; again, 
see footnote number 343 where this issue is first addressed).  And in the case of teleological systems, 
lifetimes are neither infinite nor limited by the braising rate; instead, the expected lifetimes for all 
nodes in a teleological SCC are always greater than baseline, and thus the relative lifetimes are always 
greater than 1. 
 
The Tripartite Ontology 
 
Presumably there are other as-yet-unexplored types of graphs containing organizational 
identities that may have as-yet-unimagined characteristics or behaviors that may prove to be 
interesting in various ways.  However, there is a good reason that, for the time being, we can leave 
those stones unturned.  Mathematically speaking, the temporal regimes of the categories we have 
found already completely fill out the spectrum of persistence behaviors.  The lifetime of an identity 
is either (i) between zero and the baseline, or (ii) finite, yet above the baseline, or (iii) infinite.  Any 
new type of organizational identity that may be found will inevitably turn out to be a subcategory of 
one of these three types.  Such an identity will have organizational content that is either guaranteed 
to exist (it will be a new subtype of spontaneous organization) or guaranteed not to (it will be a new 
subtype of ontological nonce), or else its existential fate will be in its own hands (it will be a new 
subtype of teleological organization). 
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The byproduct of having developed our theories of identity and value, then, is that not only 
do we come to understand how a thing might be able to help itself, but we also come to understand 
the source of nature’s blueprints.   
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E. A General Theory of the Nature of Living Systems 
 
Insights gained from philosophical investigations into language and logic strongly suggest that the seemingly 
interminable nature of the controversy over life’s definition is inescapable as long as we lack a general theory of the 
nature of living systems and their emergence from the physical world. 
 
      —Carol Cleland and Christopher Chyba (2002) 
 
Psychologists have found that what is most salient to humans about death is that it is a 
universal, irreversible, non-functionality.  That is to say:  Everything that is alive eventually dies; and 
what it means to die is to cease to function; and this inevitable inability to continue functioning is 
permanent.  Beyond a certain threshold, there is just no coming back (see, e.g., Carter 2016).  In 
contradistinction, there is what we call life.  And so life can be thought of as a rare and temporary 
functionality.  That is to say: only certain things of a certain sort may be alive.  And what it means to 
be alive is to be able to have one’s parts continue to function.  And that ability to function will only 
ever last a finite period before coming to an end.  As it turns out, this is the same characterization 
that emerges from our theory of informational identicality and expected organizational lifetimes 
(except that the theory also specifies to what end the parts of the living may function).344 
The tentative theoretical definitions for the long-elusive concepts of life, death, and health that 
I’ll offer now will probably not account for all the ways in which we think of those concepts, but I 
																																																								
344 This intuitive characterization seems much like conceptual analysis.  However, in this case the intuitions are not 
derived from a philosopher’s introspection, but from a kind of psychological experimentation—now sometimes called 
“experimental philosophy”—in which an author derives the intuitions from the opinions of a population.  The method 
is still very fallible, but the characterizations it produces can often be more balanced than just one philosopher’s 
opinions. 
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think the offerings will be intuitive, and their rough outline might one day—if the rest of this theory 
pans out as I imagine—form a foundation for more scientific treatment of these notions. 
I’d like to emphasize the fact that the theoretical claims regarding life that I am about to set 
forth emerge nearly effortlessly from what I’ve written so far—they come out of the few simple 
assumptions that my model is based on.  We have assumed: 
 
(i) that physical, organizational patterns play dynamically specific causal roles in one 
another’s coming to be (whether by spontaneous or causalytic synthesis or 
decomposition);  
(ii) that there is probabilistic decay in the material organization of patterns, and that that 
decay tends to accumulate; 
(iii) and that identity consists not of physically but of organizationally identical states of the 
world (a theoretical definition supported by a distinction between actual and potential 
organization).   
 
Using those ingredients, we have a small system for reasoning about the potential changes in 
organizational structure, from which a simple mathematical property—the relative expected lifetime 




Of course, the term “lifetime” was chosen because it refers metaphorically to how long the 
organizational information within an identity might last, whether or not the identity is of the 
teleological type that we might view as vitalistic.  But it has a stronger, more literal meaning when we 
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look in particular at those teleological identities whose behavior, when they do exist, helps them to 
continue to exist.  The theory of life suggested here is this:  to be alive is to be an active physical 
instantiation of a teleological identity.  It is to be a thing that, thanks to the machinations of its parts 
in helping to reconstruct one another, is able to buy itself more time. 
The sharp boundary drawn between an SCC and the remainder of a graph is, in these 
analyses, the boundary between the existence and the non-existence of the set of patterns in the 
potential organization of that SCC.  All the states within the SCC have the same potential 
organization, the same identity.  I suggest that what it means to be alive or not is for the actual state 
of the system to be on one side of this boundary or the other—to be in the identity, or not to be in 
it.   This distinction differentiates the living not only from the once-teleological-but-now-dead, but 
also from the two kinds of never-animate matter that we have been calling spontaneous organization 
and ontological nonce. 
Departure from the identity represents permanent death because, as soon as the SCC is 
exited, there is no longer a source of information, either in the identity or in the environment, for 




This definition of what it means to be (or not to be) alive also immediately suggests a 
measure of health, primarily in terms of informational redundancy.  The more redundant 
organizational information the current state of a teleological identity has, the higher its chances of 
resisting braising.  The further the current state is from any transitions that lead out of the identity, 
the less likely that state is to get bumped over that boundary by a random perturbation.   
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If we recall the earlier image we had when analyzing replication in terms of the draft of the 
iceberg, we can see that, in principle, a highly replicated system might get to be very far from the 
risky boundary of that identity, near the leading edges of the graph.  In such a case the identity is 
very healthy, and thus highly resistant to potential braising.  On the other hand, when the current 
state of an unreplicated autopoietic system is very close to the boundary of the SCC, it will be highly 




In the current instantiation of our system of analysis, time steps are measured in discrete 
ticks, a fact that keeps the model at a level abstracted from the physics that we take to be real (itself 
measured in terms such as kelvins, amperes, kilograms, meters, and of course seconds). 
I have neither the time nor the capacity to translate the abstract model into a physically 
realistic one.  But I can perhaps point out one way that we might eventually approach that problem.  
Each particular pattern that plays some causalytic role in a model will, in the context of a particular 
distribution of braising energy (within a particular environment), have a number of seconds that it 
can be expected to persist through resilience.  Those details have been condensed, in our current 
system of analysis, down to a set of transition probabilities between nodes.  But in principle, it seems 
that one might be able to reconceive the transitions of our graphs in terms of the real statistical 
expectations given by the distributions of energy and the likelihoods of causal interactions and so 
on, and thereby come to a more realistic model.  If one day someone is able to do so, then I imagine 
it may be a significant step towards understanding the concepts of life, death, and health as physical 
phenomena, measurable perhaps in terms of information (bits) and time (seconds).  In the 
meantime, the abstract version we have been looking at will hopefully serve us well in revealing 
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some of the key relationships between the high-level subjective concepts and phenomena that we set 











Time is limited, even for those of us who temporarily are able to buy more. I had intended 
most of each of the following sections to be chapters of their own. As things stand, however, the 
parts of this project that come before this point are not yet complete.  And so, writing those 
chapters that lie ahead will have to wait . . . perhaps a long time.  For now, I will only put down a 
series of impressions about ways to interpret the graph theoretical methodology we’ve developed, 
and about some directions for future work.  I will summarize what I think the theory is able to do, 
and I will explore some of what it is not yet able to do. 
At this point, we have an abstract theory of teleology and of its subjective accompaniments, 
but along with those pieces comes a theory of the kinds of organizational structures that can emerge 
from the causal and temporal fabrics of a material world, accounting for some grand ontological 
divisions by which we might classify the diversity in the larger-than-particle-scale patterns found in 
our universe.  It is not necessarily the only quantitative theory that can describe the phenomena in 
these branches of inquiry, and it does not describe everything about those phenomena, but it is—by 
my lights—a rather intriguing theory for describing some of the central aspects of those phenomena.  
And in spite of the oversimplifying assumptions the theory makes and the abstract level at which its 
most solid pieces have been described, some of its key strengths are its simplicity, its (purported, but 
																																																								
345 As cited in Diogenes Laertius, Chapter V, Life of Theophrastus, X (Yonge 1853). 
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as-yet-unverified) explanatory breadth, and its consistency with our modern materialist logic and 
knowledge of the physical world. 
To some eyes, the simplicity of the view I’ve described may appear to be a gross 
oversimplification of some of the deepest philosophical and scientific concepts that make up our 
physical, biological, and agentive lives.  But to my eyes the theoretical concision is encouraging.  I 
am not sure that Occam’s razor or the principle of parsimony should guide our theories; but in this 
case, it seems justifiable that the obvious conceptual connections tying together identity, normativity, 
ontology, teleology, and agency should be mirrored by a hypothesis that is equally direct in how its 
theoretical parts are related.  Our graph-theoretic system for describing the distribution of 
organizational potential within sets of patterns appears to be capable of making all these 
connections—deliberately and not haphazardly—with only a single central formula allowing us to 
calculate the expected lifetimes of the nodes in the SCCs of organizational graphs: (I – P) EL = 1.  
And as we have seen, the logic that holds all these pieces together may be abstract, but it is not 
abstruse. 
The theory claims that the kinds of material order that can exist in the context of braising are 
those whose blueprints are, somehow, available.  And the two primary ways in which blueprints can 
reliably be made available are either (i) as a result of a serial chain of spontaneous organization, or (ii) 
as a combination of some spontaneous organization along with some reflexive (Kantian) 
organization that continually constructs and repairs the redundancy in its own blueprints.  That latter 
kind of material order forms the basis by which an identity—construed of as a persistent organizational 
potential—may benefit from its own actions, thereby laying the groundwork for subjective, agentive, 
teleological phenomena. 
This set of concepts accounts for identity and value and autocausal persistence and, thus, for 
the goal-directed nature of teleological systems, and, as we’ll soon review, also for functioning.  It 
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also simultaneously supports four centrally biological capacities—autopoiesis, replication, and, as we 
will briefly review, also ontogeny and symbiosis—each of which is tightly linked to the notions of 
identity and value and constitutes a major part of what makes biological activity interesting.  
Furthermore, it supports the most fundamental property of biological entities: the distinction 
between, on the one hand, life or vitality (and the graded continuum of health) and, on the other 
hand, death or inanimacy . . . that universal, irreversible, state of non-functionality (Carter 2012).  
What we have in this theory is really a form of emergent vitalism. 
But there is more to life than this.  The breadth of phenomena that we find in organisms and 
ecosystems is certainly vitalistic, but it is far, far more complex than the descriptions given by the 
simple graph-theoretical models we’ve looked at.  For one thing, while the abstract space of 
organizational potential does map onto the coexistence of physical patterns, I have not yet been able to 
show how to map it onto specific arrangements of coexisting physical patterns, such as that which 
occurs in cells or multicellular organisms (this complex issue was approached in our discussion of 
the chemoton, but it was not thoroughly answered there).  For another thing, there are no vitalistic 
systems out there in the biological world that correspond to graphs symbolized in a space of just 
three letters.  And I have not yet been able to make it entirely clear how to scale up such small 
graphs in a way that might allow them to represent real systems, including organisms.  For a third 
thing, biological replicators can be far more complex than symbolic replicators or simple 
autocatalytic chemical replicators.  Our graph-theoretic method of analysis may be able to obviously 
account for those latter types of teleological system, but quite a bit of work remains in order to 
determine how the same method might account for the kind of replication that occurs, say, in sexual 
reproduction with chromosomal crossover.  I cannot address all of these topics now, but I will try to 
say a few words about those that I think I can. 
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One of the topics I would like to address in the next few pages is how our simple graphs 
may grow and combine open-endedly, in ways that mirror some of the complexity of biological 
reality.  We will only be able to scratch the surface of this topic, but in looking at it, I will try to 
remind us of the role both chance and selection play in diversifying and adapting persistors within 
their environments.  I will also point out how I think the kinds of symbiotic relationships that 
characterize both ecologies and individual organisms may be construed in terms of various graph-
arithmetic operations between identities. 
I also feel an obligation to remark on how the theory of teleological systems then impacts 
analyses of the concept and the phenomenon of function.  In the early part of the dissertation, we 
spent a lot of time examining function theories.  Although I do not have the time to persuasively 
defend a new theory of function, I will make some initial suggestions as to how we might now 
conceive of functioning in terms of teleological systems, leaving the fuller analysis of those issues for 
future work.  When that is done, I will also be in a position to assess the degree to which my work 
addresses the twenty questions raised in Chapter VI. 
In addition to all of these matters, I would also like to make note of another piece of work 
that I am aware of that makes some similar interpretations of some of the key concepts that I have 
been working with.  Let’s do that first. 
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A. A Similar Interpretation 
 
Combining robustness and plasticity provides a measure of viability as average expected survival time under ongoing 
perturbation, and allows us to measure how viability is affected as the configuration undergoes transitions. 
 
—Eran Agmon, et al. (2016) 
 
A group of researchers, led by my colleague Eran Agmon in his graduate work at Indiana 
University, and including one of my own advisors, Randall Beer, have come to some similarly graph-
theoretic conclusions about identity, value and vitality, which I would like to describe here.   
Agmon and his colleagues (Agmon, Gates, and Beer 2015; see also Agmon et al. 2014, 2016) 
developed a cellular automata-like model of an autopoietic protocell in which there exists a 
membrane enclosure that contains an autocatalytic chemical, in an environment of both water and a 
readily available species of “food” molecule.  Their protocell is built to model the diffusion of these 
chemicals across the membrane, and the formation of the autocatalyst and the membrane material 
from the food. 
The authors’ (2015) goal was to characterize the viability, ontogeny, and adaptivity—in other 
words, the health and life and the development—of an individual by exhaustively mapping the 
possible changes to that individual’s physical structure.  Their approach began by starting their 
protocell in a particular configuration and allowing it to proceed through time in the presence of 
random perturbations, in order that they could observe the structural evolution of the model over a 
broad range of possible scenarios.  They then mapped the various states of change onto a graph 
meant to represent all the possible lives of that kind of protocell.  It is not yet clear how to draw a 
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mapping between the kind of graph that Agmon et al. developed and the graphs that I have been 
describing.346  Nonetheless, what is clear is that both are graph-theoretic analyses of similar topics. 
Agmon et al. interpreted their graphs in some way similar to my interpretation of my graphs, 
in that individuality (their term most related to identity) and value are claimed to be features of the 
graphs (see the epigraph above); however, owing to the differing natures of our graphs, we’ve 
ultimately come to different conclusions about the meanings of those terms. 
In their (2015) paper, Agmon et al. describe an “ontogeny”—a lifetime of an individual—as a 
trajectory through their graph, beginning at their initial state and ending at what they consider the 
“death” state (a roughly uniform concentration of each of their four molecular species across the 
entire space of the model).  Trajectories of this sort cross through multiple strongly connected 
components of their graph along the way.  Agmon’s interpretation seems to be that an individual is 
best thought of as being an autopoietic organism (personal communication).  I was personally unable 
to come to a clear understanding of whether an autopoietic organism is one actual trajectory (one 
ontogeny) or whether it is the full set of possible trajectories in Agmon’s graphs (which he calls an 
“ontogenic network”), but in either case, these entities cross more than one strongly connected 
component.  And while it is unclear, as I said, how to map Agmon’s graphs onto mine, I find an 
interpretation in which identity does not map to some kind of clearly organizationally identical unit to 
be incongruous with my own theoretical interpretations.347  As for the topic of value, Agmon claims 
																																																								
346 Firstly, the representations within their nodes and mine are very different. Secondly, their explorations were strictly in 
a [model] physical space, while mine are in some kind of more abstract organizational space.  And, thirdly, their graph is 
of what they call “stable configurations”—condensing series of transient states into singular nodes that serve as a kind of 
natural unit.  It would take some work to understand whether those single-node units or the strongly connected 
components in their graphs are the clearest analog to the strongly connected components in my graphs. 
347 It may be the case that the SCCs in Agmon’s graph turn out to be equivalent to SCCs in my graphs in some way.  In 
that case, the nodes of each such SCC of his graph are organizationally identical with one another.  We could then view 
his SCCs as being teleological identities that attempt to persist, and also view the transitions between his SCCs as being 
wildly damaging perturbations that result in still-viable alternative identities.  In that case, those SCCs are not the same 
thing, but there may be historical paths from one to another.  This way of putting things is somewhat similar to Agmon 
et al.’s own interpretation (since they classify robust vs. plastic responses to perturbations); however, it makes different 
claims from theirs about what constitutes an individual or an identity. 
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that value accrues to an individual—an organism—not to a more abstract informational or 
organizational entity, as I believe to be the case with the kinds of identities I have described.  
Because of this, we tend to disagree about the status of replicators as bearing the property of identity 
and as serving as potential beneficiaries.   
Generally, the model that Agmon et al. have built impresses me, as an attempt to characterize 
the possible lives of an individual.  Their protocell does appear to be a model autopoietic system of 
some sort, and so I remain hopeful that perhaps with further work we can one day come to 
understand how to reconcile their notions with mine.  At the moment, however, it is not yet clear 
how that might be done. 
Despite our inability to define our terms in quite the same ways, I am intrigued by a certain 
idea apparent in the work of Agmon et al., whereby the ontogeny of an organism potentially may 
span a series of strongly connected components.  There are two things that I think are worth 
exploring here.  The first thing I’d like to explore is what it means to move from one viable 
organizational identity to another.  The other thing I’d like to explore is the question of how my 
graphs might represent ontogeny—for example, the transformation from a caterpillar to a 
butterfly—even within just one identity.  Let’s explore the two issues in that order. 
In Agmon’s work, the notion of moving from one strongly connected component to 
another is a fairly obvious feature of his graph.  In mine, the direct analog—a transition between 
SCCs made within a single graph—would be a destructive departure from an organizational identity.  
But another idea analogous to the move from one SCC to another in an individual graph could be 
represented by a parametric transformation of an entire graph into a different one within which a 
similar (but not identical) SCC might exist.  One viable identity may transform into another that is 
no longer the same; nonetheless, the second identity may also remain viable.  This of course 
happens to real replicators all the time in the course of evolution, both by drift (McShea and 
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Brandon 2012) and by natural selection.  Systems change, and their denizens change with them. 
When a bacterium acquires some non-destructive mutation in its DNA, its daughter cells may still be 
complex teleological systems, but their identity—and the SCCs in the graphs that might describe 
them—will not be the same as those of the mother cell before the mutation.  The new SCC here is 
not a transition from one part of a graph to another, but instead a result of the reshaping of the graph 
itself.   
One interesting new question that is presented by trying to find the analogies between my 
work and that of Agmon et al. is the question of how often this kind of shift in identity might 
happen over the course of autopoietic persistence (rather than replicative persistence).  We do know that 
organisms come to be infected by, or otherwise engaged with, various parasites and commensals all 
the time, thus changing both the organism and their relationship to their environment (Dawkins 
1982).  And in some interesting cases those parasites may come to functionally replace or 
functionally alter parts of the original organism (recall the tongue-eating louse from earlier, as 
reported by Brusca and Gilligan 1983).  We also know that organisms might survive well, as they are, 
but are sometimes able to do better, in different ways, through the use of artifacts.  In this case, the 
new part—the artifact that has been taken up—may come to play an unexpected role in maintaining 
the organism against braising, thereby redefining the organism’s identity by serving as an additional 
part with causal effects that add nodes and transitions to a graph.  And so there are at least a few 
ways in which the definition of an identity may be altered over the course of a lifetime, as an 
individual loses old parts or takes on new parts that begin to work in new ways with respect to the 
remainder of the original identity.  For the time being, these ideas will have to remain inconclusive, 
but I think we must recognize that there is a lot of space still to be explored in coming to 
understand the notions of identity and value as they manifest in real organisms.  
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The second issue to discuss now is that of how a caterpillar and a butterfly can be seen to be 
“the same thing”.  Again, our analyses here cannot be complete, but we can look at how this general 
issue is addressed already in our graphs.  If you recall, even within a single SCC in our organizational 
graphs, there are still potentially vast physical changes that a system may go through within one 
identity.  The case of a multiquine makes it clear how two or more quite distinct looking programs 
can exist at different moments in time but still contain identical organizational information.  And we 
can make the example more attractive:  it is certainly possible to write a many-versioned multiquine 
half of whose versions maintain a fairly consistent (identifiable) form for a long period (with, say a 
counter embedded within, and decremented as it is passed from version to version), after which 
there might occur a transition to the other half of the versions which take a very different (also 
identifiable) form for a while before returning to the beginning.  The “phenotypic” appearance of 
such a set of programs could be reasonably likened to that of a caterpillar and a moth or a hen and 
an egg.  In fact, part of the point in developing the system of graphing that we did was to account 





Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each [entity] naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments as 
are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the 
whole. 
 
—David Ricardo (1817) 
 
Individuals are not stable things, they are fleeting. Chromosomes too are shuffled into oblivion, like hands of cards soon 
after they are dealt. But the cards themselves survive the shuffling. The cards are the genes. The genes are not destroyed 
by crossing-over, they merely change partners and march on. Of course they march on. That is their business. 
 
—Richard Dawkins (1976) 
 
Let’s discuss now the ways in which graphs, especially those that prescribe teleological 
identities, might be combined. 
Biologists have for a long time now understood and documented the way ecosystems are 
constructed from complex networks of economic relationships between organisms that are all 
engaged in trade or thievery or scavenging of one sort or another.  The same thing occurs at other 
levels of analysis.   
For instance, while it has long been apparent that some of the relationships that exist within 
organisms may be similar to those in ecosystems, only in recent decades have biologists begun to 
shift towards understanding larger organisms not as being unitary identities but instead as being 
collectives composed of a network of smaller organisms interacting economically.  The most clear and 
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thorough testament to this point of view is the emerging study of the microbiome—the vastly 
diverse community of microorganisms that make their home in and around multicellular organisms, 
in various states of relation, without which the multicellular organism may not be able to survive.  
But other evidence—e.g., endosymbionts such as mitochondria and chloroplasts, as well as various 
studies of obligate ectosymbionts—all points to the same thing:  individuals are generally not as 
individual as we imagine them to be, and they are generally not self-sufficient; most may only be able 
to persist when engaged in a series of commercial relationships by which they may make their living.   
Richard Dawkins (1976, 1982) has taken the argument to a third level, beyond just seeing the 
individual in terms of an ecology made up of various organisms, and I think it worth following him 
here.  Dawkins’ idea is that the genes within an individual are the replicators that matter, and that they 
form a complex economy of their own—each vying for its own replicative survival, but cooperating 
with those it can, in order to earn gains from trade (Ricardo 1817).  In light of our Kantian notion of 
an identity and a replicator, we can update Dawkins’ idea, by viewing a gene not as an identity or a 
replicator by itself, but as potentially playing a role in the context of a more complete replicating 
teleological identity within the cell.  If we view things in this way, then we might consider the 
genome—the collection of various genes that co-inhabit a “single” organism—to comprise a system 
of commerce in which various identities (if the relationships are facultative) or pseudo-identities (if 
the relationships are obligate) each bring something to the table in exchange for something else . . . 
and hopefully—for the sake of the entire community—coming to some economic equilibrium that 
helps the majority persist together, rather than undermining one another through excessive 
competition. 
Graph-theoretically, we can see that, if A, B, and C are mutually catalytic or causalytic, and if 
A, B, and D are mutually catalytic or causalytic, then the full set of A, B, C, and D also form a 
teleological system, but the two identities (A–B–C and A–B–D) live side by side, partially 
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overlapping, sharing parts, and also, in some way, serving as an individual. Now, if we imagine A and 
B to represent the non-genetic machinery of cells and C and D to represent different genes that co-
inhabit those cells, we can really understand Dawkins’ gene’s-eye perspective in terms of our 
teleological identities. 
We can also look briefly at how a parasitic pattern could take advantage of a teleological 
identity.  This could be just a bit of selfish-DNA (see, e.g., Burt and Trivers 2006) or it might be a 
virus or a prion.  In any case, let’s imagine E happens to be catalyzed by A and B together, but it 
doesn’t serve in any way to help create either A or B.  If so, E can hitchhike on the backs of A, B, 
and C as long as C does the work to create the A and B that E also needs.  If one reviews the graph 
of such a system (with the following rules:  A + B " A + B + C, A + B " A + B + E, C " A + C, 
C " B + C) it turns out to be a teleological system wherein A, B, C, and E are all able to persist, 
despite E not providing anything for the others. 
The upshot of all this discussion of the way commercial relationships operate at various 
levels, from the genome up to the ecosystem (and the actual economy), is that we can view our 
organizational graphs in two different ways.  One of those ways is to make assumptions about which 
products or byproducts produced by other identities may be “freely available” in the environment 
and then, based on those assumptions, graph just the identity in which we are interested.  The other 
way is that we can include two (or more) identities in the same graph and specify their coupling in 
terms of the ways the organizational contents of each affect the other.  If we take this latter 
approach, we should be able to see which kinds of relationships might produce joint identities and 
which might not. 
Although I am not prepared to spend the time drawing out in full detail how our abstract 
graphs might support analogs of each of the biological capacities of mutualism, commensalism, and 
parasitism, it looks as if such analyses will be rather straightforward.  We have just done part of that 
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analysis (not to mention that we also began to look at some of the variety in couplings between 
potential identities when we graphed Eigen’s hypercycles in the latter part of Chapter IX).  I am 
hopeful that a deeper exploration of the various possible couplings between identities, in terms of 
the arithmetic operations that may combine or extend graphs, might be able to explain the spectrum 
of symbiotic relationships from mutual to parasitic.  And that analysis may also be able to explain 
how those relationships may come to be obligate or facultative, permanent or temporary, and cooperative or 
competitive, not to mention the ways that multiple identities may even overlap and share physical 
parts—each using the same machinery for their own needs in the same or different ways.  Analyzing 
graphs of the relationships between identities in this manner may help us use those graphs to 
account for many of the complex ways that the underlying notions of vitality, identity, and value 
come to be expressed throughout numerous levels of the biological and economic worlds.   
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C. Chance and Other Conditions 
 
Chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, only chance, absolute but 
blind liberty is at the root of the prodigious edifice that is evolution... It today is the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only 
one that squares with observed and tested fact. 
 
—Jacques Monod (1971) 
 
Another thing worth exploring in future work will be the role that chance plays in the 
organization of systems.  A system, as I’ve described them, is a temporary definition.  It is a 
summary of the larger organizational patterns that might emerge from the causal relationships 
between various possible sets of organizational parts.  But as an environment shifts and changes, 
system definitions change with them, and so, too, do the identities in those systems.  It will be no 
small feat to try to understand what kinds of useful generalizations one might be able to make from 
this.  
Not only this, but a system definition, specified only in terms of organizational content, is 
not enough to predict the behavior of material in a system.  In order to get micelles to 
spontaneously organize, for instance, we require not just the right parts (the surfactants along with 
the solvent that attracts one of their ends), but also the right concentrations of those parts in the 
solution, and the right temperature and pressure for the system and so on (van Doren 2007).  
Chemical systems in general require energetic conditions that go beyond the potential in the 
reactants in order to proceed.  For example, temperature is a factor for the catalytic processes that 
contribute to teleological systems too.  Most real biological enzymes work only in a quite narrow 
range of temperatures.  In humans that range is around 37ºC, plus or minus a few degrees.  The 
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physiological phenomenon of fever is so dangerous to us because, when our body temperature lies 
outside the effective range for the many enzymatic processes in our cells, the functional behaviors of 
many of those parts just don’t work, and our autopoietic systems can no longer operate.  So, in a 
system where the organizational relationships for a particular teleological identity are right, other 
conditions may still not be right and the teleological identity will never be actualized. 
Perhaps all that this means is that the nodes in our systems need to be made more 
complex—they need to represent more about the causal interactions between parts—in order that 
we can say more about what really accounts for the transitions between them.  I would be pleased to 
see if someone can discover a way to do just that.  But it is not an easy job.  Of course, were we to 
take up the task, I would find it crucial to respect the notion of redundancy that underlies 
persistence against braising, in order to retain the underpinnings for identity and value in our 
method of analysis. 
Another issue that this discussion of further conditions brings to mind is that of how a 
teleological identity might come to exist in the first place.  If these little eddies in the causal fabric of 
material order work so hard in order to buy themselves more time, yet inevitably may succumb to 
braising—if life is inherently so risky—then what causes them to form in the first place?  From 
where do they come? 
I think the largest part of the answer here is that we need to look beyond the theory of 
teleology, to the theory of evolution by descent with modification.  As I said in Chapter V:  natural 
selection does not make things teleological (that status, I claim, exists thanks to the Kantian structure 
of those things), but natural selection does make teleological things.  It has the power to take existing 
teleological systems (replicators, especially) and modify them (by chance) providing the opportunity 
for some of those modifications to also exist as viable teleological systems (while others disintegrate 
into ontological nonce).   
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D. Organization, More Broadly 
 
Who could foresee the organization of living beings, if the cellulose, which is right, should become left, if the left 
albumen of the blood should become right?  There are here mysteries which prepare immense labours for the future, and 
from this hour invite the most serious meditations in science. 
 
—Louis Pasteur (1860) 
 
Localization of function is the law of all organization whatever: separateness of duty is universally accompanied with 
separateness of structure: and it would be marvelous were an exception to exist in the cerebral hemispheres. 
 
—Herbert Spencer (1855) 
 
The quotes from Pasteur and Spencer, about molecular chirality and the functional correlates 
of mental processes in the brain, remind us that organization is not always just the presence of 
organizational parts with some likelihoods of interaction.  Organization is often a more complicated 
arrangement of spatial, structural relationships; it doesn’t depend only on what parts there are, but 
also on where they are and just how they might interact with one another.  While the theory we’ve 
analyzed discusses “organization” at one level, there seems to be another level at which the 
organization of a system needs still to be addressed.   
This is the problem that vexes me most about the theory put together in this dissertation:  It 
is clear that an autocatalytic set and other such diffusively interacting chemical systems may be 
interpreted straightforwardly by the kinds of organizational graphs we have looked at, but it is not 
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clear how more complex organization may fit the same mold, in order to justify the leap from the 
abstract model (that is strongly analogous to biology) to a true account of biological behavior.348 
I dearly hope this problem is not insoluble, but unsuccessfully pondering it in search of a 
solution has troubled me greatly in the years since first developing the graphical approach to 
organizational redundancy. 
The two paths that I think most likely to bear fruit in resolving this concern are either a 
richer understanding of the complexity that can be modeled by graphs such as those at which we 
have been looking, or a richer interpretation of the ways the contents of nodes in our graphs are able 
to influence one another. In the first case, I imagine that perhaps a sufficiently complex graph of the 
possible states of a system can model the parts of a system as well as their arrangements.  I have, 
however, struggled to find a way to see our graphs as operating in such a manner.  In the second 
case, I imagine a new interpretation of our nodes, in terms of both the parts that make up a structure 
and their spatial relationships, might allow us to specify the transitions between those nodes more 
carefully.  This seems more tractable and comprehensible to me; however, I have still struggled to 
find a way to simply model all the details within a node, in order to realize an improved graphical 
method.  In either case, it is clear that some additional theory of organization is required in order to 
make full sense of the ways the parts of systems interact and in order to bring this theory closer to a 
complete account of biological reality. 
In spite of this vexing problem, I would like to point out the reason it is worth holding out 
hope:  The theory, if it can be drawn out into something more than its current abstract version, 
presents us with an internally consistent and logically satisfying solution to a series—or network—of 
even more vexing philosophical problems.  For that reason, I think that whatever form an eventual 
																																																								
348 By the way, it should be noted, that this problem is not a problem for Agmon et al., as described above; their work is 
an actual functional model of autopoiesis with all the necessary organization built right into the model. 
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complete theory of these topics takes will need to preserve the roots that I’ve developed here, 
regarding the notions of redundancy and organizational identicality.   
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E. Function Theories 
 
In every context where functional talk is appropriate, one has also to do with the goals of some goal-directed system. 
 
—Christopher Boorse (1976) 
 
I suggested in Chapter V that, were each of the six main theories of function to make some 
adjustments and concessions, they might all come to converge on a unified story that somewhat 
resembles each one of those theories and that, more importantly, accounts for most of the 
observations that drove theorists to each of them.  The concessions to be made in some cases turn 
out to be large but, in the context of what we have seen in the second part of the dissertation, and in 
the context of what is gained by such concessions, I think the amendments to the theories are 
justifiable.  I will make some proposals now, beginning with the most obvious cases. 
Functioning that is a causal contribution to the persistence of a teleological identity is almost 
literally what Christopher Boorse had in mind with his Goal Contribution analysis.  The major 
difference being that Boorse intended his theory to be one of both strong and weak function 
statements—both (“has a”-style) proper functions and (“serves a”-style) functioning—while the 
current theory abjures the former and only directly addresses the latter.  If Boorse recognizes—as he 
seems almost to do—that strong function statements are a product of the illusion of function 
constancy, and if he relinquishes the cybernetic theory of goals (which I think he is prepared to do, 
given a suitable alternative) and if he instead accepts my new theory of what makes for goal-
directedness (which I cannot say if he would be prepared to do; but he might), then his theory of 
functions would seem to account for all functioning (as it already did), yet it would be given in terms 
that are no longer so vaguely defined.  There is much work that would still have to be done to show 
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how the numerous examples and counterexamples of a conceptual analysis might hold up to this 
version of Boorse’s theory, but I remain optimistic that his previous work could be amended to 
show how that might be done in order to account primarily for a central sense of the concept of 
functioning in terms of direct or indirect causal contributions to the persistence of a teleological 
identity, and then for a series of more peripheral senses of functioning that are metaphorical 
extensions of that central sense.  One significant theoretical piece that would need to be worked out 
to make this work is the way in which psychological goals derive from biological teleology.  The 
solution I propose is that the brain is a heuristic device meant, like any other organ, to help an 
organism achieve its biological goals.  Psychological goals are attempts made in that direction.  Some 
of those attempts succeed, some don’t; and sometimes the system becomes hijacked and instead 
serves the goals of some other identity that gains control over it. 
The same theory of functioning that I hope would satisfy Boorse is also closely aligned with 
Mark Bedau’s Valuable Effects analysis.  Simply put, to make a causal contribution to the persistence 
of a teleological identity is to have a valuable effect on that identity.  Bedau would have to relinquish 
his commitment to the function–accident distinction, and he would have to put his distinction 
between grade-two and grade-three teleology (mirroring the distinction between biological and 
psychological goal-directedness) in different terms (here again I have in mind the idea, mentioned 
above, that psychological goal-directedness derives from the way minds heuristically, and fallibly, serve 
biological functions).  But if Bedau did so, and if he accepted our new account of how value arises 
naturally from the persistence of organizational identities, then he may be able to retain the claim 
that value lies at the fundamental core of the notion of teleology (and functioning) and still account 
for most or all of the functioning we observe, while no longer being committed to a nonspecific 
notion of value.  Again, I think quite a bit of work is required to make it clear how this would all 
occur, and it is not yet clear that Bedau himself would want to make those concessions, but I remain 
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optimistic that an account of functional items in terms of their valuable effects upon teleological 
systems may one day be possible. 
Before moving on to the three popular theories of function, we can also review Mayr’s 
Programmed Effects analysis.  Although Mayr’s analysis performed poorly with respect to 
counterexamples earlier, I felt there was an important kernel of truth in his, admittedly vague, notion 
of programming.  We can try to fish out that kernel now.  His tentative definition of programming 
as “coded or prearranged information that controls a process (or behavior) leading it toward a given 
end” (Mayr 1992) could be interpreted to mean that it is the organizational relationships between the 
parts within an item that make that item and its parts functional.  And this interpretation might be 
seen as aligning fairly closely with the notion of teleological identities that we have been discussing.  
If the various states of an identity are thought of as containing different versions of the same “code” 
in the causal proclivities of their organizational potential (the same way the different versions of a 
multiquine do) then Mayr’s idea of functional, teleonomic systems having programmed effects is a 
bit more coherent than I had previously analyzed.  The organizational potential in the identity can be 
thought of as the prearranged information that controls the processes and behaviors of the system 
that continually guide it in the pursuit of persistence (the “given end”).  This is still not a very clear 
interpretation of “programming”, and I don’t want to defend it strongly, but it does provide a way 
to generally understand Mayr’s intuition. 
We can review the three popular theories now.  When we first looked at the Causal Role 
analysis, I used an accounting of examples to stress that the analysis seemed to reliably, but silently, 
require teleological systems as the ultimate context for the causal roles that justify function 
attributions (and that all the causal roles that we don’t consider functional occur in the absence of 
teleological systems).  Cummins and other CR theorists expressed their ideas in staunchly anti-
teleological terms because of their conviction that the normativity of teleology is in direct 
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contradiction with their materialist beliefs.  I agree with their materialism, but I think the theory of 
teleology and normativity that I’ve developed is in fact fully naturalistic, and so I would implore 
Cummins, Davies, and any other CR analysts to reconsider that there may in fact be a source for the 
“norms of nature”—a single concession that would allow their causal role theory to otherwise make 
perfect sense. 
When we looked at the Selected Effects theory of functions, I was impressed with the fact 
that these theorists, in contrast to the CR theorists, were committed to accounting for the normative 
nature of functioning.  I think that commitment was the core truth in the search that found the SE 
theorists arriving at the comparative, historical norms of natural selection.  To those theorist’s eyes, 
history appeared to be the only available norm by which to ground our observation that biologically 
functioning items ought to do whatever it is they do that we consider to be the function of that item.  
However, I didn’t find those comparative norms satisfying; they seemed to me, for many reasons, to 
be inappropriately normative in accounting for functioning.  Perhaps the foremost of those reasons 
was that historical norms force us to choose between believing in functions that are causally 
irrelevant and believing in some kind of historically granted residue such as a functino.  In light of a 
theory of an emergent kind of evaluative normativity, however, I think those theorists who are 
committed to the normative nature of functioning might be able to back up and think about 
whether these norms can do the job better than historical norms and still make sense of not just why 
a thing may be functional, but also the question of “why is it there?”  The answer I would give to 
that question is that functional items are there, in the functional sense of the question, because they are 
components of systems that work to produce themselves, regardless of whether selection has 
worked to alter them.  (Many of them are also there in part because of selection—but that is a 
different sense of the question.)  In the case of the SE analysis, I think the concession to be made to 
align with the theory of teleology would be larger than in most cases.  One would have to generally 
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abandon many of the details of the SE theory, and hold on only to the driving factors for which that 
theory was established.  That may be too big a leap to ask its proponents to make.  But I believe if 
Millikan, for instance, were to take such a leap, she could still ground her biosemantics (her theory 
of meaning in biological systems) in the notions of functioning and its contribution to goal-
directedness.  While the details of making the theoretical adjustments clear would take a significant 
amount of work, I expect the payoff to be worthwhile.    
Lastly, we can look at the Replication Dispositions analysis of function, which I suggested 
earlier would turn out to be very close to the theory of functioning in terms of teleological systems.  
The traditional replication dispositions analysis was given in two primary forms, one of which took 
functioning to be a causal contribution to the disposition to replicate and the other of which took it 
to be a contribution to the maintenance of an autopoietic system.  The theory in terms of 
teleological systems agrees with both, because at an abstract level both replicators and autopoietic 
systems are forms of persistors that maintain their organizational redundancy.  And so the update I 
would propose to the RD analysis would be simply to join its two branches, thereby framing 
functioning as a contribution to the disposition of an identity to persist.  If earlier RD theorists were 
to concede that dispositions toward either replication or self-replication (autopoiesis) can ground 
functioning, and if they were to loosen their account and also admit indirect contributions—such as 
those made by artifacts, then I think they could work to eventually find their theory accounts for the 
majority of central cases of functioning, now including the counterexamples that their theory 
previously struggled with.   
Ultimately, I think a lot of work still remains to be done to clearly understand the concept of 
functioning and the shape of the conceptual halo that characterizes it.  But it seems clear to me that 
a theory of teleological systems that produces a natural source of normativity should deeply affect 
the assumptions of the prior six function theories and incentivize making some revisions to each.  
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F. Reaching the Goal? 
 
Teleology is not the antithesis of causality, but subordinate to it.  It is, of course, inadmissible to consider “final causes” 
as implying that an object or end is capable of having effect.  No event that has not yet taken place can possibly act.  
But results are caused by the keeping of the end in view, and it is in this way that the final becomes an 
efficient cause.  These final efficient causes are not in the slightest degree metaphysical, for they derive 
from organic matter. 
 
—Hans Driesch (1914, emphasis added) 
 
Earlier, I attempted to set some standards of achievement—in the form of my twenty 
questions—that I suggested should apply not only to the theoretical work here, but also to any 
future work in the same vein.  The idea is simply that we can gain some initial confidence that a 
theory is on the right track if it demonstrates a moderate degree of explanatory completeness with 
regard to teleological phenomena, including both of the main streams of teleological observation—
that of goal-directedness and that of function.  If we find the fairly concise terms of our new theory 
to have broad explanatory power, then we should find ourselves at least tempted to unbox that 
theory further and see what else its pieces might be able to do for us and how we may be able to 
develop it further.  As it turns out, we will have to leave the bulk of that unboxing to future work, 
but for now we can measure up what we’ve got so far by seeing how it performs in answering the 
twenty questions.  I apologize in advance, because I find it best to address these questions out of the 
numerical order in which I had previously put them.   
The first three questions inquired into the nature of teleology, identity, and value, and the 
fourth question asked how we may clearly draw a line between teleologically organized systems and 
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other systems that may have some similarly lifelike properties (such as the growth, healing, and 
metabolism that we find in spontaneously organized systems).  I hope it is obvious at this point that 
the abstract theory I’ve given is a direct attempt to answer each of those questions.  Again,  
 
(i) an identity is a set of states of a system that all contain the same organizational 
potential—that is, they can transform into one another freely;   
(ii) persistence is good for an identity and so things that have (subjective, relative) value are 
things that contribute to the persistence of an identity; 
(iii) teleology occurs whenever some identity is able to provide value to itself—whenever a 
system that contains redundant organizational potential is able to work towards increasing its 
own organizational redundancy and thereby work against the environment of braising that 
has the tendency to reduce organizational redundancy; and 
(iv) this can be put in contrast with spontaneously organizing systems, which are those that 
also sometimes grow, heal, or replicate, but do so purely through the machinations of 
environmentally present organizational contents, rather than the internal machinations of the 
very patterns that are growing, healing and replicating.   
 
Systems that are teleologically organized are a subset of those dissipative systems that metabolize 
free energy to construct their patterns, and they are a subset of those systems that display 
perseverance and plasticity. 
The fifth question asked what life itself is.  And again, I think it straightforward to say that 
while our theory of teleological organization is in no way a detailed theory of cell-biological life, it 
does constitute a theory of vitalistic processes more broadly, and so, while much work remains to be 
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done, it can nonetheless be seen as abstractly encompassing not only cell-biological life but also 
other potential prebiotic or abiotic forms of vitalistic, teleological organization.   
We can jump ahead now to the last seven questions (numbered fourteen through twenty), 
each of which asked whether a new theory of teleology could help us understand why some central 
aspect of an older function theory seemed to be so well correlated with items that function as to 
convince a theorist to propose a theory in terms of that aspect.  The answers to the first six of these 
questions were addressed, in part, in the previous subsection, and there is no need to repeat those 
thoughts here.   I don’t think the answers I gave there are yet entirely satisfying, but I remain 
optimistic that, with more time and thought, the details may be worked out.  The fact that Millikan 
(1984) saw reproductively established families as being the locus of the norms that cause functionality 
(question 20) is accounted for by the fact that goal-directed systems are, generally, reproducing 
items. 
The discussion of those function theories above also provides some approximate answers to 
question seven (“what is a function?”) and questions twelve (“can we account for accidental 
functioning?”) and thirteen (“how can we reform our concept of functioning?”).  The reformative 
aspect here is accounted for by the argument I gave in Part I that there are no proper functions 
(TDHF) and that we need to account only for functioning.  Under that perspective, the question 
“what is a function?” is then replaced with “what is functioning?”, which we can answer pretty much 
in the way Christopher Boorse has done.  This makes it easy to account for accidental functioning 
too, because an item that happens to help a persistor persist for a bit longer than it otherwise would 
is, for that moment, serving a function.   
There are now five questions remaining—numbers six, eight, nine, ten and eleven. I’ll try to 
quickly answer the last three of those first, and then we can finish up with the other two, which are 
more interesting.  The function statements found in the list on pp. 205-207 (question nine) are 
	 631	
generally accounted for by a theory of (verb-) functioning.  Things that serve a function (FS10, 
FS11, F13, FS14, FS16, FS20) are directly accounted for; things that have a function (statements FS1 
through FS9, FS15) only seem to have their functions because either they regularly serve functions 
or they are usually thought of only in terms of the functions that they may potentially serve; and the 
unusual function statements such as FS17 through FS19, are cases in which we have stretched the 
meaning of the term, either by conceiving of the functional item in a teleological context (FS18, 
FS19) or otherwise extending the conceptual halo of the term by analogy (FS17) (see Hofstadter and 
FARG 1995; Hofstadter and Sander 2013).  
The many senses of “for” (question ten) can be unified under the view that ultimately being 
for something means being good for some teleological identity.  In each case of being designed for, 
being used for, being meant for, and so on, we can trace the meaning of “for” back to the 
contribution of value to a teleological identity, in one manner or another. 
Design (question eleven) can be thought of as any process that contributes to the 
construction of a thing that is able to function.  The process is often—and probably best—
performed by the hill-climbing procedure that Dennett (1995) calls “generate and test”.  But some 
things might become designed by just a single iteration of the process—one attempt at generation 
that produces a successful model.  What ultimately matters is whether the item eventually comes to 
be functional.  In some cases things might be poorly designed, and in other cases design-efforts may 
fail to produce anything functional, but when something is eventually determined to actually be able 
to function in providing some value to a goal-directed agent in some way, then the thing has been 
successfully designed.  (Of course a designed item may never actually serve a function, but at least it 
is able to.) 
We can look at our last two questions now.  Question number six asked how we might 
address the problem of backwards causation.  I take it that the seeming causal paradox that teleology 
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raises (whereby a thing in the future—a goal state or event—seems to be a partial cause of 
something in the present or past) is clearly resolved by the circular logic of teleology.  Rather than 
avoid backwards causation, we can embrace it.  As Driesch put it in the epigraph to this section, 
results are caused by the keeping of the end in view.  Of course, we already recognize that this is true in our 
own human goals, wherein the process of striving toward a psychological goal is caused by our 
mental representation of an end state, rather than by the unrealized end state itself.  But in biological 
goal-directed systems, results—future states of the system—can also be said to be caused by keeping 
the end in view, just as long as one understands that the potential organization for future states is built 
into the current state.  There is a Q that’s in P, and there is a P in the Q that’s in P.  Since every state 
of an identity is organizationally identical, every state of a teleological system contains a representation of 
the system’s intended future.  For an identity, there is a sense in which past, present, and future are all the 
same, and so the goal of persistence is always tacitly kept in view.  The goal is represented (non-
psychologically) by the identity itself, for as long as it persists.   
A few lines up, I used the word “intended”, in the teleological sense in which an intention is 
an aim towards a goal.  But I would like the reader to also take note, here, of the relationship to the 
philosopher’s notion of intentionality, which is synonymous with the terms “meaning” or 
“aboutness”.   When we talk about a goal being represented within the organizational potential of a 
system, that organizational potential comes to be quite literally about the future, and about the goal.  
The sense in which the potential encoded in an organizational identity is about the future is, I claim, 
the proto-intentional foundation upon which anything may come to be about anything.  It is the 
foundation for the minimally cognitive behaviors of all simple living systems, and the eventual 
foundation for the ways in which the intentionality in minds comes to serve the goals of the 
complex communities of persistors that use those minds. 
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Our eighth, and now final, question had to do with whether teleology can provide for the 
autonomy of biology among the sciences.  When introducing the notion of the autonomy of biology 
in Chapter IV, I already hinted at my answer to this question.  I believe that there are three 
astonishing and fundamentally irreducible biological phenomena:  first that there are living things, 
second that there is such a diversity of living things, and third that the diversity of living things are 
so well adapted to their environments.  The second and third are both explained in some way by 
natural selection.  If we divide natural selection along the lines that McShea and Brandon (2012) do, 
we can see that random, diffusive, genetic drift can begin to account for the diversity of living 
things, while selection can account for the rest and, at the same time selection can also account for 
the commonly found adaptedness of those diverse living things.  I contend that a theory of goal-
directedness—be it the theory I am offering now or some improved or alternative version of it—will 
be able to account for the first phenomenon, the existence of living things.  A theory of teleology 
accounts for the characteristics that are central to life—namely striving, agency, projectivity, and 
vitality.  At the same time, the particular theory of teleology that we have been looking at rules out 
older conceptions of vitality, such as those based in metabolism, reproduction and arbitrary 
boundaries such as cell walls, firstly by showing how to distinguish between teleological systems and 
spontaneous systems and, secondly, by abstracting the generic, cyclical, Kantian causality of 
teleological systems away from the specific metabolism–membrane autocausality that we find in cell-
biological life. 
If I am right in all this . . . and I understand it is not yet easy to measure whether I am, then 
those who find the functional nature of biological phenomena to be irreducible (e.g. Laubichler 
1999) are close enough to right, and the biological reductionists are just wrong.  I think that 
existence as a teleological system is the most basic property that accounts for the vitality we see in 
living things, and it is precisely what makes them alive.  And since this property is emergent from a 
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certain kind of organization amongst causal relationships, it does not have its basis directly in the 
physical and chemical parts from which those teleological systems may be made.  Teleology is truly 
an irreducible law of life, logically prior to both drift and selection, and thus a fair contender for the 
position of Biology’s First Law. 
So there are our twenty questions.  On balance, I think I have given some kind of answer to 
each of them, but I don’t think I have yet fully and satisfyingly addressed all of them.  I have made 
strong progress towards some, and more impressionistic progress towards others.  Although the 
results so far are inconclusive, I am encouraged to think it worth pursuing this line for two reasons.  
First, the majority of that inconclusiveness just calls out for more work; there are ways in which 
further progress might be made towards answering each of these questions within the current 
framework.  And second, it is satisfying to imagine that such a diverse set of historically vexing 
questions might all be answered by a single, relatively uncomplicated, theoretical model.  For all its 
incompletions, I contend that the modern theory of teleology, the main pieces of which have been 
around for fifty years but which have now been integrated into a fairly cohesive story, is able to 
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